that the issue was not freedom against slavery, but empire and subjugation against independence and self-government.

It was obvious that sound statesmanship, as it regarded our cause both at home and abroad, required a more vigorous policy. It became every day more clear that slavery was not only the cause of the war, but, as treated thus far, an element of great strength, and a bond of union to the rebel States. The neglect of the government to strike decisive and fatal blows at this institution, especially to those who did not know and appreciate the condition of affairs in Maryland and Kentucky, was inexplicable, and had encouraged the enemies, and paralyzed the friends of the republic abroad. The friends of the administration impatiently asked, if the time had not arrived for making war directly upon slavery? They insisted that this source of strength to the rebels could be made a source of weakness; that the millions of colored people were the friends of the Republic, and could be made to aid its cause against their masters. The period was critical. Bull Run and Ball's Bluff were unavenged, and the great army under McClellan had as yet done nothing to give confidence to the country. The Confederates were striving to secure recognition abroad, Mason and Slidell, were in Fort Warren as prisoners taken from beneath the folds of the British flag, and England, backed by France, would make the refusal to surrender them, a cause of war.

Such was the condition in which Congress assembled, and received the President's message, in December, 1861.

This message has fewer of the characteristics of Mr. Lincoln, than any other of his State papers. The truth is, he was feeling his way, revolving the slavery question, and was scarcely yet ready to announce a settled policy on that subject. He congratulates Congress that the patriotism of the people had proved equal to the occasion, and that the number of troops tendered, greatly exceeded the force called for.

He calls the attention of Congress to the fact, that Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, neither of which at his first call for troops in April, had promised a single soldier, had, at the date of the message, not less than 40,000 men in the

field under the Union flag; and that in West Virginia, the Union men, after a severe struggle, were masters of the country. He announced the retirement of General Scott, and stated that public sentiment and the recommendation of the Lieutenant General, and Executive confidence, had all indicated General McClellan as the man upon whom to place the command.

He said that the insurgents at the beginning, confidently claimed a strong support from North of Mason and Dixon's line, and that the friends of the Union were not free from apprehension on the point. But this was soon settled, the people of the free States were united for the Union. Of the slave States, little Delaware was right from the first. Maryland was made to seem against the Union. The soldiers of the Republic, were assaulted, bridges were burned, and railroads torn up within her limits, and the Government had been at one time, for several days without the ability to bring a single regiment over her soil to the Capital. Now all this was changed. She had already given seven regiments to the Union cause, and none to the enemy. Kentucky, for sometime in doubt, was now, decidedly, and he hoped, unchangeably, on the side of the Union. Missouri was com

paratively quiet, and he believed could not be again overcome by the insurrectionists.

Upon the policy on the slavery question, he said, “I have adhered to the act of Congress, confiscating property, and freeing persons held to service, used for insurrectionary purposes." On the subject of emancipating and arming negroes, he said, “The Union must be preserved, and all indispensable means must be used, but he deprecated haste in the use of extreme measures, which might reach the loyal, as well as disloyal."

It is worthy of notice as illustrative of his views of the condition of the insurgent States, and the power of Congress over them in time of war, that he recommends the establishment by act of Congress, of courts in the insurgent States, when brought under the control of the National Government, in which civil rights might be adjudicated.

This is his language on that subject:

"I have been urgently solicited to establish by military power, courts administer summary justice in such cases. I have thus far declined to do this, because I have been unwilling to go beyond the pressure of necessity in the unusual exercise of power. But the power of Congress I suppose, is equal to the anomalous condition, and therefore I refer the whole matter to Congress with the hope that a plan may be devised for the administration of justice in all such parts of the insurgent States as may be under the control of this Government."*

The courts were to be temporary, but the recommendation is conclusive, that he recognized fully, the right of Congress to legislate for the insurgent States, while in a condition of war, and before they were restored to their proper relations to the Union.

He reviewed at some length, the condition of affairs, the advantages of our democratic institutions; and expressed his deep convictions that the fate of free government was involved in the contest. "The struggle," said he, " of to-day, is not altogether for to-day. It is for a vast future also."

Mr. Cameron's report, as Secretary of War, was a very important paper. After reciting the operations of the army, he states that under the call for 75,000 men, made by the President, and under the call for 500,000 volunteers for three years, authorized by act of Congress in July, there had been raised an army of 600,000 men.

His report, as originally prepared, ably discussed and strongly recommended the arming and emancipation of the slaves of the seceding States. This part of the report was not submitted to the President until it was in print. When it was then brought to the knowledge of Mr. Lincoln, he expressed surprise and some displeasure, that a member of his Cabinet should have prepared and printed such a report, without first submitting it to him, and he caused the report to be modified. A portion of this report is here presented as a very clear and able presentation of the great question which was then agitating the public mind:

"It has become a grave question for determination, what shall be done with the slaves abandoned by their owners on the advance of our

*Message of December 8d, 1881. McPherson's Political History, p. 132.

troops into Southern territory, as in the Beaufort District of South Carolina. The whole white population therein is six thousand, while the number of negroes exceeds thirty-two thousand. The panic which drove their masters in wild confusion from their homes, leaves them in undisputed possession of the soil. Shall they, armed by their masters, be placed in the field to fight against, or shall their labor be continually employed in producing the means for supporting the armies of the rebellion?

"It was the boast of the leader of the rebellion, while he yet had a seat in the Senate of the United States, that the Southern States would be comparatively safe and free from the burdens of war, if it should be brought on by the contemplated rebellion, and that boast was accompanied by the savage threat that 'Northern towns and cities would become the victims of rapine and military spoil,' and that 'Northern men should smell Southern gunpowder and feel Southern steel.' No one doubts the disposition of the rebels to carry that threat into execution. The wealth of Northern towns and cities, the produce of Northern farms, Northern workshops and manufactories, would certainly be seized, destroyed, or appropriated as military spoil. No property in the North would be spared from the hands of the rebels, and their rapine would be defended under the laws of war. While the loyal States thus have all their property and possessions at stake, are the insurgent rebels to carry on warfare against the Government in peace and security to their own property?

"Reason, and justice, and self-preservation, forbid that such should be the policy of this Government, but demand, on the contrary, that, being forced by traitors and rebels to the extremity of war, all the rights and powers of war should be exercised to bring it to a speedy

end.

"Those who make war against the Government, justly forfeit all rights of property, privilege or security derived from the Constitution and laws against which they are in armed rebellion; and as the labor and service of their slaves constitute the chief property of the rebels, such property should share the common fate of war, to which they have devoted the property of loyal citizens.

"As has been said, the right to deprive the rebels of their property in slaves and slave labor, is as clear and absolute, as the right to take forage from the field, or cotton from the warehouse, or powder and arms from the magazine. To leave the enemy in the possession of such property as forage and cotton, and military stores, and the means of constantly reproducing them, would be madness. It is, therefore, madness to leave them in peaceful and secure possession of slave property,

more valuable and efficient to them for war, than forage, cotton, and military stores. Such policy would be National suicide. What to do with that species of property, is a question that time and circumstances will solve, and need not be anticipated further than to repeat that they cannot be held by the Government as slaves. It would be useless to keep them as prisoners of war; and self-preservation, the highest duty of a government, or of individuals, demands that they should be disposed of, or employed in the most effective manner, that will tend most speedily to suppress the insurrection, and restore the authority of the Government. If it shall be found that the men who have been held by the rebels as slaves, are capable of bearing arms, and performing efficient military service, it is the right, and may become the duty of the Government to arm and equip them, and employ their services against the rebels, under proper military regulation, discipline and command.

"But in whatever manner they may be used by the Government, it is plain that, once liberated by the rebellious act of their masters, they should never again be restored to bondage. By the master's treason and rebellion, he forfeits all right to the labor and service of his slave ; and the slave of the rebellious master, by his service to the Government, becomes justly entitled to freedom and protection.

"The disposition to be made of the slaves of rebels, after the close of the war, can be safely left to the wisdom of Congress. The representatives of the people will unquestionably secure to the loyal slaveholders every right to which they are entitled under the Constitution."

The foregoing gives the substance of Mr. Cameron's argument. By direction of the President, that part of it in regard to emancipation and the arming of freedmen, was so modified as to read as follows:

"It is already a grave question what shall be done with those slaves who were abandoned by their owners on the advance of our troops into Southern territory, as at Beaufort District, in South Carolina. The number left within our control at that point is very considerable, and similar cases will probably occur. What shall be done with them? Can we afford to send them forward to their masters, to be by them armed against us, or used in producing support to sustain the rebellion? Their labor may be useful to us; withheld from the enemy it lessens his military resources, and withholding them has no tendency to induce the horrors of insurrection, even in the rebel communities. They constitute a military resource, and being such, that they should not be