Ms. FALCO. If they think that, they have not conveyed it to me. However, they are often confused about what appears to be a lack of consensus within our own country or a kind of mixed philosophy toward these drug-use patterns. The most dramatic one is marihuana, which many countries see as a serious danger from a public health point. The debate has been going on for many years.

We are bound by international treaty to take every step we can to control the drugs specified as illicit.

Senator BIDEN. Has that debate in the United States hampered your office's ability to be successful?

Ms. FALCO. No. It is hard to measure that kind of thing. I explain to other government officials that what we have been talking about is decriminalization, not using penal sanctions for personal, private use of certain substances. We stress that we are not by any means sanctioning the use nor providing free drugs on every street corner, which is the kind of dramatic alternative they envision, I think they understand that, particularly since we are a flourishing democracy where many different views are debated.

But particularly with regard to Mexico, it is a problem in our bilateral relations.

Senator BIDEN. I share your view. But what would happen, what scenario would you envision occurring, specifically in Colombia and then internationally, if the United States legalized marihuana? What does that do to the other drug enforcement problems that we have? How does it, if at all, impact on heroin or cocaine or anything else? Ms. FALCO. Our immediate problem would be that we would have to try to get the international treaty-the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs amended-which is very unlikely, or we would have to withdraw.

That treaty is the primary basis for all international drug control activities. In fact, the Psychotropic Convention tries to do for psychotropic drugs what the Single Convention tries to define for opium, cocaine, heroin, coca, and marihuana. So it would immediately put us in a legal crisis. I think it would be very difficult to try to explain to other countries. Although if that were the will of the Congress, obviously, and reflected the views of the American people one would have to explain it.

But I think it would be very tough to ask them for help back. We are in that situation in Mexico now. It is a classic illustration. Mexico feels that marihuana is its primary drug abuse problem. We are asking them to do something for us; that is, eradicate opium, and they want us to continue eradicating marihuana. I think everyone has been following this issue.

Senator BIDEN. So that you think it is fair to say that if we legalize marihuana, we will exacerbate our heroin problem?

Ms. FALCO. It makes it hard for us to get cooperation in areas where we think it is a problem for us.

Senator BIDEN. We not only think that, we know that Mexico was a problem for us and still is to a lesser degree, fortunately, with regard

to heroin.

Ms. FALCO. And it has that potential again. It would only take one growing season to get back up to heroin.

Senator BIDEN. Even if we reached the conclusion that marihuana

did not present a sufficient public health problem-and we have not reached this conclusion-would you still recommend we not legalize marihuana because of the implications it would have on our ability to control substances flowing into this country which are much more significant and clearly public health dangers to the citizens of this country? It is a tough question.

MS. FALCO. The answer I think is probably fairly straightforward— that is, no, I would recommend against legalization, and that any decision by the Congress to legalize would have to take into account the foreign policy implications in terms of what we are trying to do with heroin which comes entirely from outside our own borders.

Senator BIDEN. I think that is a very important point, if I may be so bold as to suggest that you communicate it to my colleagues. It is an element that is not injected into the debate on the question of the legalization of marihuana in this country.

It is not in the general political mainstream of political debate that takes place when the issue of marihuana is debated; and it is debated on every local election. I do not know of a single man or woman who stands for public office who does not get confronted with that issue.

I am not suggesting that it has reached the proportions of a hue and cry for some new action; but the point is it is being debated. Two things are not raised in those debates:

One is the point you just raised and the second is that if it is trueand I am not asking you, because you have indicated it is not your area of expertise, so I will pursue it with DEA-and that is the link between organized crime and the flow of money from marihuana, just marihuana, through the organized crime coffers into legitimate business in the United States.

I think it would be useful for those two elements to be more widely debated by us nonexperts as we develop positions and continue to move forward.

Senator Laxalt has some very specific questions that he would like answered and quite possibly you could respond in writing. I am not sure to whom they are directed. I do not physically have them, but if you will do that.

[The questions of Senator Laxalt and the responses of the State Department can be found in the appendix.]

[Additional material submitted by the State Department is on file with the committee.]

Senator BIDEN. Ms. Falco, I hope you did not take offense to my persistence on the global question. It is probably a byproduct of my lack of understanding. Maybe it is just a matter of educating me. I am not being facetious. On the surface, I am confused. I would like to arrange a series of meetings to let me ask some questions.

Ms. FALCO. I would be pleased to have that opportunity.

Mr. Ambassador, you are truly doing a tremendous job. I do not mean just with regard to drugs. You have not only upped the profile but improved the profile of the United States in Colombia, and I think it is a mark of not only vour ability but the assertion that some of us cling to that single individuals can make vast differences in both bilateral and multilateral relations. The chemistry of that particular ambassador or a person from the State Department or from the executive branch or Congress is able to establish with a particular leadership is verv, very significant in terms of overall development as far as foreign policy is concerned.

I compliment you.

I warn you all; this is for me the beginning, and I would anticipate taking you up on your request for continued cooperation and availability to this committee both formally and informally.

[The prepared statements of Ms. Falco and Ambassador Asencio follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MATHEA FALCO

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of State's international narcotics control program. As you have requested, our testimony will give an overview of our international efforts, and our sense of what and where the problems are, and what more needs to be done.

As you know, drug abuse has been a serious problem in the United States for more than a decade. In economic terms, the Departments of Treasury and Justice estimate that $36 billion to $46 billion in illicit drug retail transactionsunderground and untaxed-occur each year in the United States, with a minimum of $2 billion annually leaving the country. In terms of human suffering, destroyed lives and broken homes the cost is incalculable. In particular, the crime, health, and social problems associated with drug abuse have heightened national concern about the illicit drug trade.

Now, at the end of the decade, drug abuse has become a major international problem, with other nations, particularly those of Western Europe and Southeast Asia, suffering the terrible problems of heroin addiction and drug trafficking. President Carter underscored the importance he attaches to the international narcotics control program in his August 2, 1977, message on drug abuse. The President noted that in addition to the human suffering and social harm caused by drug abuse, the illicit drug traffic also generates enormous profits which distort the economies of many smaller nations, aggravate their inflation rates, drain their tax revenues, engender corruption, and erode sometimes fragile political stability.

The Federal Government currently spends more than $800 million annually for programs to reduce the demand for, and the supply of, illicit drugs. The Department of State's international efforts represent approximately $40 million, or 5 percent, of that total amount.

The development of the international program was based on two practical realizations: First, that the U.S. heroin and cocaine supply, as well as most of the marihuana consumed here, is produced in other countries, and second, that most of these countries are less developed than the United States. The goal of our international program is to reduce the amount of illicit narcotics entering this country.

We do so by providing assistance for narcotics control programs to governments of developing nations where most of the illicit production occurs. Our projects are designed not only for the short- and long-term reduction of the availability to the U.S. of illicit drugs, but also to assist other nations to strengthen their own illicit drug suppression capabilities.

In addition to providing bilateral assistance, the Department of State also conducts bilateral discussions and negotiations, designed to improve cooperation on narcotics-related issues. Later today, for instance, I will be attending the signing of an extradition treaty which we have negotiated with the Government of Colombia, in order to facilitate prosecution of narcotics traffickers. During the past 2 years, we have negotiated prisoner exchange treaties, mutual assistance treaties, and extradition treaties with a number of countries involved in narcotics control efforts, such as Turkey, Mexico, and Bangkok.

During the past 2 years, we have placed special emphasis on seeking to stimulate more attention internationally to narcotics control in addition to continuing bilateral assistance and discussions. This has meant that our program has focused not only on particular countries, but also on international and regional organizations. These can be enormously useful in combatting drug abuse, production and trafficking, for several reasons.

First, the United States alone simply cannot afford to do all that is necessary without more help from other nations and international financial institutions. Second, since narcotics production and trafficking are regional problems, intergovernmental cooperation is necessary for successful narcotics control. Third, since narcotics control and rural development are increasingly seen as related, it is useful to sensitize organizations involved in rural development to narcoticsrelated problems. Fourth, it makes practical sense for the United States to exchange information with other countries and regional organizations. Finally,

international organizations can sometimes provide vital assistance to countries which the United States, because of political circumstances, cannot reach. In short, only a truly global effort, put into place over time, will provide a longterm solution for the illicit drug problem.

More specifically, we have worked to bring about increased contributions internationally for the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC), particularly from Western European countries. The United States has contributed the bulk of UNFDAC's funds since its inception in 1971, and there is continuing congressional concern that we are contributing disproportionately. As you know, the Congress has limited U.S. contributions in fiscal year 1980 to $3 million or 25 percent of total contributions, whichever is less.

We have also raised narcotics problems within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), suggesting that bilateral development assistance coordination efforts take into account narcotics control considerations and that OECD develop statistically comparable data bases on drug abuse costs in member countries. In addition, we are supporting narcotics initiatives through two Southeast Asian regional organizations, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Colombo Plan, another Southeast Asian regional organization headquartered in Sri Lanka. Finally, we are exploring the possibility of cooperation with regional organizations in Latin America.

In addition to enlisting further cooperation and participation in narcotics control from international and regional governmental organizations, we have also initiated contact with international and regional financial institutions. The purpose here is to sensitize their directors, who are responsible for deciding on loans to narcotics producing countries, to narcotics problems. Ultimately, we hope that they will consider efforts in development complementary to efforts in narcotics control.

We have undertaken a similar approach with the Agency for International Development (AID). This attempt to link planning for economic development with planning for narcotics control has been given emphasis and direction by legislation passed by Congress this year. Section 110 of the International Development and Cooperation Act, urges assistance programs to give priority to projects which will help reduce illicit narcotics cultivation.

Not all of our efforts in the international sphere will bring short-term results. However, I am convinced that they will in the long term, and that building an international network of concerned governments and citizens is the only way to curtail illicit drug production and traffic.

Before I turn to the specifics of our bilateral programs, I would like to comment on one matter of deep concern to us, the need for prompt Senate ratification of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances.

The Psychotropic Substances Convention is an international treaty to control certain internationally recognized drugs of abuse, including those classified as hallucinogens, amphetamines and barbiturates. It has been ratified by 52 nations. President Carter has indicated his support for the Convention on several occasions both before the Congress and U.N. bodies. The legislation necessary to implement the treaty has been adopted by Congress and signed by the President. Extensive hearings were held on this legislation and a full consensus achieved. We hope that this committee will urge prompt ratification of the treaty by the Senate.

I will now turn from our efforts with international and regional bodies to what remains the heart of the Department of State's narcotics control program, bilateral assistance to countries which are the source of illicit drugs consumed in the United States.

Our assistance to supplier countries-by which I mean both countries where illicit drugs are produced and those through which there is substantial illicit drug traffic-is used for several different types of narcotics control efforts. The combination varies, depending on the strategies and requirements of the host government, but each program usually includes assistance for one or more of the following elements: rural development combined with narcotics control enforcement; border interdiction activities; educational projects relating to reduction in demand for drugs in the host country itself. Enforcement and border interdiction assistance provides support mainly for training, transport, and communications.

The producing countries which are the main source of illicit drugs for the United States are well known, and we have long standing cooperative narcotics control efforts with most of them. The chart below gives an outline of how the Department of State is planning to allocate our resources in fiscal year 1980, by region and illicit drug.

The amount shown as "other" includes U.S. contributions to international organizations; training programs designed and implemented by the Drug Enforcement Administration and U.S. Customs; and demand reduction programs through bilateral agreements with other countries and U.S. Embassies; and, finally, program development and support costs.

As the chart indicates, there are three main areas of the world producing the bulk of the illicit narcotics drugs: Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the Near East, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. The United States contributes extensively to programs in Latin America, which is the source of most of the illicit drugs consumed in this country, and Southeast Asia, which includes the Golden Triangle production area of Burma, Laos, and Thailand.

However, difficult political circumstances have impeded cooperative efforts with Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is extremely serious because together with Iran, the Near East, now produces, according to Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) estimates, the largest illicit crop of opium in the world.

Since the Turkish Government ended illicit opium production in that country in the early 1970's, the U.S. heroin market has been largely supplied by Mexican and Southeast Asian heroin. As Mexican Government efforts have severely reduced availability of heroin from that country, and South Asian heroin has found sizable markets in Europe, we are increasingly concerned about the possibility of an upsurge in heroin trafficking from Southeast and South Asia to the United States.

For the moment, however, heroin availability is at its lowest point since the early 1970's. Heroin purity is low at 3.5 percent and the price is increased. More importantly, there has been a reduction in the number of heroin overdose deaths and heroin related injuries reported by hospitals.

I would like to begin my discussion of our bilateral assistance programs with a brief description of our cooperative efforts with the Government of Mexico. I begin with Mexico for three reasons. First, the reduction in heroin entering the United States from Mexico is the most obvious reason for the drop in heroin availability in the United States today.

Second, Mexico is slated to receive the single largest amount of narcotics control assistance given by the United States to producer countries in 1980, mainly because of our cooperative efforts to eliminate the Mexican heroin supply. Third, as you know, the future of the joint United States-Mexican narcotics control effort is in question at the moment. The Percy amendment prohibits assistance to countries which use hazardous herbicides for marihuana eradication which may be encountered by American marihuana users.

Several years ago, Mexico produced an estimated 80-90 percent of the illicit heroin seized in the United States, according to the DEA. Since the Mexican Government undertook an active drug eradication program in 1976 with U.S. assistance, heroin from Mexico has been reduced to less than 50 percent of the U.S. supply. Heroin from other countries has not yet filled this gap, and the overall amount of heroin available in the United States has been diminished. Both the United States and Mexico have contributed over $100 million to this highly effective program.

All levels of the Mexican Government are contributing to the narcotics control effort. Responsibility for the program is centered in the office of the Mexican attorney general, which corresponds to the U.S. Department of Justice. The Mexican defense department gives crucial support to the activities of the attorney general's office by assigning troops to primary poppy growing areas. The troops both interdict drug trafficking and inhibit the planting and cultivation of opium poppies. The Mexicans have also had important successes in breaking up some of the major trafficking networks.

United States assistance to the Mexican Government has been in the form of aircraft, communications facilities, and other equipment necessary for opium poppy eradication in thousands of square miles of remote mountainous regions. Additional funds have been used to develop successful operational and maintenance systems for the aircraft used in poppy eradication.