considered as a powerful argument for the necessity of counteracting them, and of exerting the strength of Great Britain, in opposition to its most inveterate enemy.

The marquis of Lansdowne expressed himself with his usual feryour against ministerial measures. He was particularly severe on the frequent refusal of ministers to lay before the house copies of instructions to admirals and generals. This practice had begun, he observed, in the reign of George I. to the high disgrace of parliament, of which it had greatly wounded the dignity in the eyes of the nation. It was incumbent on this body to assert the right it had enjoyed till that period, of claiming, without denial, a participation in the knowledge of those public documents, on which alone it could form a clear conception of the propriety of ministerial measures in matters of the most essential consequence. The marquis entered with great accuracy into an examination of the relative interests of the chief

European powers. He represented the desire of Russia, to form a connexion with England, as flowing from the dread entertained by that power, that the potentates of Europe were meditating an union against this overgrown empire, in order to set bounds to its ambition. This was a measure of such necessity, that it were the height of im. policy to counteract it. But no nation could so effectually oppose the enterprises of Russia, as the Ger. mans assisted by the French, who had always been the surest friends to the independence of the German princes. This connexion ought not therefore to be disturbed, nor the

French prevented from acting the part they had already done in behalf of Germany, merely on account of their having changed the form of their government, from monarchical to republican. The interests of France were invariably the same, whether a monarchy or a republic: but the infatuation of those who opposed the establishment of the republic, might induce it, in order to attain that object, to connive at the pretensions of its principal enemies, and permit them to swallow up the smaller states of the German empire, provided the settlement of the republic was no longer obstructed. The prospects that arose from this new arrange. ment of things, were, in the opinion of the marquis, more critical than any alterations that had happened in the course of many centuries. It was easy to foresee, that if France allowed the greater powers to adopt the system of partition, they must in return permit the same to the French. Thus Europe would be

thrown into a state of confusion

highly unfavourable to the interests of this country, which evidently re quired that the political situation of Europe should remain as hereto. fore, and that no power whatever should be aggrandized at the expence of another.

The greater

the number of smaller powers, the greater must be the safety and inAuence of Great Britain. Were Europe to be divided, on the par titioning plan in contemplation at the ambitious courts well known to desire it, no peace could henceforth be lasting or secure. The thirst of dominion once excited, and partially gratified, would never rest, and the dividers of states and kingdoms [02]

would,

would, like plunderers on a smaller scale, fail out among themselves about the division of the booty, and keep the world in continual alarms and dissentions. Two of the mem. bers of the coalition had already acted on this plan, in the business of Poland. One of them, Prussia, had deserted us, and the other would probably do the same, were France to proffer better terms than England. Thus, after throwing away immense treasures, we might at length be abandoned to our sole exertions against an ancient enemy, provoked at our endeavours to reduce him to a worse degree of servitude than he had ever experienced; and become, through our folly, more able than at any former period to make us feel the weight of his resentment. It was in the mean time illusory to boast of the extent of our commerce. Insurance, the best crite rion of loss or gain, was continually rising; and of three islands taken by us in the West Indies, one only, Martinico, remained. Instead of inciting the Chouans and other insurgents to persevere in a fruitless resistance, were it not more consistent with humanity and good policy to treat with the French government for an amnesty to the emigrants, or on failure, to make them a donation of half a million, or more if necessary, to enable them at once to fix them. selves in some settled way of living? The marquis concluded by adverting to the affairs of Ireland, on which he expressed himself in the same manner as the other speakers in the opposition.

The other adherents and opponents to ministerial measures took part also in this debate. Lord Lauderdale in particular took notice, that, according to ministers, our

allies were the whole human race, and our wealth that of the whole world. Yet, with allies innume rable, and wealth inexhaustible, we could not, he observed, bring the French to our terms. The earl of Guildford's motion was negatived by a majority of ninety.

As a final struggle on the part of opposition, Mr. Wilberforce, on the 27th of May, moved the house of commons to declare itself of opinion, that in the present circumstances of France, the British government ought not to object to proposals for a general pacification, and that it was the interest of the nation to put an end to the war as soon as just and honourable terms could be obtained. He supported his motion in a long and pertinent speech. Though he would not, he said, insist on the common axiom, that the voice of the people was the voice of God, yet much weight should be allowed to sentiments generally received. Thus the public being in the persuasion that a speedy end ought to be put to the present ruinous war, it was incumbent on the legislature to pay a due deference to the inclinations of its constituents, and earnestly to seek for every facility in the way to attain it. The people were the more justified in their warm expression of so reasonable a desire, when they heard how readily the most potent of our allies acceded to the wishes of his people in this particular: the very day on which the emperor signed the treaty for a loan of money from this country, he also signed a rescript, expressing that he was ready to enter into a negotiation with the French. What were we to think of such behaviour? Did he really mean to be true to the conditions on

which he accepted our subsidy? or to sacrifice the faith he owed to this country, to the interest and the entreaties of his subjects. Whichever of these determinations he adopted, he could not be exculpated from duplicity, as he must neces sarily deceive one of the parties, Could we proceed in security with such alies? Were the French them. selves less worthy of being trusted? The condition of these, ho vever deplorable in the representation of those who argued for the war, was now much more formidable than when it begn: they had suppressed all domestic insurrections, they had made peace with Prussia, and were negotiating with the other members of the coalition, which in fact was, if not actually dissolved, on the point of dissolution; they had conquered Belgium and Holland, and expelled all their enemies from the low countries: they were masters of the spacious and opulent provinces on the left side of the Rhine, and were preparing to cross it in great force their deliverance from insurrections at home, and the pacific treaties they had concluded abroad, had strengthened their armies against the remaining members of the confederacy, to the amount of near three hundred thousand men. Were such a people to be declared unfit to be treated with? Much had been hoped from the depreciation of their papermoney but was it not strange that we would not take lessons from our Own woeful experience? How had America combated and overcome us with paper, one hundred per cent. below par? The French were proceeding directly in the same track. Provisions were cheaper in France than in England, and the republican armies had remitted nothing of

their attachment to the principles of the revolution, nor of their enthusiasm in its cause. We still con. tinued to trust to the commotions reported to be breaking out among them, and to the number of discontented people daily looking for opportunities to rise against govern ment: but might not the French on their side allege the multitudes in this country that disapproved of the war? The excessive bounties given, and the difficulties found to procure men for the navy and army? the re sistance in some places to the injunctions of our legislature? might they not adduce these particulars as proofs how much we were exhausted and inadequate to the farther prosecution of the war? Neither was our situation in the East or the West Indies on a footing of permanency in the East, the princes of those countries were watching the opportunity to distress us, and from their natural superiority in numbers, in opulence, and in native resources always at hand, would probably soon or late reduce us to such straits, as might compel us to revert to our primitive situation of merchants and traders. In the West the same system of emancipation from thraldom, held out by the French to the negroes, had already effected a revolution among them. In the island of Hispaniola they had in a great measure thrown off the yoke of servitude, and their num. bers were such, amounting to some hundred thousands, that a reduction of them was hardly practicable. We should not, therefore, in prudence build much on our acquisitions there. Our situation nearer home was extremely serious. Ireland, our sister nation, felt deeply, and expressed loudly, every species

of discontent: at home itself the people were exasperated at their suffer. ings, and the less disposed to bear them, that they did not clearly com, prehend why they should. The ef. fects of the war were of a truly alarming nature: it not only spread calamity through the land, but di-, verted a large portion of the people from peaceable occupations, to which they never returned with alacrity after they had been used to a military life, and contracted those habits of idleness and dissipation al. ways attending it. Another effect was, that the Americans were apprehensive, lest, if successful in our at tempts against the French islands, we might narrow their commerce in those parts; nor were they disposed to bear with patience the haughty and contemptuous language we bestowed on republican principles and governments. The longer the war lasted, the stricter would be the union of the French, and the more fervent their resolution to maintain their domestic independence, with which their present form of government was daily becoming so intimately connected. The rulers in that country, sensible of the general inclination to peace, were very far from a verse to it themselves: the difficulties perpetually ari ing in providing the means to continue the war, and their anxiety not to run counter to the reasonable wishes of the majority, were motives that must strongly influence them to close with equitable offers. All these were objects that called for the most serious attention on our part. He had proposed them in the clearest point of view they appeared to him, and to those who coincided with his sentiments.

This speech occasioned a warm reply from Mr. Windham, who contended, that it was nugatory to talk of the willingness of the French government to listen to overtures from this country, after the explicit manner in which they had deter mined to reduce its power and influence throughout Europe. France was at the present hour in a state of universal agitation; jealousies and mistrusts of each other distracted its rulers, and irritation at their con duct pervaded the mass of the people, who had never been so prone to shake off the usurpations of their governors, as they appeared of late. Motions to treat for peace were totally unseasonable for those rea sons: they tended to dishearten the public from the prosecution of a war which promised to terminate so favourably to the cause of this coun try and its allies; they promoted disaffection, and placed government in an odious light. He would, therefore, oppose the present mo, tion, by moving the order of the day.

Herein he was seconded by sir B. Hammet; but vigorously op posed by Mr. Fox, who amidst a variety of other allegations, particularized the satisfaction expressed by the subjects of those powers that had made peace with France. He instanced the grand duke of Tuscany, who had rendered himself highly popular by abandoning the coalition; which was an object of hatred to the commonalty of all Europe. The constitution which the coalition held out to the French, as the price of peace, was precisely that which they had proscribed. This alone was sufficient to excite their aversion to it: no spirited peo

ple

ple being willing to accept of a go. vernment upon compulsion. But did our allies require from us a con. tinuation of this war? Were they not all inclined to peace? Was it not also a fact, that so far from extinguishing jacobinism in this country, which was one of the most com. mon pretences for the war in those, who approved it, those who went under that name rejoiced in its continuance, from the prospect it af forded of accelerating the ruin of ministry, and of the party that sided with them, and of promoting all the views of their adversaries. The good faith of the French was at least equal to that we had ex. perienced from our allies: were the French to deceive us, they would do no more than had been done by our allies under the mask of friendship to this country, and after having, through that pretence, drained it of as much treasure as they could prevail on our credulity in their promises to bestow. We had sufficiently felt the evils of war: those prognosticated from peace had no existence but in the speculations of persons who did not feel the calamities of the times but ought the mere speculations of men in power to outweigh the contrary opinions of the great inass of the community? among whom it were an insult to common sense and experience to deny, that as much knowledge and understanding might be found as in any ministry.

It was argued by Mr. Pitt in re. ply, that to represent it as the duty of ministers, to acknowledge them selves ready to accept of overtures of peace from the enemy, was tak. ing from them the advantages they ought to possess in relation to them: they must, from their situation, best

know the language to be held with him. For this reason the constitu tion had invested the executive power with the exclusive right of foreign negotiations, from the supe. rior degree of information it could not fail to derive through the various channels of which it had the sole direction. From sources of this nature proceeded the reluctance of government to comply with the opinion of those who were desirous to shew a willingness to treat with the rulers in France. From authentic intelligence, the situation of that country was more critical than ever: the resources were universally diminished in every quarter from whence they had arisen, or been extorted. Disunion reigned in every department of the state, and dissatis faction extended through all classes. Was this, therefore, a time to come forward with proposals to negotiate, while, through the patient delay of a short lapse of time, alterations might happen in the internal parts of that country, more favourable to us, than we could expect from the most advantageous treaties that could be framed at the present moment? To negotiate now would therefore be precipitation and im prudence unbecoming the discretion of government, while so thoroughly acquainted with the diminution of strength in the enemy, and that not. withstanding the apparent vigour and success of his exertions, they could not last much longer. This description of the state of France he compared with that of England, of which the resources still remained unexhausted, and where, though impositions had been numerous, they had not depressed the industry, nor affected the general welfare of society. The debate closed by the [04]

order