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excited them to take up arms; unwilling to act aggressively, in so dubious a case, he proposed a nego. tiation for peace; but his offers were rejected. He now saw himseif constrained either to make a retreat, or to engage an enemy, whose strength was double to his own; confiding, however, in the bravery and experience of his people, he resolved not only to stand his ground, but to proceed to an immediate attack. The position of the Indians, and their auxiliaries, was strong and well chosen, and they did not imagine that he would venture to assail them with an in. ferior force this he did, however, with such impetuosity, and so much judgment, that they were entirely defeated, and forced to disperse in several directions.

So complete a success, obtained under the guns of a British fort, occasioned its commanding-officer to expostulate with the American ge. neral, for having made so near an approach, and to warn him against any act of hostility; as no war existed between Great Britain and the United States. The general replied, that he had of right expelled an enemy from the territory of the states; but that an act of hostility had been committed by the British troops, in re-occupying the fort of which they were in possession, as it stood confessedly on ground belong. ing to the states; he required him,

for that reason, to evacuate it, and retire within the British boundaries. The answer to this, which was no other than a summons to surrender the fort, purported, that being com. missioned to occupy it, by superior authority, he could not deliver it up; expressing at the same time, his hope of an amicable settlement of the matter, by their respective governments.

Such was the substance of the letters that passed on this occasion, between major Campbell, commander in the fort, and general Wayne. The latter was too prudent to insist on a compliance with his requisition from the British officer, which might have produced consequences of a very fatal nature; he therefore withdrew, leaving the termination of this difference to a more friendly mode of decision. It was, however, shrewdly suspected, from a variety of circumstances, that inimical designs were in agitation; if not by the immediate direction of the British administration, still through the interference of its agents among the Indian tribes. Much was said and written on this subject by the American ministry, and the British resident; but it was not finally settled till the next year, when a formal embassy was sent from America to Great Britain, for that purpose, as well as others of equal-importance.

VOL. XXXVII.

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CHAP.

CHA P. IX.

Successes of the Arms of France in every part of Europe.-Most of the Powers, engaged in the Coalition, alarmed at the Backwardness of their People to push the War for the Restoration of the French Monarchy.—General Partiality of the inferior Ranks, in all Nations, to the French Republic.Different Sentiments entertained of the French Republic, by different Powers of Europe. And of the necessary political Balance.-Treaties between the French Republic and several Members of the Confederacy.-Meeting of the British Parliament.-Speech from the Throne, recommending a vigorous Prosecution of the War.-Addresses, in Answer; from both Houses.-Debates thereon-Motion, by Mr. Sheridan tending to the Repeal of the Suspension of the Habeas Corpus.-Negatived.-Motion, by Mr. Wilberforces for negotiating a Peace with France.-Negatived.-Motion for a Repeal of the Act suspending that of Habeas Corpus.-Negatived.Motion for continuing the Suspension Act.-Carried in both Houses.

TH HE conclusion of the year 1794, and the commencement of the ycar 1795, were marked by the splendour attending the arms of France, in every part of Europe, and the dejection with which their successes had impressed most of the powers engaged in the coalition. Exclusively of their continual defeats in the field, they had other motives to grieve them, of a nature distressing in proportion to their unwillingness to avow them; these were the backwardness of their own people in seconding their views, and the manifest aversion they openly expressed to a war, which they considered as undertaken merely to compel France to revert to a mo. narchical government. Herein the multitude could not perceive in what manner they were interested; their feelings led them to condemn an attempt from which they had

hitherto derived nothing but losses and disgraces abroad, and misery at home. Hence, in the anguish of their hearts, they were not sparing of censure on the conduct of their rulers; and looked upon themselves as victims devoted to their ambition, which could not brook that any por. tion of mankind should live under any other government than that of fellow-monarchs. Full of this idea, the inferior ranks, throughout all Europe, reprobated the coalition against the French republic, and styled it the war of kings against the people.

This idea was propagated by the French, with indefatigable industry, in every kingdom, and had, at this period, gained them prodigious num bers of well-wishers; nor were the lower classes alone under its influence: a large proportion of the more decent and reputable people

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were not averse to those maxims of liberty, both in political and religious matters, which the French inculcated with so much zeal, and supported with so much valour and success; they were secretly pleased at the ineffectual efforts of the coalesced powers to overturn the re public, and acknowledged their good wishes to it as far as they durst.

This partial disposition to France was too visible, in most of the European monarchics, to remain con. cealed from the heads of the state; but it was a discovery which prudence forbade them to promulgate: they were conscious that this par. tiality was produced by the sense that men entertained of the wrongs and oppressions they endured, through the misconduct and iniqui tous government of their rulers; but they carefully abstained from the manifestation of such consciousness, and, in their addresses to the public, always expressed themselves as if perfectly satisfied of its attach ment and entire approbation of their measures. By thus dissembling their own sentiments, they prevented, in a great measure, those of others from being propagated through those ex. tensive communications that always take place between individuals, whenever complaints and proclama. tions are issued by government, against those who are obnoxious to them.

From causes of this nature proceeded, at this time, much of the discouragement that appeared in the enemies of the French republic. But, without adverting to such mo. tives, there was a sufficiency of reasons to be alarmed at the continual victories and conquests of the French, and the rapid progress of their opinions. Their situation,

though agitated at home, was triumphant abroad. Notwithstanding that they were professedly foes to kings, yet, in the opinion of sound politicians, they were esteemed too judicious to carry this enmity beyond mere speculation, whenever their evident interest should require them to contradict that theory by a contrary practice. Thus it was, that a mutual good understanding first took place between them and Prussia, as it already subsisted between them and the two northern courts of Sweden and Denmark; which, instead of joining the coa lition against them, obstinately persisted in a friendly neutrality, and even united together to maintain it, and to require a compensation for the damages done to their commerce, in violation of the treaties on which their commercial rights were founded.

These transactions evinced, at the same time, that all the European powers did not coincide in their ideas of the French government. Their nearest neighbours were, doubtless, so deeply interested in the diminution of their overgrown power, that it was not surprising they should strain every nerve to effect it; but those at a distance were no less interested in preventing the depression of France, with out the weight of which, the po *litical balance of Europe was no less in danger of being destroyed, than by its retention of the im moderate power it had now at tained.

Ideas of this kind operated more effectually in favour of France, than many have seemed to perceive, or thought proper to acknowledge; they prepared the way to those treaties which the French found

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means to conclude, in the course of 1795, with some of the most considerable members of the confede. racy; whose dereliction of it, at the beginning of the preceding year, was not even suspected, and the apprehension of which would have appeared chimerical.

It was in the midst of the triumphs of France over all its enemies, and while the potentates of Europe were beginning to hesitate concerning the measures proper to be pursued, that the parliament of Great Britain, resumed its annual sessions: they were opened by the king on the thirteenth day of December; the royal speech insisted on the necessity of a vigerous continuation of the war, and on the rapid decline of the resources of France. Holland terrified at the dangers that threatened it, had sought to obviate them by negotiation for peace with the French government; but this was not to be confided in, and its enmity to Great Britain, in particular, ren dered every attempt at a reconcilia. tion disgraceful and impracticable: the most effectual means had, therefore, been used for the augmentation of the national force; and the operations of the next campaigns would be concerted with due care, in conjunction with those powers that were convinced of the necessity of acting with the utmost vigour. The acceptance of the crown of Corsica was mentioned, together with the treaty of amity and commerce with America, and the mar riage of the prince of Wales with the princess of Brunswick. The commons were exhorted to make an ample and timely provision for the public service; the flourishing state of commerce, credit, and public resources, was strongly asserted;

and the prospe held out, that, by resolution and perseverance, security would be obtained at home, and Europe delivered from the dangers to which it was exposed.

In the house of lords, the address was moved by lord Camden, and secunded by lord Besborough: they warmly insisted on the prosecution of the war, and that the illsuccess of the last campaign render. ed negotiations for peace un eason. able, as the enemy would require concessions too dishonourable to be granted. The situation of France, compared to that of England, was far more critical, from its destitution of the many resources maining to this country. Never had the strength of Great Britain been so powerfully exerted; the revenue was particularly flourishing, and the forces by land and sea had at no period displayed a more formidable appearance.

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They were opposed by the earl of Guildford, who in strong terms, reprobated the continuance of the war, and alleged its impolicy, from the incessant disasters it produced to the country, which was in a much worse situation than when it commenced. The object, proposed by ministers, was as distant as at that time; and the allies, who were to assist in its accomplishment, acted as if they rather permitted than wanted the aid of this country. Our engagements tied us to them more than them to us, and were framed for the purposes of their ambition. Holland had been sacrificed to it, and, without a peace, was utterly undone; France, it was clear, could neither be conquered nor dictated to by the confederacy; to represent that country, as labouring under heavier calamities than England,

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was no encouragement to proceed in a war that had proved so ruinous. The ministry had been equally improvident and unskilful in the directing of military operations, and in the framing of treaties. Their foreign politics were marked by inconsiderate prodigality, and their domestic proceedings by unconsti tutional rigour. Immense subsidies had been trusted, for instance, to the king of Prussia, which he ap. plied to the destruction of the li. berty and independence of Poland. And alarms had been raised at home, in consequence of which, personal freed m was at an end. The earl concluded by recommending peace, without suffering the French system of government to stand as an obstacle, and made a motion to that purpose, as an amendment to the address.

He was supported by the earl of Derby, who, in answer to the earls of Morton and Kinnoul, who spoke against the earl of Guildford, went over a variety of those arguments so frequently adduced against the mi. Histerial measures. He touched par. ticularly upon the business of Cor sica; the possession of which, he said, would be productive of more expence than utility. He complained of the enormous bounties given to recruits, amounting to twenty-five guineas a man, a price far beyond the competency of the country's finances at the present day, when, if not entirely exhausted, they were alarmingly diminished. The navy, he also complained, was sacrificed to the army; the supplies of men for which, prevented the manning of the navy with its usual proportion of one-third of landsmen. He ended by advising a change of ministers, as

France would not treat with the present.

Lord Spencer, in reply, recom. mended a spirited prosecution of the war; stating that the navy wouid, in the following spring, assume the most formidable appearance ever known. He maintained the great use of Corsica, were it only for the reception it afforded to the British fleet, in the proximity of the many harbours occupied by the enemies to this country.

A recapitulation of the victories won, towns taken, and the other advantages obtained, by the French, was laid before the house by the marquis of Lansdowne, with his usual accuracy. He warmly inveighed against the continuance of the war; especially since the approach of the French to Holland, which would inevitably fall into their hands, now that the rivers were, through the intenseness of the frost, become passable every where. He noticed that Germany was in. clinable to peace; Prussia, in particular, could not be deemed a real enemy, to France, while Austria, the great rival to both, had an existence. National credit, the mar quis observed, had long stood its ground; so it had in France, under the former government, but failed at last. This was an admonition not to be slighted. It was, in the mean time, absurd to deny the competency of the French government to form treaties. In the fluctuation and uncertainty of its internal situation, it had not violated its engage. ments with foreign states. Advert. ing to Corsica, he cited Volney and Neckar in proof of its little value. His opinion was, that the French government would refuse to treat [L3]

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