IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, March 2, 1863. Resolved, by the Senate of the United States, (the House of Representatives concurring,) That in order to enable the "Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War" to complete their investigations of certain important matters now before them, and which they have not been able to complete, by reason of inability to obtain important witnesses, be authorized to continue their sessions for thirty days after the close of the present Congress, and to place their testimony and reports in the hands of the Secretary of the Senate. Resolved, further, That the Secretary of the Senate is hereby directed to cause to be printed, of the reports and accompanying testimony of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, 5,000 copies for the use of the Senate, and 10,000 copies for the use of the House of Representatives. Attest: J. W. FORNEY, Secretary. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, March 2, 1863. Resolved, That the House concur in the foregoing resolutions of the Senate to continue the sessions of the "Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War" for thirty days, and to direct the Secretary of the Senate to cause the printing of the reports, &c., with the following amendment insert at the end the words: "of the present Congress." Attest: EM. ETHERIDGE, Clerk. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, March 2, 1863. Resolved, That the Senate concur in the foregoing amendment of the House of Representatives to said resolution. Attest: J. W. FORNEY, Secretary. APRIL 6, 1863. Mr. WADE, from the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, in accordance with the preceding resolution, placed in the hands of the Secretary of the Senate the following report in three parts. PART 1.-ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. PART 2.-BULL RUN-BALL'S BLUFF. PART 3.-WESTERN DEPARTMENT, OR MISSOURI-MISCELLANEOUS. OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR. PART II.-BULL RUN-BALL'S BLUFF. BULL RUN. The joint committee on the conduct of the war submit the following report, with accompanying testimony, in relation to the battle of Bull Run, in July, 1861: So long a time has elapsed, and so many important events have occurred in the progress of the war, since the campaign which ended with the battle of Bull Run, in July, 1861, that your committee do not deem it necessary to go very much into detail in their report. The testimony they submit herewith is very voluminous, and fully covers all the points of interest connected with that campaign. They therefore submit a brief report, confining their attention principally to the causes which led to the defeat of our army in that battle. That which now appears to have been the great error of that campaign was the failure to occupy Centreville and Manassas at the time Alexandria was occupied, in May. The position at Manassas controlled the railroad communication in all that section of country. The forces which were opposed to us at the battle of Bull Run were mostly collected and brought to Manassas during the months of June and July. The three months' men could have made the place easily defensible against any force the enemy could have brought against it; and it is not at all probable that the rebel forces would have advanced beyond the line of the Rappahannock had Manassas been occupied by our troops. The next cause of disaster was the delay in proceeding against the enemy until the time of the three months' men was so nearly expired. In that respect the movement was made too late rather than too soon, and the enemy were allowed time to collect their forces at Manassas and to strengthen the position by defensive works. The reason why the movement was so long delayed is shown, to some extent, by the testimony, to which your committee would direct the attention of those who desire to examine that point. And when the movement was finally determined upon, much was needed to render the troops efficient. There had been but little time devoted to disciplining the troops and instructing them, even as regiments; hardly any instruction had been given them in reference to brigade movements, and none at all as divisions. When General McDowell reviewed eight regiments together-the only instance previous to the battle, so far as the evidence shows, that even that number of troops were manœuvred in one body-he was charged with desiring to make a show. General McDowell was instructed, verbally, by General Scott, to prepare and submit a plan of operations against the enemy at Manassas. This plan was considered in cabinet meeting, and agreed to; and the 9th of July was fixed upon by General Scott as the day when the army should move. The plan of General McDowell was to move out in the direction of Centreville, and endeavor to turn the enemy's right with a portion of his force, and destroy his communication by railroad with Richmond. He asked that a certain number of troops be given him to operate against the force which it was estimated that Beauregard had under his command. He was assured that the enemy below should be kept occupied by General Butler, who was in command at Fortress Monroe; and that the enemy under Johnston, in the Winchester valley, should be held there by General Patterson. Some days before the battle, upon expressing some fears in regard to the force under Johnston being detained by Patterson, he was assured by General Scott that "if Johnston joined Beauregard, he should have Patterson on his heels." The movement did not commence until the 16th of July, a week later than the time first decided upon. The transportation was deficient, and General McDowell had to depend upon others to see that supplies were forwarded to him in time. The march was slow, one reason being that, since the affair at Vienna, near Alexandria, and at Big Bethel, near Fortress Monroe, a fear of "masked batteries" caused hesitation in regard to advancing upon points concerning which there was a want of information. There was some delay, on the march, in consequence of the want of complete discipline among some of the troops. They were not sufficiently under control of officers to be prevented from leaving the ranks and straggling. The affair at Blackburn's Ford, on Thursday, the 18th, being more extensive than General McDowell had ordered, drew the attention of the enemy to that point; and, in consequence of the preparations they made there to meet any attempt of General McDowell to turn their position in that direction, it became necessary to adopt another line of operations. General McDowell determined to make the attempt to turn their right, and steps were taken to secure the necessary information. It was not until Saturday that the information which General McDowell desired was obtained. He then issued orders for the troops to move the next morning, the 21st, some at two o'clock and some at half-past two. The division of General Tyler was in the advance, and was ordered to proceed directly out to Stone Bridge, and take up position there. General Hunter's and General Heintzelman's divisions were to follow, and when they reached a road leading to the right, about a mile in advance of General Tyler's camp, they were to turn off and proceed in the direction of Sudley's Church, and endeavor to turn the enemy's left. The movement to the right was intended to be made under cover of General Tyler's force at Stone Bridge. But there was much delay in the movements of the troops that morning. Tyler's division did not pass the point, where Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions were to turn off, until after the time designated. Some of the troops were delayed for three hours, affording time to the enemy to discover the movement and make preparations to meet it. Notwithstanding these disadvantages, our forces were successful during the fore part of the day, although Beauregard had been re-enforced by some of Johnston's forces from Winchester. Our troops were very much fatigued. The day was exceedingly warm; the roads were dusty; and they had been some hours longer on the march than had been anticipated. In the afternoon additional reenforcements arrived from Johnston's army, and suddenly attacked our right and threw it into disorder. About the same time two of our batteries (Ricketts's and Griffin's) were captured by the enemy, and our entire force began to fall back in great confusion. In regard to the capture of the batteries, it appears by the testimony that they were ordered to take an advanced and exposed position, and were not sufficiently supported. Not long after they were placed in position, a rebel regiment appeared in their immediate vicinity. Captain Griffin states that he took them to be rebels from the first, and directed one of his lieutenants to open upon them with canister. But Major Barry, chief of artillery, coming up jus at the time, told him that they were some of our own troops coming to the support of the batteries, and directed him not to fire upon them. The battery was accordingly turned in another direction, and, almost immediately after, this regiment of the enemy opened fire upon it, disabling the horses, and killing and wounding most of the men at the guns. That completed the discomfiture of our troops, and the day which had opened upon our success, closed upon a defeated and retreating army. A division, under Colonel Miles, had been stationed at Centreville, partly for the purpose of a reserve, and partly to guard against any flank attack. The enemy did attempt a movement upon our left, but were promptly met and checked by our forces there. The principal cause of the defeat on that day was the failure of General Patterson to hold the forces of Johnston in the valley of the Shenandoah. He had a force of about 23,000 men; while the force of the enemy opposed to him, according to the best evidence your committee could obtain, did not exceed from 12,000 to 15,000 men. General Patterson testifies that he was satisfied that Johnston had from 35,000 to 40,000 men, and over 60 guns. He also states that a large number of his troops were anxious to return home; that their time had about expired, and he could not persuade them to remain. There is considerable testimony to show that the troops became dissatisfied, and refused to remain, only when they learned that their movement from Bunker Hill on the 17th of July was a retreat, and not an advance upon the enemy; that while they supposed they were being led to the attack, little, if any, complaint was made, and they were in excellent spirits. In reference to the orders given to General Patterson, and the object to be accomplished by his operations, there seems to be no question. That object was to prevent Johnston from joining Beauregard before General McDowell could have an opportunity to attack the forces under the latter. The character of the orders is indicated by the following telegram of the 13th of July (Saturday) from General Scott to General Patterson: "I telegraphed you yesterday, if not strong enough to beat the enemy early next week, make demonstrations so as to detain him in the valley of Winchester. But if he retreats in force towards Manassas, and it be hazardous to follow him, then consider the route via Keyes's Ferry, Leesburg, &c." General Scott had, the day before, conveyed to General Patterson the intimation that General McDowell would commence his movement on the 16th or July, and on the 15th General Patterson advanced from Martinsburg to BunkeHill, remaining there the 16th. On the 17th General Scott telegraphs to General Patterson : "I have nothing official from you since Sunday, but am glad to learn through Philadelphia papers that you have advanced. Do not let the enemy amuse and delay you with a small force in front, whilst he re-enforces the Junction with his main body. McDowell's first day's work has driven the enemy beyond Fairfax Court-House. The Junction will probably be carried to-morrow." There is no evidence at what time that despatch was received. But it could not have been received before the movement from Bunker Hill to Charlestown was made by General Patterson, for that movement commenced very early in the morning of the 17th, the date of the despatch. On the 18th General Scott telegraphs: tions. "I have certainly been expecting you to beat the enemy. If not, that you had felt him strongly, or at least had occupied him by threats and demonstraYou have been at least his equal, and, I suppose, superior in number. Has he not stolen a march, and sent re-enforcements towards Manassas Junction? A week is enough to win a victory." |