Statement of Facts.

the counties by actions in the courts of civil common law jurisdiction in such counties, respectively.

"§ 6. That all laws in conflict with this act are repealed. "87. This act shall take effect from its passage.'

The powers and duties conferred by this act upon the board of equalization were, by a subsequent act, approved April 19, 1882, devolved upon the board of railroad commissioners, appointed under an act approved April 6, 1882.

These actions were brought in the Franklin Circuit Court in pursuance of the 5th section of the act.

The cause of action against the Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railroad Company was set out in the petition, according to the practice in Kentucky, as follows:

"The plaintiff states that the defendant is a railroad company and corporation, and is, and was during the year 1882, the owner of, by lease, and operating, a line of railway lying in the State of Kentucky known as the Cincinnati Southern Railway, and the same constructed under, and chartered and incorporated by, an act of the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, entitled 'An act to authorize the trustees of the Cincinnati Southern Railway to acquire the right of way and to extend a line of railway through certain counties in this Commonwealth,' approved February 13th, 1872.

"Plaintiff states that the defendant, for the purpose of assessment and taxation for the year 1882, as required by law, reported to the Auditor of Public Accounts of the State of Kentucky the total length of said road owned and operated by it as aforesaid and the value thereof per mile, and also reported its engines, cars, depot grounds, improvements, and other real estate, and the value thereof. The total valuation of said roads, including sidings and other taxable property as reported, was dollars.

"Plaintiff states that after said report and valuation was made to the Auditor of Public Accounts by the defendant, the Board of Railroad Commissioners, who by law constitute a Board of Equalization to value and assess the railroad property of the State, after being sworn, as required by law, met on the first day of September, 1882, at the office of the auditor, in

Statement of Facts.

Frankfort, and with a majority of said board present constituting a quorum, the auditor placed before them the valua tions, returns, and report made to him by defendant.

"Plaintiff states that said Board of Equalization continued its sittings from day to day, as provided by law, of which the defendant had due notice; and plaintiff avers that defendant did appear before said board by its officers, agents, and attorneys, and presented such facts, figures, and information and argument in relation to the valuation and assessment for taxation of its said property as it saw proper to.

"Plaintiff states that said board, after a full hearing of defendant, by her officers, agents, and attorneys, and a full con- . sideration of said returns, reports, information, and arguments before them, valued and assessed for taxation for the year 1882 the defendant's line of railroad lying in this State, the same reported by defendant to the auditor, together with the rollingstock, engines, cars, depot grounds, improvements, and other real estate, at the sum of $6,027,942.00, and on the day of September, 1882, returned and filed with the Auditor of Public Accounts the record of said assessment and valuation, signed and attested, as provided by law, a certified copy of which, marked 'A,' is filed herewith as a part hereof.

"Plaintiff states that the Auditor of Public Accounts, before the 10th day of March, 1882 [1883], duly notified defendant of the amount of its assessment for taxation, and, as required by law, opened an account with defendant, charging it with the sum of $28,632.42, the amount of tax due the State of Kentucky upon said assessment and valuation of the defendant's property for the year 1882 at 473 cents on the one hundred dollars, which is the rate of taxation prescribed by law on such property, and all other real estate of the Commonwealth. A certified copy of said account is filed herewith as a part hereof, marked 'B.'

"Plaintiff states that the defendant is indebted to him in the sum of $28,632.42, taxes due as aforesaid for the year 1882, no part of which has been paid.

"Wherefore plaintiff prays judgment against the defendant

Argument for Plaintiffs in Error.

for said debt, and interest from October 10th, 1882, and for her costs and all proper relief."

In the case against the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, the petition is substantially the same, except the averment of the valuation of its lines o. railroad, which, it is alleged, were valued and assessed at the sum of $15,521,406, on which the amount of tax, at 47 cents to the $100, is $72,726.69, on which there is admitted a credit of $25,000, paid January 22, 1883.

The taxable property of the other plaintiff in error, the Chesapeake, Ohio and Southwestern Railroad Company, it is averred in the petition, otherwise substantially the same as in the other cases, was valued and assessed at $2,791,994, on which the tax levied was $13,261.98, which is credited with $6,798.32, paid January 5, 1883.

An answer was filed in each case, but, so far as they raised an issue of fact, they were withdrawn, and the causes were heard on demurrers, the questions of law being such as arose upon the face of the petitions.

Judgments were rendered in favor of the Commonwealth in all the cases, and were affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and thereupon the present writs of error were allowed and have been prosecuted.

Mr. C. B. Simrall, Mr. William Lindsay, and Mr. Holmes Cummins, for plaintiffs in error.

It has been held in Kentucky, that for the purposes of taxation a railroad is a unit; that its rolling-stock and its road are not subject to local taxation for municipal purposes, but that they are fixtures and to be treated as real estate. Cincinnati, &c., Railway Co. v. Commonwealth, 81 Ky. 492, 503. In proceedings for assessment for taxation in that State the owner of private property has the right (1) to value his own property under oath for purposes of taxation. (2) If this value is raised, to appeal successively to different boards created by law for the purpose, and to have evidence under oath taken regarding it, reduced to writing, and preserved. (3) On failure to list his property to have it valued on his own application, and

Argument for Plaintiffs in Error.

upon the testimony of witnesses. (4) To be notified by the board of supervisors of a purpose to increase his return, and to have opportunity to be heard as to it before the increase can be made. On the other hand, as to railroads, the law denies the companies the right to value their own property for taxation, but imposes this duty on State officials, without regard to fitness or qualification. The ample protection which the law gives to private citizens against irresponsible assessors is denied to railroad corporations.

I. Corporations are persons within the purview of § 1, Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees to every person the equal protection of the law. It is true that this point has never been directly decided, although the point has twice been before the court:-In Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 96 U. S. 521, and Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Needles, 113 U. S. 574. But in every case which required the enforcement of the obligations of a contract, or the protection of the rights of property, this court has looked beyond the shell of the corporate name, to the persons and individuals represented by that name, and has accorded to them the full protection of the law as natural persons. Bank of the United States v. Devaux, 5 Cranch, 61; Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514, 562; United States v. Amedy, 11 Wheat. 392; Beaston v. Farmers' Bank, 12 Pet. 102; Soc'y for Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven, 8 Wheat. 464, 489; National Bank v. Graham, 100 U. S. 699; United States v. Ins. Co., 22 Wall. 99; Louisville, &c., Railroad Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497; Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 16 How. 314. Railroad Tax Cases, 13 Fed. Rep. 722, is directly in point. See as to the principle of interpretation, Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304, 326; Woodson v. Murdock, 22 Wall. 351; Henshaw v. Foster, 9 Pick. 312, 316; Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, 612; Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Commonwealth, 1 Bush, 250, 253; People v. Fire Ins. Ass'n, 92 N. Y. 311. The cases of Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 15 Pet. 517, and Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, are not antagonistic to this contention. They only decide that citizens of one State do not carry with them into another State special privileges or immunities conferred by a

Argument for Plaintiffs in Error.

law of their own State, corporate or otherwise. See Mr. Justice Field's opinion in the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 57, 100.

II. The term "equal protection of the laws," as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, embraces and covers all rights of the citizen, whether pertaining to property, liberty or life. Mr. Justice Miller in Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 104; Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22; Mr. Justice Field in San Mateo v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., and the Slaughter House Cases, already cited; and Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 31. If the law of Kentucky makes one class of taxpayers (the private citizens) favorites, surrounds and protects them by every safeguard which ingenuity can devise, and leaves another class (the railroad corporations) helpless and unprotected and without those safeguards, as it certainly does, it denies to the latter class the "equal protection" it should afford.

III. By the act of April 3, 1878, owners of railroad property are deprived of their property without due process of law. "Due process of law," as used in the Federal Constitution, and "law of the land," as used in State constitutions, are synonymous terms: Cooley on Const. Limitations, 4th Ed. 437; and guarantee "the right of hearing and condemnation; a proceeding upon inquiry, and only after trial." Ib. 438. See also pages 265, 266. These views express concisely the judgments of Federal and of State courts. Cleghorn v. Postlethwaite, 43 Ill. 428; Darling v. Gunn, 50 Ill. 424; Patten v. Green, 13 Cal. 325; Sioux City & Pacific Railroad v. Washington County, 3 Neb. 30; Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183; Leavenworth County v. Lang, 8 Kansas, 284; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 107; Philadelphia v. Miller, 49 Penn. St. 440; Commonwealth v. Runk, 26 Penn. St. 235; Butler v. Saginaw County, 26 Mich. 22. The court cannot, we think, but conclude both from the weight of reason and adjudication, that a law which gives to any tribunal the power to affect the property of the citizen, without a right in the citizen to be heard on the question of affecting his property, is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. The same rule has long obtained in England as a fundamental prin