Your Power accompanying this Letter, is joint and several, authorizing you to confer and treat with Ministers, also duly authorized, from all or any of the American Powers, of Peace, Friendship, Commerce, Navigation, Maritime Law, Neutral and Belligerent Rights, and other matters interesting to the Continent of America. After the mutual exchange of Powers, it will be necessary to determine the forms of deliberation, and the modes of proceeding, of the Congress. It is distinctly understood, by the President, that it is to be regarded, in all respects, as Diplomatic, in contradistinction to a Body clothed with powers of ordinary Legislation; that is to say, no one of the States represented is to be considered bound by any Treaty, Convention, Pact, or Act, to which it does not subscribe, and expressly assent by its acting Representative; and that in the instance of Treaties, Conventions, and Pacts, they are to be returned, for final Ratification, to each contracting State, according to the Provisions of its particular Constitution. All idea is, therefore, excluded of binding a minority to Agreements and Acts contrary to its will, by the mere circumstance of the concurrence of a majority of the States in those Agreements and Acts. Each State will, consequently, be governed and left free, according to its own sense of its particular interests. All notion is rejected of an Amphyctionic Council, invested with power fiually to decide Controversies between the American States, or to regulate, in any respect, their conduct.

Such a Council might have been well enough adapted to a number of small contracted States, whose united Territory would fall short of the extent of that of the smallest of the American Powers. The complicated and various interests which appertain to the Nations of this vast Continent, cannot be safely confided to the superintendence of one Legislative Authority. We should almost as soon expect to see an Amphyctionic Council to regulate the affairs of the whole Globe. But even if it were desirable to establish such a Tribunal, it is beyond the competency of the Government of The United States, voluntarily to assent to it, without a previous change of their actual Constitution. Although the speculation of such a Council has been sometimes made, and associated in Publick Papers with the contemplated Congress, we can hardly anticipate that it will be seriously pressed by any of the Powers. The Congresses, which have been so common in Europe, especially within these later times, have been altogether Diplomatic, and, consequently, the States whose Ministers composed them, were only bound by their signatures. With this necessary and indispensable restriction, upon the action of the Congress, great advantages may, nevertheless, be derived from an Assembly, at the same time and place, of Ministers from all the American Nations. Such an Assembly will afford great facilities for free and friendly Conferences, for mutual and necessary explanations, and for discussing and establishing some

general principles, applicable to Peace and War, to Commerce and Navigation, with the sanction of all America. Treaties may be concluded, in the course of a few months, at such a Congress, laying the foundations of lasting amity and good neighbourhood, which it would require many Years to consummate, if, indeed, they would be at all practicable, by separate and successive Negotiations, conducted between the several Powers, at different times and places. Keeping constantly in view the essential character and object of the Congress, which have been described, it is not very important in what manner its conferences and discussions may be regulated. Experience has, perhaps, sufficiently established that, for precision, for safety to the Negotiators themselves, and for an early practical result, it is wisest to proceed by Protocol, in which the mutual propositions of the Parties, together with such concise observations as any of them desire to have preserved, are carefully recorded. But you are left free to agree to that mode of proceeding, with the indispensable limitation before stated, which, under all circumstances, shall appear to you most advisable. Your Power conveys an authority to treat with all or any of the Nations represented at the Congress, of any of the subjects comprised in your Instructions. And on those, especially of Commerce and Navigation, Maritime Law and Neutral and Belligerent Rights, it is the President's wish that, if those interests cannot be adjusted satisfactorily to all the attending Powers, you should form, nevertheless, Treaties with such as may be disposed to conclude them with you. But in the conduct of any such separate Negotiations, you will carefully avoid giving any occasion of offence to those Powers who may decline Treating; and, if you should have strong reason to believe that the fact itself of opening such separate Negotiations would have the tendency of creating unfriendly feelings and relations with other American Powers, you will decline entering on them altogether. You are also authorized to agree upon a transfer of the Conferences from Panama to any other place on the American Continent that may be considered more eligible for conducting them.

In now proceeding to direct your attention particularly to the Instructions of the President, by which, after having settled the preliminary point to which I have just adverted, you will govern yourselves, the first observation to be made is, that, in acceding to the invitation which has been accepted, no intention has been entertained to change the present pacific and neutral policy of The United States. On the contrary, it has been distinctly understood by the three Republicks who gave the invitation, and has been enforced on our part, in all our communications with them in regard to it, that The United States would strictly adhere to that policy, and mean faithfully to perform all their neutral obligations. Whilst the existing War is limited to the present Parties, it is as unnecessary, as it would be

unwise, in The United States, to become a Belligerent. A state of things can hardly be imagined in which they would voluntarily take part on the side of Spain; and on that of the Republicks, it would be entirely useless, since they have been all along able, unaided, triumphantly to maintain their Cause, and to conquer the arms, if they have not overcome the obstinacy, of Spain. By maintaining the neutral position which The United States have assumed, they have been enabled to hold strong language to Europe, and successfully to check any disposition which existed there to assist Spain in the re-conquest of the Colonies. If they had departed from their Neutrality, and precipitated themselves into the War, there was much reason to apprehend that their exertions might have been neutralized, if not overbalanced, by those of other Powers who would have been drawn by that rash example, into the War in behalf of Spain. Keeping, therefore, constantly in view the settled specific policy of The United States, and the duties which flow from their neutrality, the subjects will now be particularized, which, it is anticipated, will engage the consideration of the Congress at Panama.

In respect to the first,
Discussions of them
You will refrain from

These subjects may be arranged under two general heads. 1st. Such as relate to the future prosecution of the present War with Spain, by the combined or separate operation of the American Belligerents. And, 2dly. Those in which all the Nations of America, whether neutral or belligerent, may have an interest. for reasons already stated, we can take no part. must be confined to the Parties to the War. engaging in them. You will not be expected or desired to do so. But, whilst it has been perfectly understood that The United States could not, at the Congress, jeopard their Neutrality, they may be urged to contract an Alliance, offensive and defensive, on the contingency of an attempt by the Powers of Europe, commonly called the Holy Alliance, either to aid Spain to reduce the new American Republicks to their ancient Colonial state, or to compel them to adopt political systems more conformable to the policy and views of that Alliance. Upon the supposition of such an attempt being actually made, there can be no doubt what it would be the interest and bounden duty of The United States to do. Their late Chief Magistrate solemnly declared what, in that event, he considered they ought to do. The People of The United States acquiesced in the declaration, and their present Chief Magistrate entirely concurs in it. If, indeed, the Powers of continental Europe could have allowed themselves to engage in the War, for either of the purposes just indicated, The United States, in opposing them with their whole force, would have been hardly entitled to the merit of acting on the impulse of a generous sympathy, with infant, oppressed and struggling Nations.

The United States, in the contingencies which have been stated,

would have been compelled to fight their own proper battles, not less so because the storm of War happened to rage on another part of this Continent, at a distance from their borders. For it cannot be doubted that the presumptuous spirit which would have impelled Europe upon the other American Republicks, in aid of Spain, or on account of the forms of their political Institutions, would not have been appeased, if her arms, in such an unrighteous Contest, should have been successful, until they were extended here, and every vestige of human freedom had been obliterated within these States.

There was a time when such designs were seriously apprehended: and it is believed that the declaration of the late President to the Congress of The United States, which has been already referred to, had a powerful effect in disconcerting and arresting their progress. About the same period, Great Britain manifested a determination to pursue the same policy in regard to the New Republicks, which The United States had previously marked out for themselves. After these two great Maritime Powers, Great Britain and The United States, had let Continental Europe know that they would not see with indifference any forcible interposition in behalf of Old Spain, it was evident that no such interposition would, or with any prospect of success could, be afforded. Accordingly, since that period, there have been no intimations of any designs on the part of the European Alliance, against the new American Republicks. If that Alliance has seen, with any dissatisfaction, (as may be well imagined,) the successful progress of those Republicks, both in the War and in the establishment of their free Political Systems, they have confined themselves to silent and unavailing regrets.

The auspicious course of events has not only occasioned the abandonment of any hostile intentions which were entertained, if such were ever entertained, by the European Alliance, but there is strong reason to hope that it has led to the creation of pacific, if not friendly, views towards our Sister Republicks. Upon the entry of the President of The United States on the duties of his present Office, his attention was anxiously directed to, and has been since unremittingly employed on, the object of establishing Peace between Spain and those Republicks. In considering the means for its accomplishment, no very sanguine hope was indulged from an approach to Spain directly, and it was thought best to endeavour to operate on her through that Alliance, on whose countenance and support she mainly relied for the recovery of the Colonies. Russia was known to be the soul of that Alliance, and to the Emperor, of whose wisdom and friendship The United States had so many proofs, the appeal was at once made. A Copy of the Note from this Department to the American Minister at St. Petersburg on that subject,* accompanies these Instructions. Copies See State Papers, 1825, 1826, page 403.

of it were transmitted, contemporaneously, to the Courts of London and Paris, whose co-operation in the work of Peace was also invited. Our Minister at Madrid was instructed to lose no fit occasion there for creating or strengthening a disposition towards Peace. The hope was cherished that, by a general and concerted movement of The United States, and the great Powers of Europe, at the same time, the Councils of Spain might be prevailed upon to accede to a Peace, which had become more necessary, if possible, to her, than to the New Republicks. An Answer has been lately received here from St. Petersburg, through Mr. Middleton, a Copy of which, together with Copies of his accompanying Notes, is placed in your hands. From a perusal of these Documents, the contents of which have been confirmed by the Russian Minister, in official interviews which I have had with him, you will perceive that the appeal to Russia has not been without effect; and that the late Emperor, sensible of the necessity of Peace, prior to his death probably employed his good offices to bring it about. His Successor has formally announced his intention to tread in the path of his illustrious Predecessor, and it is, therefore, most likely that he will also direct the influence of that Government to the conclusion of a Peace satisfactory to both Parties. It is possible that these efforts may not be effectual, and that the pride and obstinacy of Spain may be unconquerable. There is, however, much reason to hope, that she may either consent to a Peace, upon the basis of the Independence of the Colonies, or if she feels that too humiliating, that she will agree to a suspension of hostilities, as was formerly done in the case of the Low Countries, which would, in the end, inevitably lead to a formal acknowledgment of the actual Independence of the New Republicks. Whatever may be the future course of Spain, the favourable reception which the Emperor of Russia has given to the overture of The United States, to say nothing of the known inclination of France and other Powers of the European Continent, to follow the example of The United States and Great Britain, fully authorizes the conclusion that the Holy Alliance will not engage in the War, on the side of Spain, but will persevere in their actual neutrality. The danger, therefore, from that quarter having disappeared, there can be no necessity, at this time, for an offensive and defensive Alliance between the American Powers, which could only find a justification, at any period, in the existence or continuation of such a danger. Such an Alliance, under present circumstances, would be worse than useless; since it might tend to excite feelings in the Emperor of Russia and his Allies, which should not be needlessly touched or provoked.

The Republick of Colombia has recently requested the friendly interposition of this Government to prevail upon Spain to agree to an Armistice, upon the conditions mentioned in Mr. Salazar's Note, of