anywhere else, and went to the place and led others thither, would he not be a right and good guide? Men. Certainly. Soc. And a person who had a right opinion about the way, but had never been and did not know, might be a good guide also. might he not? Men. Certainly. Soc. And while he has true opinion about that which the other knows, he will be just as good a guide if he thinks the truth, as if he knows the truth? Men. Exactly. Soc. Then true opinion is as good a guide to correct action as wisdom; and that was the point which we omitted in our speculation about the nature of virtue, when we said that wisdom only is the guide of right action; whereas there is also right opinion. Men. True. Soc. Then right opinion is not less useful than knowledge? Men. The difference, Socrates, is only that he who has knowledge will always be right; but he who has right opinion will sometimes be right, and sometimes not right. Soc. What do you mean? Can he be wrong who has right opinion, as long as he has right opinion? Men. I admit the cogency of that, and therefore, Socrates, allowing this, I wonder that knowledge should be preferred to right opinion or why they should ever differ. Soc. And shall I explain this wonder to you? Men. Do tell me. Soc. You would not wonder if you had ever observed the images of Daedalus; but perhaps you have not got them in your country? Men. Why do you refer to them? Soc. Because they require to be fastened in order to keep them, and if they are not fastened they will run away. Men. Well, what of that? Soc. I mean to say that it is not much use possessing one of them if they are at liberty, for they will walk off like runaway slaves; but when fastened, they are of great value, for they are really beautiful works of art. Now this is an illustra tion of the nature of true opinions: while they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out of the human soul, and do not remain long, and therefore they 98 are not of much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause; and this fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection, as has been already agreed by us. But when they are bound, in the first place, they have the nature of knowledge; and, in the second place, they are abiding. And this is why knowledge is more honorable and excellent than true opinion, because fastened by a chain. Men. Yes indeed, Socrates, that I should conjecture to be the truth. Soc. I too speak not as one who knows; and yet that knowledge differs from true opinion is not a matter of conjecture with me. There are not many things which I should affirm that I knew, but that is most certainly one of them. Men. You are right, Socrates. Soc. And am I not right also in saying that true opinion is as good a guide in the performance of an action as knowledge? Men. That also appears to me to be true. Soc. Then right opinion is not a whit inferior to knowledge, or less useful in action; nor is the man who has right opinion inferior to him who has knowledge? Men. That is true. Soc. And surely the good man has been acknowledged by us to be useful? Men. Yes. Soc. Seeing then that men become good and useful to states, not only because they have knowledge, but because they have right opinion, and neither knowledge nor right opinion is given to man by nature or acquired by him,- (do you think that either of them is given by nature? Men. Not I.) Soc. Then if they are not given by nature, neither are the good by nature good? Men. Certainly not. Soc. And nature being excluded, the next question was whether virtue is acquired by teaching? Men. Yes. Soc. If virtue was wisdom, then, as we thought, it was taught? Men. Yes. Soc. Aud if it was taught it was wisdom? Men. Certainly. Soc. And if there were teachers, it might be taught; and if there were no teachers, not? Men. True. Soc. But surely we acknowledged that there were no teachers of virtue? Men. Yes. Soc. Then we acknowledged that it was not taught, and was not wisdom? Men. Certainly. Soc. And yet we admitted that it was a good? Men. Yes. Soc. And the right guide is useful and good? Men. Certainly. 99 Soc. And the only right guides are knowledge and true opinion, - these are the guides of man; for things which happen by chance are not under the guidance of man: but the guides of man are true opinion and knowledge. Men. I think so too. Soc. But if virtue is not taught, neither is virtue knowledge. Men. Clearly not. Soc. Then of two good and useful things, one, which is knowledge, has been set aside, and cannot be supposed to be our guide in political life? Men. I think not. Soc. And therefore not by any wisdom, and not because they were wise, did Themistocles and those others of whom Anytus spoke govern states. And this was the reason why they were unable to make others like themselves, because their virtue was not grounded on knowledge. Men. That is probably true, Socrates. Soc. But if not by knowledge, the only alternative which remains is that statesmen must have guided states by right opinion, which is in politics what divination is in religion; for diviners and also prophets say many things truly, but they know not what they say. Men. Very true. Soc. And may we not, Meno, truly call those men divine who, having no understanding, yet succeed in many a grand deed and word? Men. Certainly. Soc. Then we shall also be right in calling those divine whom we were just now speaking of as diviners and prophets, as well as all poets. Yes, and statesmen above all may be said to be divine and illumined, being inspired and possessed of God, in which condition they say many grand things, not knowing what they say. Men. Yes. Soc. And the women too, Meno, call good men divine; and the Spartans, when they praise a good man, say "that he is a divine man." Men. And I think, Socrates, that they are right; although very likely our friend Anytus may take offense at the name. Soc. I do not care; as for Anytus, there will be another opportunity of talking with him. To sum up our inquiry, — the result seems to be, if we are at all right in our view, that virtue is neither natural nor acquired, but an instinct given by God to the virtuous. Nor is the instinct accompanied by reason, unless there may be supposed to be among statesmen any one who is also the educator of statesmen. And if there be such a one, he may be said to be among the living what Tiresias was among the dead, who “alone," according to Homer, "of those in the world below, has understanding; but the rest flit as shadows." Men. That is excellent, Socrates. Soc. Then, Meno, the conclusion is that virtue comes to the virtuous by the gift of God. But we shall never know the certain truth until, before asking how virtue is given, we inquire into the actual nature of virtue. I fear that I must go away, but do you, now that you are persuaded yourself, persuade our friend Anytus. And don't let him be so exasperated; for if you can persuade him you will have done some service to the Athenian people. |