ABANDONED OR CAPTURED PROPERTY.
See LIMITATION, STATUTES OF, 6.
A State employed two attorneys to collect a claim, and agreed to pay them
a certain percentage on any amount recovered by suit. They brought
a suit and obtained judgment for the State upon the claim. The
State employed another person as agent, to assist in its collection,
and made an agreement with him to pay him a percentage which
should cover all attorney's fees, already accrued, or to be fterwards
incurred; and afterwards modified this agreement in res ect to the
amount which he should receive if contingent fees should have to be
paid to any other persons under contracts with them. This agree-
ment and its modification were unknown to the two attorneys first
employed by the State. The agent, knowing of the agreement of
these attorneys with the State, promised them to hold any fund that
he might collect until their fees should be paid by the State. He
collected a large amount, and paid most of it over to the State, re-
taining in his hands, after deducting his own compensation, a sum
less than was due to them under their contract with the State. They
made a final settlement with the State for this sum in discharge of all
their demands against the State: Held, That they could not after-
wards maintain any action against the agent, on his promise to them.
-Merrick v. Giddings, 300.
1. A, a foreign steamship corporation went into liquidation August 15,
1867, and sold and transferred all its ships and other property August
16, 1867, to B, another foreign corporation, formed for the purpose
of buying that property and continuing the business, with the right
reserved to all stockholders in A to become stockholders in B. The
officers in the old company became stockholders in the new company,
and the business went on under their direction as officers of the new
company. October 24, 1867, a collision took place in New York
harbor between one of the steamships so transferred and some canal
boats, resulting in the death of plaintiff's intestate. Plaintiff sued A,
in a State court of New York, to recover damages under a statute of
that State, for the loss of her husband, and obtained a verdict and
recovered judgment. Held, That this judgment against the old com-
pany could not be enforced in equity against its former property in
the hands of the new company, thus transferred before the time
when the alleged cause of action arose. Gray v. National Steamship
Co., 116.
2. After a decree disposing of the issues and in accordance with the prayer
of a bill it is not competent for one of the parties, without service of
new process or appearance, to institute further proceedings on new
issues and for new objects, although connected with the subject mat-
ter of the original litigation, by merely giving the new proceedings
the title of the original cause. Smith v. Woolfolk, 143.
See ACCORD AND SATISFACTION;
REMOVAL OF CAUSES;
ADMINISTRATOR'S SALE OF REALTY.
The Circuit Court, in an appeal from a decree of a District Court in ad-
miralty may in its discretion permit amendments to the libel, enlarg-
ing the claims, and including claims rejected below as not specified
in the pleadings. The Charles Morgan, 69.
See COLLISION;
EVIDENCE, 2.
See EQUITY PLEADING, 1, 2;
LIMITATION, STATUTES OF, 4, 5.
See INJUNCTION, 1, 2 ;
JURISDICTION, A, 5; B, 3.
See LIMITATION, STATUTES OF, 2.
A police officer of a State, or a private citizen, has no authority as such,
without any warrant or military order, to arrest and detain a deserter
from the army of the United States. Kurtz v. Moffitt, 487.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3, 4.
1. A suit in which the purchaser from a trustee in bankruptcy of property
of the bankrupt estate asserts title against a defendant claiming an
adverse interest therein, though brought more than two years after
the cause of action accrues to the trustee, is not barred by the limita-
tion of two years prescribed by Rev. Stat., § 5057, if the defendant
acquired title by a fraud practised by him on the trustee, and the
fraud was concealed by the defendant from the trustee and the pur-
chaser, until within two years before the suit was brought. Traer
v. Clews, 528.
2. There is nothing in the policy or terms of the bankrupt act which for-
bids the bankrupt from purchasing from the trustee property of the
bankrupt estate. Ib.
3. A trustee in bankruptcy may sell the unencumbered property of the
estate on credit, when he thinks it most for the interest of the cred-
itors. Ib.
BILL OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES.
A bill of exchange, dated March 4, payable in London, 60 days after
sight, drawn in Illinois, on a person in Liverpool, and accepted by
him "due 21st May," without any date of acceptance, was protested
for non-payment on the 21st of May. In a suit against the drawer,
on the bill, it was not shown what was the date of acceptance: Held,
That the bill was prematurely protested, it not appearing that days
of grace were allowed.
Bell v. First National Bank, 373.
CASES AFFIRMED OR APPROVED.
1. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Ide, 114 U. S. 52, where a like
decision was made as to actions ex-contractu, affirmed and applied.
Pirie v. Tvedt, 41.
2. The Lucille, 19 Wall. 73, affirmed and applied. The Charles Morgan, 69.
3. Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall. 493, affirmed and applied. Mayfield v. Rich-
ards, 137.
4. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Ide, 114 U. S. 52; Putnam v.
Ingraham, 114 U. S. 57; and Pirie v. Tvedt, 115 U. S. 41, affirmed.
Starin v. New York, 248.
5. Detroit City Railway Co. v. Guthard, 114 U. S. 133, cited and followed.
Jacks v. Helena, 288.
6. National Bank v. Insurance Co., 100 U. S. 43, followed.
Van Slyke, 290.
7. Jones v. Van Benthuysen, 103 U. S. 87, affirmed. S. C. 464.
8. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Waterman, 106 U. S. 265, approved and
applied. Hassall v. Wilcox, 598.
The North Carolina, 15 Pet. 40, distinguished. The Charles Morgan, 69.
The principles on which Railway Co. v. Prescott, 16 Wall. 603, and Rail-
way Co. v. McShane, 22 Wall. 444, were decided, are re-stated, so far
as they are applied to this case. Northern Pacific Railroad v. Traill
County, 600.
CASES QUESTIONED OR OVERRULED.
The authority of State v. Rives, 5 Ired. 297, is questioned by the Supreme
Court of North Carolina in Gooch v. McGee, 83 N. C. 59. Buncombe
County v. Tommey, 122.
CATTLE GUARDS AND FENCES.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 5.
CESTUI QUE TRUST.
See LIMITATION, STATUTES OF, 3.
1. In a charter-party, which describes the ship by name and as "of the
burthen of 1100 tons, or thereabouts, registered measurement," and
by which the owner agrees to receive on board, and the charterer
engages to provide, “a full and complete cargo, say about 11,500
quarters of wheat in bulk," the statement of her registered tonnage
is not a warranty or condition precedent; and if her actual carrying
capacity is about 11,500 quarters of wheat, the charterer is bound to
accept her, although her registered measurement (unknown to both
parties at the time of entering into the contract) is 1203 tons. Watts
v. Camors, 353.
2. The clause in a charter-party, by which the parties mutually bind them-
selves, the ship and freight, and the merchandise to be laden on
board, "in the penal sum of estimated amount of freight," to the per-
formance of all and every of their agreements, is not a stipulation
for liquidated damages, but a penalty to secure the payment of the
amount of damage that either party may actually suffer from any
breach of the contract; and is to be so treated in a court of admiralty
of the United States, whatever may be the rule in the courts of the
particular State in which the contract is made and the court of admi-
ralty sits. lb.
3. Under a charter-party which allowed fifteen lay days for loading after
the ship was ready to receive cargo, the owner tendered her to the
charterers, they immediately refused to accept her, and thirty-six
days afterwards he obtained another cargo, but negotiations were
pending between the parties for half of that time, and the owner sus-
tained substantial damage in a certain amount by the failure of the
charterers to comply with their contract. The Circuit Court found
these facts, and entered a decree against the charterers for that
amount Held, no error in law for which the charterers could have
the decrce reversed in this court.
CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
See ADMIRALTY ;
JURISDICTION, B.
CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
A person who, by a contract made with him by the quartermaster's de-
partment of the army in behalf of the United States, agrees to fur-
nish all the steamboat transportation required by the United States
for officers and soldiers between certain places, and to certain Indian
posts and agencies, during a certain time, and to "receive from the
officers or agents of the quartermaster's department all such military,
Indian and government stores, supplies, wagons and stock, as may be
offered or turned over to him for transportation in good order and
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