4 for the powers, whom Prussia had engaged in the coalition, induced it to make a previous trial of the opinion that Europe would form of so unexpected a measure. Its private emissaries were directed, so early as the beginning of October, 1794, to circulate a report that France and Prussia had concluded a secret peace, which was in a short time to be made public. This report produced an effect that perfectly answered the views of Prussia. It was received with almost univer. sal satisfaction, and encouraged the court of Berlin to realise it without delay. A trusty agent was immediately dispatched to open a formal negotiation; and he was shortly followed by an ambassador, openly commissioned to treat with the French minister, at Basle, M. Barthelemy. The Prussian ambassador on this occasion was baron Goltz, who had formerly filled that station at Paris, where his abilities and modera. tion had procured him much esteem. The respect he was held in, by the French, contributed greatly to forward the treaty; when, to the surprise and the regret of the public, he fell ill, and was carried off in a few days, not without suspicions of poison; which were, unhappily, not discountenanced on the opening of his body. As the enemies to France, and the peace projected, were suspected, it was some time before any person would undertake an office seemingly accompanied with so much danger as that of apacificator. Another was at length appointed, M. Hardenberg, a gentleman less unacceptable to the Friends of the coalition. The French negotiators, conformably to those ideas of acting in the face of the world, which appeared most con. sistent with the spirit of republi. cans, refused, at first to admit of secret articles; and it required an explicit order from the committee of public safety to alter their deter. mination. This committee had, it seems, either foreseen or experienced the difficulties that would arise by departing from long authorized usages; and insisted on the dangerous parade of adhering to austere maxims, that carried with them more haughtiness than integrity. The articles of this treaty were entirely favourable to France, such, indeed, was the temper, as well as the situation, of the French at this time, that no others would have been admitted. The Prussian terri. tories on the left bank of the Rhine were ceded to France, and those only on the right restored to Prussia. The regulations for the internal settlement of the countries thus ceded, were referred, for final discussion, to the period of a general peace between France and Germa ny. It was agreed that a cessation of hostilities should take place, and continue in the north of Germany, which henceforth should be consi dered as neutral ground, and that those princes whose dominions lay on the right side of the Rhine. should be entitled to make proposals to France, and to be favourably treated, in behalf of whom the king of Prussia should interpose his good offices. The conclusion of this treaty, which was presented to the conven« tion, upon the tenth of April, for its approval and ratification, filled the members of this assembly, and the friends to the republic, with the highest exultation. It was the first acknowledgment of the republic formally made by any of the great powers powers of Europe; and this power was precisely that very one which had been foremost in the coalition, The French people at large conceived strong hopes, from this cir. cumstance, that a general pacifica tion would be effected, though the intervention of the Prussian ministry, as the secession of so principal a member of the coalition would necessarily weaken it; and the influ. ence of that member over the remaining, might prevail upon them to follow its example. It was not, in the mean time, without violent debates, that the rigid republicans consented to allow of the insertion of secret articles in this, or in any treaty. They pleaded the precedent of the Romans, whose treaties with their enemies had always been open and public to the world. As it would be unworthy of so great a republic as that of France to condescend to any meanness, there could be no necessity for concealment of its transac. tions with foreign powers. Secrecy, in this case, would insinuate, that it had either committed or permitted something too degrading to its dignity to be divulged. The answer to this objection was, that the motive for assenting to secret articles might proceed from a desire not to humble and mortify those who requested secrecy. Moderation, in prosperity, could never be better proved than by abstaining from that insulting display of superiority, which exposed to the world the de. gree of humiliation to which an enemy had been obliged to submit, After a long discussion it was decreed, that secret articles might be allow. ed, provided they did not contradict those that were made in public. Having thus successfully accom plished that object they had so long and so anxiously kept in view, a pacification with Prussia, they next converted their attention to another of a similar kind; which was, to compel Spain, by dint of successes, to accede to pacific measures. The close of the late campaign had left that kingdom in such a state of de bility, that it had little hopes of being able to face the French in the field. So repeated, and so de structive, had been the defeats of the Spanish troops, that Spain could now hardly be said to have an army. The various bodies of men that could be collected, were so dispirit. ed, that they made little or no re sistance, and fled almost at the very approach of the French. The des pondency of the people, as well as of the military, became at last so universal, that the court, after mak. ing a variety of fruitless efforts to reanimate the nation, was at last convinced, that unless a speedy peace were made, the French armies would over-run the whole kingdom. Their 'eastern army of the Pyrennees was now advancing over those mountains, with an inten tion to make itself master of the rich and extensive province of Catalonia, in which they had numerous well. wishers. On their descending into the champain country, the few forces that guarded it, fled before them, and retired to Rosas, a sea-port of consideration, and which they seemed resolved to defend. It was situated on a spacious bay, and regularly fortified. The bay. was commanded by a strong fort, well garrisoned, and provided with artillery. Till this was taken, the approaches to the city were dif ficult. The French, however, soon compelled it to surrender; but, on laying siege to the town, the inun dations from rain and melted snows obliged them to desist. After lying three weeks in a state of inaction, they took possession of a rising ground near the town; and, erect. ing a battery of heavy cannon, bat. tered it so effectually, that a general assault was resolved upon; but the garrison, apprehending such an intention, evacuated the town in the night preceding the day it was to have been assaulted. A small party that remained surrendered at dis. cretion; and the inhabitants were promised kind usage, and experienced it accordingly. This event took place on the fifth of January, 1795. From this time till May the Spaniards remained inactive, not daring to move from the strong holds they occupied in the mountainous parts of the province; and the French were taken up in preparations to march into the interior dis. tricts of the kingdom, and to endeavour to penetrate even to the metro. polis. Some of the Spanish commanders, however, struck with shame at the spiritless behaviour of their countrymen, exerted them. selves to revive their drooping courage, and having assembled a considerable body, vigorously attacked a corps of French on the fifth of May, near the town of Sistella; but the latter after a warm dispute, were completely victorious; and the defeat of the Spaniards was such, that they gave up all expectations of being able to make an effectual stand before so victorious an enemy. The French were so elated with their continual successes, that one of their generals, in whose camp some spies had been detected, sent them to the Spanish quarters, with a letter, informing the enemy of 3 his strength, position, and designs, This was general Moncey, an offi. cer of note, who concluded his let. ter by telling the Spanish command. er, that as soon as he had received the reinforcement he expected, he would drive him and his army out of Biscay and Navarre. So confi. dent were the French, and so de. pressed the Spaniards, that no doubt was entertained by either that he would execute his threats; after which the way would lie open to him as far as Madrid. It was ob vious, that no army, nor fortified city remained to obstruct his march. The peasantry were a wretched and heartless race, worn down by po. verty and oppression; and the inhabitants of the towns were an idle and indolent generation, debased by superstition, and grown inca. pable of manly exertions. In this extremity, the court of Madrid saw no other expedient to extricate itself from unavoidable ruin, than to have recourse to an im mediate treaty with the French republic, and to obtain peace, on any terms that might be demanded. All resources had been exhausted; the nobility, the gentry, the clergy, the monastic orders, had all contributed; the orders of knighthood, which have large possessions in Spain, had lately made liberal donations to government, besides a tax, laid On their estates, of eight per cent. No class, in short, had been remiss in pecuniary assistance to the state: but want of personal spirit, or discontent at the measures pursued by the ministry, seemed to pervade the mass of the nation. Under the conscious. ness of such a situation, the court of Madrid came to a determination wherein it had been so unfortunate. France was no less willing to diminish the coalition, by the secession of so powerful a member as Spain, which, under more skilful management, might have proved a most dangerous enemy. A treaty of peace was accordingly concluded between them at Basle, on the twenty-second of July, by M. Barthelemy, on the part of France, and Don Domingo d'Yriarte, on the part of Spain. The conditions were, that France should restore to Spain all her conquests in that kingdom, and that Spain should cede to France all its part of the island of Hispaniola, in the West Indies, together with all its artillery and military stores. Spain agreed to recognise the French, and the Batavian or Durch republic, and France consented to the interposition of Spain in favour of Naples, Sardinia, Parma, and Portugal. to detach itself from a confederacy the coalition of two such members as Prussia and Spain, added to that still greater loss the seven united provinces, excited in the enemies to the French republic, the greatest alarm for the two remaining members, Austria and Great Britian. If the former and the latter, when united and in full strength, unimpaired by losses or defection, had failed in their endeavours to bring France to submission, it was not probable that after the repeated defeats of their armies, and the dissolution of the confederacy, those two powers only should be able to effect what all the five together could not compass. These reason. ings happened certainly well-founded; but it ought also to be considered, that none of these coalesced powers agreed fundamentally in their views, and were guided by separate interests in whatever they proposed. Had they succeeded in their first attack of France, it was well understood, that their designs upon that kingdom were of a nature to set them quickly at variance with each other. Reduced from five to two, the agreement between these seemed to promise the more permanency, that their respective arms, by the distance of their objects, could not easily clash together. There were two articles in this treaty highly inimical to Great Britain; the cession of the Spanish part of Hispaniola to France, and the engagement on the part of Spain, to employ every means in its power to detach Portugal from its present alliance with Great Britain against the French republic, The loss to СНАР. CHA P. IV. A Pacification between the Convention and the Insurgents in La Vendée. On Terms very favourable to the latter.-Yet they again rise in Arms.Action between the Republicans and Emigrants, with other Loyalists, near Quiler-Defeat and Disasters of the Loyalists.--Their Capture or total Excision.-A British Squadron reduces and fortifies L'Isle Dieu. New Arrangements in Holland.-Enormous Contributions.-The Convention highly elated with the Successes of their Armies.—Distribution of these.-Distresses of the French People.-And those of the Conquered Countries.-Reduction of the Fortress of Luxembourg.-And Mentz invested by the French.-Who cross the Rhine.-Compaign on that River. -Successes of the French.-And Losses.-Tide of Success turned in favour of the Austrians.-A Junction between the French Armies, under Jourdan and Pichegru, checks the Victorious Career of the Austrians.— Manheim retaken from the French.-Campaign on the Italian Frontiers of France. Situation of the Interior of France.-And general Temper of the French Nation.-Extreme Animosity and Licentiousness of abusive Language.-Measure of Convention for Restraining this.—And securing the Liberty of Religious Worship. N event of greater importance than any treaty of peace with a foreign enemy, had, in the mean while, taken place in France. This was the pacification of those internal troubles that had occasioned so much effusion of blood, and laid waste some of the finest provinces of the kingdom. The proclamation of amnesty to all those who would lay down their arms, and submit to the republic, had wrought every effect that could have been desired. The insurgents in La Vendée and the neighbouring provinces, who had till then looked upon themselves as devoted to destruction by the repub. licans, and had continued in arms for their preservation, were gradually prevailed upon to confide in the promises of government. Since the fall of Roberspierre, conciliation had succeeded to terror, and examples had been publicly made of the principal perpetrators of the cruelties in La Vendée; and of the barbarities exercised on the unhappy royalists at Nantes and other places. This, together with that proclamation, which was issued on the first of December, in the preceding year, had prepared the minds of the insurgents to receive amicably the various offers of amity and protection which were held out to them by the moderate party, that, happily for France, had now the direction of affairs. The majority of the insurgents had availed themselves of these of fers; but numbers still adhered to their chiefs. Accustomed to the predatory |
