which Lincoln gave him, replying, "Your telegram, CHAP.XIX. just received, saves Western Tennessee." It was found by the Washington authorities that the early reports of McClellan's reverses had been unduly exaggerated, and that by straining resources in the East the Western armies might be left undiminished. But with this conviction President Lincoln also reached the decision that the failure of the Richmond campaign must be remedied by radical measures. To devise new plans, to elaborate and initiate new movements, he needed the help of the highest attainable professional skill. None seemed at the moment so available as that of Halleck. Under his administration order had come out of chaos in Missouri, and under his guiding control, however feeble in the particular cases that we have pointed out, the Western armies had won the victories of Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Pea Ridge, Shiloh, Island No. 10, and Corinth. It was a record of steady success, which justified the belief that a general had been found who might be intrusted with the direction of the war in its larger combinations. The weakness of his present plans had not yet been developed. Accordingly on the 11th of July this order was made by the President: "That Major-General Henry W. Halleck be assigned to command the whole land forces of the United States as general-in-chief, and that he repair to this capital as soon as he can with safety to Vol. XVII., the positions and operations within the department under his charge." It seemed at the moment the best that could be done. In his short Corinth campaign Halleck had substantially demonstrated his unfitness for the Lincoln, Order, July 11, 1862. W. R. Part II., p. 90. CHAP. XIX. leadership of an army in the field. He had made a grievous mistake in coming away from his department headquarters at St. Louis. He was a thinker and not a worker; his proper place was in the military study and not in the camp. No other soldier in active service equaled him in the technical and theoretical acquirements of his profession. The act of the President in bringing him to Washington restored him to his more natural duty. In following the further career of Halleck, one of the incidents attending this transfer needs to be borne in mind. The first intimation of the change came in the President's dispatch of the 2d of July which asked: "Please tell me could you make me a flying visit for consultation without endangering the service in your department?" A few days later one of the President's friends went from Washington to Corinth bearing a letter of introduction to Halleck, explaining among other things: "I know the object of his visit to you. He has my cheerful consent to go, but not my direction. He wishes to get you and part of your force, one or both, to come here. You already know I should be exceedingly glad of this if in your judgment it could Vol. XVI., be without endangering positions and operations in the Southwest." To this Halleck replied on July 10: "Governor Sprague is here. If I were to go to Washington I could advise but one to Lincoln, thing-to place all the forces in North Carolina, Vol. XVI., Virginia, and Washington under one head, and hold that head responsible for the result." Lincoln to July 6, 1862. W. R. Part II., p. 100. Halleck July 10, 1862. W. R. Part II., p. 117. It is doubtful if Halleck measured fully the import of his language; or whether he realized the danger and burden of the responsibility which, if he did not invite, he at least thus voluntarily CHAP. XIX. assumed. Nominally he became general-in-chief, but in actual practice his genius fell short of the high duties of that great station. While he rendered memorable service to the Union, his judgment and resolution sometimes quailed before the momentous requirements of his office, and thrust back upon the President the critical and decisive acts which overawed him. In reality, he was from the first only what he afterwards became by technical orders the President's chief-of-staff. CHAPTER XX YORKTOWN CHAP. XX. ENERAL MCCLELLAN arrived at Fort Mon GE roe on the morning of the 2d of April, 1862, to begin the campaign against Richmond on the route chosen by himself. According to his own report he had the next day ready to move 58,000 men and 100 guns, besides the division artillery. They were of the flower of the volunteer army, and included also Sykes's brigade of regulars, Hunt's artillery reserve, and several regiments of cavalry. These were all on the spot, prepared to march, and an almost equal number were on their way to join him. He seemed at first to appreciate the necessity for prompt and decisive action, and with only one day's delay issued his orders for the march up the Peninsula between the York and James rivers. The first obstacle that he expected to meet was the force of General J. B. Magruder at Yorktown, which McClellan estimated at from 15,000 to 20,000. Magruder says his force consisted of 11,000, of Magruder, which 6000 were required for the fortifications of Report. W. R. Vol. XI., Part I., p. 405. Yorktown and only 5000 were left to hold the line across the Peninsula, 13 miles in length. His only object was to delay as long as possible the advance of the National troops upon Richmond, and his CHAP. XX. dispositions were made to that end. If he had had troops enough, he says that he would have made his line of defense between Ship Point, on the York, and the mouth of the Warwick, on the James. But his force being insufficient for that purpose, he took up as a second line the Warwick River, which heads only a mile or so from Yorktown and empties into the James some thirteen miles to the south. Yorktown and its redoubts, united by long curtains and flanked by rifle-pits, formed the left of his line, which was continued by the Warwick River, a sluggish and boggy stream running through a dense wood fringed with swamps. The stream was dammed in two places, at Wynn's Mill and at Lee's Mill; and Magruder constructed three more dams to back up the river and make the fords impassable. Each of these dams was protected by artillery and earthworks. General McClellan was ignorant not only of these preparations made to receive him, but also of the course of the river and the nature of the ground through which it ran. He knew something of the disposition of Magruder's outposts on his first line, and rightly conjectured that they would retire as he advanced. His orders for the 4th of April were therefore punctually carried out, and he seemed to expect no greater difficulty in his plan for the next day.' He divided his force into two columns - Heintzelman to take the right and march directly to Yorktown; and Keyes, taking the road to the left, to push on to the Half-way 1 In a letter on the 3d he wrote: "I hope to get possession of Yorktown day after to-morrow." 1862. |