UCKFIELD RURAL COUNCIL v. CROWBOROUGH WATER Co.

Nor did they deliver notice specifying the date on which they would begin to erect the water tower, as provided by by-law 94.

The appellants contended that the respondents had committed an offence against the by-laws and ought to be convicted. The respondents contended that the erection of a water tower was expressly authorised by their special Act, and that the by-laws did not apply.

The appellants further contended that, notwithstanding the fact that the building in question was expressly authorised by the special Act, nothing in that Act contained relieved the respondents from the duty of complying with the particular by laws in question; and it was also pointed out that among the Acts incorporated with the respondents' special Act was the Waterworks Clauses Act, 1847 (10 & 11 Vict. c. 17), section 93 of which enacted "That nothing herein or in the special Act contained shall be deemed to exempt the undertakers from any general Act relating to waterworks, or any Act for improving the sanitary condition of towns and populous districts, which may be passed in the same session of Parliament in which the special Act is passed, or any future session of Parliament."

There

fore, having regard to the above section, nothing in the respondents' special Act contained could relieve them from the necessity of complying with by-laws made in pursuance of Acts passed since the date of the Waterworks Clauses Act, 1847. The respondents contended that, notwithstanding section 93 of the Waterworks Clauses Act, 1847, they were under no obligation to comply with the by-laws in question in respect of the proposed erection of works specifically authorised by the special Act.

The Justices' attention was called to

Grand Junction Waterworks Co. v. Hamp; ton Urban Council [1898],' London and Blackwall Railway v. Limehouse Board of Works [1856], and Barker v. Edger [1898].3

The Justices were of opinion that the by-laws did not apply to the building of the high-service water tower referred to

(1) [1898] M.C. 241; 67 L. J. Q. B. 903. (2) 26 L. J Ch. 164.

(3) 67 L. J. P.C. 115; [1898] A.C. 748.

in section 25 of the company's special Act, and that the appellants had no power in law to enforce the requirements of their by-laws as against the respondents in the construction of those works, and dismissed the informations.

The question for the opinion of the Court was whether, under the circumstances stated, the Justices were right in dismissing the informations.

R. E. Moore, for the appellants.-The special Act of 1897 gives the respondents power to erect necessary and proper buildings, and there is no inconsistency between the Act and the by-laws. The respondents' act in building without previous compliance with the by-laws amounts to a revocation of the provisions of the Public Health Act, 1875, which never was intended by the Legislature. The appellants do not contend that they have any right to prevent the respondents building their water tower, but that before the respondents begin the appellants are entitled to notification, so that they may see that the work required is really carried out. This tower is so clearly a building that no definition is necessary. Irrespective of section 93 of the Waterworks Clauses Act, 1847, there is nothing whatever in the appellants' special Act to relieve them from the by-laws, and no implied revocation. The respondents

must therefore shew an entire incon

sistency between the special Act and the by-laws-Hill v. Hall [1876].* Here there is no such inconsistency between the two Acts as to make the subsequent special Act repeal by implication the prior general statute so as to enable the respondents to dispense with the requirements of these by-laws.

W. Whately (Boxall with him), for the respondents. It is admitted that this water tower is a building within section 157 of the Public Health Act, 1875; but the propositions are-first, that the appellants have no power to make by-laws here; and secondly, that the by-laws, as they stand, do not purport to exercise a power in the case of a building such as this. The dates are of importance. The special

(4) 45 L. J. M.C. 153; 1 Ex. D. 411.

U

and proper works, including a high-service water tower situate in a particular field. The question is, could they build this tower without the approval of the rural district council required by by-laws 93 and 94-could they begin it without first submitting plans and giving notices in compliance with these by-laws In my opinion the company had not that power. Counsel has argued on their behalf that, because they were authorised by their special Act to build their high-service tower, they could put it up as they chose; but I cannot accept this argument. In my view, the precise effect of the provision made by their special Act is to enable them to build their water tower on land belonging to some one else as if it were their own; and to do this an Act is necessary. But when they were so empowered they were then only in the position of any one else intending to erect a building on his own land, who must comply with the law as laid down by the Public Health Act, 1875, and with by-laws properly made and published under its provisions.

UCKFIELD RURAL COUNCIL v. CROWBOROUGH WATER Co. Act of 1897 received the Royal assent on July 15 of that year, whilst the by-laws made under the Public Health Act, 1875, were allowed on January 15, 1897. The Waterworks Clauses Act, 1847, which is expressly incorporated in the special Act of 1897 shews, by section 93, that what is to be taken to be incorporated in the special Act is general legislation passed subsequent to its date-that is, 1897. Accordingly, the special Act is exempt from by-laws made under the Public Health Act, 1875. The water company, being specially authorised, are entitled to exercise their discretion how the water tower is to be built, apart from the control of any district authority. The Legislature in passing the special Act intended the work to be carried out in the discretion of the engineer of the water company, and not in the discretion of the engineer of the district authority. Section 93 of the Waterworks Clauses Act, 1847, intended that legislation subsequent to 1897 was to be taken to be incorporated. Where the Legislature has vested special powers in a particular body for a certain special purpose, a general Act subsequently passed will not override those special powers-London and Blackwall Railway v. Limehouse Board of Works. There is a distinction between general and special Acts of Parliament; and where there is a distinct inconsistency, no general rule as to incorporation of prior legislation applies to special Acts-City and South London Railway v. London County Council [1891]. This is not a domestic building, but a water tower, and none of the provisions of by-laws 93 and 94 apply to it, but are, on the contrary, inconsistent with the class of building. By laws may no doubt deal with factory chimneys, but there are none that deal with towers such as this.

RIDLEY, J.-I am of opinion that in dismissing these informations the Justices did not arrive at a correct conclusion, and that the Case must be sent back to them to convict. The respondents were empowered by section 25 of their special Act of 1897 to construct all necessary

(5) 60 L. J. M.C. 149; [1891] 2 Q.B. 513.

One contention of counsel for the company amounts to this - that the Public Health Act, 1875, is not incorporated with the special Act of 1897, and that it ought to be, in order to give effect to these by-laws. But the contention, to be of any value, must go this length-that no Act is to have effect unless specially named. On the contrary, the presumption is that the Public Health Act, 1875-a general Act and part of the law of the land-does apply, although not expressly incorporated, unless it be shewn that the intention of the Legislature was that it should not apply. It is, therefore, in my view, to be presumed that the company's special Water Act of 1897 is not protected or exempted from the provisions of the Public Health Act, 1875, nor from the operation of the by-laws made under and in pursuance of those provisions. Section 93 of the Waterworks Clauses Act, 1847, supports this view. That section is silent as to then existing Sanitary Acts, but is express as to Acts passed in the same session, or to be passed in the future. The principle that this special Waterworks Act of 1897 has been passed subject to the general law of the

UCKFIELD RURAL COUNCIL v. CROWBOROUGH WATER Co.

land remains untouched; and, in my
opinion, there is nothing to shew that
the respondents are exempted from it.
But it was contended, further, that
there was such an inconsistency between
the two Acts as would lead us to infer
that the Legislature had intended the
earlier Act of 1875 to be regarded as
repealed; and in support of this view
London and Blackwall Railway v. Lime-
house Board of Works 2 and City and
South London Railway v. London County
Council 5 were cited. Both these cases are,
however, distinguishable. In the Blackwall
Case the special Act was the earlier, and
conferred special powers on the railway,
which it was held were not to be over-
ridden by a general Act subsequently
passed.
Vice-Chancellor Wood pointed
out that, in considering whether Acts can
or cannot be read together, it is the inten-
tion of the Legislature that must be looked
to. There the subsequent general Act
relied upon by the Limehouse District
Board was said to be inconsistent with
the special Act of the railway; but, look-
ing at the intention of the Legislature,
it was considered that there was no such
inconsistency as would lead the Court to
infer that the special powers of the earlier
Act were intended to be repealed by the sub-
sequent Act. But that decision comes nearer
to supporting the contention of the respon-
dents' counsel than the next he cited-
City and South London Railway v. London
County Council-in which there was a
manifest inconsistency. The railway com-
pany's special Act, passed subsequently to
the Metropolis Management Act, 1862

(25 & 26 Vict. c. 102), gave them power to build on land up to a certain line which projected beyond the general line of buildings. Therefore it was held that the two Acts could not be read together, and that the effect was to repeal section 75 of the earlier Act; if there had not been this inconsistency between them, the decision would have been the other way.

But in the case before us we find that the respondents have power by their special Act to put up a water tower in a field belonging to some one else, and, in our opinion, there is no such inconsistency between this power and the provisions of the appellants' by-laws as to lead us to infer that the latter have been repealed. Accordingly, the water company are subject to the by-laws of the appellants. Upon the other point I am clearly of opinion that the water tower is a building within the meaning of the by-laws. The Case must be remitted to the Justices with our direction that they must convict.

DARLING, J.-I am of the same opinion.
Case remitted.

Solicitors-Lewis & Holman, Lewes, for appellants; Verrall & Borlase, Brighton, for respondents.

[Reported by G. Metcalfe, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.