If it might be permitted to interrupt the course of our narrative, yet a little longer, to deplore an event so common in history, as the triumph of the wrong over the right, we should express the regrets of humanity, that the Poles, reasonable, moderate, and capable of regulated freedom, should have been abandoned, to appearance, by heaven and earth, while the French, arrogant furious, and atrocious, were triumphant.

It is to be ascribed to the natural good temper of the Poles, that, with all the seeds of faction and mis. rule, so profoundly sown in their political constitution, they yet hung together so long as they did, as one nation. The new constitution of 1791 was still a greater proof of temper and moderation, and appears to be the happiest medium that had hitherto been adopted between monarchy and popular go.

vernment. For moderation, equity, and sound political wisdom, it form. ed a contrast with the precipitation, violence, and impracticable complexsity of the French revolution, or ra ther revolutions. In the former, the ground-work of the constitution remained the same; respect was paid to the rights and privileges of all the orders of the subjects; and the reform begun, but not considered as finished, was to be carried on, as the way to perfection should be pointed out by times and circumstances. In France, as a preliminary to reformation, all things were moved from their centre, and thrown into the completest chaos and confusion. On the whole, as the history of the old Polish constitution warns men of many things to be avoided, so the new constitution, though strangled at its birth, exhi bits others worthy of imitation.

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an elastic force, which not only overcamethatresistance, but sprang far beyond the boundary at which it would have been completely defeated. The invasion of France, by the Duke of Brunswick, produced the resistance and the triumphs of Dumourier in the Netherlands. France, from being invaded, became the invader; she not only pushed her conquests to the Rhine, but crossed it, and took Frankfort, with other places beyond it. Custine, at the head of revolutionary legions, not only tock Spires and Mayence, but threatened Hesse and Hanover. An union of greater force than that which had followed the councils of the French princes became necessary, and such an union was formed. The incursions of the French into the Low Countries and Germany, produced in their turn, the combinations, which retook Frankfort and Mayence, rescued Holland, and secured the conquest of Landrecy, Conde, Quesnoy, and Valenciennes. The irruption of the Ger. mans, within the frontiers of France, gave rise to those efforts, which not only restored those places to the dominion of France, but which carried the French arms again beyond the Rhine, and stretched them into the United Provinces, and different quarters in the German territories; until, as we shall see in the sequel, being weakened by division and expansion they were a second time obliged to recross the Rhine with the severest losses.

The French government, encou. raged by recent success, resolved to pursue, without relaxation, the advantages held out to them by the situation of that country, which was nearest to those they had already re.

duced, and which seemed, indeed, by every circumstance, to invite their immediate attack.

This country was Holland. Its armies had opposed the French in the field; but the general mass of its inhabitants was friendly to them, and openly displayed an unfeigned satisfaction at their victorious progress, during the whole of the cam. paign. Frequent and loud were their complaints, that their rulers had involved them in a war, totally foreign to their concerns, and ini mical to their interests; and they manifested a rooted determination to seize the first opportunity of com. pelling them to enter into terms of peace, if not of friendship, with France. The nearer the French armies drew to the confines of the United Provinces, the bolder and more explicit was the avowal of the people at large, of a determined partiality in their favour.

The states-general of the seven united provinces, had hitherto continued firmly attached, in all appear. ance, to the interests of the coalition; but the statesof several of the particu. lar provinces were decidedly averse to the continuation of the war, and resolutely insisted on its immediate termination. That which first came to a formal decision, was the opulent province of Friesland. By a resolution of its assembled states, about the middle of Oct. 1794, it was de. creed to acknowledge the French republic, to abandon the connexion with Great Britain, and to enter into terms of peace and amity with France. This precedent was quickly adopted in other provinces; and the ancient attachment of the Dutch to the house of Orange gave way, in most places, to the most violent re

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sentment at its conduct. They accused it, in unqualified terms, of proposing, by means of the coalition, to become absolute sovereigns of the United Provinces.

Fearful of the consequences of such a disposition, the governing powers in Holland, the most important province of the union, thought it incumbent on them to suppress that spirit of opposition, which began in almost every place to assume a menacing aspect. It was principally at Amsterdam that the people shewed their aversion to the family. of Orange, and its connexions with England. They acted, at this time, with so little disguise, and spoke of their attachment to France, as a measure so wise and salutary at the present juncture, that it was thought indispensable to arrest the progress of their opinions, by formally prohibiting all meetings of the people, on any pretext. This was done to prevent their presenting any peti. tion or memorial relating to public affairs; which was, at the same time, to less strictly prohibited. The proclamation to this intent came forth on the seventeenth of October, precisely at a time when intelligence was daily arriving of the capture of the Dutch frontier towns, one after the other, with little intermission.

The unpopularity of this mea sure accelerated that which it was taken to prevent. Individuals met, and conversed with more freedom than ever. Emboldened by the proximity of the French, they un folded their minds without the least restraint. They plainly gave the regency of Amsterdam to under. stand, that their prohibition arose from the dread of a scrutiny into

their conduct; which no upright magistrates would fear, and only a wicked administration would strive to avert. They continued to assemble, and kept a vigilant eye on the proceedings of government, which they suspected of being deter. mined to employ the most ruinous and destructive means, to accom, plish the objects they had in view.

These means were of a nature deeply to interest the citizens of Amsterdam, and the people of Hol. land. It had been proposed, in the consultations of the principal com manders in the allied army, that, in order to prevent the French from penetrating into that country, it should be laid under water, as in the famous year 1672, when Lewis XIV. at the head of a victorious army, that had subdued three of the seven provinces, was unable to proceed farther, and the province of Holland preserved; but the pa triotic party alleged, that the present was very different from that former epoch. The Dutch were then literally fighting for their freedom and property, against two ambitious princes, Lewis, of France, and Charles II. of England, who sought to enslave them; but were now compelled to take up arms against France, merely to gratify the coalition against that power, from which, had they remained peace. able, they would have had nothing to apprehend. It was, therefore, the interest of the Dutch, to procure a reconciliation with France at any rate. No conditions, however harsh, could equal such a calamity as the inundation of their country, and the destruction of all their ha bitations and landed possessions. Years must elapse, before they could