either in the Mediterranean, or in the plained away, the professed object of the Emperor was, to arrest a treaty which was commencing without him, by saying, that he was willing also to treat: the Emperor, therefore, declared in substance, that he thought France might be treated with. On every ground, then, he must suppose that the Emperor thought thus, and was sincere. What, then, was the state of the confederacy? Our allies were vanishing away very fast. Whether the Emperor signed the rescript in his quality of head of the empire only, or in that of king of Hungary, &c., he did not exactly know: but at any rate, he was not two separate men; and if peace was desirable for the German empire, any one who cast his eye on the map, must see that it must on the same ground be desirable for the other possessions of the Emperor also. The aid of Germany, and even of a quintuple contingent, had been stated by many declarations of this very Emperor to be absolutely necessary to the general success of the war; and now if Germany fails him, Prussia also having withdrawn, his own territory being reduced, and his army shut out from crossing the Rhine, how could it be hoped that he would make farther head against the French? As to Spain, she likewise was reported to be negociating, and her known weakness was one ground of the report. From Sardinia little was to be expected. An alliance, indeed, with Russia was spoken of; and certainly he felt disposed to commend the endeavours of government to interest her in the war; provided, however, we should not thereby draw down upon us more enemies than would be compensated for by her assistance. But even though his understanding should dictate a policy of this sort, still his feelings would follow very slowly; for he should find it hard indeed to wish success to such a power as Russia had shown herself to be. He next adverted to the state of France; and here, he said, that some new considerations came in, which the House had never had the full opportunity of deliberating upon before. First, that she had quieted those great internal insurrections, which had occupied some very considerable armies during the preceding periods of the war. Not only the allies were lessened in numbers and in force; not only the king of Prussia had withdrawn, and the Emperor seemed likely to follow his example; not only the British troops were removed from the continent, while tended in like manner to increase their the line of frontier, both by the capture strength, by sustaining their reputation of Holland and the peace with Prussia, in Europe. He here adverted to the comwas exceedingly narrowed; but, on the motions recently excited in Paris. This other hand, by the quieting of these insur- was an event which he was not particu rections, a large accession of disposable larly surprised at, and if any member force had been gained to the French, meant to make it an argument against a which they might bring at once to bear motion for peace, he should object to on any new point. The advantage to the such use of it. We must not allow the French by the above-mentioned defection happiness of the people of England to be of our allies, and the accession to their the sport and play of these successive own strength, he computed at between 2 events. He had observed, on many ocand 300,000 men.-Next, as to the casions, a disposition in the House, as French resources. Their paper-money well as in some people without doors, to was much depreciated, and had fallen be on the watch, as it were, for some still more very lately: nevertheless, every new event, and to rest almost the whole thing went on as before. In America, ground of going on with the war on somepaper-money had been depreciated during thing future, which they could not define. the war far below the present depreciation Every little incident was magnified by in France, and yet new resources had persons of this description, and turned after that been opened; and the fallacy into an argument against making peace. of supposing that a nation's pecuniary What would be the consequence, if France means must end with its paper credit, had were to act in the same manner. What if been evinced. In point of subsistence, her government were to urge the high he had received information from persons price of provisions as a proof that we who had arrived from France within these were nearly exhausted? What if the two or three days, that, generally speak- vast bounties given to man our navy, or ing, they were in no sort of distress; that increase our army should there be urged; in Paris, indeed, bread had been scarce, but and what if the risings which had taken it was now less so than before; and in most place in this country should be magparts provisions were cheaper than in nified: the account of them being conEngland. In the French armies there veyed by persons the least favourable to had been no sign whatever of disaffection. our government? Would not a very erroA general satisfaction prevailed in the neous judgment be formed in France concountry, on account of the termination cerning as to resources, and the probable of the troubles of La Vendée and of the period of our terminating the war, if Chouans; and some hope of peace was these alone were the grounds on which excited by the treaties already entered the French government should argue on into; and whatever partial or temporary the subject? With regard to the probatumults might arise in Paris, the idea of ble consequences of pursuing the war, he a general rising in the country seemed considered them to be in their nature unnow to be over. The general circum- certain. Heretofore it might justly be stances of the war also tended to make said to be carried on in order to prevent them think their troubles nearly at an the progress of French principles; but end; for peace seemed to them not far now there was much more danger of their distant. The conduct of foreign nations being strengthened by a general disconto them tended to confirm this sentiment. tent, arising from the continuance of the The duke of Tuscany's treaty with them war, than from any importation of the was a small matter, when considered in principles themselves from France; for the light of an additional strength gained; the nature of them had now been seen but it was very important in another view, through; the spirit of Jacobinism and franamely, as a symptom of the sort of confi- ternization had subsided, even in that dence which foreigners placed in them. country, and a gradual change in this resHere was a shrewd Italian prince, who pect had taken place. One bad effect of some time ago thought himself safer under the war was, the drawing off so great a the wings of the confederacy, but who part of the people to a military life. This now thought it was time to commit him- was a very serious evil, tending to hurt esself rather to the protection of France.sentially the morals of the people, and to The French peace with Prussia, and Swe-detach them from the habits of civil life; den's recognition of the French republic, and though no present consequences might be felt, yet very material ones might, at some distance of time, follow.-As to the effects of the continuance of the war on France, he was persuaded that the war tended, under the present circumstances, rather to prevent a counter-revolution than to forward one. Suppose the most successful events of war to happen; suppose Austria to penetrate into France: suppose some new Russian allies, fresh from the capture of Poland, to be united with them, and to march into that country, would not the people of France, uniting against these fresh invaders, forget their internal animosities, and be again compressed into resistance? Or, suppose these animosities to continue, we had seen already that France, though weak and disturbed in her center might still be terrible in her extremities. An idea had prevailed, that if peace should be made with one party in France, and that party should be dispossessed, the succeeding one would of course, not abide by it. This supposition seemed to him extremely ill-founded. If the people were for peace every new party would court the popular favour by the preservation of it. The party at present in power was peculiarly favourable to peace, and consequently more likely to negociate on terms that would be honour. able to both countries. - Wherever we turned our view, the most evident advantages seemed likely to result from peace. If, then, peace was so desirable what obstructed it? If they should see government treating for peace, would the nation feel disappointed? Were the allies unwilling? The chief doubt was, whether, if we pursued the war they would continue to join us. Were the French unwilling? He was persuaded, that if any such pacific language was held out, as that which his motion conveyed, means would be taken to try by some neutral powers, the effect of a negociation. There had been in France a growing spirit of moderation. In Bourdeaux, British property to a great amount had lately been suffered to be taken though known to be British, and that part of it which the Convention had taken for its own use had been restored in value. Hitherto our language had been, that though we would not refuse to make peace with France, even under the form of a republic, yet we were decidedly against making peace with the present men in power, and with the present republic; for we have implied, that the present government is incapable of maintaining the accustomed relations of peace amity, the present motion would not oblige govern ment to treat; it would merely prepare the way for it. He then proceeded to answer what probably would be the arguments advanced against the measure he recommended, particularly adverting to the objections to peace urged by government in former debates. It had formerly been urged as a reason for continuing the war, that if we would not continue it while we had the advantage of so many allies, we should in the end have to make war alone. That argument would not be pressed in the same degree at present; because that very event was approaching, not through our making peace, but through our too long continuance of the war; and if we wished to secure a future co-operation of allies, the way would be to dissolve what remains of the confederacy by consent, before it entirely dissolved itself, as the only chance of resuming it, if hereafter it should be necessary. Another argument hitherto used, would not now be repeated, viz. that we could not make peace with France without acknowledging the republic; and without acknowledging it as founded on the principles of liberty, equality, and the Rights of Man. But had the Emperor, the king of Prussia, the king of Sweden, or the duke of Tuscany in this sense acknowledged the republic? Had they signed, or proposed to sign (as all who acknowledged the republic were said to do), their own deposition? No; the treaties entered into had been mutually signed as other treaties usually were, and it had been shown that no impediment of this kind had existed. Again the safety of Europe had been declared to be a principal ground of war; but if Europe was determined to make peace as the best means of consulting its safety, did it be. long to Great Britain to fight her battles for her, and to fight them alone, or almost alone? The declining resources of France had been stated as another encouragement to go on with the war; but when was the destruction of them to arrive? Their ar mies did not want fresh requisitions, and every thing went on much as heretofore. There was one view of the subject, which seemed so highly important that he must touch upon it. He alluded to the pros. pect of a general war in Europe. Russia it might be supposed would take part with us. Turkey, on the other hand, and other powers with France; and a new scene of the most extensive hostilities might in that case follow. Humanity shuddered at such a scene: but even putting humanity out of the question, it seemed to him in the view of dry policy, that such a course of events must be highly prejudicial to Great Britain. Who could say what might be the consequence of strengthening Austria and Russia, as their successes might do; or of the irruption of French troops into almost all Europe, if the other side should prove superior. The very opposing armies might catch the spirit of French democracy; and when it was considered that the French revolution owed its rise to a great pressure on the lower orders of the people in that country what might not be the consequence on the minds of all the lower orders of people in Europe, if a destructive war should prevail. In his opinion, the true line of policy for this country would be, to cultivate our domestic resources, to consult the happiness, the good morals, and the comfort of the lower orders of the people; and to excite their confidence in administration; to keep, on the other hand, as much as may be, from continental connexions, on account of the general uncertainty of them, the character of foreign princes, and the situation of the affairs of Europe. He then moved, "That it is the opinion of this House, that the present circumstances of France, ought not to preclude the government of this country from entertaining proposals for a general pacification; and that it is for the interest of Great Britain to make peace with France provided it can be effected on fair terms, and in an honourable manner.” Mr. Duncombe seconded the motion. He adverted to an argument that had often been urged, that it was impossible to have a permanent peace with the present government of France; and asked, whether we ever had a permanent peace with France, or whether, during the last half century, we at any time had a peace that had lasted for more than seven years? The fact was, that we had been continually embroiled in wars, from the ambition of that very monarchy which we were now so anxious to restore. He remarked only one difference in our present situation; formerly, we were at war with the kings and ministers of France, now we were at war with the people. He remarked on the state of the confederacy against France, and on the absurdity of any reliance on the proffered assistance of the empress of Russia. Such an offer on her part could only proceed from a strong presumption of British credulity. He considered the present motion as a call upon ministers to put a stop to the scene of misery and calamity which was now going on; to conciliate the public mind, by adopting measures to bring about a peace, and to preclude the necessity of making any addition to those burthens which had already increased to such an extent, that they could not much longer be borne. Mr. Windham (Secretary at War) said, that the House had now heard the reasons urged by the hon. mover and seconder, in support of a motion so extraordinary, both in itself and in relation to the sentiments and declarations which had formerly been adopted by those gentlemen, in conjunction with a great majority of that House. He agreed as to the propriety of bringing forward questions at different periods of a war, whether, under any change of circumstances that might have taken place, it was advisable to proceed in the prosecution of the contest. The point, then, to be discussed was, whether any such change had taken place? He affirmed that no such change had taken place, or at least none which rendered peace in the present moment preferable to the prosecution of the war. He remarked that in every argument, it was necessary to consider those with whom we were arguing. In the present instance, then, it was necessary for him to consider whether he was arguing with those who, in its commencement, had considered the present war as just and necessary, or, in other words, as just, because it was necessary→→→ who had reprobated the doctrines of the French, and wished the destruction of the system, which they were attempting to establish; or with those who had opposed the war from its outset; who had approved the doctrines of the French; who had held out the example of their re. volution as most glorious; who had wished success to their exertions, and had even openly professed that the establishment of the republic was an event desirable to mankind. It was evident that the ques tion, as taken in relation to those opposite opinions, must be argued upon grounds entirely different, and it was only to the latter description of persons that he meant to address himself. In every question respecting peace, two things were to be considered, which the hon. mover had not kept sufficiently distinct in the course ings of the government. It was moderate, it was true; but how was it moderate? It was moderate only in comparison with the preceding plans of terror, murder, and proscription. Compared with other governments, the government of France was still distinguished for injustice, violence, and insult; or admitting, for the sake of argument, that it were not so, was it possible to prophesy how long it might be before such a system might return? But here let us examine in what manner this change was produced. They had been brought down to talk the language of moderation; and therefore their moderation was the result of necessity. They were relaxed in their circumstances; their vigour was weakened, and their courage crippled. If they had the desire to revive their former atrocities, they had not now the power, and it was our duty to prevent them. Their fortune had reached its flood, and was now ebbing fast away. The symptoms of decay were manifest, and the pulse that raged so violently would of his argument; first, what sort of peace was to be gained; and, secondly, what were the means of gaining it? The hon. mover seemed too much to consider peace as peace. He seemed to think that the moment the treaty was signed, we should be at liberty to disband our armies; that prosperity would of course return; and that we should immediately enter upon a career of tranquillity and affluence. On that subject (said Mr. Windham), I differ from him most widely: he thinks peace, in the present moment, safe and honourable; I think it neither safe nor honourable. But here I cannot help remarking, that the hon. gentleman is a sort of constitution-monger, and that he declared, upon a former occasion, that he would give to France the same constitution as that of America. The hon. gentleman would give them a constitution, as if it was a ready-made house which could be transported without inconvenience from one place to another, and as if every government did not grow out of the habits, the prejudices, the sentiments, and the af-soon no longer beat. He remarked, that fections of the people. He would give them a constitution, as children who had surrounded a twig with a quantity of dirt, would think that they had planted a tree. Some questions he wished to ask, as to the means of attaining peace. And first, he would ask, was to express a desire of peace on the part of this country the best means of attaining it? How far ought the inclination for peace manifested by France to operate as an inducement to this country to come forward, and manifest its dispositions for the same purpose? How far would this inclination for peace in France be likely to grow and increase in consequence of our keeping aloof, and abstaining from any declaration that might indicate a reciprocity of sentiment? What change had taken place in the state of France, since the subject was last under consideration, which tended to render any negociation for peace more secure? A great change had indeed taken place, but none which rendered any prospect of peace permanent; the government was not become more durable, nor was the character of the people changed: he did not at present see any reason why they might not return to the spirit of domination and of proselytism, which had formerly rendered them so dangerous. The present boasted system of moderation acquired all its praise only from being contrasted with the former infamous proceed though the hon. mover had demanded a precise answer, he had not encouraged it by bringing forward any thing precise in his own statement. He had given it as his opinion, that the distress in the interior of France was not great. He had thought, that since the communication had begun to be open, there was such a body of evidence, with respect to the existence of that distress, as could not well have been resisted; and that the confessions of the extreme hardships suffered from the depreciation of assignats, and the scarcity of provisions, were too frequent and notorious to be in any degree invalidated. The hon. gentleman talked of recent reports as to disturbances in Paris, of the truth of which he seemed to intimate some doubt. They might not, indeed, be true to the extent to which they had been stated; they had, however, now been reported upon the authority of public papers, and the hon. gentleman who called their existence in question, might as well dispute the accounts of the massacres at Paris, or the ravages of the guillotine. Was it to be treated as a matter of slight report, that the mob had broke into the august body of the Convention that the members had been forced to fly-that the head of one of their number had been cut off and that, with the head in their hand, the mob had addressed a speech to the president of |