then, may in a work of art be in both external form and intuition, or in either one alone; or there may be no beauty since beauty does not belong to the essence of art. The latter is judged from the standpoint of artistic activity, in regard to which art demands the complete harmony, the inseparability in function of form and content. However, art considered as a communication of the intuition. to others finds in beauty not only a powerful aid, but one that is well-nigh indispensable. Of this we shall treat more explicitly later. Rarely is the artistic genius really admired and appreciated unles it presents what in some way or other appeals to human nature. Nor are men in general satisfied with a merely fleeting pleasure; and that beauty is always considered greatest which is most permanent and satisfies the noblest instincts of mankind—a beauty of which the poet well sings: There is a beauty that outlives the form That gives it birth, and lingers in the mind. After all has been said about the analysis of beauty, the most emphatic feature is that beauty contains an instinctive appeal to human nature. On account of this instinctive operation of beauty, in fact of all art, it is dangerous to set down conventional rules regarding it, as is so often done, unless these be understood simply as aides rather than rules. To examine past works of art and from them to establish inexorable rules is certainly to hamper the creative power of the artist, to check all posibility of advance, and makes for stagnation. We do not believe that all the resources of human nature and interest have been exhausted in the past or ever will be exhausted in the future; and the works of the past are valuable as guides only in so far as they show us what time has proved to be of permanent interest and value to human nature. To try the new is certainly a laudable undertaking. And the critics who rigorously test the new by the cenventions of the past alone are well characterized by Francis Thompson after his own fashion as men "who were for ever shearing the wild tresses of poetry between rusty 52 David Morton, Forum, 57: 576. rules, who could never see a literary bough project beyond the trim level of its day but they must lop it with a crooked criticism, who kept indomitably planting in the defile of fame the 'established conons' that had been spiked by poet after poet."53 At the same time we cannot sympathize with those who scorn conventions just because they are conventions, since they express what has withstood the critical mind of mankind for generations. Speaking of the function of criticism, Mr. Brownell mentions that the ultimate standards "arise insensibly in the mind of the cultivated public and spread in constantly widening circles. Mankind, once more, is wiser than any man."54 So, too, several generations are wiser than one, and only works that have lasted can be said to contain something in them answering to the permanent element in human nature. "One man opposing another determines nothing," says Reynolds; "but a general union of minds, like a general combination of the forces of all mankind, makes a strength that is irresistible.55 Bagehot concludes his estimate of Thackery with the words: "When the young critics of this year have gray hairs, their children will tell them what is the judgment of posterity upon Mr. Thackeray."56 This principle is almost analogous to the present philosophy of progress according to which evolution goes on in various directions, although only the activities in the right direction will continue while the others will die out. Still the criterion of time should not be pushed too rigorously, but serve mainly to make us cautious in our judgments. For it matters little after all to one generation whether a work of art will endure in the future as long as it means something to the people of the present. It is as a rule out of the present that the inspiration of art derives its source, as Brownson claims. And for that reason so many works are applauded by one generation only, while some new works, not of special contemporary interest, establish themselves only after a time, after the adage of 'truth will out' has asserted itself. The ultimate criterion of all art is its continued appreciation by mankind; and the element that produces this 53 Op. cit., iii, 15. 54 Standards, p. 149. New York 1917. 55 Op. cit., p. 117. 56 Literary Studies, ii, 129. Everyman's Library. cannot be other than a note sympathetic with human nature itself. Such, in fact, is the conclusion that many recent treatises touching on the subject arrive at. "Art resolves itself into two elements," writes Mr. Moulton: "interest of design, and human interest. The first lends itself readily to analytic treatment, but human interest will often defy analysis.”57 Just because this human interest defies complete analysis, it leaves a wide scope for the artist's activities and prevents the formulation of rules that dictate the confines of all future art. It is the varied expanse of this human interest that causes the approval of works of art in which there is little of beauty; that permits of the grotesque and even of the ugly in their places; that prompts one poet to sing: A sweet disorder in the dress, etc., etc., Do more bewitch me than when art Is too precise in every part;58 and another to write of the "hot-house seclusion of beauty in a world which Nature has tempered by bracing gusts of ugliness;"59 and that permits the philosopher to say: "Aesthetic psychoses are always pleasurable. But it cannot be claimed that all pleasures are aesthetic."60 Again, if any "new art" fails to touch the general public, this is not so much because it breaks the conventional forms of art, but because it fails to express to its beholders by and through its form that which touches the heart-strings of mankind, which bears the stamp of true human interest. It is only the common judgment of humanity that finally distinguishes between what is merely individual and what is eccentric, and that tolerates a weakness in any work if overshadowed by good qualities, weighing all the multiple considerations arising in art for a final adjudication of the work. This common voice of men needs no defense, for it has always. stood for that quality in art which expresses what is noblest in human nature, which has value as an incentive towards all 57 The Modern Study of Literature, p. 379. Chicago (1915). 58 Robert Herrick, "Delight in Disorder." 59 Francis Thompson, Op. cit., iii, 98. 60 Marshall, Op. cit., p. 107. that is good-a quality that can well be termed the spiritual worthiness of a work of art.61 In this spiritual worthiness and the human interest of art we find its final influence on beholders and their final source of appreciation. It is the element of human interest in any work of art that causes it to be well received by men; while its spiritual worthiness we should judge by the power it has towards giving to men worthy thoughts and aspirations. This spiritual worthiness we should set up as "the criterion of reason applied to the work of ascertaining value apart from mere attractiveness."62 Every experience resulting from human interest is broadening, lifts the mind out of its narrow self; and every experience of what is ennobling brings new joy and value into life. The faculty of art appreciation-generally called taste— is the faculty of detecting in a work of art the genuineness of the element that awakens human interest, and of the qualities that constitute its spiritual worthiness. As a first step towards exercising this taste, it is necessary to possess the faculty of repeating in oneself the intuition of the artist-a counterpart of the creative ability of the artist. Guyau divides the world into two classes: "les novateurs et les répétiteurs, c'est-à-dire les génies et le public, qui répète en lui-même par sympathie les états d'esprit, sentiments, émotions, pensées, que le génie a le premier inventés ou auxquels il a donné une forme nouvelle."63 He concludes rightly that the "instinct novateur" and the “instinct imitateur" exist both in the genius and in the ordinary man, that the one dominates in the former and the other in the latter. In the same way Croce rightly stresses the universal existence of intuitional power in man. And this power, while it is creative of new expressions in the genius, is in the ordinary man the faculty of reproducing these expressions when the external form is seen. The primary aspect of taste is then a milder form of the artistic power. The similarity and ultimate identity of taste and genius in this sense was already hinted at by Reynolds in his Discourses on Art,64 and now 61 Cf. Brownell, Criticism, p. 59. New York 1914. 62 Brownell, ibid. 63 Op. cit., p. 43. 64 P. 102. finds general acceptance. However, as some men have the intuitional power only in a minimum quantity; and as only some have enough of it combined with the requisite erudition and culture to appreciate works of art that are the results of the profoundest genius: so there will always be those who can appreciate no art, and others who can appreciate only certain productions of art. But the accepted meaning of taste does not refer only to the ability of recognizing the presence of artistic activity. Its further and almost greater task is to judge what art contains the element of permanent human interest, what possesses the greatest spiritual worthiness. 4. THE GOOD, THE TRUE, AND THE BEAUTIFUL As So far we have said nothing of the relation between morality and art, between the good, the true, and the beautiful-matters so emphatically brought to the foreground by Brownson. has already been mentioned these matters are vital to a synthesis of his artistic principles, and any disagreement with Brownson's view of them necessitates the positing also of other principles of art. It is therefore only in connection with the preceding paragraphs that we can discuss the relations of art to the beautiful, the good, and the true as they were set forth in the first part of this dissertation. There are those who claim that the artistic impulse is a blind impulse, one for which the artist is not responsible, and that art can therefore be judged only by the rules of art, not by those of ethics, etc. But this is viewing art only from one side. The artist may not be responsible for the intuitions that come to him, but he is responsible for the externalization of those intuitions, which is a matter of choice with him. This externalizing, being a free act, cannot but be amenable to the laws of all free acts, whether the laws be social, political, or moral. If morality means anything in this world, then its meaning extends to all of man's free activities, and works of art contrary to it must be considered injurious to the individual nature and to society as a whole. All human faculties are for 7 the good of man. And he who rules morality out of the sphere of art must, to be consistent, rule it out of life altogether. The question then becomes not so much one of the amenableness of |