unexpectedly encountered three battalions of infantry formed in squares. Without hesitation Bock's cavalry charged these squares, successfully penetrating them at places where wounded horses or falling men had caused a gap in the side of the square. The vigor and skill with which this small force (about 110 sabres) was handled resulted in the dispersion of the French infantry with a loss of 1 general officer and 1000 men; the German casualties were 4 officers, 48 men, 67 horses killed, and 2 officers, 56 men, 46 horses wounded, with 6 men missing.

Napoleon's disastrous Russian campaign demoralized his cavalry. The intense cold, deep snows, want of food for horses and men, and ceaseless encounters with the Cossacks reduced the French horsemen in numbers and spirit. General Morand says of the Cossacks: "These natural horsemen are not organized in divisions, pay no attention to regular alignments, rest their feet in great stirrups which serve as supports when using their weapons; trained to pass at once from the halt to the gallop and from the gallop to the halt, their horses second their dexterity. These ungroomed animals of irregular size, supplied by their riders, possess wonderful endurance, are guided entirely by the snaffle, and easily accomplish 100 verst (66 miles) in 24 hours." Their method of attack, in Napoleon's time called "the lava," consisted of a charge in small, irregular groups-in open or close order as circumstances seemed to require these "groups" hovering around the enemy until launched at a vulnerable point. Since then the close association with the regular system of the Russian army has caused the lava to degenerate into a simple "charge as foragers." In some respects the Cossack methods are not unlike those of the North American Indian of the plains.

The Crimean War was remarkable for the cavalry errors committed. Neither the Russians nor the allies employed the arm effectively either for reconnaissance, outpost, or in large bodies on the battlefield. The most unfortunate instance of this nature, the charge of the Light Brigade at Balaklava (1854)-where gallant men were sacrificed through the folly of their commander and the ambiguity of an order gained undying fame by a poet's pen. On the same field the heavy cavalrymen of both armies met-the one body at a slow pace, the other at a halt-with negative results. From the experience of the Crimea and that of the Italian campaign of 1859 doubts arose as to the value of cavalry in future operations, Austria making a decided reduction in 'that arm. "The awakening from this transient period of theory came from a nation not trained to arms, and it is to the American Civil War that we owe the revival that took place in the use of the cavalry arm." (Liddell.)

The experience gained in the Civil War in the United States (1861-65) laid the foundation for renewed confidence in the value of mounted troops and led to many changes in the armament, equipment, and instruction of European cavalry. At the outset the aged General Scott and the new commander of the United States forces (McClellan) did not expect that a large mounted force would be needed. In the North and West people were not accustomed to the saddle; in the South the majority were good horsemen. So it happened that the Confederates, at the beginning of the war, displayed greater mobility in

their operations, screened them effectually, and were better informed as to the enemy's movements than were the Union troops. The lesson of the first year taught the United States government the importance of a due proportion of cavalry in the composition of its armies, and by the spring of 1863 the Union cavalry were able to cope with the Southern horse. The mounted service of the United States in 1861 consisted of two regiments of dragoons, one of mounted rifles, and two of cavalry, variously armed, but later in that year another regiment was created and all were armed alike, with carbine, pistol, and sabre, were taught to fight as "dragoons," and were denominated "cavalry." On this basis was organized a great body of volunteer horsemen, eventually aggregating 300,000. The Confederates created their mounted force principally from the many mounted militia regiments and the thousands of good horsemen with which their section of the country abounded; these were officered in many cases by ex-officers of the United States army and by young planters. For want of carbines and sabres many Southern organizations were armed with rifles, but as a rule with sabre and pistol. It has been said that these troops were not "cavalry" in the European sense. On the other hand, it has been urged that they were cavalry of the most efficient and versatile description.

In 1862 the Confederate cavalry leader Stuart, with a small brigade and a battery, made a reconnaissance (or so-called "raid") from Richmond, Va., passing entirely around the Army of the Potomac, in position near that city, obtaining valuable information as to McClellan's position, destroying supplies, driving in outposts, swimming swollen streams, and returning home by a swift détour with the loss of one officer killed. In 1863 the Union general Pleasanton made a reconnaissance in force with 7981 cavalry, 3000 infantry, and 24 horse-artillery guns to discover, if practicable, General Lee's intentions. The movement was carried out with so much secrecy that upon crossing the Rappahannock River early in the morning of June 9, the enemy's cavalry-8500 strong, with 20 guns -was surprised, but, recovering, engaged Pleasanton's command near Brandy Station, and a great cavalry battle ensued which lasted ten hours and ended with the ultimate withdrawal of the Union troops unmolested, at nightfall, having accomplished their purpose. The action was spirited, and a number of mounted charges were made in which the sabre was freely used, although there was some dismounted work with the carbine. The infantry did not take an active part, but remained in reserve, covering Beverly Ford in the rear of the Union force. Pleasanton's casualties aggregated 932; those of Stuart about 500; the loss in commissioned officers was heavy. The occasion marked a new departure in the history of the war; in the language of Colonel McClellan, chief of staff to General Stuart, "It made the Federal cavalry. Up to this time confessedly inferior to the Southern horsemen, they gained, on this day, that confidence in themselves and their commanders which enabled them to contest fiercely the subsequent battlefields."

SO

At Gettysburg (1863) General Buford, in advance of the Union army with two small brigades of cavalry, 2500 strong (dismounted), and a battery of 6 rifled guns, defended the approaches to that field, delaying the advance of a corps of

Confederate infantry, who believed that they were opposed to an infantry force. Buford's skill and boldness enabled Reynolds's corps to reach the field in time to secure the advantage of position for the Union army. The Comte de Paris, writing of this affair, says: "This first inspiration of a cavalry officer and a true soldier decided, in every respect, the fate of the campaign. It was Buford who selected the battlefield where two armies were about to measure their strength." On the third day of the battle an encounter took place between the cavalry of Stuart (6000 sabres) and Gregg (5000), in which the former was thwarted in an effort to gain the rear of the Union line, simultaneously with Pickett's famous charge upon its front. Each cavalry division was accompanied by 3 batteries (about 12 guns) and engaged in a series of mounted charges and individual combats with medieval ferocity, resulting in the withdrawal of the Southern horse and casualties of 10 per cent of the forces engaged. The nature of the fight was shown when a fatigue party detailed to bury the dead "found two men, who had cut each other down with their sabres and were lying with their feet together, their heads in opposite directions, and the blood-stained sabre of each still tightly held in his grip." At another point lay "two men, one a Virginian, the other a Pennsylvanian, who fought on horseback with their sabres until they finally clinched and their horses ran from under them. Their heads and shoulders were severely cut and their fingers so firmly embedded in each other's flesh that they could not be removed without force." (Miller.) Another typical instance of the value of cavalry trained after "the American fashion" follows. At Cold Harbor, Va. (1864), during the Wilderness campaign, Merritt's brigade of 800 (regulars and volunteers) Union cavalry were dismounted at the edge of a wood, with orders to hold the position at all hazards. The horses were hidden in a ravine in the rear. Onehalf of this force was armed with Springfield breech-loading carbines, the other half with Spencer magazine carbines; all had pistols and sabres. Behind a barricade of fence rails, carbine in hand and ammunition by his side, each cavalryman awaited the enemy. Soon after, the head of an infantry force (McLaw's Confederate division) was discovered moving through the woods in column of companies, armed with Austrian muskets and sword bayonets. They advanced unsuspectingly until within 100 yards, when a volley from the cavalry met them. The incessant fire from the magazine carbines made a terrific noise, set the woods on fire, killed and wounded many of the enemy, threw them into confusion, and, believing themselves in the presence of a superior infantry force, they fell back out of range. This delay enabled Grant to occupy the ground upon which was fought the great battle of the following day. The Civil War contains numerous examples of brilliant cavalry operations which have served to place the names of Sheridan, Buford, and Stuart by the side of Seydlitz and Ziethen on the cavalry roll of fame.

In 1866 the "Seven Weeks' War" between Germany and Austria was too brief to furnish any new cavalry lesson. One or two brilliant actions occurred; at Benatek, where a squadron of Prussian hussars surprised a Hungarian battalion as it emerged from a wood and captured a flag, 16 officers and 665 men, and at Tobit

The

schau, where three Prussian squadrons attacked batteries in position and captured 16 guns. The greater war between France and Prussia (187071) was distinguished for the excellence of the German mounted scouts and the failure of the French cavalry. Three famous charges equally desperate (one French, two German) against the enemy's infantry marked this war. That of the French failed, but the Germans were successful, although the French formations remained intact. The cavalry casualties were very heavy. German cavalry was inferior to the French in fire action, and the Uhlans were powerless in presence of the "Franc-tireurs" (Home Guards). At Vitray a whole Prussian cavalry brigade was detained for 12 hours by 12 chasseurs d'Afrique armed with carbines, who by dexterous dismounted tactics successfully posed as infantry. In 1877-78 the war between Russia and Turkey was comparatively barren in cavalry results, if we except the famous Balkan expedition under Gurko. The Spanish-American War (1898) was uneventful from the mounted point of view. The South African War and the operations in the Philippines have shown how important and indispensable a well-mounted and trained cavalry is. The theoretical views as to the disappearance of cavalry in face of modern firearms have vanished. The influence of the South African War of 1899-1902 on the future organization, equipment, and employment of cavalry will be found treated under MOUNTED INFANTRY.

The work of the cavalry in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) was, in general, disappointing on both sides. The Russians had about 30,000 men, the difficulty of transporting horses limiting their numbers; the Japanese had about 6000 men, probably because their horses are not suited to the work and their men but little accustomed to riding. The Russian cavalry was poorly handled, and no real cavalry leader was developed among their commanders. The Japanese cavalry was so weak in numbers that it had to keep within supporting distance of its infantry and artillery, but rendered important service in securing information.

The cavalry regiments of the European armies, with the exception of the Austrian, by 1914 for the most part were equipped with the lance; this was more largely due to the example of the German army than to actual demonstration of superiority in recent wars. The modern tendency, however, is to attach increased importance to dismounted fire action, consequently the rifle and the bayonet have been adopted by the cavalry of the principal Powers; only France and Italy retain the carbine. The campaigns of Sheridan and Stuart are studied at the cavalry schools of Europe, and the lessons derived therefrom were being applied to an unusual extent at recent manœuvres.

In the wars in North Africa and the Balkans (1912-13) the cavalry rendered important service, but there were no noteworthy examples of shock action. To-day all armies are working with great energy on the improvement of the organization and tactical instruction of their cavalry, showing that the importance attached to this arm has not been diminished. In the United States army the cavalry, which for over 50 years has had a single-rank formation and an organization differing materially from European types, in 1913 was experimenting with the French drill and with a regimental organization resembling the Austrian, in which the regiment

1. CAVALRYMAN OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR.

2. CAVALRYMAN OF THE EARLY ARMY, 1799-1802. 3. DRAGOON-Mexican War Period.

4. CAVALRYMAN-Period of the Civil War.

5. DRAGOON-Period Before the Civil War.

6. CAVALRYMAN-Full Dress Uniform, 1888-1902.

7. CAVALRYMAN IN SERVICE DRESS (Blue), 1890.

8. CAVALRYMAN IN SERVICE UNIFORM (Olive Drab), 1914.

consists of six squadrons. This would be a return to the organization of the American cavalry in force more than 70 years ago, except that both the squadrons and the regiment are considerably larger, whereas in nearly all of the European armies the number of squadrons in a regiment has been reduced to four. The British cavalry regiment in 1913 consisted of three squadrons.

The voices which, after the first favorable experiments with dirigible balloons and aëroplanes, declared that cavalry could be dispensed with in reconnaissance, are silent, and it is now recognized that these technical developments serve to increase the opportunities and enhance the value of cavalry as the fighting force of greatest mobility.

THE CAVALRY OF TO-DAY

The condition of this arm of service in the principal nations of the world (1913-14) may be summarized as follows:

AUSTRIA has 42 regiments of regulars (15 dragoons, 16 hussars, 11 Uhlans); total, 46,910 (all are light cavalry). Also, 6 regiments of Imperial Landwehr, 4350, and 10 regiments of Hungarian Landwehr, 5736. Arms: sabre and repeating Mannlicher carbine. Each man carries water bottle and 2 ammunition pouches. Total weight carried by horse, 297 pounds. There are three remount depots; peace effective, 78,000 horses and mules; Imperial resources, 3,500,000 animals. On mobilization, 250,000 horses would be required.

BELGIUM, 8 regiments; total, 7608.

BRAZIL, 12 regiments of 4 squadrons each, and 5 regiments of 2 squadrons each; total, 3732.

BULGARIA, 11 regiments.
CHILE, 8 regiments.

DENMARK, 4 regiments of 3 squadrons each, and 5 reserve squadrons. Peace strength varies greatly according to season. War strength is not known.

EGYPT, 10 squadrons--1100. Arms: lance (front rank), sabre, and Martini carbine.

ENGLAND, 31 regiments regular (5 heavy, 13 medium, 13 light)-20,472. Regiment consists of 3 squadrons of 4 troops each. Household regiments are of 24 officers, 430 men, 275 horses. Line regiments (home), 26 officers, 696 men, 465 horses and mules; (India), 29 officers, 624 men, 592 horses. Arms: Lee-Metford carbine, sword; also lance in lancers and front rank of dragoons. Total weight carried by horse, 252 to 276 pounds. The Yeomanry (volunteer horse), 10,000, largely recruited from young farmers. In Great Britain and Ireland about 3,000,000 horses, of which 70,000 are fit for military purposes; about onefifth of these are registered. The Anglo-Indian cavalry consists of 40 regiments (native)24,937-besides the 9 regiments (British) already mentioned. Each regiment consists of 4 squadrons, 10 British officers, and 625 natives (all ranks). India supplies its own horses.

FRANCE has 91 regiments (12 cuirassiers, 32 dragoons, 23 chasseurs, 14 hussars, 4 chasseurs d'Afrique, 6 Spahis)-71,200 (all ranks). Four squadrons and 1 depot squadron, 37 officers and 792 men to each regiment. Arms: sabre and magazine carbine; also lance, except for cuirassiers. Sabre and dynamite cartridge on saddle, carbine over shoulder. Cuirassiers wear cuirass weighing 13 to 16 pounds. Horses required on mobilization (all arms), 480,000. There are 8

remount companies, total strength 2392, and 20 remount depots.

GERMANY has 103 regiments of cavalry, as follows: Prussia-10 cuirassiers, 26 dragoons, 19 hussars, 21 Uhlans, 1 heavy cavalry, and 6 Jäger zu Pferde; Saxony-1 heavy cavalry, 2 hussars, 2 Uhlans; Württemberg-2 dragoons, 2 Uhlans; Bavaria-2 heavy cavalry, 2 Uhlans, 8 chevauxlégers. Total strength, 2585 officers, 70,370 men. Regimental organization: 4 squadrons and 1 depot squadron. Peace strength of squadron: 5 officers, 142 men. Arms: lance, sword, and carbine; noncommissioned officers carry a pistol. The carbine, which is practically a rifle, is carried in bucket on off side of saddle. Horses available (peace), 70,000. Seven new regiments have been added (1913), bringing the total up to 110 regiments. Armament with rifle and bayonet appears to be experimental.

GREECE has 3 regiments (12 squadrons), about 1400 men. Arms: Gras carbine and sword.

ITALY has 29 regiments, each of 5 squadrons. Arms: carbine, bayonet, long sword; the first 10 regiments carry a 9-foot 9-inch lance. There are about 750,000 horses and 300,000 mules in Italy. The cavalry in peace requires 23,000.

JAPAN has 89 squadrons of cavalry, formed into 19 regiments of 3 squadrons and 8 regiments of 4 squadrons each. The strength of the squadron is 5 officers and 136 men. In time of war each regiment is to be augmented by 2 reserve squadrons. Total peace strength is kept secret, probably about 15,000.

MEXICO, 14 regiments and 4 skeleton regiments-634 officers, 7166 men. (Returns before the disturbances of 1913.)

THE NETHERLANDS, 4 regiments of 4 squadrons each.

NORWAY, 16 squadrons formed into 3 regiments.

PORTUGAL, 8 regiments-270 officers, 4920 men (peace).

RUMANIA, 20 regiments of 4 squadrons each; 21 depot squadrons, and 3 squadrons in the escort regiment.

RUSSIA'S cavalry consists of 66 regiments (4 guard cuirassiers, 4 guard light cavalry, 58 line dragoons) and 2 regiments of 6 sotnias in the Crimea and Daghestan, and 4 independent sotnias; the cuirassier regiments are 4 squadrons; the others, 6 squadrons. Each regiment (peace), 816-1143; (war), 708-1015; to each will be attached 1 officer, 16 men trained for scouting and courier duty; also another detachment 2 officers, 16 men for pioneers and signal duty. Arms: curved sword, rifle, and bayonet; the rifle slung over shoulder-is similar to infantry rifle. Each, man carries 40 rounds. Saddle packed with two "wallets," forage sack, cloak, intrenching tool, picket pin, spare horseshoes, canvas water bucket, etc.; total weight carried by horse (exclusive of rider), 119 pounds. The Cossacks number (peace) 54 regiments or 323 squadrons; or (war) 152 regiments and 42 independent squadrons-935 squadrons in all, by adding the 2d and 3d levies of the Cossack reserve; strength of regiments varies from 660 to 1100 (all ranks). Arms: sword without guard, rifle, and (front rank) lanceexcept Kuban Cossacks. Each man carries 2 bandoleer pouches, containing 40 rounds; only snaffle bridle and light saddletree resting on felt pads. Weight carried (exclusive of rider), 97 pounds. The aggregate (peace) strength of the Russian cavalry is 5600 officers, 125,000 men