out skirmishing. The country was bostile to them all the way. The city of Groningen shut its gates against them, and like the other parts of the retreating army, they labour. ed under all manner of distress.

Such was the fate of as brave a body of men as ever Great Britain sent into the field. Both men and officers behaved, throughout the whole of the campaigns of 1793, and 1794, with a spirit that distinguished them wherever they were employed, and that fully corresponded with that idea of British valour, so justly entertained by foreign nations. It was, how. ever, in the last stages of this unsuccessful campaign, that their courage appeared with most lustre. The undesponding perseverance with which they met and surmounted every hardship and obstacie, arising from the various incidents of war, was the more remarkable, that they contended against an enemy in the full possession of every advantage occurring from victory, and whom they could only expect to impress with the sense of their valour. Herein they certainly succeeded. The French officers and soldiers that acted against the British troops, in the winter campaign of 1794, gene. rously acknowledged their bravery upon all occasions, but especially during that retreat which they began from Rhenen, on the fourteenth of January, and persisted in with inflexible intrepidity, through all the storms of the severest winter long known in those parts, and every ob. struction that could be formed by a victorious foe, irresistibly superior in

numbers, and aided by the wholestrength of the countries through which they were compelled to di-, rect their inarch. Thus, assailed in. every direction, they traversed, orrather fought their way through the provinces of Utrecht, Guelderland,. Overissel, and Groningen, almost destitute of necessaries, and incumbered with a heavy train of artillery, baggage, and waggons loaded with sick and wounded. This dreadful trial of courage, patience, and military skill, lasted upwards of two months, and deservedly excited the admiration of all Europe..

The savage hard-heartedness and hostility of the Dutch boors towards our suffering soldiers, was strongly and happily contrasted by the kind and cordial reception which they received from the inhabitants of Bremen. "It is something like a dream," says a witness and partaker of those pains and pleasures, "or fairy vision, and we could hardly give credit to our own senses: We who had lately been so buffetted about by fortune, driven like vagabonds, through frost and snow, over all the wilds of Holland, and who, in our greatest extremities, when we asked for any thing to refresh ourselves, with the money in our hands, were answered only with a shrug of the shoulders, nothing for the Englishman!'-Now, to seated in the most elegant apart, ments,--servants attending, ready to anticipate every wish,--beds of the softest down to repose upon without being disturbed in the morning with the thundering of carnon, or the usual alarms of war,

1719.

It seemed like some sudden enchant ment: but it proved real; for they used us like part of their own fa. mily or children which had been long absent, and now returned; and omitted nothing that could contribute to either our ease or pleasure. The greatest part of our soldiers left Bremen with much regret. The generous and elegant entertainment we met with there, far exceeded any thing we ever experienced be. fore, or, I may venture say, ever will again. A great number accompanied us out of town, and shewed every possible respect."

The British troops began to embark on board the transports on the 14th of April, at the mouth of a creek near Bremen lake. The whole fleet, with the convoy, was upwards of two hundred sail. On the 24th, it cleared the mouth of the Weser. The ships were tossed about and driven far to the northward of the due course by tempestuous weather. The Greeks who returned, under Xe. nophon, from an unsuccessful andhard expedition into Asia, were not more transported at the sight of the Ionian Sea, than the British soldiers, when on the twenty-seventh, being off the coast of Northumberland and Dur. ham, they espied the Cheviot-hills. The fleet, the weather becoming favourable, steered southward towards the Nore, when it part. ed into different divisions: cne bound for Harwich, one for Green. wich, and one for Portsmouth. They all arrived safely at the places cf their respective destinations.

During these transactions in the seven provinces, the French armies on the Rhine were preparing to besiege the city of Mentz, the only place of importance remaining to the empire on the left bank of that

river. They hoped, that by effecting its reduction before the setting in of winter, their hands would be at liberty for the pursuit of those vast schemes of conquest they had projefted in Germany. Relying on the discontents fréquently expressed among the inferior classes, they flattered themselves that on the appearance of their armies on the right side of the Rhine, the sub. jects of the petty principalities in Germany would be tempted to throw off the joke of their masters, and join them; or would at least, compel their rulers to remain neuter, and leave the House of Austria to the sole defence of its own people, among whom a spirit of dissatisfac tion was well known to prevail.

Induced by these motives, the French government directed its commanders, on the confines of Germany, to proceed towards Manheim; the reduction of which would open an entrance into the interior parts of the empire, facilitate the taking of Mentz, by diverting the attention of their enemies, and preventing them from affording it relief. They laid seige, accordingly, to that strong fort on the Rhine which covered that city; and it surrendered to the French on the twenty-fourth of December. Impa. tient to become masters of Mentz, in the same manner, they made three assault on the fort of Zahlback, in its neighbourhood; but were re pulsed with considerable loss. This check completely retarded their operations till the ensuing spring; as it was found impracticable to form a regular siege of so strong a place as Mentz, until the severity of the winter was ower.

The possession of Holland had, in the mean while, filled the French

with the highest expectations of deriving a multitude of advantages from it. No acquisition could exceed its value and importance. Placed in the middle ground, as it were, of the present contention, it extended an influence on every side, which, with skilful management, might evidently be productive of the most beneficial consequences to those whom it favoured. Hence had formerly arisen the most essential part of its power, and that weight in the affairs of Europe, which had so long been felt and acknowledged by every state. It was now become the property of France, and it was hoped, in that country, that the effects resulting in former days, from the strength and opulence of the seven provinces, would be transferred to the present possessors. Thus reasoned the French politicians: but they seemed to forget that the great power and influence of the Dutch republic, during the periods of its prosperity, was entirely founded on its inde. pendence, and on the unanimity and patriotism of the Dutch them. selves. But this was no longer the case; they had long been a divided people. It was a disputed point among them, who where the real patriots; and they were now a conquered nation. The wisest heads in France did not consider them as likely to prove an active, but rather an useful and subordinate ally, from whom much aid might be received, for the support of the armies and finances of the republic. The Dutch themselves did not incline to move out of the sphere of their domestic concerns; and, with their best wishes for the prosperity of France, viewed it chiefly as a secu. rity to their own. They were not

unwilling to go considerable lengths in providing for the various de mands, which they doubted not would be made upon them; but they considered their compliance, in this respect, as the price of that freedom which they expected to enjoy, in the arrangements they were meditating at home.

The French, however, seeing themselves uncontrouled masters of the seventeen provinces, constitut. ing that country called the Nether. lands, could not refrain from conceiving the most extensive views of conquest in the neighbouring coun tries. After they had driven the last remains of the allied armies' from their newly acquired terri tories, they next resolved to pursue them into the countries where they had taken shelter. They first made themselves masters of Bentheim, which, indeed, was a dependence of the Dutch republic, and then carried their arms into Westphalia, where they defeated a body of imperial forces. The reason why they proceeded no farther was the prospect of a peace with Prussia, and of a neutrality for the north of Ger. many. Certain it is, that the force. they had collected in those parts showed they had formed great designs; but the most prudent of those who presided over their councils, prevailed upon the others to desist' from attempts that might render the French odious, without conducing to their interest. What they had already acquired was sufficient to establish their superiority over the combined strength of all their ene mies. The best policy they could' now adopt would be, to conciliate and secure the attachment of their new subjects, by punctually adhering to the engagements formed

with them, and by proving, through the evidence of deeds, that an union with France was more eligible than a subjection to their former mas

ters.

The main object of the republican councils in France, at this juncture, seemed to be the renovation of their marine, through the means afforded by the conquest of Hol. land; and the employment of it, when renovated, against that power which they looked upon as the soul of the coalition against them. They had also two other objects in view; the one was, to detach Prussia from this coalition, by sowing the seeds of jealousy and suspicion between the courts of Berlin and Vienna. This did not appear to the French politicians a matter of much difficulty. The junction of that power with Austria was founded on the most extraordinary event that had happened in Europe for many centuries. The French revolution, which, by alarming all the crowned heads, reconciled at once their jar. ring interests, and united them for self preservation. But the first panic was over; and, notwithstanding the antipathy with which the French beheld royalty and its adherents, it was not imagined that, provided they were delivered from the apprehension of its restoration in their own country, they would carry their hatred of it so far, as to continue the war, in order to procure its abo. lition in every other country. A strong connexion had subsisted be. tween Prussia and France before the subversion of this monarchy; the motives for that connexion sub. sisted in their full force, and were only suspended by an accident, which, though unfriendly to the system of government settled in the

Prussian dominions, could not alter the nature of those relations existing necessarily between that court and its long-standing rival the court of, Vienna. The politics of this lat. ter were incessantly occupied with plans for the recovery of that valuable portion of its hereditary patrimony, the rich and extensive province of Silesia. This was the first acquisition that had placed the house of Brandenburgh on a footing of great consequence. It was respectable before, but had since become formidable. This elevation of a family, at no time in particular esteem at Vienna, created the more deep and irradical rancour, that it was wholly at the expence of the house of Austria. These resent.

ments would evidently never termi. nate, while the causes of them remained; and the house of Brandenburgh must either consent to re. move them, by restoring the territories it had wrested from the imperial family, in the hour of its dis tress, or keep a continual guard against its well-known determina. tion to recover them, at any cost, on the first favourable opportunity.

All these considerations were industriously laid before the Prussian monarch. They were obvious truths; but they were enforced with so much strength of persuasion, that they made the desired impression, and prepared that prince to listen favourably to the proposal of a separate peace with France, in case the powers with whom he had form ed the coalition, should be averse to treat in conjunction with him, To this it may be added, that his subjects were generally inclined to live on terms of amity with the French, and had never acceded to the junction with Austria, from any

other

other motive, than mere compliance with the will of their sovereign. A friendly intercourse had already been established between the go. vernment of France and the court of Berlin. During the summer of 1794, a private agent of this court repaired to Basle, in Switzerland, where he had secret interviews and conferences with M. Barthelemy, the principal negotiator on the part of the French, with foreign powers. It was undoubtedly a business of intricacy to the Prussian ministry, so to conduct itself, as to preserve the influence it had ob. tained in Germany, and lose none of the importance it had acquired by being the first mover of the coalition; as head of the protestant interest in the empire, the king of Prussia was already the counterpoise to the exorbitant weight of Au. stria, which had hitherto been supported by the princes and states of the Roman communion; but as religious motives had now lost much of their former prevalence, and political considerations preponderated against all others, these alone seemed to govern the various courts. Hence the dread of that overbear. ing sway which Austria had never failed to exercise over those it was in any manner able to controul, had detached many of the states of Germany from their preceding attachment to the Austrian politics. The minds of the generality of people, in that immense republic of princes and states, seemed more intent on a firm consolidation of their liberties and respective independence, than on the restoration of the French mo narchy, which they looked upon as a pretence of the court of Vienna, intended to conceal views of aggrandizement, which would have

given too much offence to all Europe, had they been avowed.

The ambitious disposition of the house of Brandenburgh was no less notorious; but the Prussian ministry was convinced, that it could not, in the present situation of affairs, be gratified at the expence of France. It turned its attention, therefore, to the only object that remained exposed to the common rapacity of its powerful neighbours. This object was Poland, of which, from its inability to resist them, they had pro jected the partition long before. They were now employed in exe. cuting it, and it behoved Prussia to be present at the division of the spoil; and to be ready, if necessary, forcibly to insist on that portion which had been assigned to its lot.

Swayed by these views, the court of Berlin thought it more prudent to treat with France, than to consume its treasures and armies in a fruitless contest with that power. By relinquishing a quarrel from which no benefit could be derived, it was at liberty to gratify the desire long cherished, of making vast ad. ditions to the territories of Prussia. This could not have been done, had it continued with the coalition. Its associate in the partition, Russia, had it been left sole agent in this business, might have availed itself of the absence of its Prussian confe derate, to have seized a larger share than was its due; and as pos session is usually the right of the strongest, might not have been pre vailed upon, by amicable means, to resign what it had seized in this

manner.

Such were the arguments by. which the Prussian ministry was brought to enter into a negotiation with France. A remnant of regard

for