I in possession of the means, I would again repel the unjust attack. Upon the whole, I can see no reason why we should not now enter into a negociation, if circumstances admit of it, without any regard whatever to the origin of the war.

stances which I have now mentioned, are almost all new, and very different from any that have hitherto occurred. Some may imagine that there was sufficient security before this period. They cannot, then, deny that there is more now. There is another point I must touch upon. Is it true that disasters have every where attended us, except our successes at sea? In our land, operations has no honour been gained to the British name? The conduct of our troops in Holland and in Germany demand our admiration and our gratitude. Have sir Charles Grey, and the other officers in the West India expedition added no lustre to the British arms? Might he not mention Martinique, Cape Nicola Mole, and the Cape of Good Hope? Are they not indeed most important conquests; and are they not in our hands? Are we not possessed of means which enable us to enter on any negociation with effect? For this purpose ministers demand ouly those discretionary powers which are necessary. It would be hard indeed to take from them the discretion and double the responsibility. It is said that we have left open a loop-hole for the purpose of evasion, and are really not sincere in what we profess; but let us see what is actually the case. The message undoubtedly reserves a discretion as to the mode of acting, but expresses fairly, that if a proper disposition to negociation manifest itself on the part of the enemy, his majesty will be fully inclined to give it effect. It is said that we allow only the present order of things to be such, as we may treat with, and that we suppose no other equally competent; consequently, if another change were to take place, we should be just where we were. This, however, is not altogether the case. The permanency of the present government does not now so much connect itself with a permanency of a treaty of peace. Formerly, the succession of parties was so rapid and so violent, that the circumstance of this country making peace with one, would have been a sufficient motive for the other to set it aside; but considering the situation to which France is now reduced, no man can pretend to say it would be policy in any other set of men who might come into power, to reject a treaty of peace, concluded with the present rulers. If it be asked, what I would do were the same miserable state to recur, which gave rise to the present contest, I answer, were

Mr. Fox said, that however he might differ from much of what had fallen from the right hon. gentleman, however he might object to the terms of the address which had been moved, there was one thing which must give him pleasure he must congratulate the House and the country on the complete change which had happily taken place in the language and in the system of government. The House would believe him when he said that he rejoiced, and when he congratu lated them upon this change, since he had also to congratulate himself upon the occasion, as this change of language and of system pronounced his pardon, and was a complete absolution of all his past sins. Ministers had made a total retractation of all the charges they had brought against him for the motions he had made, and for the doctrines he had held from the commencement of the war to the present day: they had fully acquitted him, and had positively declared that, in every sentiment he had uttered, he was right, and that the House should have acted upon his opinion; for all along, he had maintained the doctrine now laid down in his majesty's message. Three years ago, namely, on the 15th of December 1792, he had made a motion for a negociation for peace. In June 1793 he had done the same thing: he had also moved an amendment in the course of the same session, tending to the same purpose. In January 1794 he had supported the motion of an hon. friend; and in the latter end of the same session he had maintained and supported in argument the same sentiment as that now conveyed in his majesty's message, namely, that it was fit and proper to negociate with the existing government of France. It had been his uniform argument, that, at every moment from the first commencement of hostilities to the present, it was wise and politic to make the declaration which had been now submitted to the House,--that France was in a state to negociate with this country. He had, therefore at present, this triumph, that ministers retracted by this message all the language they had held in answer to his motions, and all the imputations which they had thrown upon

him.

"What!" they said, "treat with men whose hands are yet reeking with the blood of their sovereign! What! treat with men who would come here with principles that are destructive of all governnient!" Such were their arguments, and yet mark their conduct: they now declared themselves ready to treat with the new Directory of France, four members of which had actually participated in the judgment and death of their sovereign, and were directly implicated in that act. He regretted exceedingly the absence of some gentlemen from the House this evening, who had signalised themselves by reprobating his sentiments and conduct in the severest terms, because from them also he might have received the same sentence of pardon and absolution, and because they might now have been ready to confess, that the censures in which they had so liberally dealt were the effect of sudden irritation, or gross misapprehension. Other modes of attack had been practised; not the least remarkable of which was, that he and his friends left nothing to the discretion of ministers. When by their motions they had merely called upon the House to consider the existing government of France as capable of maintaining the relations of peace and amity with their allies, a complaint was made on behalf of ministerial discretion, and the supporters of the motions were accused of a wish to deliver over his majesty's advisers bound hand and foot, to the governors of France. They did no such thing; neither his two amendments, nor the motions of his hon. friend (Mr. Grey), went so far as the present message from the crown. His amendments did no more than declare, that there were no embarrassments to treating in the form of the government of France; nothing that made it impossible or improper for this country to treat. The motion of his hon. friend was still more gentle. It was, that there was nothing in the government of France that tended to retard a negociation. But the present message declared at once their readiness to treat under certain circumstances, and the House were now called upon to do what had then been declared to be so improper, so degrading and so ignominious. All these foul epithets, however, were now completely retracted, and justice was done to the good intentions, and to the sound policy of the gentlemen on his side of the House.

The chancellor of the exchequer had thought to involve them in a difficulty, by insinuating that his hon. friend had argued against the address. But this Mr. Fox positively denied, for he had not opposed the address; but thinking it inadequate fully to express the sentiments which the House ought to feel on the occasion, he had proposed an amendment more definite in its object, and more comprehensive in its provisions. He could not, however, but protest against a mode of arguing, by which a person was not allowed to approve of an address if he ventured to express his disapprobation of the measures by which the situation was produced in which the address was moved. If it should be said, that it was an opposition to the address, because they proposed an amendment, he must protest against such reasoning, which tended to deprive him of the freedom of speech. If he must agree to a proposition only in the terms in which it was put, he was deprived of deliberation, and was no longer permitted to be a free reasoner. But this would not, he supposed, be seriously disputed; and it would not be ascribed to him, that he was an enemy to peace because he agreed to an amendment, to a message which was extremely equivocal. An enemy to peace! The whole tenor of his reasoning from the commencement of the war was, that every moment was favourable to a negociation for peace. Had he any objections to that peace being concluded by the hon. gentleman? None; for he should think it an addition to the blessings of peace, if the country could along with it procure the advantage of bringing his majesty's ministers into disgrace; and he should conceive that they were completely disgraced by the retractation of every assertion they had made, and by the surrender of every object which they had held out as the pretext of war. If this should be said to be an invidious mode of speaking, he had no objection to plead guilty to the charge, for he most assuredly did think, that next to the blessings of peace would be the disgrace of ministers, who had entered upon the war without reason, and rejected every opportunity of concluding a peace upon terms infinitely more favourable for the country than any that they were now likely to obtain. It might, however, be their consoling idea, that if they had rejected peace upon better terms than they were now likely to

obtain, still they had brought the country to such a pitch of calamity, and so clamorous were the people, that peace upon any terms would be received from them as a boon and an atonement for all their transgressions. Such might be their feeling. But, if it were possible to believe that the members of that House could so far surrender their pride, their independence, and their spirit, as to justify such a sentiment, he could only say, that they surrendered their public principles to personal motives, but that such conduct was inconsistent with their duty as representatives of the people, and incompatible with their character as men of honour. No; though they should give peace to the country, he would not agree to forget their demerits. He should still think himself bound to accuse them as the authors of all the calamities that we had suffered, and he should not think it was a sufficient atonement for their conduct, that they had prevailed on a majority of that House to support them in the sys

tem.

He now came to consider the question of the amendment. And first, it was necessary to inquire whether the address wanted explanation; and secondly, whether it was not necessary, in addition to the declaration which it contained, to come to some precise expression of the sense of the House as to the necessity and wisdom of negociation, whatever might be the form of the government of France. The right hon. gentleman had said, that they should be left open to negociate, but not be obliged to it. Upon this he would inquire whether there did exist at this moment a form of government in France, that in the opinion of his majesty's ministers made it wise, fit, and practicable for them to treat? This was the question. Was it not the intention of gentlemen, that with such a government they should treat? Last year, when his hon. friend made a motion for pacification, the right hon. gentleman objected to it as being a practical declaration for treating, and he moved an amendment, which he called a conditional declaration, that we were disposed to treat whenever there was a form of government in France capable of maintaining the accustomed relations of peace and amity with other countries. That time was come. His majesty's message expressly declared that they were now come to such a form of government. Nay, a

more precise term was used than in the amendment of last year, for, instead of other countries, the message expressly stated Great Britain. Then, if they were come to this state, why not declare, said Mr. Fox, that you will treat with them? Why not act upon your own declaration? Why not be steady to the principle which you have pronounced, and declare that you will treat? Since that declaration was made in the month of June last, there was not a statesman in Europe, except his majesty's ministers, who did not believe that France was in a state capable of maintaining the accustomed relations of peace and amity with other countries. Their conduct to neutral powers had demonstrated the fact. Prussia had acted upon the demonstration, and had concluded a peace accordingly. It was evident to all the world, then, except to the king's ministers; and if they had been sincere in the declaration that they made in the month of June last, it would have been manifest to them also, and they would have acted upon it. With this glaring fact before their eyes, would the House again leave it in their power to juggle with words, and to evade their own declarations? Would they not now think it necessary in prudence to bind them down to a specific act upon their own words? If they did not, what possible confidence could they have in the present declaration more than in the past? They might say, it was true that at the time of making such declaration there appeared to be a disposition in France to treat; but now circumstances have changed, and there is not the same disposition. They might affect to see circumstances unknown, or totally disregarded by the rest of Europe, and might say that they were not bound by the present declaration, and that the House had come to no opinion which made it necessary for them to treat; such had been the result of their former conduct. The right hon. gentleman had persuaded the House to leave them to the exercise of their own discretion, and they had neglected the time which other statesmen and other cabinets had wisely seized and happily improved. If the House desired, therefore, that the blessings of peace should be restored to the country, they must take care that the present address should be precise and definitive. If it was not clear and intelligible, it was fit that it should be amended, and the ex

perience of last year ought to convince them that no loop-hole should be left, no latitude given, to that disposition to equivocate which they had so much reason to lament.

Speaking of France, the right hon. gentleman said, that the present was a fit government with which to treat; and he had accused his hon. friend of having made a slip of the tongue, when he said that by a singular state of things they might be said to be attacking the French constitution which ministers were defending. It was no slip of the tongue; nor was there any thing wrong in the reasoning. His hon. friend never otherwise had defended the former constitutions of France as being good governments for the people of that country, but good in relation to others. He and every gentleman around him had contended, not that the constitutions of France were well framed for the happiness of the people of that country, but that they were sufficient for all the purposes of good neighbourhood, and of preserving peace and amity with others. They never attempted to defend the government of Robespierre. The right hon. gentleman would not do him the injustice to impute to him an approbation of that detestable monster. He had always said, that every one of the successive governments of France had shown a disposition and capacity to maintain their treaties with foreign nations. He was of the same opinion still; and if any one man should rise in his place, and assert that he saw good reason to believe that the present government of France was more capable than any of its predecessors to maintain those relations, he must only say that he should very much doubt either his sincerity or his judgment. It had been a darling expression to call the state of France for three years past a state of anarchy. It would have been a more correct description to have called it a state of tyranny, intolerable beyond that of any, perhaps, that ever was experienced in the history of man. To say that he rejoiced in the probability of its termination was, he hoped unnecessary. He certainly rejoiced in it as much as he did in the fall of the tyranny of the house of Bourbon. But, was that tyranny capable of maintaining terms with foreign powers? Most certainly it was. And if this assertion should be denied, he called upon gentlemen to produce a single instance

in which they had departed from the strict performance of their engagements; a single instance in which any one of the adverse parties that tore one another to pieces, and in their despicable and horrid conflicts tore also the bosom of their country, ever violated the engagements they had made out of France. Did not the Brissotine party maintain the treaties of their predecessors? Did not the execrable tyrant Robespierre himself, observe with equal fidelity the treaties made by Brissot? Were not his successors uniformly steady in their adherence to the external system which had been adopted? It had been observed with truth, that no one period in the French revolution had been marked by a more sacred regard to the neutrality of foreign powers, than the reign of that execrable tyrant, Robespierre; and it would not be denied, but that treaties had been made with tyrants as execrable; and considering what sort of treaties ministers had made, with whom they had made them, and what acts of base and abandoned tyranny they had not discountenanced, it was not worthy the manly character of the British nation to abet them in their resistance to a treaty with France.

Having thus shown, in his mind, the futility of all objections to treat on account of the insecurity of treaty, Mr. Fox came to their next argument, that now France was in the greatest possible distress. Granted. Was that a reason for treating now? Was it because this very stable government was on the point of annihilation, that it was capable of maintaining the relations with foreign powers? The absurdity was too gross for argument. But if their distress was a reason for treating with them, had they not experienced this distress a twelvemonth ago? Let the House remember the speeches of the right hon. gentleman and his noble friend (lord Mornington) on the state of their assignats, when they said that their depreciation was at the rate of 80 per cent. Aye, but they had not then come to sufficient distress to be solicitous of peace, and now it seems they were come to this disposition. And what was of more consequence, it seemed that they had now a constitution which was quite fit for all the purposes of negociation. If ministers depended upon this slender thread, our security was slight indeed. He was not about to praise or to censure their new constitution; that he

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