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with regard to the provisions of the law. He agreed with ths minister, that to over calculate the expense of the year would be disadvantageous to the public. He agreed, too, that the very best system was, to make the estimate as great and the extraordinaries as little as possible. Upon that point he had often complained before, and he complained then, that the minister had not done his utmost. An evident instance in the case of the barracks presented itself. The minister himself had said, that it would have been more regular to have given to the House of Commons an account of them in the first instance; and yet those ministers who pleaded guilty in the instance of barracks, told the House that in every other instance they had done better than their predecessors.

Having said this, he must observe upon the general outline of the subject before the House, that, in his opinion, a vote of cre lit was better than extraordinaries; first, because you provide in the former for the interest of the debt you incur; secondly, you do not, by a vote of credit, disobey a positive act of parliament, in complying with such vote. He must again desire to know, whether extraordinaries might not be voted immediately after they were incurred when parliament were sitting? What advantages were there to be expected, in a financial point of view, to say nothing of the principle, if extraordinaries incurred this day were to be voted immediately by the House? How stood the case, when compared with the clothing of the army, which was required by law? He wished to know why the minister did not provide for them at once, if necessary, by a vote of credit? The right hon. gentleman said that his votes of credit bore a greater proportion to the expense than in former wars, and yet he would defray expenses of this year out of money voted in the last. He would ask, why the vote of credit ought not to be increased, rather than the service of last year should be unpaid? The right hon. gentleman had stated a number of suppositions. He said he could not know the extent of the estimates of the service altogether, or the time they would each of them occur. Certainly. He said also, he could not estimate when the supplies would come in; the most certain in that respect were, the land and malt; another was the case of the exchequer bills; and most of all, was the period when the loan

was to be paid. Granted. But, what occasion had they to suppose when they were talking of facts? One loan came in so early last year, that it was argued that a possible inconvenience might arise from the circumstance; that the loan might come in before they had use for it; and that it would be lying dead upon our hands, while they were paying the interest first. At this very period, ministers were proceeding in direct disobedience to the act of parliament, and they were scandalously in arrear to the army. Then he would say again, the minister had no occasion to have recourse to supposition while he was furnished with facts upon the subject.

With respect to this year, nine million had already been expended in the army. He would leave the House to judge what they were likely to do next year. As to the question, what was the blame of the executive government? He would say there was much indeed, under all the circumstances, in the disobedience of the law, in their proceeding without informing the House of what they were doing, and what was the situation of the country. Had he then any difficulty in saying that this was a great misdemeanor on the part of administration, and one that called for the public judgment? Most certainly he had not. It seemed, however, that the right hon. gentleman thought of securing himself by precedent. The right hon. gentleman had heard of the case of the earl of Macclesfield, who, in many respects, was a worthy character. But how stood the case upon the trial of that nobleman? What was said by the wisest men of that day upon that occasion? That precedent of similar conduct in others ought not to prevent the pronouncing of judgment upon guilt; he would therefore say, that although precedent might be pleaded to prevent a rigorous judgment, yet it was no justification of the breach of the law. On the Paymasters' act, he would say no excuse could be offered, for there was no precedent for its breach. It was an act of parliament recently made after full consideration of the subject; an act which all men were bound to obey, and the minister more than any other, on account of the share he took in framing of it. The minister had, however, wilfully, wittingly, wantonly, and unnecessarily, disobeyed it; and he could not help saying, that administration, by such con

duct, had made the act a sheet of waste paper. He defied any man to show what the act was good for, if the minister's defence was just. The minister said it was inapplicable to a time of peace. This should have been stated to the House long ago. If that was really the feeling which the minister had upon the subject. He would again repeat, and he was sorry to be obliged to repeat, that ministers had knowingly, wittingly, wilfully, and according to their own statement, unnecessarily, set this act aside, and made it a sheet of waste paper. Heartily agreeing with his hon. friend, in all the facts he had stated, he should most cordially vote for the motion.

Mr. Steele having moved, "That the other orders of the day be now read," the House divided:

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So it was resolved in the affirmative.

which I particularly allude, is the negotiation at Basle, and the notice which has been given of the negotiation with foreign powers. As I shall have occasion to comment upon this transaction more fully hereafter, I shall only say at present, that notwithstanding all the applauses that have been bestowed upon it, the result cannot fail to draw the attention of every thinking man to the present posture of public affairs; it must call the attention of every man who is not determined to act blindly (a description of persons, of which I hope there are none in this House), to the situation of the country, and that line of conduct which the govern. ment ought to follow. For one thing that we have learned is, whether ministers have acted wisely or not (no matter which for our present purpose), that we have no immediate prospect of peace. It signifies but little, whether the obstacle 209 may have arisen from the unreasonable demands of the enemy, or the mismanage ment of his majesty's ministers; but of this we are assured, that we have no prospect of peace), an event much to be lamented, but more especially in the present circumstances of the country), and that it is not in the power of those who are entrusted with the administration of public affairs to obtain terms from the enemy, which they dare to offer to the nation. Whatever may be our opinions of the causes which have led to this situation, we must all be agreed as to the effect; and none, I presume, will dispute that our situation is worse than it was at the period when, either by conquest or concession, we had a prospect of approaching peace.

38

Debate on Mr. Fox's Motion respecting the Conduct of the War with France.] May 10. Mr. Fox rose and addressed the House to the following effects :-It having fallen to my lot, Sir, both at the commencement, and in the course of the war, to trouble the House with several motions which have not been honoured with their concurrence, and having last session proposed an inquiry into the state of the nation, to which the House did not think proper to assent, it may be thought by some, perhaps, to be rather presumptuous in me, again to call their attention to the same subject. And I confess that if some events hadnot occurred during the last year, rather singular in their nature, I should have, however reluctantly, acquiesced in the former decisions of the House, after having entered my solemn protest against the plans that were adopted, and avowed my strong and complete disapprobation of the whole system of measures that has been pursued. There certainly, however, have happened, during the last year, some events, which must, in no inconsiderable degree, have tended to alter the sentiments of those with whom I had the misfortune to differ, as well as to strengthen and confirm the former opinions of those with whom I have the honour to agree. The event of great importance, and to

Having stated this point, upon which there can be no difference of opinion, I shall go into a detail of those circumstances which, in my mind, have reduced us to the situation in which we are now placed. I know the language which has been held by the executive government on former occasions of a similar nature, and the language which may be used by the executive government on the present, because it is its interest to use it, is, that it is not our business to inquire into the causes of the evil, but into the best mode of remedy. If these could be separated, I admit that the conclusion would be just, but as long as man remains the same, I contend that there is no mode of extricating ourselves from danger, but by retracing the circumstances by which we

have been involved in the difficulties of When he observed the conduct and the which we complain. The first thing then fate of the Athenians, and compared their to be done, is, to take an impartial review calamities with the mismanagement of their of past events, which have led to the rulers, this mismanagement so far from situation in which we now stand, that being a cause of despair, he directly stated the country may be enabled to take steps as a ground of hope. "If," said he, to extricate itself from the situation into "they had fallen into these misfortunes which it has fallen. I shall, therefore, by the course of natural and irremediable rather look retrospectively than prospec- causes, then, indeed, there would be tively, and in that retrospect I shall not reason for despair; if, on the contrary, go farther back than the American war. they are the fruits of folly and misconduct, Most members present will recollect the it may be possible, by wisdom and prucalamities which befel us in that contest, dence, to repair the evil." In the same and also the terms of peace which in the manner I would argue on the present end we were constrained to make; terms occasion. Had we not fallen into our which I shall not argue at present, present situation, from plans ill formed whether it was or was not for the ad- and worse executed; if every minister had vantage of the country to accept, in the been wise, and every enterprise ably circumstances in which it was then placed. executed, then, indeed, our state would Many will also recollect the discussions have been truly deplorable. But if our which took place in the course of that policy has been erroneous and our meawar, and the constant argument which on sures ill conducted, we may still entertain all occasions was pressed from the minis- some hope, because our errors may be terial side of the House, that we ought corrected, and the losses from our misto look not retrospectively but prospec- conduct retrieved. I have often had tively; that when the House was on occasion to employ this argument, and I fire, the question was not how the fire know it has been said in reply, that the was kindled, but how it could be most argument is good when carried to an exspeedily and effectually extinguished. treme, but that the natural imperfection The argument which we opposed to common to every man renders it inconthat was one founded upon solid prin- clusive in any other case. But when the ciples, and one which the House listened misconduct was of such a nature as to be to at last; that a consideration of past capable of being remedied, when the miserrors would lead to future amend management was such as ought to be ment, and that a change of measures avoided, it showed that the argument was would lead to a change of circumstances. true in a degree, as well as true in the And I appeal to fact, whether the truth of extreme. This I state as a motive against this argument was not confirmed by expe- despair; and I contend, that upon the rience. As long as we declined going face of the thing, when we compare the into a retrospective inquiry, the war con- situation to which we are now reduced, tinued, and our misfortunes increased; with that which we held four years ago, but from the moment that the House there is ground for presumption, that the adopted a resolution to inquire into its change has been in a great measure owing past errors, measures were put into a train to errors in the conduct of those who by which peace was obtained, and the have had the management of public affairs. national prosperity restored. In a survey of the past, the period to which we are naturally apt to recur, is the period of the commencement of the war. If we could consider in one debate every particular of the external and internal situation of the country, and more especially the effect which the measures that have been adopted have had on its constitution, we might go farther back; but this would involve a detail too extensive for the discussion of a single night, a field too large for the capacity of the speaker.

Before we go into particular inquiries, let us first examine whether erroneous maxims of policy have not been adopted, and whether the principles which have been acted upon are not fundamentally wrong. There is an argument, which has been used by an ancient orator, the greaest orator that perhaps the world ever saw, which, in my opinion, is not inapplicable to the present situation of this country. Demosthenes uses this brilliant, and, in my opinion, no less solid than brilliant argument, in the introduction to one of his noblest orations.

I shall begin, Sir, with the opening of the budget in 1792, when a most splendid

display of the situation of the country | I so far agree, therefore, with the opinion was given by the minister, without al- of ministers, that instead of the country luding to any prior or subsequent state- being in danger from the french revoment; and I take that day because it lution, there were no circumstances atwas a day on which this statement was tending it, which rendered the continumore to his own satisfaction, and more to ance of peace more uncertain than it was the satisfaction of the House than at any before it happened. It may be said, that other period. In the year 1792, three at that time France was professing pacific years after the french revolution, the views. I have so often seen these prominister came forward with his boasted fessions made by the most ambitious and triumphant description of the state powers, in the very moment when they of the country, of the prosperity of our were thirsting most for aggrendisement, commerce, of the improvement of our that I repose little faith in them; so little manufactures, of the extent of our indeed, that I cannot believe that the revenue, and the prospect of permanent pacific views of ministers were founded peace. He then admitted that fifteen upon these professions which were made years peace was, perhaps, rather too much by the french. But at that very time to expect, but he said that we had as France was either engaged in actual hosrational hopes of the continuance of tran- tilities with Austria, or on the point of quillity as ever had existed in the history commencing hostilities. War was either of modern times. Then-full two years begun, or there was a moral certainty and a half (I wish to speak within that it would take place. compass) after the first revolution in France, after the time that the king had been compelled to return to Paris, that the national assembly had annihilated the titles and destroyed the feudal tenures of the nobility; had confiscated the lands belonging to the church, banished part of the clergy, and compelled those who remained to take an oath contrary, in many instances, to the dictates of their conscience; then, I say, it was, that this prospect of fifteen years' peace was held out to the country. It was after the king of France had been made, as was said at the time, to stand in a splendid pillory, on the 14th July, that this expectation of lasting tranquillity was raised. So that I have a right to conclude, that in the opinion of the king's ministers, the annihilation of the titles of the nobility, and the degradation of the order, the exile of the clergy, and the confiscation of the lands of the church; that the invasion of the royal prerogative, and the insults offered to the sovereign, described as they then were by their friends, by the terms pillory and imprisonment (terms which I now repeat, not with any view of courting the favour of those who employed them, but merely to show the light in which those events were considered at the time), not only so little interfered with the system of neutrality which they had adopted, but were in so small a degree connected with the interests of the country, as not to damp the prospect of peace, or even to render the duration of tranquillity for fifteen years very uncertain.

Without stopping to discuss a point, (on which, however, I have no difficulty in my own mind), whether Austria or France was the aggressor, it was sufficient that ministers knew at the time that an aggression had been made on the part of one of those powers. And notwithstanding the defeats which attended the French arms at the outset, it was the general opinion that the Austrian territory was defenceless, and that it would soon be over-run by the enemy's arms. But even then a fifteen years peace was talked of. And I must here state a fact, which though not officially confirmed, rests upon the general belief of Europe, that before hostilities commenced between Austria and France, an insinuation, or rather a communication, was made by England to the latter power, that if they attempted any aggression upon the territories of Holland, which at that time was our ally, we should be obliged to break the neutrality that we had observed, and interfere in the contest. This message has been differently interpreted. Some have put upon it the interpretation which, I think, upon the whole, is the fair one, that it was our policy to take all prudent means of avoiding any part in the war. Others, I know, have put upon it a more invidious construction, and insinuated that our meaning was neither more nor less than this, speaking to the French, "Take you Austria and do with it what you please, but we set up the limits of Holland, beyond which you shall not pass." I state this to show that at that time mi

nisters did not foresee any probable | was possible to carry it, except in that event which might occasion a rupture between this country and France. That this also was the general opinion of the House in the spring of 1792, I need not spend time in convincing them. I shall, however, barely mention a circumstance of a financial nature, which happened near the close of the session, which proves the fact beyond dispute. I mean the measure of funding the 4 per cents. At that time the 3 per cent consols had risen to 95, 96, and even to 97, and it was the opinion of the right hon. the chancellor of the exchequer that they would rise to par; in this conviction, and with a view of a probable saving, he had lost the opportunity of a certain saving to the nation of a perpetual annuity of 240,000l.; a thing of such magnitude, as to prove to the House that at that time the right hon. gentleman had no expectation that the peace was likely to be disturbed, since it induced him to forego the great good which was in his power, in the hope of the trifling addition that might have accrued on the event of the 3 per cents. rising to par. I mention this as a fact subsidiary to the declarations which the minister made at the commencement of that session, and which proved, that to the end of it he continued to entertain the same confidence of peace.

Thus ended the session of 1792. In the course of the summer of that year various events of various kinds took place. The revolution in France of the 10th of August chiefly deserves notice. I shall not now comment upon the nature of that revolution, I shall speak of it merely as a member of the British legislature, and as an event connected with the interests of this country. The great alteration it had produced was the changing the government of France from a monarchy to a republic. I know that these are excellent words, and well adapted, as the history of our country has proved, for enlisting men under opposite standards. But this is not the view in which that revolution is to be considered, as affecting the policy of this country. Let us in the first place consider its influence upon this country in the way of example, and the prevalence which it was likely to give to Jacobin principles throughout Europe. After this country had seen the order of the robility destroyed, and their titles abolished, when it had seen the system of equality carried to as great a length as it

one instance of the existence of a king, I ask those who are fondest of the name of monarchy (I beg not to be understood as speaking in the least disrespectfully of that form of government), whether there was any thing in the monarchy of France previous to the 10th of August which tended to fortify the english monarchy ? Whether there was any thing in the sub. sequent revolution which tended to render it less secure than it was immediately before that event happened, when no danger was apprehended? Whether there be a greater or a less prospect of peace between this country and France since the overthrow of the house of Bourbon than there was before? It is not my disposition to triumph over the distresses of a fallen family; but, considering them as kings of France, as trustees for the happiness of a great nation, and remembering at the same time my old English prejudices, and I may farther add, old English history, can I regret that expulsion as an event unfavourable to the happiness of the people of France, or injurious to the tranquillity of Great Britain? No man who thinks that the former wars of this country against France were just and necessary, can refuse to say that they were provoked by the restless ambition of the house of Bourbon. And can it then be said, that the overthrow of that monarchy was either a cause of alarm or a symptom of danger to Great Britain ?

Lest, however, I should be thought by some to approve more of the conduct of ministers than I really do, I here find it necessary to say a few words by way of explanation. I approve of their sentiments in 1792, in as far as they thought that the French revolution did not afford a sufficient cause for this country involving itself in a war, and I approve of their conduct, in as far as it proceeded upon a determination to adhere to an invariable line of neutrality, provided universal tranquillity could not be preserved. I differ, however, with them upon the means of preserving that neutrality. I think there was a time before the war broke out with Austria, which presented an opportunity for this country to exercise the great and dignified office of a mediator, which would not only have been highly honourable to herself and beneficial to Europe, but an office which she was in some measure called upon to undertake by the events of the preceding

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