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more disastrous than an unsuccessful battle. The CH. XXIV. President had already placed General John Pope at the head of the Army of Virginia, in front of Washington, and he now took the resolution of sending to Corinth for General Halleck, whom he placed in chief command of the armies of the United States. This was done by an order of the 11th of July, and General Halleck was requested to start at once for Washington. As soon as he could place his command in the hands of General Grant, the next officer in rank in his department, he came on to Washington, assumed command of the army on the 23d, and the next day was sent to the camp of General McClellan, where he arrived on the 25th.

He asked the general his wishes and views in regard to future operations. McClellan answered that he proposed to cross the James River and attack Petersburg. Halleck stated his impression of the danger and impracticability of the plan, to which McClellan finally agreed. The General-in-Chief then told him that he regarded it as a military necessity to concentrate Pope's army and his on some point where they could at the same time cover Washington and operate against Richmond; unless it should be that McClellan felt strong enough to take the latter place himself with such reënforcements as would be given him. McClellan thought he would require thirty thousand more than he had. Halleck told him that the President could only promise twenty thousand, and that if McClellan could not take Richmond with that number, some plan must be devised for withdrawing his troops from their present position to some point where they could unite with General Pope without expos

1862.

CH. XXIV. ing Washington. McClellan thought there would be no serious difficulty in withdrawing his forces for that purpose; but he feared the demoralizing influence of such a movement on his troops, and preferred they should stay where they were until sufficient reënforcements could be sent him. Halleck had no authority to consider that proposition, and told him that he must decide between advising the withdrawal of his forces to meet those of Pope, or an advance upon Richmond with such forces as the President could give him. Halleck gained the impression that McClellan's preference would be to withdraw and unite with General Pope; but after consultation with his officers he informed Halleck the next morning that he would prefer to take Richmond. He would not say that he thought the probabilities of success were in his favor, but that there was "a chance," and that he was "willing to pp. 337, 338. try it." His officers were divided on the subject of withdrawing or making an attack upon Richmond. McClellan's delusion as to the number of the enemy had infected many of the most intelligent generals in his command. General Keyes, in a letter to Quartermaster-General Meigs, assured him that the enemy had two hundred thousand, more than Ibid., p. 338. double our number. At the same time General Meigs himself, simply from reading the Richmond newspapers and controlling their accounts with his own common-sense, had formed an estimate of the rebel force very much nearer the truth than that made by the generals at the front. He found it to consist of 152 regiments, which, at an average of 700 men too high an average-would give a pp. 340, 341. total force of 105,000. By General McClellan's

W. R. Vol. XI., Part III.,

July 27,

1862.

Ibid.,

returns for the 10th of August he himself had an CH. XXIV. aggregate present of 113,000 men.

W. R. Vol. XI., Part III.,

p. 367.

1862.

Ibid.,

Ibid., Part I.,

p. 132.

Halleck's return to Washington was followed by a shower of telegrams from McClellan urging the reënforcement of his army. "Should it be determined to withdraw it," he says on the 30th of July, "I shall look upon our cause as lost, and the demoralization of the army certain "—a statement Ibid., p. 342. which certainly was lacking in reserve. The weight of opinion, however, among the generals of highest rank, was on the other side. General Keyes wrote in the strongest terms urging the withdrawal of the pp. 331, 332. army. General Barnard, McClellan's chief of engineers, and General Franklin counseled the immediate withdrawal from the James to reunite with the forces covering the capital. Upon General Halleck's return to Washington, this course was resolved upon. General Halleck's first order in that direction was dated the 30th of July, requesting McClellan Ibid., p. 77. to send away his sick as quickly as possible. Four days afterwards, without having taken in the mean while any steps to obey the order, McClellan sent General Hooker to Malvern Hill. He drove away the Confederates from there after a sharp cavalry skirmish. This so brightened McClellan's spirits that he telegraphed to Halleck on the 5th that Aug., 1862. with reënforcements he could march his army to Richmond in five days; a suggestion to which Halleck made the curt rejoinder, "I have no reënforcements to send you."1

1 General Hooker told the Committee on the Conduct of the War a curious story about this affair. He said that after General McClellan received his orders to

abandon Harrison's Landing he
went to him voluntarily and sug-
gested that, with the forces they
had there, they could take Rich-
mond, and urged him to do it. So

W. R. Vol. XI..

Part III., p. 359.

CH. XXIV.

The order to dispose of the sick was not promptly obeyed, because General McClellan insisted upon knowing the intentions of the Government in regard to his army, and after being informed that it was to be withdrawn from the James several days more were wasted in wearisome interchange of dispatches between himself and Halleck; McClellan protesting with the greatest energy and feeling against this movement, and Halleck replying with perfect logic and temper in defense of it. In a long and elaborate dispatch, in which Halleck considered the whole subject, he referred to the representation made to him by McClellan and some of his officers that the enemy's forces around Richmond amounted to 200,000, and that McClellan had reported that they had since received large reënforcements.

General Pope's army covering Washington [he adds] is only about 40,000. Your effective force is only about 90,000. You are thirty miles from Richmond, and General Pope eighty or ninety, with the enemy directly between you, ready to fall with his superior numbers upon one or the other as he may elect. If General Pope's army be diminished to reënforce you, Washington, Maryland, and Pennsylvania would be left uncovered and exposed. If your force be reduced to strengthen Pope you would be too weak to even hold the position

confident was Hooker that he was
willing to take the advance, and
so assured McClellan. On reach-
ing his camp, about two hours
after that interview, he says he
found on his table an order from
General McClellan to prepare
himself with three days' rations
and a supply of ammunition, and
be ready to march at two o'clock
the next day. "I firmly believe,"

said Hooker, "that order meant
Richmond. I had said to McClel-
lan that if we were unsuccessful it
would probably cost him his head,
but that he might as well die for an
old sheep as for a lamb. . . But
before the time arrived for execu-
ting that order it was counter-
manded."- Hooker, Testimony,
Report of the Committee on the
Conduct of the War, Pt. I., p. 579.

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you now occupy. . . You say that the withdrawal from CH. XXIV. the present position will cause the certain demoralization of the army. I cannot understand why, . .

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unless the officers themselves assist in that demoralization, which I am satisfied they will not. . . But you will reply, Why not reënforce me here so that I can strike Richmond from my present position? To do this you said at our interview that you required 30,000 additional troops. . . You finally thought that you would have " some chance" of success with 20,000. But you afterward telegraphed me that you would require 35,000.

W. R.

. . To keep your army in its present position until it could be so reënforced would almost destroy it in that climate. . . In the mean time General Pope's forces would, Vol. XI., be exposed to the heavy blows of the enemy without the slightest hope of assistance from you.

He tells McClellan in conclusion that a large number of his highest officers are decidedly in favor of the movement.

Part I.,

p. 83.

Weary at last of arguments, Halleck became more and more peremptory in his orders; and this failing to infuse any activity into the movements of McClellan, he had recourse to sharp dispatches of censure which provoked only excuses and recriminations. In some of his replies to Halleck's urgent dispatches, enjoining the greatest haste and representing the grave aspect of affairs in Northern Virginia, McClellan replied in terms that indicated as little respect for Halleck as he had shown for the President and Secretary of War. On the 6th of August, in answer to an order insisting on the immediate dispatch of a battery of artillery to Burnside, he calmly replies, "I will obey the order as soon as circumstances permit. My artillery is Ibid., p. 79. none too numerous now." On the 12th, little or no progress having yet been made, he says, "There

1862.

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