A. J. REMMINGTON, Plaintiff in Error, v. STATE OF OREGON, Defendant in Error. Error to Multnomah. 1. Gambling is not an offence under the statute. 2. Criminal statutes must be construed in accordance with their natural and grammatical meaning. THIS is a prosecution for betting on a game of cards. The indictment was found at the November term, A. D. 1859, of the Circuit Court for Multnomah County, and plaintiff in error did not deny the betting, as charged, but pleaded guilty, and was fined by the court below. It is now claimed by the plaintiff in error that there is no such offence as that charged in the indictment, which is based upon the third section of the statute, passed February 1st, A. D. 1858; being an act to amend chapter ten of the Oregon Statutes, entitled gaming. Remmington v. State. W. W. Page, for plaintiff in error. D. W. Douthitt, for defendant in error. BOISE, J. The question presented by the assignment of errors, in this case, is purely one of the construction of the third section of the act of the 1st of February, 1858; section one of which act prohibits all gambling with cards, but provides no penalty for the violation of such prohibition. Section two provides for the punishment of persons who shall set up any gambling device; and section three, on which this indictment is founded, provides, that "every person who shall bet any money, or other property, &c., at or any other gaming table, bank, or gambling device, shall be punished, &c." The word "other," as here used in this section, by grammatical construction, must refer to some gaming-table, bank, or gambling device, not mentioned in the preceding section of this act, and cannot, therefore, refer to gambling with cards. It is true, as urged by the prosecution, that this construction of the statute renders it impossible to prevent betting on gambling devices. But we are not at liberty to construe the language of the statute contrary to its natural and grammatical meaning. And if the legislature has failed to accomplish its object by the enactment of this statute, it is to that authority, and not to the courts, that the public must look for a correction of the mistake. Judgment below reversed. Stephens v. Powell. JAMES B. STEPHENS and WILLIAM H. FRUSH, Plaintiffs in Error, v. DAVID POWELL, Defendant in Error. Error to Multnomah. Where a charter for a ferry recites, that it "shall be subject to the same regulations, &c., as other ferries are, or may hereafter be, by the laws, &c., fixing the rates of toll," &c., the rates of ferriage are subject to change by future legislation. THIS action was originally brought before a justice of the peace of Multnomah County, to recover illegal ferriage, demanded and received by plaintiffs in error of Powell, at their ferry, in Multnomah County; and, also, to recover the penalty for demanding and receiving such illegal rates of ferriage; which penalty is provided for in section fifty of the act of the legislature, relating to roads and ferries. W. L. McEwen, for plaintiffs in error. Williams & Gibbs, for defendant in error. BOISE, J. Plaintiffs in error claim their ferry rights under a charter to plaintiff, Stephens, from the legislature, passed January 17th, 1853, and continuing for the term of ten years; and they claim that the county commissioners of the proper county, (who, by the charter, had authority to fix the rates of toll for this ferry,) having exercised the authority, and fixed such rates, under the provisions of the statute of 1854, section fifty, such rates became a vested right in Stephens, which the legislature could not impair during the continuance of the charter. But the legislature did, by act passed January 17th, A. D. 1857, provide, that "the county commissioners of the several counties be authorized to fix, alter and establish, from time to Stephens v. Powell, time, the rates of ferriage to be levied and collected at all ferries now established, or hereafter to be established by law, within the then "territory of Oregon ;" and the commissioners of Multnomah County, in pursuance of this act, proceeded to reduce the rates at the ferry of the plaintiffs in error. But the plaintiffs in error did not recognise any authority to make such reduction, and continued to demand and receive the rates established prior to the passage of the act of the 17th of January, 1857; and the only question presented for the consideration of this court is, had the said commissioners authority to make such reduction? The charter, under which the plaintiffs in error claim, after making the grant of the ferry privilege, contains a proviso in these words, "provided that said ferry, when established, shall be subject to the same regulations, and under the same restrictions, as other ferries are, or may hereafter be, by the laws of this territory, fixing the rates of toll, and prescribing the manner in which licensed ferries shall be kept and regulated." It is clearly indicated by this provision of the charter, that the legislature intended that the ferry rates of this ferry should be fixed by the local authorities of the county where it was situated; and the only question is, whether they were to remain subject to future legislation. If the charter had simply provided that this ferry should be subject to the same regulations, and under the same restrictions, as other ferries are by the laws of this territory, fixing the rates of toll, and prescribing the manner, &c., leaving out the words " or may hereafter be," then the regulations and restrictions referred to, being the then existing laws of the country, would have become a part of the charter, and there being no proviso to alter it, the same would have remained unalterable during the existence of the charter; but the legislature did provide, that this ferry should be subject to be affected by any further legislation on the subject of ferries, restricting the matters of toll and otherwise. The words "or may hereafter be," refer to future action of the legislature, and are susceptible of no other construction. We conclude, there Keith v. Cheeny. fore, that this ferry became subject to the law of the 17th of January, 1857, and was liable to the action of the county commissioners in reducing the tolls; and that the court below was right in instructing the jury, that the county commissioners had authority to alter the rates of ferriage at this ferry. Judgment below affirmed. MATTHEW KEITH, Plaintiff in Error, v. FRANKLIN CHEENY, Defendant in Error. Error to Multnomah. 1. The issuing to claimants of certificates of donation claims belongs to the register and receiver of the land office; and in Oregon, they are the successors of the surveyor-general in this business. 2. A certificate is evidence of residence, cultivation, and other facts which it recites. 3. The donee of a land claim may maintain an action, under our statute, for the recovery of real property, at least, against one who shows no title except possession. THIS action is to recover the possession of a town or building lot situate in the city of Portland, and county of Multnomah. The cause was tried at the March term, 1860, of the Circuit Court of Multnomah County. Williams & Gibbs, for plaintiff in error. Logan & Shattuck, for defendant in error. BOISE, J. The plaintiff in the court below declared as tenant in fee; and the defendant, in his answer, also claimed to be tenant in fee. On the trial, the plaintiff (Cheeny) offered in evidence a 1 285 6 177 |