Edwards v. Steamship Panama. who frequent the harbor, as pilot-ground. It does not appear that the boundaries or limits of the pilot-ground have ever been defined by any authority, and are only known from usage. As a question of fact, I find that the libellant first offered his services, and, as between himself and Rogers, considered as a Washington Territory pilot, was entitled to be employed, or paid half pilotage. But it further appears from the evidence and the admission of the pleadings, that Moses Rogers was duly licensed as a first class pilot of steamboats on the 3d day of July, A. D. 1860, under the act of Congress, "approved August 30, 1852," by "O. A. Pitfield, supervising inspector for the fourth supervising district." This license, by the provisions of the law and its own terms, is to continue one year from its date. It is admitted by the pleadings, that the Panama is a steamship engaged in carrying passengers, and this brings her within the description or class of vessels provided for in the act of Congress, entitled "An act to provide for the better security of the lives of passengers of vessels, propelled, in whole or in part, by steam.” "Approved July 7, 1838," and the "Act to modify" the same, 'approved March 3, 1843," and the act amendatory thereof, entitled, "An act to amend an act, entitled an act to provide for the better security of the lives of passengers on board of vessels, propelled, in whole or in part, by steam, and for other purposes." The act of 1838 provides for the inspection of hulls and boilers. The act of 1843 provides, in addition, that such vessels shall be provided with means of steering that may be available in cases of fire. The act of 1852 completely supplies the provisions of both acts on these subjects, and then provides for the "other purposes" suggested in the title of the act. Among these appear to be the employment of engineers and pilots on board of such vessels, "instead of the present system of pilotage and mode of employing engineers." The act provides for a board of inspectors who shall examine, classify and license accordingly, "all engineers and pilots of steamers carrying passengers." That "it shall be unlawful for any person to employ, or any Edwards v. Steamship Panama. person to serve, as engineer or pilot on any such vessel, who is not licensed by the inspectors; and any one so offending shall forfeit one hundred dollars for each offence." For the libellant, it is contended, that Congress did not intend, by the provisions of this act, to supersede the existing State laws on the subject of pilotage; because, it is said, the act does not expressly so declare; because of the inconvenience that would result from such construction; and, because it being eminently proper and necessary that the States should control this subject themselves, it is not to be supposed that Congress would interfere with it. The constitution gives Congress power to regulate commerce. (Art. I., sec. 8.) This includes the power to regulate navigation, and pilot laws are regulations of navigation. In the case of Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 315-16, the Supreme Court says: "That the power to regulate commerce includes the regulation of navigation, we consider settled. And when we look to the nature of the service performed by pilots, to the relation which that service and its compensations bear to navigation between the several States, and between the ports of the United States and foreign countries, we are brought to the conclusion, that the regulation of the qualification of pilots, of the modes and times of offering and rendering their services, of the responsibilities which shall rest upon them, of the powers they shall possess, of the compensation they may demand, and of the penalties by which their rights and duties may be enforced, do constitute regulations of navigation, and consequently of commerce, within the just meaning of this clause of the constitution." The power of Congress in the premises cannot be questioned. As to its intent, there is no limitation in the words of the act. It speaks of all "such vessels," wherever they may be, whether upon bars, bays, rivers or inlets. As to the argument from inconvenience and the impropriety of superseding the State laws, I cannot agree with it. The acts of Congress within its power are not to be restrained in their import, or limited in their operation, because it can be supposed or shown that Edwards v. Steamship Panama. some State law is thereby rendered inoperative, or that the State prefers some other system, which she thinks preferable. The law of Congress is paramount, and all State legislation which is inconsistent with its terms, liberally and fairly construed, must yield to it. Nor is it true that there is any presumption in favor of the State law and against the law of Congress, which, in doubtful cases, would determine the question in favor of the State law. But on the contrary, where, as in this case, the power is primarily and inherently in Congress, and is only allowed to the State by the sufferance of Congress, the presumption should be the other way. The wisdom of the law was a question for Congress, and not for the court or the State, to determine. I think the act intended just what it says, "to change the system of pilotage for vessels spoken of, so that instead of the present system, the following regulations shall be observed." That is, one to take the place of the other. What was the present system at the date of the law? It was the pilot laws of the States regulating pilots and pilotage upon the bays, lakes and rivers within their several jurisdiction. It did not extend to the high seas. This was the system which the regulations of the act of 1852 as to steamboats were to be "instead" of, that is, in lieu of, to take the place of. Is the Columbia River bar exempted in any way from the operation of these general words? If so, I cannot see it. The new regulations are to take the place of the then existing system throughout the United States. Because the State has a system of pilotage there with which this regulation" interferes, so far as steam-vessels are concerned, is no reason why the bar should be exempt from the law. If it were, the proposition would be reversed, and the act of 1852 should read, the "following regulations" shall be observed, instead of the present system, (that is, State pilot laws,) only where the present system does not exist. There can be no question but that the act of 1852 applies to the whole route, and every part of it. It is made a crime for the master of any such vessel to employ any one as a pilot unless licensed by the United States inspectors, or for any one not having 66 Edwards v. Steamship Panama. such a license to be so employed. For the greater security of life, it seems to have been the intention of Congress to no longer leave the subject to the conflicting, contradictory and inefficient legislation of the several States, but to provide a uniform authority for examining and licensing steamboat pilots; men who were not merely acquainted with the channels, rocks and shoals of a particular route, but who were well acquainted with the machinery, motion and motive power of steam-vessels, and knew how to control them and guide them under any and all emergencies. A bar pilot may be a good seaman, and intimately acquainted with the currents, tides and shoals of a particular pilotage ground, but this alone does not render him a competent or safe person to take charge of a vessel propelled by steam. Again, the difficulty suggested by counsel for libellant, that pilots licensed by the inspectors might be ignorant of the channels on particular pilot grounds, is possible, but not very probable. The inspectors are to inquire diligently into the qualification of the applicant, and may call third persons before them as witnesses. The inspectors are appointed for collection districts, and their licenses are for routes within that district, where they may reasonably be supposed to have as much local knowledge and means of information as a board of pilot commissioners of the State. No inspectors have been appointed for this State, and the duty has devolved upon the supervising inspector living upon the Atlantic coast. Under this state of things, it is not to be expected that the law would be very thoroughly administered in the examination of pilots and engineers; but doubtless, Congress will provide for inspectors in this collection district, and that difficulty will be obviated. The law only so far abrogates the State law as to require that a steam-vessel carrying passengers shall have a pilot licensed by its authority, and to prohibit any pilot without such license from serving as pilot on such vessel. The compensation of pilots, the mode and manner of offering their services, until Congress secs proper to provide for them, still remain legitimate subjects of State legislation. The bar pilot, licensed by the State, may apply Waling v. Sloop Christina. to the United States inspectors for license to pilot steam-vessels, and, if found competent, and licensed, 'may pilot such vessel. The libellant, then, although he first offered his services to the Panama, as she was outward bound, is not entitled to recover his claim of half-pilotage. The law of the State under which he claims, as to the Panama, was void. He was prohibited, under a penalty of one hundred dollars, from being employed on the Panama as pilot, and the master in the like sum from employing. The decree of the court will be, that the libel be dismissed, and that claimants recover of the libellant and his sureties their costs. G. H. Cartter, for libellant. D. Logan, for claimants. DAVID WALING V. THE SLOOP CHRISTINA. United States District Court for the District of Oregon.— Cause, Civil and Maritime, for the Subtraction of Wages. SPECIAL TERM, FEBRUARY 8, 1862. DEADY, J. The libel in this cause alleges, that the libellant shipped as a seaman on the sloop Christina, at Port Townsend, in W. T., on the 28th of October, 1861, on a voyage from said port to Bellingham Bay; thence to Portland, in Oregon, and back to the port of departure. That the contract of shipment between the libellant and the master, George Thompson, was, that the schooner should proceed to Portland, and that there the said master should purchase a cargo of apples, and return with the same to Port Townsend, and that libellant should have one-third of the profits of said cargo of apples for his wages. That no shipping articles |