*365 stood 15 or 20 feet from the channel of Mo- | Co. 21 Wall. 389, 22 L. ed. 619; Panama R. bile river or bay, in water 12 or 15 feet deep, and was built on piles driven firmly into the bottom. There is no question that it was attached to the realty, and that it was a part of it by the ordinary criteria of the common law. On this ground the district court declined jurisdiction, and dismissed the libel. The Blackheath, 122 Fed. 112. Co. v. Napier Shipping Co. 166 U. 8. 280, 41 L. ed. 1004, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 572. Compare The Rock Island Bridge, 6 Wall. 213, 18 L. ed. 753. But, as has been suggested, there seems to be no reason why the fact that the injured property was afloat should have more weight in determining the jurisdiction than the fact that the cause of the injury was. The Arkansas, 5 McCrary, 364, 17 Fed. 383, 387; The F. & P. M. No. 2, 33 Fed. 511, 515; Hughes, Admiralty, 183. And again, it seems more arbitrary than rational to treat attachment to the soil as a peremptory bar, outweighing the considerations that the injured thing was an instrument of naviga rounded on every side by water, a mere point projecting from the sea. In The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20, sub nom. Hough v. Western Transp. Co. 18 L. ed. 125, where a libel was brought by the owners of a wharf burned by a fire negligently started on a vessel, the jurisdiction was denied by this court. See also Ex parte Phenix Ins. Co. 118 U. S. 610, 30 L. ed. 274, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 25. In two later cases there are dictation, and no part of the shore, but surdenying the jurisdiction equally when a building on shore is damaged by a vessel running into it. Johnson v. Chicago & P. Elevator Co. 119 U. S. 388, 30 L. ed. 447, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 254; Homer Ramsdell Transp. Co. v. La Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, 182 U. S. 406, 411, 45 L. ed. 1155, 1159, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 831. And there are a number of decisions of district and other courts since The Plymouth, which more or less accord with the conclusion of the court below. See note to Campbell v. H. Hackfeld & Co. 62 C. C. A. 287–290. It would be simple, if simplicity were the only thing to be considered, to confine the admiralty jurisdiction, in respect of damage to property, to damage done to property afloat. That distinction sounds like a logical consequence of the rule determining the admiralty cognizance of torts by place. On the other hand, it would be a strong thing to say that Congress has no constitu- | tional power to give the admiralty here as broad a jurisdiction as it has in England or France. Or, if that is in some degree precluded, it ought at least to be possible for Congress to authorize the admiralty to give redress for damage by a ship, in a case like | this, to instruments and aids of navigation prepared and owned by the government. But Congress cannot enlarge the constitutional grant of power, and therefore if it could permit a libel to be maintained, one can be maintained now. We are called on by the appellees to say that the remedy for any case of damage to a fixture is outside the constitutional grant. The precise scope of admiralty jurisdiction is not a matter of obvious principle or of very accurate history. As to principle, it is clear that if the beacon had been in fault, and had hurt the ship, a libel could have been maintained against a private owner, although not in rem. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Philadelphia & H. de G. Steam Towboat Co. 23 How. 209, 16 L. ed. 433; Atlee v. Northwestern Union Packet' 1 As to history, while, as it is well known, the admiralty jurisdiction of this country has not been limited by the local traditions of England (The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 574, 22 L. ed. 654, 661), the traditions of England favor it in a case like this. The admiral's authority was not excluded by attachment even to the main shore. From before the time of Rowghton's Articles be could hold inquest over nuisances there to navigation, and order their abatement. Black Book (Twiss) 224, art. 7; Clerke, Praxis; 1 Select Pleas in Adm., 6 Seld. Soc. Publ., xlv., lxxx.; Articles of Feb. 18, 1633, Exton, Maritime Dicæology, pp. 262, 263; 8 Hale, De Port., chap. 7, p. 88, in Hargrave, Law Tracts; Zouch, in Malynes, Lex Merc., 3d ed. 122; 1 Comyns's Digest, Admiralty, E. 13. See Benedict, Admiralty, 3d ed. § 151; De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gall. 398, 470, 471, note, Fed. Cas. No. 3,776. Coke mentions that "of latter times by the let ters patents granted to the lord admirall he hath power to erect beacons, seamarks and signs for the sea, etc." 4 Co. Inst. 148, 149. To the French admiral, it is expressly stated, belonged "contraincte et pugnicion, tant en criminel que en civil,” in this matter. 1 Black Book, 445, 446. See Crosse v. Diggs, 1 Sid. 158. Spelman says: "The place absolutely subject to the jurisdiction of the admiraltie, is the sea, which seemeth to comprehend publick rivers, fresh waters, creekes, and surrounded places whatsoever within the ebbing and flowing of the sea at the highest water." Eng. Works, 2d ed. 226. Finally, by the articles of February 18, 1633, all the judges of England agreed that the admiralty jurisdiction extended to "injuries there which concern navigation upon the sea." Exton, Maritime Dicæology, ad fin., pp. 262, 263. And "if the libel be founded upon one single continued act, which was principally upon the sea, though part was upon land, a prohibition 998. 898. will not go." Comyns's Digest, Admiralty, |-injured by the motion of the vessel, by a F. 5; 1 Rolle, Abr. 533, pl. 18. What the early law seems most to have looked to as fixing the liability of the ship was the motion of the vessel, which was treated as giving it the character of a responsible cause. Bracton recognizes this as an extravagance, but admits the fact, for the common law. 122a, 136b. 1 Select Pleas of the Crown, 1 Seld. Soc. Pub. 84. The same was true in admiralty. Rowghton, ubi sup. art. 50; 2 Rotulæ Parlimentariæ, 345, 346, 372a, b; 3 Rotulæ Parlimentariæ 94a, 1206, 121a; 4 Rotulæ Parlimentariæ 12a, b, 4926, 493. The responsibility of the moving cause took the form of deodand when it occasioned death, like the steam engine in Queen v. Eastern Counties R. Co. 10 Mees. & W. 59, and innumerable early instances, but it was not confined to such cases. 2 Black Book (Twiss) 379. But compare 1 Select Pleas in Adm., 6 Seld. Soc. Publ. lxxi., lxxii. The principle has remained until the present day. United States v. The Malek Adhel, 2 How. 210, 234, 11 L. ed. 239, 249; The China, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. ed. 67. The foregoing references seem to us enough to show that to maintain jurisdiction in this case is no innovation even upon the old English law. But a very little history is sufficient to justify the conclusion that the Constitution does not prohibit what convenience and reason demand. continuous act, beginning and consummated Mr. Justice Brown, concurring: I do not dissent from the conclusion of the court, although for forty years the broad language of Mr. Justice Nelson in the case of The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20, sub nom. Hough v. Western Transp. Co. 18 L. ed. 125, has been accepted by the profession and the admiralty courts as establishing the principle that the jurisdiction of the admiralty does not extend to injuries received by any structure affixed to the land, though such injuries were caused by a ship or other floating body. It received the approval of this court in the case of E parte Phenix Ins. Co. 118 U. S. 610, 30 L. ed. 274, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 25, and in that of Johnson V. Chicago & P. Elevator Co. 119 U. 8. 388, 30 L. ed. 447, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 254, and has been followed by the courts of at least a dozen different districts, and applied to bridges, piers, derricks, and every other class of structure permanently affixed to the soil. I do not think this case can be distinguished from the prior ones, as, in my opin whether a beacon be affixed to piles driven into the bottom of the river or to a stone projecting from the bottom, or whether it be surrounded by 12 feet or 1 foot of water, or whether the injury be done to a wharf projecting into a navigable water, or to a beacon standing there, or whether the damage be caused by a negligent fire or by bad steering. In the case of The Plymouth there was nothing maritime in the nature of the tort for which the vessel was attached. The fact that the fire originated on a vessel gave no character to the result, and that circum-ion, it makes no difference in principle stance is mentioned in the judgment of the court, and is contrasted with collision, although the consideration is not adhered to as the sole ground for the decree. It has been given weight in other cases. Campbell v. H. Hackfeld & Co. 62 C. C. A. 274, 125 Fed. 696; Queen v. London Court Judge [1892] 1 Q. B. 273, 294; Benedict, Admiralty, 3d ed. § 308. Moreover, the damage was done wholly upon the mainland. It never has been decided that every fixture in the midst of the sea was governed by the same rule. The contrary has been supposed in some American cases (The Arkansas, 5 McCrary, 364, 17 Fed. 383, 387; The F. & P. M. No. 2, 33 Fed. 511, 515), and is indicated by the English books cited above. It is unnecessary to determine the relative weight of the different elements of distinction between The Plymouth and the case at bar. It is enough to say that we now are dealing with an injury to a government aid to navigation from ancient times subject to the admiralty,—a beacon emerging from the water, I accept this case as practically overruling the former ones, and as recognizing the principle adopted by the English admiralty court jurisdiction act of 1861 (§ 7), extending the jurisdiction of the admiralty court to "any claim for damages by any ship." This has been held in many cases to include damage done to a structure affixed to the land. The distinction between damage done to fixed and to floating structures is a somewhat artificial one, and, in my view, founded upon no sound principle; and the fact that Congress, under the Constitution, cannot extend our admiralty jurisdiction, affords an argument for a broad interpretation com *367 69%. mensurate with the needs of modern commerce. To attempt to draw the line of jurisdiction between different kinds of fixed structures, as, for instance, between beacons and wharves, would lead to great confusion and much further litigation. (195 U. S. 369) CITIZENS' NATIONAL BANK OF KAN- v. M. S. C. DONNELL Usury by national banks. 1. By compounding interest oftener than is issory note is met by the plea of usury may [No. 36.] Argued November 1, 1904. Decided ber 28, 1904. *Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court: his ing he This is a writ of error to the supreme court of Missouri on the ground that the plaintiff in error is denied the rights with regard to charging interest conferred upon it by the national banking act. Rev. Stat. §§ 5197, 5198, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3493. The suit was brought by the plaintiff in error upon a promissory note for $20,000, with interest at 8 per cent, made on April 29, 1892. The facts, shortly stated, are as follows: On October 29, 1892, the plaintiff bought the defendant's note for $15,000, with interest at 7 per cent. On July 12, 1895, the defendant being behindhand with payments of interest and also havoverdrawn a bank account which kept in the plaintiff's bank, he gave the plaintiff a new note for $17,500, and interest at 7 per cent, in satisfaction of both liabilities. The amount of this note included three semiannual interest charges of $525 each, with a few days' further interest, on the former note, with interest on this interest from the time it was due, and charges of 1 per cent or more a month on the amount overdrawn each month. It left the defendant with a credit on his bank account of $230.50. On April 29, 1896, the note in suit and another note for $2,000 were given in satisfaction of the last note for $17,500, and of another note for $2,500, of October 1, 1895, with interest accrued on both, and of an overdraft of $919.90, and a balance of $2.42. The overdraft item included, as before, charges of about 1 per cent a month on the amounts actually overdrawn. The supreme court of Missouri held that the plaintiff must forfeit all interest from the beginning of the above transactions, and could recover only the original $15,000, the Novem-the bank credit of $230, given the same day, actual overdraft on July 12, 1895, $474.24, N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the I State of Missouri to review a judgment reversing the judgment of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, in that State, in favor of plaintiff in a suit on a promissory note for the full amount claimed, and directing the trial court to enter up judgment for plaintiff without interest, which it decided was forfeited under the national banking act because usurious. Affirmed. See same case below, 172 Mo. 384, 72 S. W. 925. the note of October 1, 1895, for $2,500, the overdraft on April 29, 1896, of $878.81, and the bank credit of $2.42—in all, $19,081.97, less 95,500 collected on account since the aotion was begun. 172 Mo. 384, 72 S. W. 925. By the U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5197, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3493, a bank may charge "interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the state, where the bank is located, and no more." By § 5198 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3493), taking, receiving, or charging "a rate of interest greater than is allowed by the preceding section, when knowingly done, shall be deemed a forfeiture of the entire interest which the note, The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Oliver H. Dean, William D. Mo-bill, or other evidence of debt carries with Leod, and Hale Holden for plaintiff in error. it, or which has been agreed to be paid thereon." The Revised Statutes of Missouri fix 6 per cent as the rate of interest in the absence of agreement (8 3705), but allow *374 parties to agree in writing for not over 8 per cent (§ 3706). They also allow parties to contract in writing for the payment of interest upon interest, "but the interest shall not be compounded oftener than once in a year" (§ 3711). It will be seen that the charge on the overdrafts went beyond § 3706, and the compounding of the semiannual interest on the notes encountered § 3711. The plaintiff in error denies that the prohibition of compounding oftener than once a year affects the "rate of interest" within the meaning of those words in U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5198, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3493, and contends that so long as the total sums received would not amount to more than 8 per cent on the debt, it has a right to charge them under U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5197, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3493, coupled with Mo. Rev. Stat. § 3706. It disposes of the 12 per cent charge on overdrafts by the suggestion that the amount is trifling, and de minimis non curat lex, and that this charge was a penalty because of a failure to pay a debt*when due, and therefore not usurious. We are of a different opinion. The rate of interest which a man receives is greater when he is allowed to compound than when he is not, the other elements in the case being the same. Even if the compounded interest is less than might be charged directly without compounding, a statute may forbid enlarging the rate in that way, whatever may be the rules of the common law. The supreme court of Missouri holds that that is what the Missouri statute has done. On that point, and on the question whether what was done amounted to compounding within the meaning of the Missouri statute, we follow the state court. Union Nat. Bank v. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. 163 U. S. 325, 331, 41 L. ed. 177, 179, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1039. Therefore, since the interest charged and received by the plaintiff was compounded more than once a year, it was at a rate greater than was allowed by U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5197, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3493, and it was forfeited. The suggestions as to the 12 per cent charge on overdrafts do not seem to us to need answer. We perceive no warrant in the statute or the cases for the contention that the bank, when it brings the action and is met by the plea of usury, may avoid the forfeiture imposed by Rev. Stat. § 5198, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3493, in absolute terms, by then declaring an election to remit the excessive interest. Judgment affirmed. (195 U. S. 375) BALTIMORE SHIPBUILDING & DRY DOCK COMPANY OF BALTIMORE CITY, Plff. in Err., v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTI MORE et al. Taxes-state taxation as prohibited by Federal interest-taxation of Federal agency. 1. A state tax, though in form levied upon land conveyed by the United States to a corporation for dry-dock purposes, with a reserved right in the grantor to the free use of the dry dock, and a provision for forfelture in case of the continued unfitness of the dry dock for use, or the use of the land for other purposes, will be held to create a lien upon the company's interest alone, where the highest state court so regards the effect of the tax, although it neglects to modify its Judgment sustaining the tax to conform to its views. 2. The United States has no such interest in land conveyed by it to a corporation for dry. dock purposes, with a reserved right to the free use of the dry dock, and a provision for forfeiture in case of the continued unfitness of the dry dock for use, or the use of the land for other purposes, as will prevent the state from taxing the corporation's interest in such land. vember 28, 1904. There is no doubt, of course, that the Argued November 3, 3, 1904. Decided No court could go behind the face of the present note, and analyze the sum which it represents into its original elements. Brown v. Marion IN N ERROR to the Court of Appeals of Nat. Bank, 169 U. S. 416, 42 L. ed. 801, 18 the State of Maryland to review a judg Sup. Ct. Rep 390; Haseltine v. Central Nat. ment which affirmed an order of the BaltiBank, 183 U. S. 132, 135, 136, 46 L. ed. 118-more City Court, confirming the action of 120, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 50. These cases sufficiently show, also, if more is wanted than the words of Rev. Stat. § 5198, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3493, that the court below did not err in forfeiting all the interest from the beginning. the Appeal Tax Court of Baltimore City in assessing for taxation certain property held under a conveyance from the United States for dry-dock purposes, with a reserved right in the grantor to the free use of the dry dock, and a provision for forfeiture $380 381 in case of the continued unfitness of the dry | cerned in the appeal in this case," that is dock for use, or the use of the land for supposed to mean the same thing. other purposes. Affirmed. We will deal with the argument drawn See same case below, 97 Md. 97, 54 Atl. from the last consideration first. It is true 623. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. E. P. Keech, Jr., Leon E. Greenbaum, and Archibald H. Taylor for plaintiff in error. that commonly taxes on land create a lien paramount to all interest, and that a tax sale often has been said to extinguish all titles, and to start a new one. Hefner v. Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. 123 U. S. Messrs. Edgar Allan Poe and W. Ca- 747, 751, 31 L. ed. 309, 311, Sup. Ct. Rep. bell Bruce for defendants in error. Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court: This is a writ of error to the court of appeals of the state of Maryland, brought to reverse a judgment sustaining a tax upon certain land. The plaintiff in error filed a petition and appeal from an assessment by the appeal tax court of Baltimore in the Baltimore city court, alleging that its land was not subject to taxation, and, if subject, was taxed too high. The city court reduced the tax, but held the land liable, and its judgment was affirmed by the court of appeals. 97 Md. 97, 54 Atl. 623. The land in question formerly belonged to the United States, being part of the property known as Fort McHenry, and is admitted not to have been taxable at that time. Under an act of Congress of June 19, 1878 (20 Stat. at L. 167, chap. 310), it was conveyed to the plaintiff in error on March 26, 1879. By the terms of the deed, following the requirements of the act, the consideration of the conveyance and the condition upon which it was made was that the dock company should construct a dry dock upon the land as specified, which it did, and that it should "accord to the United States the right to the use forever of the said dry dock at any time for the prompt examination and repair of vessels belonging to the United States, free from charge for docking, and if at any time said property hereby conveyed shall be diverted to any other use than that herein named, or if the said dry dock shall be at any time unfit for use for a period of six months or more, the property hereby conveyed, with all its privileges and appurtenances, shall revert to, and become the absolute property of, the United States." This condition is relied upon as still keeping the land outside the taxing power of the state. 337; Textor v. Shipley, 86 Md. 424, 438, 38 Atl. 932; Emery v. Boston Terminal Co. 178 Mass. 172, 184, 86 Am. St. Rep. 473, 59 N. E. 763. Perhaps it was assumed that this always was the effect of tax sales, in Northern P. R. Co. v. Traill County, 115 U. S. 600, 29 L. ed. 477, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 201. But it needs no argument to show that a state may do less. It may tax a life estate to one and a remainder to another, and sell only the interest of the party making default. With regard to what the state of Maryland has done and what are the purport and attempted effect of the tax in this case, we follow the court of appeals. That court treated the tax and the lien as going only to the dock company's interest in the land, although, probably by an oversight, it neglected to modify the judgment according to its own suggestion so as to show the fact. That only the company's interest was taxed is shown by the reduction of the assessment on account of the condition. Of course it does not matter what form of words the judgment employs when its meaning is thus declared by the court having the matter under its control. In the next place, as to the interest of the United States in the land. This is a mere condition subsequent. There is no easement or present right in rem. The obligation to keep up the dock and to allow the United States to use it carries active duties, and is purely personal. The property is subject to forfeiture, it is true, if the obligation is not fulfilled. But it is only by forfeiture that the rights of the United States can be enIt would be a very forced against the res. of the states to tax lands because of a mere harsh doctrine that would deny the right possibility that they might lapse to the United States. The contrary is the law. The condition cannot be extinguished by the state, but the fee is in the dock company, and that can be taxed and, if necessary, sold, It is argued that the United States has R. Co. v. Myers, 172 U. S. 589, 598, 43 L. ed. subject to the condition. See Northern P. such an interest in the land as to prevent the 564, 567, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 276; Maish v. Artax, and also that the land is an agency of izona, 164 U. S. 599, 607–609, 41 L. ed. 567, the government by the terms of the grant. 570, 571, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 193; Central P. It is noted that this tax originally was lev- R. Co. v. Nevada, 162 U. S. 512, 525, 40 L ied upon the land, not upon the dock com- ed. 1057, 1061, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 885. The pany's interest, and although the language title of the dock company was not inalienof the final judgment was "the property con-able, as that of the railroad was held to be 382 |