1,582 killed, 7,709 wounded, and 5,958 missing; total, 15,249." This may or may not include those abandoned to the enemy in hospitals, most of whom are probably numbered among the wounded. Lee's report does not state the amount of his losses, but says it is contained in "the accompanying tables;" which the Confederate authorities did not see fit to print with his report. He sums up his trophies as follows:

"The siege of Richmond was raised; and the object of a campaign which had been prosecuted, after months of preparation, at an enormous expenditure of men and money, completely frustrated. More than 10,000 prisoners, including officers of rank, 52 pieces of artillery, and upwards of 35,000 stand of small arms, were captured. The stores and supplies of every description, which fell into our hands, were great in amount and value, but small in comparison with those destroyed by the enemy. His losses in battle exceeded our own, as attested by the thousands of dead and wounded left on every field; while his subsequent inaction shows in what condition the survivors reached the protection to which they fled."

The "inaction" thus vaunted was mutual. Lee did not see fit to repeat at Harrison's Bar his costly experiment at Malvern; but, after scrutinizing our hastily constructed defenses, and guessing at the numbers and spirit of the men behind them, withdrew " to Richmond, leaving but a brigade of cavalry to watch and report any fresh evidences of activity on our side. None being af forded, he sent Gen. French, with 43 guns, to approach Harrison's Bar stealthily on the south side of the

45 List of killed, wounded and missing in the Army of the Potomac, from the 26th of June to the 1st of July, 1862, inclusive.

5. Porter's corps. 6. Franklin's 66 Engineers......... Cavalry...

2. Sumner's corps........ 187 1,076 848 2,111

8. Heintzelman's

4. Keyes'

Total...

ton's cavalry, to advance upon and seize Malvern Hill. Through the incompetency of his guides, Hooker's first attempt miscarried; but it was renewed the next night," and, notwithstanding the ample notice of it given to the enemy, proved an easy success; Hooker driving the Rebels from Malvern with a loss of barely, 14, and taking 100 prisoners; Col. Averill, with part of Pleasanton's cavalry, pushing north to White Oak Swamp Bridge, driving thence the 10th Virginia cavalry and capturing 28 men and horses. This advance, promptly and vigorously followed up in force, would doubtless have placed McClellan in Richmond forthwith. But Gen. M. had already received an order directing a withdrawal of his army by water to Acquia creek, to support a fresh demonstration on Richmond from the Rappahannock; which order he began" most reluctantly to obey; of course, recalling

54

Gen. Hooker from Malvern. He was now eager to resume the offensive with far smaller rëenforcements than he had recently pronounced indispensable, and suggested that, in addition to Burnside's men, they might be spared him from Pope's army on the Rappahannock and from the West. Gen. Halleck-assuming the correctness of McClellan's own mistaken assumption as to the strength of the Rebel Army of Virginia-replied with crushing cogency as follows:

56

ments from the South. Gen. Pope's army, now covering Washington, is only about 40,000. Your effective force is only about 90,000. You are about thirty miles from Richmond, and Gen. Pope eighty or ninety, with the enemy directly between you, ready to fall with his superior numbers upon one or the other, as he may elect; such an attack.

neither can rëenforce the other in case of

"If Gen. Pope's army be diminished to reenforce you, Washington, Maryland, and exposed. If your force be reduced to strengthen Pope, you would be too weak to even hold the position you now occupy, should the enemy turn around and attack you in full force. In other words, the old Army of the Potomac is split into two parts, with the entire force of the enemy directly between them. They cannot be united by land without exposing both to destruction; and yet tley must be united. To send

Pennsylvania would be left uncovered and

Pope's forces by water to the Peninsula, is, under present circumstances, a military tmpossibility. The only alternative is to send the forces on the Peninsula to some point by water-say Fredericksburg-where the two armies can be united.

66

* *

*

But, you will reply, why not rëenforce me here, so that I can strike Richmond from my present position? To do this, you said at our interview, that you required it was impossible to give you so many. 30,000 additional troops. I told you that

But

You finally thought that you would have some chance of success with 20,000. would require 35,000, as the enemy was you afterward telegraphed me that you being largely reenforced.

"If your estimate of the enemy's strength was correct, your requisition was perfectly reasonable; but it was utterly impossible to fill it until new troops could be enlisted and organized; which would require several weeks.

63

"It is by no means certain that the reduction of these fortifications would not require considerable time-perhaps as much as those at Yorktown.

"This delay might not only be fatal to the health of your army, but in the mean August 6.

55

August 7.

58

171

the movement. Even several of those who

originally advocated the line of the Peninsula, now advise its abandonment."

Gen. McClellan forthwith commenced embarking his sick and five of his batteries, which had been assigned to Burnside; who, having been ordered on the 1st to Acquia creek, had immediately rëembarked his men, reaching his destination on the 3d, and promptly sending back his vessels to McClellan, who had been invested with complete control over the immense fleet of transports then in the Potomac, Hampton Roads, and the James. The latter commenced as if expecting to embark his entire force, including even the cavalry, at Harrison's Bar; but repeated and urgent messages from Washington, announcing" that the Rebels were crossing the Rapidan in force, and pressing Pope, soon impelled him to move the bulk of his troops by land to Fortress Monroe; the two leading corps (Porter's and Heintzelman's), preceded by Averill's

August 10.

* Gen. Victor Le Duc, who entered the service as Captain and A. Q. M., and who acted as Division Quartermaster throughout the retreat from before Richmond, and thence to Fortress Monroe, being promoted for eminent efficiency to be a Corps Quartermaster thereafter, thus sums up, in his private diary, under date of Sept. 1st-8th, 1862, the results of his experience and observation :

"I am confident that there has been gross mismanagement in this whole affair. With all the resources that Government places in the hands of officers, the Army of the Potomac should have been transferred from the Peninsula to Acquia creek or Alexandria and landed, and

cavalry.

Gen. Porter was under orders to halt the advance at Williamsburg until the crossing was complete; but, intercepting there a letter which apprised him that the enemy were concentrating rapidly on Pope, with intent to crush him before he could be rëenforced, he took the responsi bility of pressing on to Newport News, which he reached on the 18th, having marched 60 miles in three days; and on the 20th his corps had embarked and was on its way to Acquia creek. On that day, the last of the army had reached its prescrib ed points of embarkation at Yorktown, Newport News, and Fortress Monroe." Heintzelman embarked at Yorktown on the 21st; Franklin at Fortress Monroe on the 22d; Keyes had been left at Yorktown to cover the embarkation, should any in as good condition as when they embarked, all within two weeks. Each corps as a unit should have been embarked and landed by itself, and its transportation have accompanied it; and, with the two wharves at Newport News, inconvenient as they are, three days and nights was ample time in which to put the transportation on shipboard; three days more would have been and one day in transitu-seven days. Three occupied in discharging it off and setting it up, corps could have shipped at the same time-one at Fortress Monroe, one at Newport News, and one at Yorktown. It has taken, in fact, nearly one month; and will be an entire month before all have arrived."

This view assumes that sufficient transportation was always in readiness exactly where and when it was required; which is unproved.