also be vitiated.

In order to obtain a proper understanding of the aesthetic principles so far unfolded, of the idea of beauty as it existed in Brownson, it will be necessary for us to examine the ontological principles held by him. Brownson's claim that the principles of aesthetics ought to be grounded on ontological principles, finds a full realization in his own thought. And we shall see on examining his ontology-chiefly as it is expressed in the essays under consideration—that it contains, if not a vindication, then at least an explanation of his theory of aesthetics.

CHAPTER III

ONTOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES

Brownson's ontology centers around the problem of the ideal, i.e., of that notion of the universal and necessary being which is found in the minds of all men. He seeks to learn how man acquired the general notion of necessary being, what this ideal notion is, and how it is possible for thought to originate. In the first place he thinks it evident that this idea cannot arise from sense-perception. The mind, when it operates upon the senses by the method of abstraction, can never arrive at the knowledge of a real and necessary being, an 'ens necessarium et reale,' for the simple and logical reason that such a conclusion would be greater than the premises warrant (xix 489). The less cannot contain the greater; sound logic forbids that a conclusion contain what is not contained in the premises. Hence those who assert that they obtain the notion of a necessary being from sense-perception, which presents only contingent things, err, not in the fact that they have the notion, but in the method in which they claim to get it. Without knowing it they really obtain the notion of necessary being by intuition, which offers the only logical solution of the problem (xix 489).

But another question immediately arises: By the intuition of what is man enabled to arrive at the notions that he possesses? Here opinions differ, though the solution again is only one. The exclusive ontologist says we obtain all knowledge through the intuition of simple being. He is right in saying that we have this intuition, but wrong in inferring that from the intuition of simple being we can deduce the idea of existences or creatures, for from it nothing can be derived but mere being (xix 489). In the same way the intuition of existences, or created beings, cannot lead us to the intuition of necessary being; 'it is strange that this should be disputed' (xix 488). Some try to avoid all difficulties by claiming for man the intuition simply of being as ens necessarium et reale, of an allperfect being-of God, if you like (xix 487-8). must point out the insufficiency of the supposition.

Again we

This no

tion gives us only the assurance of a possible creator, one who can create; but it teaches us nothing as to the actual fact of a creation. An argument that proceeds from the possibility to the actuality of anything is invalid and cannot stand. (Ibid.) What then is the solution?

The opinions so far advanced contain only a part of the truth, one of the elements of knowledge. They err in claiming that from this one element the others can be deduced, whereas all the elements of knowledge must be present in the mind before any deduction or thinking can take place (xix 489). The fact simply is that we have in us the notion of contingent beings, and especially that we have the notion of absolute being; that the intuition of one of these does not lead to the other, and that the intuition of the two still merely gives two entities separated by a bottomless chasm. Before any process of thought can occur, before we can go from one of these notions to the other, before we can classify our sense-perceptions under general notions and thus acquire knowledge, our mind must possess the connecting link between the notion of the contingent and the universal ideal. Hence our intuition must contain also this third element of thought. Now that which connects the necessary and the contingent is the creative act, and our intuition must therefore contain the notion of creation. This condition is fulfilled admirably if we postulate the intuition of the absolute being as creator of the contingent beings, the intuition of an ontological formula that includes 'the intuition of being, existence, and the creative act, which unites them' (xix 488). Here then is the only possible solution of the difficulty; it alone accounts for the various ideas that we find actually in our minds and gives us the proper relation of these notions in the world of thought and of reality (xix 144).

This expression of Brownson's ontological views, written in 1860, about sixteen years before his death, gives correctly the final form that his speculation on this matter assumed, and is therefore the correct basis for a critical survey of his aesthetic principles. However, a clearer understanding will be obtained of them if we revert to a few statements made elsewhere. "The empirical presents particulars, singulars only," he writes, "but these cannot be thought without the ideal;" and though we may not at first "note or advert to the ideal," the latter must

nevertheless exists in the mind before the former.2 Again we are told that the intuition, since it is "prior to all experience,' can be given "only by the Creator" Himself.3 This intuition is presented to us

........simply as the ideal, or as universal, necessary, immutable and eternal ideas, or, as some say, universal, necessary, immutable and eternal truths. These ideas or truths, which are the a priori condition of every thought, of every empirical perception or cognition, and which enter into every cognition or mental operation as an essential element and as an undistinguished part of the complex fact, are, in the last analysis, identically being, though it is only by reflection or reasoning that we know and verify the identity of the ideal and of being, as it is only by reflection or reasoning that we discover and verify the identity of being-real and necessary being we mean—with God.4

The process of intuition therefore ultimately gives us the idea of God, although we must not understand this "in any other sense than that we have intuition of that which can be demonstrated to be God. We know by intuition that which is God, but not that it is God."5 A final quotation, taken from the last article that Brownson wrote, again emphasizes the full significance of the intuitional formula, Ens creat existentias:

We say nothing here as to the way in which the mind comes into possession of this formula, but this much we hold is certain, that there is no mental operation and no mind possible, without the principle summarized or expressed by it. These principles connect all existences with God by His creative act, and consequently show that the natural is really related to the supernatural, for the Creator of nature is necessarily above nature, that is, supernatural.

These words express clearly the full importance of the intuitional theory to Brownson as far as mental activity is concerned. He himself did not fail in his Literary Essays to show its direct

2 Letter to Father Hewit (year 1872). Brownson's Latter Life, p. 571-2. Detroit 1900.

3 Letter to "a priest at the seminary near Milwaukee" (year 1870). Op. cit., p. 556.

4 Works, ii, 476-7 (year 1874). Detroit 1882-7.

5 Op. cit., ii, 304 (year 1867).

6 Op. cit., ii, 277.

bearing on his view of aesthetics. In a general way we hinted at this when we gave Brownson's opinion of the connection between aesthetics and ontology, and it remains only to show the particular application as found in the writings under our consideration.

Whenever Brownson mentions true beauty, he refers not to what pleases the ordinary nature of man, but to that higher ideal which is found in 'the common and universal human nature.' This higher ideal, which is given to man by intuition of the formula Ens creat existentias, is identical with God and has all the qualities of the all-perfect, supreme Being. It is all-true, all-beautiful, all-good (xix 190, 420, 494). Since the expression of the beautiful as given in this ideal alone constitutes true art, all that was said above about the necessary identity of the beautiful with the true and the good becomes self-evident. Again art imitates the creative act that is expressed in the formula 'Being-God-creates existences,' and 'will be higher or lower as it takes this act, so to speak, on the side of being or on that of existences, and imitates the divine act in its primary revelation, or only as it is copied by existences in the order of second causes' (xix 423). Much of the modern art fails just here. It copies the creative act 'only at second hand, in its pale reflex in the order of second causes,' in the order of nature. For that reason it is feeble, lacks 'grandeur of conception, freedom and boldness in execution, and is admirable only in the petty details' (xix 423). Thus, according to Brownson, the ideal of beauty is given to man in the intuitive apprehension, the ideal of the sublime comes from the contemplation of the creative act, and art must be judged by its relation to the ontological formula, Ens creat existentias. Without this formula, on which he bases his ontology, his theory of art has no value. Hence the first step in examining the various views so far expressed will be to test the validity of Brownson's ontological principles.