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$ 182. In general.- A charitable use, where neither law nor policy forbids, may be applied to almost anything that tends to promote the well-doing and well-being of social man. Ould v. Washington Hospital, 5 Otto, 303.

$ 183. It is no objection to a charitable devise that the trustee named, being a corporation of definite powers, not including that of holding property in trust for any other object than that connected with the corporation, is incapable of receiving or administering the trust, inasmuch as, should this be true, a court of chancery has full power to supply the want of a legal trustee. Jones v. Habersham,* 3 Woods, 443; affirmed, 17 Otto, 174.

$184. Where a grant or devise for charitable uses is made, and the donee is capable of executing the trust vested in him, the grant or devise should be upheld if the beneficiary or charitable object is stated in such a manner or with such distinctness that the court can ascertain what it is, so as to enforce the trust. On the other hand, if the grant is too vague and indefinite to enable the court to detect to what charity the grant referred, then the estate, never having been conveyed away, will necessarily follow the prescribed course of descent. Russell v. Allen,* 7 Rep'r, 614.

$ 185. A resident in Pennsylvania made his will in 1829, giving annuities to his wife and others, and directing that his executors or the survivor of them, after the decease of his wife, should provide for the annuitants then living, and dispose of the residue of his property for the use of such charitable institutions in Pennsylvania and South Carolina as they or he may deem most beneficial to mankind. His wife and three other persons were appointed executors. The three other persons all died during the life-time of the wife. No appointment of the charity was made or attempted to be made during the life-time of the executors. The charity cannot now be carried out. The executors were vested with a mere power of appointment, without haring any special trust attached to it. Fontain v. Ravenel, 17 How., 369.

$ 186. Construction of.- In construing a grant or devise for charitable uses the intention of the grantor or devisor should prevail. Hence, when by the terms of the grant it is clear that the heir was to be cut off, he will be cut off, if the trust can, under a liberal construction, be upheld for its designed charitable purpose. Russell v. Allen,* 7 Rep’r, 614.

& 187. Where property was devised to charitable and pious uses,“ provided, that the said real estate be not hereafter sold or disposed of," and in connection with and under the same proviso a number of minute directions and regulations concerning the management of the trust were added, held, that the former should be construed in connection with the latter, and be regarded as a limitation in trust as well as the latter, and not as a common-law condition. Stanley v. Colt, 5 Wall., 119.

$ 188. The testator gave all the rest and residue and remainder of his estate, real and personal, comprehending a large real estate in the city of New York, to the chancellor of the state of New York, and the recorder of the city of New York, etc. (naming several other persons by their official description), to have and to hold the same unto them and their respective successors in office to the uses and trusts, subject to the conditions and appointments declared in the will, which were, out of the rents, issues and profits thereof to erect and build upon the land upon which he resided, which was given by will, an asylum or marine hospital to be called “The Sailor's Snug Harbor,” for the purpose of maintaining and supporting aged, decrepit and worn-out sailors. And after giving directions as to the management of the fund by his trustees, and declaring that the institution created by his will should be perpetual, and that those officers and their successors should forever continue the governors thereof, he adds, “it is my will and desire that if it cannot legally be done according to my above intention by them without an act of the legislature, it is my will and desire that they shall as soon as possible apply for an act of the legislature to incorporate them for the purpose above specified; and I do further declare it to be my will and intention that the said rest, residue, etc., of my estate should be at all events applied for the uses and purposes above set forth; and that it is my desire that all courts of law and equity will so construe this, my said last will, as to have the said estate appropriated to the above uses, and that the same should in no case, for want of legal form or otherwise, be so construed as that my relations or any other persons should have, possess or enjoy my property except in the manner and for the uses hereinabove specified.” Within five years after the death of the testator, the legislature of the state of New York, on application of the trustees, also named as executors of the will, passed a law constituting the persons holding the offices designated in the will, and their successors, a body corporate by the name of "The Trustees of the Sailor's Snug Harbor,” and enabling them to execute the trusts declared in the will. This is a valid devise to divest the heir of his legal estate, or at all events to affect the lands in his hands with the trust declared in the will. If, after such a plain and unequivocal declaration of the testator with respect to the disposition of his property, so cautiously guarding against and providing for every supposed difficulty that might arise, any technical objection shall now be inter. posed to defeat his purpose, it will form an exception to what we find so universally laid

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down in all our books as a cardinal rule in the construction of wills, that the intention of the testator is to be sought after and carried into effect. If this intention cannot be carried into effect precisely in the mode first contemplated by him, consistently with the rules of law, he was provided an alternative, which, with the aid of the act of the legislature, must remove every difficulty. Inglis v. Trustees of the Sailor's Snug Harbor, 3 Pet., 99.

$ 189. Statute of 43 Elizabeth, how far operative.- The statute of charitable uses, 43 Elizabeth, chapter 4, is not in force in Maryland, and a devise to an unincorporated voluntary charitable association is void under the laws of that state. Meade v. Beale, * Taney, 339.

$ 190. A devise in trust to lay out $200 per year in wood, meal and clothing, to be distributed aniong the poor and necessitous widows and orphans within the corporation of Georgetown, is void, the statute of Elizabeth of charitable uses not being in force in Maryland at the time of the formation of the District of Columbia. Barnes v. Barnes, * 3 Cr. C. C., 269.

$ 191. The statute of 43 Elizabeth, chapter 4, was purely remedial and ancillary, and does not control the validity of charitable endowments in this country. Ould v. Washington Hospital, 5 Otto, 303.

$ 192. The statute of 43 Elizabeth, respecting charitable uses, having been rep aled in Virginia, the courts of chancery have no jurisdiction to decree charities where the objects are in. definite and uncertain. Therefore, where a bequest was made to trustees for such purposes as they considered might promise to be most beneficial to the town and trade of Alexandria, such bequest was void. Wheeler v. Smith, 9 How., 55.

$ 193. Neither the statute of mortmain of 9 George II., chapter 36, nor any similar statute. was ever in force in Pennsylvania. Miller v. Lerch,* 1 Wall. Jr., 210.

§ 194. Power of courts and legislatures to change conditions.- A court of chancery has power to direct a sale of lands devised for charitable uses, even though such sale be provided against in the devise, if lapse of time or changes as to the condition of the property or circumstances attending it have made it prudent and beneficial for the charity to do so, and to direct a different investment of the proceeds, taking care that no diversion of the gift be permitted. Stanley v. Colt, 5 Wall., 119.

$ 195. Where the legislature, exercising the powers of a chancery court in Connecticut, has passed a law directing such sale, and providing for the secure investment of the proceeds to the same uses as devised, setting out reasons therefor in the act, it is not for the federal courts to revise the facts upon which the legislature exercised its chancery power. Ibid.

§ 196. Rights of minority separating from church which is a cestni que use.- Where a trust is for a religious body of a congregational or independent organization, governed solely within itself, either by a majority of its members or by some other local organization for the purpose of ecclesiastical government, its conformity to the requirements of the trust must be judged by the general principles regulating voluntary associations, and if no other specific trust is attached to the property in its hauds than that it is for the use of that congregation as a religious society, a minority who choose to separate themselves from the church, for doctrinal or other reasons, can claim no rights in the property from the fact that they have once been members of the church, Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall., 679.

$197. Power of corporations to take.- McD., a citizen of Louisiana, made a will in which, after bequeathing certain legacies not involved in the present controversy, he gave the remainder of his property to the corporations of the cities of New Orleans and Baltimore forever, one-half to each, for the education of poor in those cities. The estate was to be converted into realty and managed by six agents, three to be appointed by each city. No alienation of this general estate was ever to take place, under penalty of forfeiture, when the states of Maryland and Louisiana were to become his residuary devisees for the purpose of educating the poor of those states. The city of New Orleans, being a corporation establisied by law, has a right to receive a legacy for the purpose of exercising the powers which have been granted to it, and amongst these powers and duties is that of establishing public schools for gratuitous education. The conditions annexed to this legacy, the prohibition to alienate or to divide the estate, or to separate in its management the interest of the cities or their care and control, or to deviate from the testator's scheme, do not invalidate the bequest, because the Louisiana code provides that “in all dispositions inter vivos and mortis causa, impossible conditions, those which are contrary to the laws or to morals, are reputed not written.” The city of Baltimore is entitled and empowered to receive this legacy under the laws of Mary. land, and the laws of Louisiana do not forbid it. The article in the code of the latter state. which says that “donations may be made in favor of a stranger when the laws of his coun. try do not prohibit similar dispositions in favor of this state," does not most probably apply to the citizens or corporations of the states of the Union. Moreover, the laws of Maryland do not prohibit similar dispositions in favor of a citizen of Louisiana. The destination of the legacy to public uses in Baltimore does not affect the valid operation of the bequest in Louisiana. McDonogh v. Murdock, 15 How., 367.

& 198. The city of Philadelphia, after the act of 1854, consolidating the whole county under that name, had power to administer property devised to the mayor, aldermen and citizens of Philadelphia for charitable uses. Girard v. Philadelphia,* 7 Wall., 1.

$ 199, Property was thus devised in trust primarily to maintain a college and secondarily for other purposes. Held, that a bill in the nature of quia timet could not be maintained by the heirs in anticipation that the proceeds of the devise would be more than adequate for the wants of the college, and that the secondary trusts could not be executed, there being then no surplus or likelihood of any surplus. Held, also, that the heirs had no authority to contest the right of the city to administer the surplus, if any should arise, that power belonging exclusively to the state. Ibid.

$ 200. Beneficiary not in issue – Uncertainty – Perpetuity.- Testator, domiciled at Philadelphia, devised certain lands in Pennsylvania to twelve trustees “in trust for the formation and support of a home for aged, infirm or invalid gentlemen and merchants, where they may enjoy the comforts of an asylum - not eleemosynary, but as far as may be by the addition of their own means, and by reference to the Prytaneum of ancient Athens, an honorable home,- with the hope that it may be perpetuated and enlarged by the bequests of its grateful inmates, .. leaving to my trustees full power to conduct and carry out this institution on the best possible plan, and to provide for its permanent usefulness in or near my native city.” On bill filed and claim made by the residuary devisees under the will and by the heirs at law of the testator, to have the devise declared inoperative and void, held, that the devise was good under the laws of Pennsylvania, and was valid as a charitable use. Whether, independent of the charitable character of the devise it could be sustained as a trust, quære? Cresson v. Cresson, * 6 Am. L. Reg., 42.

$ 201. A. executed a deed “chiefly for the purpose of founding an institution for the edu. cation of youth in St. Louis county, Mo.," conveying property to B. and his successors in trust “for the use and benefit of the Russell Institute of St. Louis, Mo.” The deed directed B. to sell the property and account for and pay over the proceeds tn C., president of the board of trustees of said Russell Institute, “ to and for the benefit of the said institute, represented by their president as aforesaid.” Held, that this as a charitable gift was valid against the donor's heirs, although the institute was never established nor incorporated until after the death of both the donor and C. Russell v. Allen, 17 Otto, 163.

$ 202. The money paid and the lands conveyed by B. to C. stand charged in the hands of C. and his executors with the same charitable trust to which they were subject in the hands of B. Ibid.

$ 203. Property was devised to trustees in trust for the “building and erection and endowment of a hospital for females within the city of Savannah, on a permanent basis, into which sick and indigent females are to be admitted and cared for,” a suitable and proper act of incorporation for said hospital to be obtained, to be called and known as the “ Telfair Hospital for Females.” This devise was objected to for uncertainty as to the objects; for uncertainty as to the time when the hospital was to be built, and when the act of incorporation was to be obtained; for the inipossibility of creating such an act under the constitution and laws of Georgia, and as being in violation of the rule against perpetuities, in that it gives the property ultimately to a corporation not yet in existence. Helu, that none of the objections could prevail, and that the above was a good charitable devise. Jones v. Habersham, * 3 Woods, 443; affirmed, 17 Otto, 174.

$ 204. The devise of land to trustees in trust to hold the same for a site for the erection of an asylum for foundlings to be built by any association, society or institution to be incorporatd by act of congress creates a valid charitable use, and is not void because it creates a perpetuity, nor for uncertainty in that it does not specify the foundlings to be provided for. Ould v. Wasbington Hospital, 5 Otto, 303.

$ 205. A grant to the church of such place is good at common law, and vests the fee in the parson and his successors. If such a grant be made by the crown, it cannot be resumed by the crown at its pleasure. Land at common law may be granted to pious uses before there is a grantee in existence competent to take it, and in the meantime the fee will be in abeyance. Such a grant cannot be resumed at the pleasure of the crown. Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cr., 292.

$ 206. A devise to trustees in trust to convey the property devised to an eleemosynary corporation for foundlings whenever congress shall create one which the trustees approved charges the trustees with an executory trust, and a conveyance from them is made necessary to pass the title. The provision as to the conveyance to be made whenever congress shall create a corporation meeting the approval of the trustees is merely a conditional limitation of the estate vested in the trustees. Ould v. Washington Hospital, 5 Otto, 303.

$ 207. Instances — Valid uses.- A will contained the following: “I give and devise to the Union Society of Savannah all that lot or parcel of land in the city of Savannah on the north

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side of B street, etc., etc., with the buildings and improvements thereon, but on the express condition that said society shall not sell or alienate said lot, but shall use and appropriate the rents and profits of the same for the support of the school and charities of said institution, without said lot being at any time liable for the debts or contracts of said society.” Held, that the above was a good charitable devise notwithstanding the condition against alienation; and that the fact that the Union Society had a surplus of funds at the time the will went into effect did not invalidate the devise. Jones v. Habersham,* 3 Woods, 443; affirmed, 17 Otto, 174.

$ 208. A devise of property was made to the trustees of a church upon “the following terms and conditions and not otherwise,” to wit: First, that the said trustees shall appropriate annually, out of the rents and profits of said property, the sum of $1,000 to one or more churches in the state of Georgia in such destitute and needy localities as the proper officers of the above arst-mentioned church may select. Second, upon the further condition that the said trustees will keep in order and have cleaned up, every spring and autumn, my lot in the cemetery, etc. Third, upon the further condition that neither the trustees nor any other officers of the said church will have or authorize any material alteration or change made in the pulpit or galleries of the present church edifice on the corner of B and S streets, but will permit the same to remain substantially as they are, subject only to proper repairs and improvements; nor shall they sell or alien the lot on which the Sabbath school room of said church now stands. Held, that the above appropriation sufficiently describes the general nature of the charitable purpose, while leaving the selection of the particular objects to the trustees, and is a good charitable use, sufficiently defined; and that the devise of the burial place of the testatrix and the direction to keep it in good order is a good charitable use under section 3157, code of Georgia, 1873; and that the condition that the pulpit and galleries should not be altered nor the Sabbath school lot aliened did not render the bequest void. Ibid.

$ 209. A devise was made to the Widows' Society of Savannah of certain property, “the rents and profits of the same to be appropriated to the benevolent purposes of said society.” Held, that as the society was incorporated for the relief of indigent widows and orphans the gift was not too general as being for benevolent purposes indefinitely. Ibid.

$ 210. A devise to a historical society in trust for charitable purposes is not void by reason of a proviso in the charter of such society that its annual income shall not exceed a certain sum, and the fact that such devise would increase its income beyond such sum. This, should the society accept the trust, might be cause for the forfeiture of its charter at the option of the state, but the gift would be none the less vested in the society. Ibid.

$ 211. A devise of property to a historical society and its successors, in special trust to keep and preserve the same as a public edifice for a library and academy of arts and sciences, made upon the condition that testator's name appear over the doorway in large letters, and upon the further condition that no portion of the building be occupied as a dwelling-house, is good as a charitable devise for educational purposes. Ibid. 8 212.

void uses.- - A legacy to or for the use or support of a minister of the gospel as such, or to or for the use or support of a religious sect, order or denominatiou, is void by the bill of rights of Maryland. Newton v. Carbery, 5 Cr. C. C., 632.

$ 213. A devise for the benefit or support of a poor-house, held void under the laws of Maryland either as an executory or as an executed devise. Barnes v. Barnes, * 3 Cr. C. C., 269.

$ 214. A provision in a will leaving funds in the hands of an executor, “to be by him applied to the support of missionaries in India, as it is my desire to aid in the instruction of the poor heathen in the way to life everlasting. The same to be applied under the direction of the general assembly's board of missions of the Presbyterian church in the United States," is void for uncertainty. Board of Missions v. McMaster, * 4 Am. L. Reg., 526.

$ 215. A will provided that if testator became a member of any of the religious communities attached to the Roman Catholic church, and should be such at the time of her death, then the previous bequests of her will were avoided, and the fund referred to in the will was to go to W., as bishop of said church, or his successor in said diguity, for the benefit of the community of which she died a member. Testator died a member of a religious community attached to the Roman Catholic church, known as the “Sisters of St. Joseph.” Held, that the terms of the bequest.did not designate the bishop or his successor personally as the trustee, but that, however that might be, the court could not enforce a trust so vague, uncertain and illegal. Kain v. Gibboney, 3 Hughes, 397.

$ 216. Dedication to.- A lot of ground had, in the original plan of an addition to Georgetown, been marked “ for the Lutheran church,” and by the German Lutherans of the place had been used as a place of burial from the dedication, and who had erected a school-house on it but no church; exercising acts of protection and ownership over it at some periods, by committees appointed by the German Lutherans, the original owner acquiescing in the same.

This may be considered as a dedication to public and pious uses; and although the German Lutherans were not incorporated, nor were there any persons who as trustees could hold the property, the appropriation was also valid under the bill of rights of Maryland. The bill of rights, to this extent at least, recognizes the doctrines of the statute of Elizabeth for charitable uses, under which it is well known that such uses would be upheld, although there was no specific grantee or trustee. This might at all times have been enforced as a charitable and pious use through the intervention of the government, as parens patriæ, by its attorney. general or other law officer. Beatty v. Kurtz, 2 Pet., 566.

VI. ACTIONS, AT LAW AND IN EQUITY.

$217. Legal jurisdiction.— The interposition of equity is not necessary where a trust fund is perverted. The cestui que trust can follow it at law as far as it can be traced. United States State National Bank of Boston, * 24 Int. Rev. Rec., 52; 6 Otto, 30.

8 218. A trustee is, in general, suable only in equity; but, if he chooses to bind himself by a personal covenant, he is liable at law for a breach thereof, although he describes himself as covenanting as trustee. Duvall v. Craig, 2 Wheat., 45.

$ 219. - the admiralty has no direct jurisdiction over trusts, although they may relate to maritime affairs. If the libelant states a trust as the foundation of his suit he states hinaself out of court. Davis v. Child, Dav., 71.

$ 220. in probate.— The fact that executors are required by law to file their annual accounts in the court of probate does not empower such tribunal to settle these accounts in any judicial sense, or determine controversies between the cestui que trust and the trustee pertaining to such accounts. Parsons v. Lyman, 5 Blatch., 170.

$ 221, Equitable jurisdiction.— There medy of the cestui que trust against the trustee for mere negligence must be in equity, and not at law. Hukill v. Page, * 6 Biss., 183.

$ 222. Courts of equity extend their control, not only over the acts of trustees, but over the acts of those who have any agency in enabling the trustees to violate their trust. Wallis v. Thornton, 2 Marsh., 422.

$ 223. A court of equity has jurisdiction, in a suit brought by the trustee against the cestui que trust, to direct an issue devisavit vel non, and to decree possession of the land to the, trustee to enable him to execute the trust. Harrison v. Rowan, 4 Wash., 202.

$ 224. Equity has cognizance only of executory trusts, not of those executed, or where a trust can be enforced at law; there must be some act to be done by the trustee. Baker v. Biddle, 1 Bald., 394.

$ 225. In order to avoid an escheat and carry out the wishes of the testator a court of equity will, if necessary, consider land as money, where a testator, who is a trustee, has directed the land to be sold, and will direct the proceeds to be given to the cestui que trust. Taylor v. Benham, 5 How., 233.

$ 226. A court of equity can, when necessary, enforce the execution of trusts, and will do so when for any reason they are likely to fail. Barings v. Willing, 4 Wash., 248.

$ 227. The rule formerly, with regard to the enforcement of marriage articles which created executory trusts, was this, namely, that chancery would interfere only in favor of one of the parties to the instrument or the issue, or one claiming through them, and not in favor of remote heirs or strangers, though included within the scope of the provisions of the articles. They were regarded as volunteers. Neves v. Scott, 9 How., 196.

$ 228. But this rule has, in modern times, been much relaxed, and may now be stated thus : that if, from the circumstances under which the marriage articles were entered into by the parties, or as collected from the face of the instrument itself, it appears to have been intended that the collateral relatives, in a given event, should take the estate, and a proper limitation to that effect is contained in them, a court of equity will enforce the trust for their benefit. Ibid. & 229.

injunction.- When trustees are in existence and capable of acting, a court of equity will not interfere to control them in the exercise of a discretion vested in them by the instrument under which they act. Nichols v. Eaton, 1 Otto, 716.

$ 230. The case of a trustee attempting to pervert his trust, or employ it to the prejudice of his cestui que trust by a proceeding at law in which the cestui que trust would be barred of an adequate protection, is particularly appropriate for the interference of equity to restrain the proceeding by injunction. St. Luke's Hospital v. Barclay, 3 Blatch., 259.

$ 231. A cestui que trust may maintain a bill for an injunction against his trustee to prevent his collecting, appropriating or disposing of the trust property. Ibid. $ 232. A trustee will not be permitted to take advantage of his situation to obtain any per

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