 | United States. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident - 1986 - 792 strani
...because they "got away with it last time." As Commissioner Feynman observed, the decision making was: "a kind of Russian roulette. . . . [The Shuttle] flies...but it shouldn't be done over and over again like that."154 4. NASA's system for tracking anomalies for Flight Readiness Reviews failed in that, despite... | |
 | Kip Schlegel, David Weisburd - 1994 - 404 strani
...1986) observed, the decision making was a kind of Russian roulette . . . (the shuttle flys with 0-ring erosion) and nothing happens. Then it is suggested,...therefore, that the risk is no longer so high for the next flight. We can lower our standards a little bit because we got away with it last time. . . . You got... | |
 | Diane Vaughan - 1996 - 608 strani
...nothing happens. Then it is suggested, therefore, that risk is no longer so high. For the next flight we can lower our standards a little bit because we got away with it last time. ... It is a kind of Russian roulette. You got away with it, and it was a risk."58 On the surface, the... | |
 | James Messerschmidt - 1997 - 148 strani
..."got away with it last time." As one member of the President's Commission (1986, p. 148) observed: [The shuttle] flies [with O-ring erosion] and nothing...little bit because we got away with it last time. In other words, because flight after flight was "successful" (an explosion did not occur), this rationalized... | |
 | Pushkala Prasad - 1997 - 408 strani
...decision-making philosophy that Commissioner Richard Feynman described as "a kind of Russian Roulette. . . . We can lower our standards a little bit because we got away with it last time." (Rogers, 1986, p. 2469) Two near disasters in early 1985 put that complacency to the test. During a... | |
 | Ronald J. Burke - 1997 - 112 strani
...decision-making philosophy that Commissioner Richard Feynman described as "a kind of Russian Roulette. . . . We can lower our standards a little bit because we got away with it last time." (Rogers, 1986, p. 2469) Two near-disasters in early 1985 put that complacency to the test. During a... | |
 | T. Hugh Pennington - 2003 - 250 strani
...Alamos scientist, Nobel Laureate and member of the President's Commission, observed, decision making was 'a kind of Russian roulette . . . (The Shuttle) flies...a little bit because we got away with it last time The 'redundancy' and 'remoteness' paradigms were swept away when the Challenger blew up at 16.39 GMT... | |
 | Marion K. Pinsdorf - 2004 - 294 strani
...flies and nothing happens. Thus it is suggested that the risk is no longer so high. For the next flight we can lower our standards a little bit because we got away with it last time. It is a kind of Russian roulette. 43 Just the day before the launch, the possible failure of the O-rings... | |
 | Dimitris N. Chorafas - 2004 - 370 strani
...roulette. . . . The shuttle flies (with O-ring erosion) and nothing happens. Then it is suggested . . . that the risk is no longer so high for the next flights....but it shouldn't be done over and over again like that.1 Science has tools for attacking such problems. NASA was not using them. Something similar happens... | |
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Feynman observed, the decision making was: "a kind of Russian roulette. . . . [The Shuttle] flies [with O-ring erosion] and nothing happens. Then it is suggested, therefore, that the risk is no longer so high for the next flights. We can lower our standards... 
