is, he will gain faster by fortifications and reënforcements than you can by reënforcements alone. And once more, let me tell you,itis indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You

will do me the justice to remember, I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting and not surmounting a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy, and the same, or equal intrenchments at either place. The country will not fail to note-is now noting, that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy, is but the story of Manassas repeated.

"I beg to assure you, that I have never written you, or spoken to you, in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as, in my most anxious judgment I consistently But you must act.

can.

"Yours, very truly,

"ABRAHAM LINCOLN."*

Meanwhile, General Franklin's division had, at the special request of General McClellan, on the 10th of April, been sent to him, and on the 30th of April, General McClellan's force amounted to 130,378, of which 112,392, were effective.†

On the last of April, there came from McClellan, while still before Yorktown, a call for Parrott Guns, to which the President, whose patience and proverbial good nature and indulgence were well nigh exhausted, said, on the first of May, "Your call for Parrott guns from Washington, alarms me-chiefly because it argues indefinite procrastination. Is anything to be done?"

On the 7th, President Lincoln arrived at Fortress Monroe, and urged a movement on Norfolk, which was successfully made. The celebrated Merrimac was now abandoned by the rebels, and blown up; all the forts and fortifications defending York river, were also abandoned. The blockade of the James was raised as far as Drury's Bluff, and an immense amount of heavy ordnance and ammunition fell into the hands of the National forces. These works and this material

*Report on the Conduct of the War, Part 1, p. 821-2.

+ Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, p. 18, army of the Potomac. Report on the Conduct of the War, p. 18 and 19.

were abandoned by the Confederates to enable them to concentrate all their forces for the defense of Richmond. The troops in and about Norfolk, nearly 18,000 in number, under General Huger, were hurried to the defense of the rebel Capital. While the President and Secretary of War were at Fortress Monroe, they received a note from General McClellan, dated May 9th, asking permission to reorganize the army corps, and for authority to relieve incompetent commanders of army corps, and complaining of his Generals. To this Secretary Stanton replied, "You may temporarily suspend that organization in the army now under your immediate command, and adopt any you see fit, until further orders." The President, on the same day wrote the following kind and friendly letter to General McClellan:

"I have just assisted the Secretary of War in framing the part of a despatch to you relating to army corps, which despatch, of course, will have reached you long before this will. I wish to say a few words to you privately on this subject. I ordered the army corps organization, not only on the unanimous opinion of the twelve Generals whom you had selected and assigned as Generals of divisions, but also on the unanimous opinion of every military man I could get an opinion from, your. self only excepted, and every modern military book. Of course, I did not, on my own judgment, pretend to understand the subject. I now think it indispensable for you to know how your struggle against it, is received in quarters which we cannot entirely disregard. It is looked upon as merely an effort to pamper one or two pets, and to persecute and degrade their supposed rivals. I have had no word from Sumner, Heintzelman, or Keyes-the Commanders of these corps are, of course, the three highest officers with you; but I am constantly told that you have no consultation or communication with them; that you consult and communicate with nobody but General Fitz John Porter, and perhaps General Franklin. I do not say these complaints are true or just; but at all events, it is proper you should know of their existence. Do the Commanders of corps disobey your orders in anything?

"When you relieved General Hamilton of his command the other day, you thereby lost the confidence of at least, one of your best friends in the Senate. And here let me say, not as applicable to you personally, that Senators and Representatives speak of me in their places as they please, without question, and that officers of the army must cease

addressing insulting letters to them for taking no greater liberty with them.

"But to return. Are you strong enough-are you strong enough even with my help-to set your foot upon the necks of Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes, all at once? This is a practical, and very serious question to you.

"The success of your army, and the cause of the country are the same, and of course, I only desire the good of the cause."

The allusion to insulting letters addressed to Senators by officers, was called forth by the fact, that officers, under McClellan, had written insulting and threatening letters to Senators, who had, in their places, criticised the General and and his army movements. Mr. Lincoln always bore such attacks upon himself with dignity and forbearance.

On the 17th of May, General McDowell was ordered, on being joined by General Shields' division, while he continued to cover Washington, to move upon Richmond by the general route of the Fredericksburg and Richmond railroad, and to coöperate with the forces under General McClellan; to establish communication between his left and McClellan's right, who was then threatening the rebel Capital, from the line of the Pamunky and York rivers.

There were then three bodies of Union troops in Virginia, North of McClellan's. McDowell's at Fredericksburg, Fremont's in the Mountains, and Banks' at Strasburg. Had these forces been under one able, sagacious chief, their union and coöperation would have made them irresistible against any force which could have been sent against them. They unfortunately were under different heads, and each received orders from the Secretary of War. The daring and active Stonewall Jackson was despatched up the valley of the Shenandoah, to prevent McDowell from uniting with McClellan, to create, if possible, a panic at Washington, and prevent all reinforcements being forwarded to McClellan. Stonewall Jackson, in a series of brilliant movements, more than accomplished his purpose. First, he attacked Banks, and drove him, fighting desperately, back to Winchester, and thence across the Potomac. This, and the retreat of some troops on the Manassas Gap Rail-' road, did create a panic at Washington. Secretary Stanton

telegraphed on the 26th of May to the Governors of Northern States, in language indicating apprehension. To the Governor of Massachusetts, he said, "intelligence from various quarters, leaves no doubt that the enemy, in great force, are marching on Washington. You will please organize and forward all the militia and volunteer force in your State." To other Governors of loyal States, he sent urgent messages for troops. Stimulated by the telegrams of the War Secretary, the Governors of Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Ohio, and other States, issued stirring appeals for volunteers, to which there was then, as at all times, a ready response by the people.

Thus far, the movements of Jackson had been successful, beyond his expectations. He had caused orders to be issued to McDowell, countermanding his advance on Richmond, and junction with McClellan. He had driven Banks across the Potomac, and created such apprehension at Washington, as effectually prevented reinforcements being sent to the army before Richmond. He had obtained a considerable amount of military stores and supplies.

Could he now make good his escape? There were abundant troops to overwhelm and crush him, if they could be concentrated, and catch him. Fremont, the far famed "Pathfinder" of the Rocky Mountains, was coming down upon him from the North. The troops of McDowell were seeking to strike him in the left flank, and still another small force was in his front, to destroy the bridges over which alone, he must escape. The nimble footed Jackson knew his danger, he knew the country, and besides, there was little or no concert among his assailants.

Jackson passed through Strasburg on the 1st of June, just in time to escape Fremont on one side, and the force of McDowell on the other. The columns of their two pursuing armies met, but Jackson had got through. He still retreated, fighting and burning bridges after him until he reached a strong position at Cross Keys; here he halted and turned at bay. Here he fought Fremont on the 8th of June. In the meantime, Colonel Carroll and General Tyler, had been

ordered to strike the line of Jackson's retreat, destroy his train which was in advance, and burn the bridges over which he must pass. They came up in time, but failed to destroy the bridges, and Jackson escaped. The failure to capture and destroy Jackson, was caused by want of coöperation and concert. This brilliant campaign of Jackson was of immense importance to the Confederates, and possibly saved Richmond. One can scarcely fail to contrast the ineffectual movements against him with the brilliant campaign of Sheridan against Early, in 1864. But Sheridan did not have Stonewall

Jackson to contend with.

Returning to the army of the Potomac, in the neighborhood of Richmond, we find it on the 15th of May, concentrating at the White House, the point where the railroad from West Point, on York river, to Richmond, crosses the Pamunky.

On the 25th of May, Mr. Lincoln telegraphed to McClel lan: "I think the time is near when you must either attack Richmond, or give up the job and come to the defence of Washington."*

On the 26th of May, a portion of the corps of General Keyes, was ordered across the Chickahominy, and was followed by the corps of Heintzelman. The corps of Sumner, Porter, and Franklin, remained on the left bank, without the means of crossing. The vigilant rebel commander saw the blunder, and instantly profited by it. The Union troop were attacked in force by the rebels, with the hope of cutting them off before they could be supported by the army on the other side of the river. Although Casey's division was driven back in some disorder, yet being supported by Heintzelman, they held the rebels in check until General Sumner succeeded in crossing and attacking the rebels vigorously in flank, which stopped their advance, and a gallant bayonet charge, led by the aged but stout and resolute Sumner in person, drove them back beyond Fair Oaks station. Sumner saved the day. Had the remaining troops been brought over, a great victory would have been secured. If, instead of Sumner's fifteen thousand, fifty thousand had been thrown across, the result

Report on the Conduct of the War, Part I, p. 830.