Western Generals, better results might not follow the unsurpassed fighting of the army of the Potomac. Halleck, on the 11th of July, had been called to the position of Generalin-Chief, and returning to Washington, entered upon his duties on the 23d of July.

General John Pope, the son of Judge Nathaniel Pope, District Judge of Illinois in whose courts President Lincoln had long practiced law, was one of the most brilliant and rising young officers of the West. He had evinced great generalship at Island No. 10, and at New Madrid. Mr. Lincoln of course knew Pope well, and rejoiced in his fame, and he was also a favorite of General Halleck. He was called to Washington, and arrived about the 20th of June.

The President having seen the disastrous consequences of having too many generals, and the lack of unity of purpose and of concert between the forces of Banks, Fremont and McDowell, resolved to consolidate the Departments of the Shenandoah, the Mountain Department of Fremont, and the Department of the Rappahannock; and in pursuance of this determination, on the 27th of June, he issued an order creating the Army of Virginia, under command of General Pope; the army of General Fremont, to constitute the First Army Corps, the army of General Banks, the Second, and that of General McDowell, the Third. Thereupon General Fremont asked to be relieved, on the ground, that as General Pope was his junior in rank he could not consistently with his honor serve under him, and his request was granted.

On the 14th of July, General Pope assumed command and issued an address to his arm y. In this address he said:

"I have come to you from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies-from an army whose business it has been to seek an adversary, and beat him when found; whose policy has been attack and not defense. In but one instance has the enemy been able to place our Western armies in a defensive attitude. I presume I have been called here to pursue the same system, and to lead you against the enemy. It is my purpose to do so, and that speedily. I am sure you long for an opportunity to win the distinction you are capable of achieving; that opportunity I shall endeavor to give you. In the meantime, I desire you to dismiss certain phrases I am sorry to find much in vogue amongst you.

"I hear constantly of taking strong positions and holding them-of lines of retreat and bases of supplies. Let us discard such ideas. The strongest position a soldier should desire to occupy, is one from which he can most easily advance against the enemy. Let us study the probable line of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of itself. Let us look before us and not behind. Success and glory are in the advance disaster and shame lurk in the rear. Let us act on this understanding, and it is safe to predict that your banners shall be inscribed with many a glorious deed, and that your names will be dear to your countrymen forever.”

This address was spirited and full of the ardor of a young, successful and sanguine soldier; but indiscreet, very, and when we remember that it was issued on his assuming command of the troops whose leaders he thus publicly reproached, was as bad in taste, as it was mistaken in policy. While it gave indications of a more vigorous policy, which was exceedingly gratifying to the people, it was calculated to create, and did create, an intense feeling against him among the officers of the army of the Potomac, and to some extent of the army of Virginia. It intensified the feeling, which finally resulted in the offense by McClellan and Fitz John Porter and some of their subordinates, of permitting Pope to be sacrificed without rendering him effective aid.

The failure of the Peninsula campaign did not in the least dishearten the courage of the North, nor shake the firm determination of the people to crush the rebellion. The Governors of seventeen States on the 28th of June, united in an address to the President, announcing the readiness of the people of their respective States to respond to a call for more troops, and their wish for the most prompt and vigorous measures. The President immediately issued a call for 300,000 additional soldiers. Pope desired, if McClellan was compelled to retreat, that it should be towards the North, that he might directly coöperate with him. He had but about 38,000 men; with these, he was to defend Washington, hold the Valley of the Shenandoah, and repel the expected approach of Lee. He felt the inadequacy of his force, and asked to be relieved, unwilling to risk his reputation against the fearful odds he perceived he was to encounter; and being early made conscious that he could not have the hearty coöperation of McClellan and

his friends.

The authorities declined to relieve him, and he set out to do the best he could with the force at his

command.

What was to be done with the army of the Potomac? It had been visited by the President, and was visited by General Halleck. General Burnside had brought his successful force to Fortress Monroe, ready to coöperate with McClellan. It was determined after careful consideration to withdraw the army of the Potomac from the James, and concentrate it with the command of General Pope. It is not my purpose to follow in detail, the movements, skirmishes, and battles of General Pope. By cavalry raids, he undertook to destroy the railroads towards Richmond, and to hold the fords of the Rapidan and other streams, that the approaching army under Jackson and Lee must cross. He was vigilant and active, and did as much with the force under his command, as could be done. On the 14th of August, he was reenforced by General Reno's division of General Burnside's command. On the 16th, General Pope captured a letter from General Lee, to General Stuart, showing that the purpose of Lee was to mass an overwhelming force in his front, and crush him before he could be reënforced by the army of the Potomac. Knowing by the tardy movements of McClellan that he would receive no immediate aid from him, Pope retired on the night of the 18th, behind the Rappahannock. The presence of the army of the Potomac was now essential, and its absence made Pope's position critical. Why was it not at hand?

On the 30th of July, McClellan had been ordered to send away his sick and wounded to clear his hospitals preparatory to moving. This order was repeated on the 2d of August. On the 3d of August, he was directed to take immediate measures for withdrawing his army to Acquia Creek; against this he remonstrated, and delayed, until on the 6th he was advised that "the order will not be rescinded," and it was emphatically said to him, "you will be expected to obey it with all possible promptness.'

Previous to the 4th of August, he had been ordered to prepare for a prompt withdrawal to Acquia Creek- a stream which empties into the Potomac, within supporting distance to Pope. On the 6th, he was ordered to send a regiment of

cavalry and several batteries of artillery to Burnside, at Acquia. Instead of promptly obeying, he sent reasons for delay, and said he would "obey as soon as circumstances would permit." On the 9th, General Halleck telegraphed as follows:

"I am of the opinion that the enemy is massing his forces in front of Generals Pope and Burnside, and that he expects to crush them, and move forward to the Potomac.

"You must send reënforcements instantly to Acquia Creek.

Considering the amount of transportation at your disposal, your delay is not satisfactory. You must move with all possible celerity.”

This was August 9th, and yet reënforcements did not leave Fortress Monroe for Acquia, until the 23d of August! On the 10th, a week after the order was first given, Halleck again telegraphed:

"The enemy is crossing the Rapidan in large force. They are fighting General Pope to-day. There must be no further delay in your moveThat which has already occurred was entirely unexpected, and must be satisfactorily explained."

ments.

Pope was gallantly fighting against an overwhelming force. Lee was massing troops to crush him and reach Washington, and yet McClellan did not move. On the 12th of August, General Halleck telegraphed:

"The Quartermaster General informs me that nearly every available steam vessel in the country is now under your control. Burnside moved nearly 13,000 troops to Aquia Creek in less than two days, and his transports were immediately sent back to you. All the vessels in the James River and the Chesapeake Bay were placed at your disposal, and it was supposed that eight or ten thousand of your men could be transported daily. There has been and is the most urgent necessity for dispatch, and not a single moment must be lost in getting additional troops in front of Washington."

On the 21st, Halleck again telegraphed to McClellan at Fortress Monroe:

"The forces of Burnside and Pope are hard pushed and require aid as rapidly as you can send it. Come yourself as soon as you can. By all means see that the troops sent have plenty of ammunition, etc."

On the evening of August 23d, the reluctant and tardy McClellan, at last sailed from Fortress Monroe, arriving at Acquia Creek on the morning of the 24th, and at Alexandria on the 27th of August!

Meanwhile, Pope had not sufficient force to hold the fords and banks of the Rappahannock. His line was so extended that it was necessarily very weak. He called for reënforcements which should have been with him long before from the army of the Potomac; but McClellan and his army, had lingered on the James. The Commander of the army of the Potomac had received the order to move his sick and wounded on the 1st of August. On the 3d, he was ordered to prepare to move his army; but it was not until the 23d, that his troops began to leave Fortress, Monroe, and he did not reach Alexandria in person until the 27th of August. It is scarcely possible for a candid mind to read the correspondence between the President and General Halleck on the one side, and General McClellan on the other, from the time of the President's visit to Harrison's Landing, until McClellan arrived at Alexandria, without coming to the conclusion that it was the deliberate purpose of McClellan so to delay his movements that Pope should be left to his fate. It is clear that he did not obey orders, and that Pope's defeat was the result.

On the 10th, General Halleck informed McClellan that "the enemy are crossing the Rapidan. They are fighting General Pope to-day. Let not a moment's time be lost." When McClellan reached Acquia on the 24th, Pope who had been defending the line of the Rappahannock for nearly a week against the whole rebel army, found that Lee was turning his right,and his rear and communications were threatened, and thus he was compelled to fall back from the Rappahannock. On the 27th of August as we have seen General McClellan himself arrived at Alexandria, and was immediately ordered "to take entire direction of the sending out of troops from Alexandria." Those which arrived before McClellan, under the leadership of Heintzelman and Hooker, had already marched to the relief of Pope, and were doing good service. After the arrival of McClellan, no troops of the army of the