Opinion of the Court.

States, the clerk of this court shall only transmit or copy into the record the amended declaration showing the ad [quod] damnum to be $10,000, and the pleas of the defendant to said declaration, together with the demurrer thereto, and the ruling of the court thereon."

Afterwards, and on the 13th of July, judgment was entered in favor of the defendant. To reverse that judgment this writ of error was brought, and docketed here October 21. At a later day in the term the cause was submitted under Rule 20 on printed briefs.

Upon the face of this record it is apparent that the actual value of the matter in dispute is not sufficient to give us jurisdiction. It is now well settled that our jurisdiction in an action upon a money demand is governed by the value of the actual matter in dispute in this court, as shown by the whole record, and not by the damages claimed or the prayer for judgment alone. Lee v. Watson, 1 Wall. 337; Schacker v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 93 U. S. 241; Gray v. Blanchard, 97 U. S. 564; Tintsman v. National Bank, 100 U. S. 6; Banking Association v. Insurance Association, 102 U. S. 121; Hilton v. Dickinson, 108 U. S. 165, 174; The Jesse Williamson, Jr., 108 U. S. 305, 309; Jenness v. Citizens' National Bank of Rome, 110 U. S. 52; Webster v. Buffalo Insurance Co., 110 U. S. 386, 388; Bradstreet Cv. v. Higgins, 112 U. S. 227. As was said in Hilton v. Dickinson, "It is undoubtedly true that until it is in some way shown by the record that the sum demanded is not the matter in dispute, that sum will govern in all questions of jurisdiction, but it is equally true that, when it is shown that the sum demanded is not the real matter in dispute, the sum shown, and not the sum demanded, will prevail." Here the suit is to recover damages for not transporting from Chicago to Marshalltown one thousand kegs of beer. There are no allegations of special damage or malicious conduct. In the original declaration the claim was for only $1200, and it was not until the case was actually decided, or about to be decided on its merits, that application was made for leave to increase the amount of the demand. Then it was manifestly done, not in the expectation of recovering more than was orig

Opinion of the Court.

inally claimed, but to give color to the jurisdiction of this court. As it stands, the case is not materially diffèrent in principle from that of Lee v. Watson, supra, where, after a demurrer was sustained, the demand for damages was increased, by leave of the court, so as to be in excess of our jurisdictional limit, although it was apparent from the whole record that in no event could there be a recovery except for a much less sum. Under these circumstances, the court did not hesitate to dismiss the cause, for the reason that it was clear the amendment was made for the sole purpose of giving color of jurisdiction. Here the stipulation which was put on file, taken in connection with the time it was made, shows unmistakably that the purpose of the amendment was to make a case for our jurisdiction. In Smith v. Greenhow, 109 U. S. 669, the action begun in a State court was trespass for taking and carrying away personal property of the value of $100, but the damages were laid at $6000. On the removal of the case to the Circuit Court of the United States it was remanded, on the ground that the case was not one arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States. This we decided was error, and, therefore, reversed the order to remand, but, in doing so, remarked that, "if the circuit Court had found, as matter of fact, that the amount of damages stated in the declaration was colorable, and had been laid beyond the amount of reasonable expectation of recovery, fo the purpose of creating a case removable under the act of Congress, the order remanding it to the State court could have been sustained." This was said in reference to the requirement of the removal act of 1875, which limits the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts, under such circumstances, to cases "where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum of five hundred dollars," but it is equally applicable to appeals and writs of error to this court where our jurisdiction depends on the money value of the matter in dispute.

It is suggested, however, that the case falls within the fourth subdivision of Rev. Stat. § 699, which gives this court jurisdiction, "without regard to the sum or value in dispute," for the review of "any final judgment at law or final decree in equity of any Circuit Court, or of any District Court acting as a Cir

Opinion of the Court.

cuit Court, in any case brought on account of the deprivation of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States, or of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States."

The authority for making this a part of the Revised Statutes is found in what are known as the "Civil Rights" acts of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27, ch. 31, §§ 1, 3, 10; May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 144, ch. 114, §§ 16, 18; and April 20, 1871, 17, Stat. 13, ch. 22, §§ 1, 2. In the original statutes this provision was applicable only to the particular rights, privileges and immunities therein mentioned. In the Revised Statutes it stands separate from the other parts of the old acts, and is to be construed accordingly, but with reference to the general rules of interpretation applicable to the revision. We deem it unnecessary to consider now whether it has, in its present form, a more extended meaning than it had originally, because, in our opinion, this is not a case to which it can, in any event, be applied. The alleged right of which these plaintiffs have been deprived is one secured to them, if secured at all, not by the Constitution, but by that principle of general law which requires a common carrier of goods for hire to carry, whenever he is asked to do so, within the general scope of his professed business, and for a reasonable reward. It grows out of the duty which in law a common carrier owes to the public at large, and is no more secured by the Constitution than are any other of the ordinary transactions of business. Whether the railroad company is excused from the performance of that duty by the statute on which it relies may depend on the Constitution. If the statute is constitutional, the plaintiffs are deprived of the right which they would otherwise have had in law, but if not, the railway company must carry for them. This, not because the Constitution requires it, but because the statute does not furnish a sufficient excuse for not carrying. The question is not, therefore, whether the plaintiffs have been deprived of a right which the Constitution has secured to them, but whether a right existing without the Constitution, has been lawfully taken away. The case may be one arising under the Constitution, within the meaning of that term, as used in other statutes, but

Opinion of the Court.

it is not one brought on account of the deprivation of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution, within the meaning of this provision.

The writ of error is

Dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

CLAY COUNTY v. MCALEER & Another.

IN ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF IOWA.

revenue.

Argued November 18, 1885.-Decided December 7, 1885.

Judgment was recovered in the Circuit Court against a county in Iowa, on which execution was issued, which was returned unsatisfied. By statute of Iowa the county was authorized to levy and collect a tax of six mills on the dollar of the assessed value of taxable property, for ordinary county The judgment creditor commenced proceedings in the same court for a mandamus commanding the county officers to set apart funds to pay the debt, or to levy and collect sufficient tax for the purpose. By the pleadings it was admitted that the whole amount of the tax for a current year was necessary for the ordinary current expenses of the county. On an application by a judgment creditor of the county to compel the levy of an amount sufficient to pay the judgment which was recovered in the Circuit Court of the United States: Held, That on the facts pleaded and admitted no case was made justifying a writ of mandamus.

The facts which make the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

Mr. George G. Wright for plaintiff in error.

Mr. John Mitchell for defendants in error.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. This record shows that Michael McAleer recovered a judgment on the 21st of October, 1864, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Iowa, against Clay County, for $9,172.50. Upon this judgment sundry payments have

Opinion of the Court.

been made, but there still remains due more than $5000. When the debt in judgment was contracted, the power of the county to levy a tax for ordinary county revenue was limited to four mills annually on the dollar of the assessed value of taxable property; afterwards this was increased to six mills, which is the authorized rate now. On the 2d of May, 1881. the administrators of the judgment creditor, he being dead, petitioned the Circuit Court for a mandamus directing the county" to set apart of the funds in their hands, and of the revenues collected and to be collected for and during the year 1881, and to pay over the same in an amount sufficient to satisfy said judgment, interest, and costs, and, if the amount shall not be sufficient, that then the defendant be compelled to levy for the year 1882 an amount sufficient to pay the said judgment and interest and costs, and for such other relief as may be proper in the premises." The answer states that the full amount of taxes allowed by law for the ordinary revenue of the county was levied for the years 1880 and 1881, and that these levies were all required, and more too, for the proper maintenance of the county government. It is also stated that no part of the revenues for these years could have been devoted to the payment of the judgment "without seriously impairing the efficiency of said government." The answer concludes as follows: "That the maximum levy for said purpose for the year 1882 will not be sufficient to pay the ordinary current expenses of said county, and that no part thereof can be applied for the payment of said judgment without seriously impairing the efficiency of said county government." To this answer the relators demurred, and, upon the hearing, the court ordered "that the peremptory writ of mandamus issue commanding the board of supervisors forthwith to levy a tax of one mill on the dollar of the assessed valuation of the property of said Clay County for 1882, and to be collected with the taxes of the current year, 1882, and to pay the same upon the judgment of relator, and that they levy and collect, and pay over a tax of one mill on the dollar each year until relator's judgment,.interest, and costs are fully paid." To reverse this judgment the present writ of error was brought.