WATSON, IN RE. I to solicitors who were under the jurisdiction of the Lord Chancellor, and would have been restrained if they had attempted to bring an action to recover these costs. Vice-Chancellor Sir W. Page-Wood says: "It is argued for the defendants, that, in that case "—namely, of treating the costs as a debt for necessaries, implying a contract on the part of the lunatic-" an action might have been brought against the lunatic- -as no doubt it might; and that, therefore, as no proceedings have been taken for six years, nothing can prevent the operation of the Statute of Limitations to bar the claim. But I have considerable doubt whether that is the correct view in a case of this description. Suppose the lunatic had been placed in an asylum under the direction of the Lord Chancellor in Lunacy, and there supplied with the necessaries of life, and that payment for these was not enforced for seven or eight years during the lunacy-Would this Court say that time had run against all the demands? think that the Court would take notice of these circumstances, and of the certainty that the moment any action was brought, the Lord Chancellor would deal with it on a petition in the matter of the lunacy. There might be some difference in the case of a common tradesman; but as regards these solicitors, the Lord Chancellor in Lunacy would have perfect control over them, and would not allow them to enforce their demand; and in this case he appears to have exercised his jurisdiction by ordering taxation of their costs. I think I must take judicial notice of what the Lord Chancellor would do under such circumstances." Does that reasoning apply here? I cannot see how it does. The Vice-Chancellor himself takes notice of the fact that there would be a difference in the case of a tradesman suing for goods supplied. It was established in Brockwell v. Bullock [1889]* that an action might be brought against a Junatic for a debt for necessaries, and that the plaintiff was not compelled to have recourse to proceedings in lunacy (under section 11 of the Lunacy Regulation Act, 1862) to recover the debt. It seems, therefore, to me that, as a (4) 58 L. J. Q.B. 289; 22 Q.B. D. 567. Local Government-Street-Execution of Works-Resolutions-Objections-Amendment-Jurisdiction of Justices-Private Street Works Act, 1892 (55 & 56 Vict. c. 57), 88. 6, 7, and 8. Under the Private Street Works Act, 1892, where, under section 6, a local authority has passed resolutions to do certain works and adopting the surveyor's specifications, plans, estimates, and provisional apportionment, and has given due notice of the resolution adopting the specifications, &c., as required by sub-section 3, a Court of summary jurisdiction, upon objection raised under section 7 by any owner of premises shewn in the provisional apportionment as liable to be charged with part of the expenses of executing the works, has authority, under section 8, to amend the resolutions, plans, &c., and the amended resolutions, plans, &c., take effect as if they had been duly passed by the local authority itself. Where Justices so amend the resolutions, &c., they have jurisdiction to say whether or not any fresh notices shall be published. The Private Street Works Act, 1892,1 was duly adopted for the district of (1) The Private Street Works Act, 1892, provides as follows: Section 6, sub-section 1: "Where any street or part of a street is not sewered, levelled, paved, metalled, flagged, channelled, made good, and lighted to the satisfaction of the urban authority, the urban authority may from time to time resolve with respect to such street or part of a street to do any one or more of the TWICKENHAM URBAN COUNCIL v. MUNTON. Twickenham, and came into operation on February 22, 1893. following works (in this Act called private street works); that is to say, to sewer, level, pave, metal, flag, channel, or make good, or to provide proper means for lighting such street or part of a street; and the expenses incurred by the urban authority in executing private street works shall be apportioned (subject as in this Act mentioned) on the premises fronting, adjoining, or abutting on such street or part of a street. Any such resolution may include several streets or parts of streets, or may be limited to any part or parts of a street." Sub-section 2: "The surveyor shall prepare, as respects each street or part of a street, "(a) A specification of the private street works referred to in the resolution, with plans and sections (if applicable); (b) An estimate of the probable expenses of the works; "(c) A provisional apportionment of the estimated expenses among the premises liable to be charged therewith under this Act. "Such specification, plans, sections, estimate, and provisional apportionment shall comprise the particulars prescribed in Part 1. of the schedule to this Act, and shall be submitted to the urban authority, who may by resolution approve the same respectively with or without modification or addition as they think fit." Sub-section 3: "The resolution approving the specifications, plans, and sections (if any), estimates, and provisional apportionments, shall be published in the manner prescribed in Part II. of the schedule to this Act, and copies thereof shall be served on the owners of the premises shewn as liable to be charged in the provisional apportionment within seven days after the date of the first publication. . . ." Section 7: "During the said month" during which the specifications, &c., were to lie open to inspection at the offices of the local authority, "any owner of any premises shewn in a provisional apportionment as liable to be charged with any part of the expenses of executing the works may, by written notice served on the urban authority, object to the proposals of the urban authority on any of the following grounds (that is to say): "(a) That an alleged street or part of a street is not or does not form part of a street within the meaning of this Act; "(b) That a street or part of a street is (in whole or in part) a highway repairable by the inhabitants at large; "(c) That there has been some material informality, defect, or error in or in respect of the resolution, notice, plans, sections, or estimate; 66 (d) That the proposed works are insufficient or unreasonable, or that the estimated expenses are excessive; "(e) That any premises ought to be excluded On June 27, 1895, the plaintiff council resolved with respect to Montpelier Road, Twickenham, to do the various street works mentioned in section 6 of the Act with the exception of lighting. On July 25, 1895, the plaintiff council passed the following resolution: "That the specifications, plans, sections, estimate, and provisional apportionment prepared by the council's surveyor with reference to the making up of Montpelier Road, Twickenham, be and they are hereby approved." The specifications, &c., mentioned in the resolution related to the whole of Montpelier Road. The resolution was duly published, and copies thereof were served in accordance with sub-section 3 of section 6 of the Act on the defendants and other owners of premises affected thereby. The defendants gave no notice of any objection, but another owner did give such notice, and on January 1, 1896, the Justices held that a part of Montpelier Road was a street repairable by the inhabitants at large, but that the remainder was a private street within the meaning of the Act; and they amended the plans, estimate, and apportionment so as to limit the operation thereof to the latter portion from or inserted in the provisional apportionment; "(ƒ) That the provisional apportionment is incorrect. Section 8, sub-section 1: "The urban authority at any time after the expiration of the said month may apply to a Court of summary jurisdiction to appoint a time for determining the matter of all objections made as in this Act mentioned, and shall publish a notice of the time and place appointed, and copies of such notice shall be served upon the objectors; and at the time and place so appointed any such Court may proceed to hear and determine the matter of all such objections in the same manner as nearly as may be, and with the same powers and subject to the same provisions with respect to stating a case, as if the urban authority were proceeding summarily against the objectors to enforce payment of a sum of money summarily recoverable. The Court may quash in whole or in part or may amend the resolution, plans, sections, estimates, and provisional apportionments, or any of them, on the application either of any objector or of the urban authority. The Court may also, if it thinks fit, adjourn the hearing and direct any further notices to be given." Section 12 gives a protection to a person who has not objected. TWICKENHAM URBAN COUNCIL v. MUNTON. of Montpelier Road; the resolution was so framed as not to require amendment. The Justices did not direct any fresh notices to be served, and no further notices were served, either on the defendants or on any other persons. The plaintiff council issued a summons claiming a declaration that they were entitled, under section 13 of the Act, to a charge on certain houses and lands vested in the defendants, situate in Montpelier Road, for the apportioned amount of the expenses incurred by them in executing the works, together with interest, and for consequential relief. Macmorran, Q.C., and Frank Russell, for the plaintiffs.-The proceedings have been regular, and the plaintiff's are entitled to the order they ask. R. Cunningham Glen, for the defendants. The Justices are not anywhere in the Act given the authority, which the local authority has, to say whether the whole or part of a street shall be made up. The local authority alone can exercise the discretion in the matter, and they have not done so in the present The Justices have, therefore, exceeded their authority in purporting to exercise a jurisdiction to amend the resolutions, plans, &c. In point of fact, they did not amend the resolutions. A proper resolution is a necessary condition of executing the works. case. But, further, it is obvious that, by this action of the Justices, the defendants are deprived of the right of objecting which they would have under section 8, and which they ought to have. On these grounds the plaintiff's ought to have commenced de novo, and the present proceedings are misconceived--Whitchurch V. Fulham Board of Works [1866].2 Macmorran, Q.C., in reply.-In amending the plans, estimates, &c., the Justices in effect amended the resolution-there was only one to amend. Under section 8 they must either amend or dismiss; there is no middle course. Whitchurch v. Fulham Board of Works 2 has no analogy; it was a case under the Metropolis Management Acts, with different procedure. (2) 35 L. J. M.C. 145; L. R. 1 Q.B. 233. Cur. adv. vult. Dec. 10.-STIRLING, J. (after stating the facts and the general framework of the Private Street Works Act).— The defendants are willing to pay the sums mentioned in the summons, provided the whole of Montpelier Road is repaired; but they object to the repair of the portion to which the scheme of the plaintiffs has been limited by the magistrates, as being detrimental to them so long as the rest of the road remains unrepaired; and for this reason they resist the summons on the following grounds. First, it is said that the Justices have exceeded their jurisdiction by taking upon themselves the duties of the urban authority, with whom rests the determination of the question whether the whole or part only of a street is to be repaired. Undoubtedly sub-section 1 of section 6 gives the urban authority the right to decide whether the whole or part of a street is to be repaired, and in the present case the plaintiff council did by resolution determine that the whole of Montpelier Road should be repaired. Sub-section 2, however, provides that the specification, estimate, and provisional apportionment of the proposed works shall be submitted to the urban authority, "who may by resolution approve the same respectively, with or without modification or addition, as they think fit." In this case the approval was without modification or addition. Sub-section 3 provides for due notice of the last-mentioned resolution being given to the owners of the premises shewn as liable to be charged, any one of whom may (section 7) take objection to the proposed works on the following amongst other grounds: "(a) That an alleged street or part of a street is not or does not form part of a street within the meaning of this Act; (b) That a street or part of a street is (in whole or in part) a highway repairable by the inhabitants at large." Section 8 provides that such objections shall be dealt with by a Court of summary jurisdiction, and it is provided that the Court may quash TWICKENHAM URBAN COUNCIL v. MUNTON. in whole or in part, or may amend, the resolution, plans, &c., or any of them; and may also, if it think fit, adjourn the hearing, and direct any further notices to be given. The Now, here the Court did not quash the resolution, or the plans, sections, estimate, or provisional apportionment, but amended the plans, estimates, and apportionment without touching the resolution, which, however, is so framed as not to require verbal alteration. jurisdiction of the Court of summary authority to amend a resolution, &c., appears to me to exist in a case where the objection taken is that the street or part of the street is a highway repairable by the inhabitants at large no less than where the objection is of any other nature specified in section 7; and, where the jurisdiction is exercised, I can find nothing in the Act which renders it necessary that the urban authority should begin their proceedings de novo, or pass a resolution limiting the works to the part of the street which is not repairable by the public. I think that the amended resolutions and plans are meant to take effect as if they had been duly passed by the urban authority itself. In my judgment, therefore, the Justices did not exceed their jurisdiction. Secondly, it was said that the defendants have been deprived of all opportunity of taking objection to the works now proposed to be executed. This is true, but it lay with the Court of summary jurisdiction to say whether or not further notices should be given to the defendants or the other owners or not. The Justices had a discretion on the subject, and they exercised the discretion. LAWRANCE, J. CHANNELL, J. WEST LANCASHIRE RURAL COUNCIL v. OGILVY. [68 L. J. Q.B. 215.] Local Government Water Supply Cost of Providing Supply to HouseLimit as to Amount-Remedy of OwnerPublic Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), s. 62—Public Health (Water) Act, 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 25), s. 3. The limitation as to the cost of providing a water supply to a house contained in section 3 of the Public Health (Water) Act, 1878, does not apply to section 62 of the Public Health Act, 1875. Where, under section 62 of the Act of 1875, an owner is required by the local authority to obtain a water supply from an unreasonable distance, the remedy of the owner is by way of appeal to the Local Government Board under section 268 of that Act. Case stated by Justices for the county of Lancaster. The respondent Ogilvy was summoned upon the complaint of the appellants, the West Lancashire Rural District Council, to shew cause why an order should not be made for payment by him to the appellants of the sum of 67. 10s. 5d., being the balance of expenses incurred by the appellants in executing works for obtaining and furnishing a supply of water for or in respect of certain premises situate at Holmeswood Tarleton, in the West Lancashire rural sanitary district, of which the respondent was at the time of the execution of such works the owner. The appellants were the local authority within the meaning of that term as defined by section 4 of the Public Health Act, 1875, for the rural sanitary district of West Lancashire, and the respondent was the owner of the dwelling-house, farm, and lands known as Shortwood Hall, situate at Tarleton, in the said district. In 1897 the appellants, acting under the powers conferred upon them by the Public Health Act, 1875, provided a supply of water for [Reported by Arthur Lawrence, Esq., Tarleton, and (inter alia) laid down at a Here, again, they acted within their jurisdiction, and I think that this objection also fails. For these reasons, I think that the plaintiffs are entitled to the order they ask. Solicitors-Ruston, Clark & Ruston, for plain- Barrister-at-Law. cost of about 340l. a three-inch water main or pipe in a highway known as Marsh Lane for the supply of Shortwood WEST LANCASHIRE RURAL COUNCIL v. Hall and other premises belonging to the respondent. There was no invitation to the appellants on the part of the respondent to furnish such supply. In order to provide the supply the appellants laid in a public footpath to a point about 293 yards from Shortwood Hall a branch main or pipe which was connected with the main or pipe in Marsh Lane. The footpath was upon land of which the respondent was the owner, and the land between such footpath and Shortwood Hall was also the property of the respondent. The mains so laid by the appellants were connected with other mains forming part of the appellants' water system to Marsh Lane, and by means of such mains water could on October 5, 1897, have been furnished to Shortwood Hall had it been connected therewith by means of service pipes and the necessary fittings thereto. By an order dated June 19, 1897, the Local Government Board, in pursuance of section 8 of the Public Health (Water) Act, 1878, duly fixed a general scale of charges for the compulsory supply of water to houses within the area of that part of the West Lancashire rural sanitary_district which comprises the township of Tarleton, and determined and declared that the charge for a supply of water according to the scale so fixed should be deemed to be a reasonable cost within the meaning of section 62 of the Public Health Act, 1875, and section 8 of the Public Health (Water) Act, 1878. On October 5, 1897, the appellants' surveyor examined Shortwood Hall and found that it was without a proper supply of water, and on October 7 reported such fact to the appellants, and also reported that a proper supply of water could be furnished thereto at a cost not exceeding the scale of charges authorised by order of the Local Government Board. On October 7, 1897, the appellants, being satisfied on the report of their surveyor that the respondent's house, Shortwood Hall, was without a proper supply of water, and that such supply of water could be furnished thereto by them at a cost not exceeding the scale of charges. authorised by the order of the Local Government Board, resolved that notice in writing be given to the respondent re OGILVY. quiring him to obtain such supply, and to do all such works as might be necessary for that purpose; and in pursuance of the resolution notice, dated October 16, 1897, was duly served upon the respondent requiring him, in pursuance of the provisions of the Public Health Act, 1875, within the space of fourteen days from the service of such notice upon him, to obtain a proper supply of water for the said house, and to do all such works as might be necessary for that purpose, and provide and lay a branch from the appellants' main and affix a tap thereto on the premises. The respondent not having complied with the notice within the time therein specified, the appellants on or about May 17, 1898, caused the works necessary for obtaining a proper supply of water to Shortwood Hall from their main in the said footpath to be executed, and in so doing incurred expenses amounting to the sum of 197. 10s. 5d., which sum was duly demanded by the appellants from the respondent, who paid to the appellants the sum of 137., which he stated was, in his opinion, the maximum amount an owner could be required to pay, at the same time stating that he must not be taken as admitting that under the proceeding adopted by the appellants they were entitled to charge the owner any part of the cost of the works. On behalf of the appellants it was contended that they had power under section 62 of the Public Health Act, 1875,1 (1) By section 62 of the Public Health Act, 1875: "Where on the report of the surveyor of a local authority it appears to such authority that any house within their district is without a proper supply of water, and that such a supply of water can be furnished thereto at a cost not exceeding the water rate authorised by any local Act in force within the district, or where there is not any local Act so in force at a cost not exceeding twopence a week, or at such other cost as the Local Government Board may, on the application of the local authority, determine under all the circumstances of the case to be reasonable, the local authority shall give notice in writing to the owner, requiring him, within a time specified, to obtain such supply, and to do all such works as may be necessary for that purpose. "If such notice is not complied with within the time specified, the local authority may, if they think fit, do such works and obtain such supply, . . . and any expenses incurred by the |