were issued to supply the army of the prince of Condé, upon what vote of credit will they naturally suppose the money to have been raised? It must be considered as an unforeseen expense, else it ought not to have been placed to the account of the vote of credit. From what vote of credit, then, is it natural to suppose that an unforeseen expense occurring in December 1795, should be defrayed? One would certainly suppose from the vote of credit for 1795, No such thing. It was defrayed from the vote of credit for 1796. What, then, was the conduct of the right hon. gentleman? In February 1796, he came down to the House, and said, "After all the taxes which I have levied, and all the burdens which I have imposed upon the country, and grievously the people will, no doubt, feel them, they are not sufficient to answer all the exigencies of the state, and I must have credit for two millions and a half more to meet the occurrences of unforeseen services;" not, you will observe, to supply the deficiencies of former estimates, but to be applied expressly for the purpose of answering unexpected, but possible demands. But what does the right hon. gentleman do? The first use he makes of the vote of credit is to pay a remittance of 200,000l. to the prince of Condé's army in December 1796,3 and of which parliament knew nothing. By way of illustration, I shall suppose that a gentleman was leaving his house in town to go to the country, or his house in the country to come to town, and that he called his steward, and gave him a sum of money for the purpose of paying the servants their wages when they became due, and of paying the taxes when they were called for. The steward, we shall suppose, might say, "Sir, all this is very proper, but on an establishment so extensive as yours, many expenses in repairs, charities, &c. may occur for which I am not provided." Well, in consequence of this representation the gentleman gives him 2001. or 300l. more. But what would he think of his steward, if, instead of keeping this 200 or 300l. in reserve for unforeseen exigencies, he applied the sum to the payment of debts which he had formerly contracted, and of which he kept his master ignorant? Not to use any coarser language, he would certainly consider him as a steward who was no longer worthy to be trusted. The analogy holds good in the conduct of the right hon. gentleman

Having laid down this principle, then, and admitted the exception, I hope I shall not be accused of pursuing an argument which would operate as an objection to all extraordinaries. All I contend is this, that they are an evil, but an evil which may sometimes be unavoidable, or in other words, that they are a mischievous exception to the principle of the constitution. The measure now before the House involves two questions: in the first place, Whether it was an expense fit to be incurred; and, secondly, Ought it to have been incurred in the mode in which it actually has been incurred, or to have been previously submitted to the decision of parliament? On the first question, I shall not enter into any discussion. And, after I have guarded the House against considering it as my opinion, I shall suppose on this day, that it was an expense proper to be incurred. With this caveat, then, let it be taken for granted, for the sake of argument, that it was a wise and prudent measure to remit 1,200,000l. to the Emperor; yet we have still this important question to decide-Ought the sum to have been issued in the manner in which it was issued? In the first place, it was not an expense respecting the extent of which we could have been uncertain. Had the remittances been numerous, and the services for which they were destined been of a very complicated nature, it might have been difficult to ascertain with precision the amount of the sum to be granted, but there could be no difficulty in determining the sum which it was proper for this country to grant either to the Emperor or the prince of Condé. I would beg to be informed why, after the country had been in the practice, year after year, ef maintaining emigrant corps, when it was in meditation to send supplies to the army of the prince of Condé, the intention was not communicated to parliament? Or why a precise estimate, which might have been very easily formed of that head of expense, was not submitted to the House along with the other estimates for the year? In the present case, to rank the expense in the class of extraordinaries, was in good truth to go the length of rendering extraordinaries absurd and ridiculous, and all the laws of appropriation nugatory and void. To apply the vote of credit to defraying this expense, was as strange and unconstitutional. When gentlemen are informed, that so early as December 1795, 200,000l.

in applying the vote of credit for defraying expenses formerly incurred, and which he kept secret from parliament. This, Sir, is something, but it is not all. There were some suspicious circumstances in the time and manner in which the vote of credit was applied for. My hon. friend (Mr. Grey), who apprehended something incorrect, I remember well, was accused of being extremely suspicious, though his suspicions were certainly very far from coming near to the reality, if that could be called suspicion, which formerly, in parliamentary language, would have been termed a watch ful jealousy of the conduct of administration. It was matter of surprise to my hon. friend, as well as to myself, that application should be made for a vote of credit at so early a period of the year; and admitting that it could be applied retrospectively, it was certainly not too much to expect that in the disposition paper which was produced in April, some account would have been given of the application of a sum which had actually been employed to cover an expense incurred in the preceding year. No such account, however, was given in that paper. Now, Sir, I ask, what was this but a direct fraud upon the public? Supposing, for argument's sake, that there was a difference between the money sent to the army of the Prince of Condé and the sums sent to the Emperor; though there certainly was no material difference, for it signified little whether we supplied an army which the House of Austria must otherwise have paid and supported, or whether we sent money to the House of Austria to enable it to pay and support that army. I wish gentlemen to attend a little to the debates of the last session, and to the subjects of public discussion. They will recollect that there were several circumstances connected with the loan which attracted attention. There is one circumstance which it is material to recollect; the terms upon which it was raised gave occasion to a good deal of discussion, and they were justified upon several grounds, one of which was, that we were not to consider it merely as a loan; that a quantity of navy debt was to be funded, and that there might be wanted a loan of three millions for the Emperor. From this I certainly inferred, that if a loan was to be given to his imperial majesty, the House of Commons would be consulted, both respecting its

propriety and extent; that ministers never would have taken it upon them to grant pecuniary succours to any foreign power without the consent of parliament; that those who were averse to the measure would have an opportunity of publicly opposing it; and if it was carried, that at least it would not be adopted till it had assumed a legal and constitutional shape. I heard it also rumoured, upon what I considered to be very good authority at the time, that there were some people connected with the bank who had stated the danger of sending so much specie out of the kingdom; and that there were many gentlemen who were acquainted with the financial state of the country who would have opposed such a step, not upon political grounds, but upon their knowledge of the state of public credit. In the course of the session questions were put to the right honourable gentleman several times upon the subject. The answers were not very decisive, but they led me to conclude, that if the measure was in contemplation, the House of Commons would certainly be consulted upon it, before it was finally adopted. Parlianient was not consulted, and the period arrives when we find that money actually was sent to Germany.

And here, Sir, for the sake of argument, I shall also admit that it was expedient, that it was wise, that it was necessary to send money to the Emperor, that it was necessary for the salvation of Germany, and that the salvation of Germany was necessary to that of Great Britain. This necessity, then, arose during the recess, and if they considered it as so imperiously urgent as not to admit of the delay of calling parliament before the money was sent, why did they not assemble parliament to inform the public of what had been done, and to petition for a bill of indemnity? Perhaps they will say, that that might be done as well at the usual period of the meeting of parliament; that after the money was granted, it was unnecessary to assemble them for the purpose of informing them of a measure already adopted; that when they sent the first remittance they had no idea of sending a second; and that when the second was sent, they did not conceive that a third would be necessary; and so on. Well the 27th of September arrived, when the king had summoned parliament to meet. One would have thought, that now their own time was come, that

were drawn, and that it was necessary that the bills should be drawn during the recess; was I, says the right hon. gentleman, to take the sense of parliament upon the payment of a bill after permitting it to be drawn? I answer, that he must still take the sense of parliament, when the question comes to be put upon the payment of the extraordinaries of the army; and that it is then in the power of the House of Commons, if not to stop the payment of that specific sum to the Emperor of Germany, to refuse to cover the deficiency which it has occasioned in the estimated service. One of the bills I find to have been dated on the 20th of May, and, if I recollect right, the House was prorogued on the 19th. Now, I ask, did he not know, on the 19th, that this bill was to be drawn on the 20th? And if he did, which it was impossible but he must have done, I ask, when it was his intention to send money to the Emperor, why he concealed it? When he found that it would be necessary to call upon the country for pecuniary aid to the House of Austria, why did he not inform the public of the additional burthen which they would be called upon to sustain? When he was compelled to have recourse to the House of Commons for support, why did he not ask that support in a constitutional manner? Supposing even for a moment, that the urgency of the crisis was such as to render it necessary to draw the bills during the recess, why did he not submit the matter to the House of Commons as soon as they were assembled ?

Without entering at all into the question of the propriety of granting these succours, a discussion which I wish on this evening entirely to avoid, I cannot help making an observation upon the relation in which we stand to the House of Austria in pecuniary matters. In 1795, this country guaranteed a loan to the Emperor of four millions and a half. There were many who doubted at the time the policy of the measure; and I recollect well that a noble lord urged in behalf of the good faith of his imperial majesty, that he had made good his first payment of the interest due upon the loan. I did not consider it as a very powerful argument at the time, because I knew that the money for the first payment of the interest was deducted from the capital; and I shall be still less surprised now to hear of his imperial majesty's punctuality

in paying the interest upon that loan, after we have remitted him 1,200,000Z. which is three or four times more than any sum of interest which he has to pay to this country. I do not state this as a reason why parliament should withhold succours from the Emperor, but I state it as an additional reason why ministers should be cautious of granting these succours without the sanction of parliament. I have been often accused, Sir, of representing the constitution as in dan ger. Of these alarms I am willing to take all the shame, and to the crime, if it be any, I readily plead guilty. The oftener I think upon the subject, and the more experience I have of the conduct of ministers, the more I am convinced that my alarms are just, and my apprehensions well founded. Upon some measures which I have conceived to be dangerous to the constitution, I allow that there was room for difference of opinion. The question now before the House, however, is not, whether the attack is greater or less than those which have been formerly directed against the constitution. It is so bold and so daring, and so entirely subversive of the letter of the constitution, that if it meet the sanction of parliament, the question will be, not how far the constitution is injured, but whether or not we have any constitution at all? It is upon these grounds that I am induced to bring forward the motion which I am about to propose. When it has been thought necessary to add new and extraordinary powers to the crown, to accumulate new descriptions of treason, to inflict cruel, barbarous, and unheard-of punishments; in fact, to institute some. thing approaching to a military government, whether these innovations have been necessary or not, I think they are of such a magnitude as to have justified some degree of alarm. But if, in addi. tion to all these new and extraordinary circumstances, there is to be added a direct attack upon the privileges of this House, and the sum of 1,200,000l. is to be disposed of by the minister, not only in augmentation of expenses approved of by parliament, but without obtaining the consent of, or so much as acknow. ledging, parliament, I should be glad to know where there is the smallest safeguard of the constitution left, or what se curity we can have against the future encroachments, either of a minister, or of a prince, who may be disposed to make

dience to the instructions of his consti tuents, who had met that day in the Common Hall of the city of London; and had desired their representatives to censure the conduct of ministers, in giving away the public money without the consent of parliament, he seconded the motion. It was with peculiar satisfaction he now obeyed their voice, as his own sentiments entirely agreed with theirs. After what had been advanced by his right hon. friend, he would not say a word upon the subject in a constitutional point of view. As the representative of the first commercial city in the world, he was well acquainted with the mischief produced by the money sent to the Emperor. discounting of the bills drawn for the purpose of remitting money to the imperial troops, had swallowed up so much of the money of the bank, as to compel that great body to narrow their discounts, and the British merchants were made to suffer, that the German troops might be supplied. The remittances of the allied armies on the continent had, in fact, been a great cause of the alarming scarcity of money last year, and of most of the embarrassments which had been experienced in the commercial world.

them? I am sure the right hon. gentleman cannot twist any provision in the vote of credit bill, so as to afford him the smallest pretence for making the application of it which he has done, and the expense can with less propriety be introduced among the extraordinaries of the army, since it might have been previously voted upon estimate. In both cases, whether the money has been paid from the vote of credit, or under the head of army extraordinaries, the right hon. gentleman has been equally culpable: in the one case, he has been guilty of a breach of trust, and in both he has acted directly contrary to the principles of the constitution. I move, Sir, that the act founded on the vote of credit may be read. [The act being read, Mr. Fox continued.] Some persons think, that in order to repair the breach of the constitution, a bill of indemnity ought to be passed: for my own part, I am not of such an opinion. I think there is no alleviating circumstance in any part of the conduct of ministers, to entitle them to such indulgence. When the subject was under discussion on a former evening, the right hon. gentleman, instead of soliciting pardon, came forward with a vindication of his conduct, and challenged the House if they dared to find fault with it. I think, therefore, that an act of indemnity would be improper, because the circumstances have been even a greater outrage upon the constitution (if a greater be possible) than the principle itself. I cannot conceive any more proper mode of acting, than for the House to express a plain intelligible opinion upon the measure. I know not what is their opinion, nor do I know the opinion of the public upon it; but this I do know, that he must be sanguine indeed who can hope that the constitution can long survive such an attack, if the authors of it are suffered to pass without any mark of reprehension. Mr. Fox concluded with moving, "That his majesty's ministers, having authorized and directed, at different times, without the consent, and during the sitting of parliament, the issue of various sums of money for the service of his Imperial Majesty, and also for the service of the army under the prince of Condé, have acted contrary to their duty, and to the trust reposed in them, and have thereby violated the constitutional privileges of this House,"

Mr. Alderman Combe said, that in obe

The

Mr. Pilt rose and said:-Sir, when I consider the nature of the motion which is this day brought forward against his majesty's ministers, and the serious charge which it involves, I must regard myself as particularly implicated in that charge. I have, however, in the discussion of this question every thing to expect from the candour and justice of the House. An imputation of a most serious kind has been advanced against ministers, but it is necessary that all which may be offered on both sides should be fairly heard, before any decision can take place. It is requisite that gentlemen should be in full possession of every fact that can be adduced, before they hasten to a conclusion which necessarily involves in it matter of such weight and magnitude. The House should clearly know the general principles on which it is to decide: it should know the grounds on which the theory of this part of the constitution is erected: it should also know, what the particular instances are, in point of practice, that militate in a certain degree against the general principles. I say, Sir, when these considerations are once known, it will then be incumbent on the House to decide. But I trust it will not be denied, that