The nature of our theories of Brownson to their foundation. task demands first of all logical completeness, and this necessitated the preceding paragraphs, which have a vital bearing on our matter. If man has an intuition of what is identical with the all-perfect Creator, then surely there is no excuse for not knowing and pursuing the highest form of beauty, there is in fact no excuse for striving after any form of beauty but this ideal. Especially would this ideal beauty be the standard according to which the critic should have to form his judgment. It was from this standpoint of the critic that Brownson made all his statements, and tried to apply his standard. His initial error was that he did not recognize the negative nature of the ideal which forms the core of his art theories. The idea of the infinite, since it has no positive content, can tell us nothing positive. Even if we call God the all-beautiful, it means in content rather the absence of all imperfections, and at most teaches us that the concretely beautiful must conform negatively with the idea of God-thus indicating no more than the general tendency that all activities must pursue. The same holds with regard to the good and the true. In ultimate ontological analysis the true and the good and the beautiful are the same, and identical with God. But further this analysis cannot take us. It tells us that goodness and truth in God mean conformity, with Himself; but we learn nothing from this with regard to the world of the concrete; and for a positive morality and truth we must examine nature-especially that of rational man— which as creature bears the impress of its Creator. This is just where Brownson stopped short. It may have been as a recoil from Transcendentalism that he seemed to recognize nothing good or beautiful in pure nature, and thought that nature in any aspect could be countenanced only in as far as it was brought directly into relation with the supernatural. He depreciated nature the statements that seem to indicate the contrary are negligible over against a host of others and he depreciated natural reason. He could not see that nature produced the ideal that he found in mankind; and he forgot that, outside of revelation, nature alone tells us whatever we know positively of truth, morality, and beauty. In the last article of his life he tells us: The whole principle and scope of the teleological order, or what Gioberti calls the second cycle or the return of existences to God without absorption in him as their final cause or last end [and this second cycle Brownson elsewhere explains as the aim of ethics or morality],11 transcends the reach of our natural faculties, or the light of nature, and is known only by supernatural revelation.12 11 Works, xix, 422. 12 Op. cit., ii, 280-1. CHAPTER V CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETIC PRINCIPLES 1. VIEWPOINTS IN ART We have seen that Brownson's definition of art centers about the beautiful and that his views on art are consequently determined by his idea of the beautiful. Just as the problem of the beautiful may be approached from different viewpoints, so too that of art. Thus art or the beautiful may be viewed in its effect, in as far as it is something that affects the minds of the perceivers regardless of the artist's intentions; or it may be regarded in its origin, as existing in the mind of the artist regardless of its effect on others. Innumerable opinions on the essence of art have been given, generally along one or the other of the above tendencies. As a rule each of these classes of opinions tries to exclude the other; the one claiming that art is independent of the beholder's mind, the other claiming that it is only what the beholder sees it to be. It would be impossible here to mention even a small portion of the theories of art advanced at different times, and it would be out of place, since our intention is far from writing a historical sketch. Opinions on the one side stress the fact that any work of art should convey some idea that exists in the artist's mind. "There is no other fine art than this—the passing of a man's soul into the work of his hands.”13 Opinions on the other side emphasize the charm or pleasure as their criterion of art. Marshall says: "Any device of man which serves to produce in any one an aesthetic thrill I shall not hesitate to call a work of art."14 This second class sometimes turns not so much upon the amount of aesthetic pleasure derived, as of the life-experience "Art for life's sake," Thus Guyau writes: "L'art véritable est, selon nous, celui qui nous donne le sentiment immédiat de la vie la plus intense et la plus expansive 13 English Illustrated Magazine, 10: 697. 14 Pain, Pleasure and Aesthetics, p. 112. London 1894. tout ensemble, la plus individuelle et la plus sociale."15 Guyau also stresses the suggestive force that art exerts, though he does not go to the extreme of the writer who said categorically: "Art, when all is said, is a suggestion, and it refuses to be explained."16 A more correct view of art is probably obtained in stressing neither of the viewpoints too much, but rather combining them in equal porportions. Reynolds speaks of art as having beauty for its object. This beauty "is an idea residing in the breast of the artist, which he is always labouring to impart, which he is yet so far able to communicate, as to raise the thoughts, and extend the views of the spectator."17 We shall consider art first of all as an activity on the part of the artist, then in its effects on men. As our criticism of Brownson's views is to be not only destructive, but also constructive, in fact mainly the latter, we shall not only mention points in which we take issue with him, but also others which he probably omitted to treat because he did not write a synthesis of aesthetic principles and because he made his statements only from the standpoint of the critic as prompted by the various works that were before him at different times. 2. THE ARTISTIC ACTIVITY Brownson speaks of the activity on the part of the artist as consisting mainly in the mental apprehension of an ideal which the artist strives to clothe in exterior form for the benefit and higher enjoyment of his fellowmen. The form of an artistic production he considers of no importance compared to the ideal to be expressed. An opposite view is held by those who claim that the form as such is the essence of art and that the content matters little. A possible third position combines the two and insists on the importance of form because of its intimate relation to the content, its inseparableness from the latter. This view is clearly expounded by Benedetto Croce.18 15 L'art au point de vue sociologique, p. 75. 16 Academy, 53: 545. Paris, 1889. 17 Discourses on Art, p. 155. Everyman's Library. 18 Aesthetic as Science of Expression and General Linguistic. (Tr. by Douglas Ainslie.) New York 1908. Because Croce's views in some respects attract us very much and will be referred to hereafter, we shall give a short exposition of them. According to Croce the essence of the artistic activity consists in intuition. By this term he means the immediate apprehension by the mind of some image or picture without the aid of logic or reflection (therefore not to be confounded with with the same word as used in the above chapters on ontology). This intuition it is that distinguishes art from the sciences, whose essence is the concept, the result of logic or reflection. The concept cannot stand alone, says Croce; it needs also intuitions: but the latter can stand alone and are simple. That is, the mind can apprehend immediately without the aid of reflection; but it cannot reflect without intuitions. The intuitions deal with particulars, while the concept, the result of reflection, deals with universals. Intuition, or immediate apprehension, is very prevalent in ordinary life. But only when it exists in larger quantity than ordinarily, does it rise to the artistic level. Then it not merely forms the basis of art, but is art, for there is no intuition without form. There can be no intuition that is vague or obscure; as soon as it exists in the mind, it is clear, and expressed in some form, be it of sound or color, or be it verbal. In other words, intuition and expression in form are inseparable, the terms are convertible. It follows then that as soon as an intuition of more than the ordinary extent is given, we have a work of art. The latter is therefore essentially something internal. However, it is nothing incommunicable and can be transmitted to others by externalizing the internal expression. The artist has no choice as to the intuitions that present themselves to him, but he can choose to which of the intuitions present he is to give external form. He can be called to account for what he has chosen to externalize, though not from the standpoint of pure art. The latter concerns itself only with the intuition as such, and for that, as was said above, the artist is not responsible. To avoid misconception it is necessary to add that intuition and concept may be found in combination, but that the former must predominate in art and the latter in a philosophical treatise, judgment in regard to this being made in accordance with the result intended by the artist. |