Sanford v. Lackland. the trustees belonging to him is of the value of $30,760, and he is now between twenty-four and twenty-five years of age. The bill sets out the foregoing facts, and prays that the property in the hands of the trustees allotted to William C. Hill may, subject to the incumbrance of Mathews, be decreed to belong to the assignee in bankruptcy. The district court overruled a demurrer to the bill, and entered a decree as prayed. The trustees and the bankrupt appeal. Cline, Jamison, & Day, for the complainant. Slayback & Haussler, and Lackland, Martin, & Lackland, for the defendants. DILLON, Circuit Judge. The share of the bankrupt in his father's estate has been duly ascertained and set apart in severalty to him, but with the exception of the ten thousand dollars advanced on his attaining his majority is yet in the hands of the trustees, as he was not twenty-six years of age at the time he was adjudicated a bankrupt. By the bankrupt law, all the property of the bankrupt, with certain exemptions not necessary to be noticed, vests in the assignee (sec. 14); and if William C. Hill owned or had a beneficial interest in the property in the hands of the trustees, it passed under the bankruptcy. That he was the owner of the property which had been allotted to him under. the will can scarcely admit of a doubt. The will directs a partition of the trust estate to be made among the children, and this has been done, but it also provides that the trustees shall hold the shares of the children until the sons shall severally arrive at the age of twenty-six years, when they are directed to convey to such son his portion in absolute property. This is not the case of a legacy or gift to vest if the Sanford v. Lackland. legatee shall arrive at a specified age which has not yet been reached. Nor is the devise or gift to the son made on any condition; there is no limitation over in case the son shall, before attaining the age of twenty-six, become a bankrupt. If William C. had not been adjudged a bankrupt, and had died intestate before reaching the age of twenty-six, can it be doubted that his heirs would have taken the estate? It has not been questioned, nor could it be, that he had the power to mortgage this property for the money borrowed of Mathews. If the intention of the testator was to prevent the property from being liable for the debts of his son, his will fails to express that intention. The testator might have provided if the son should become bankrupt before reaching twenty-six, that his estate should then determine and go somewhere else; but he cannot give the beneficial interest and annex to it the inconsistent condition that it shall not be liable for the debts of the devisee. And in fact the father has not attempted to do this. The estate is given, and the only limitation expressed in the will is that the trustees shall hold it and its accumulations until he shall reach the specified age. The trustees have no beneficial interest in the estate they hold. By operation of the bankruptcy, William C. Hill has no longer any interest in it. It belongs to and is vested in the assignee for the benefit of creditors. The trustees now hold the property in trust for the benefit of these creditors, and as the strict execution of the trusts in the will have been thus rendered impossible, the court properly decreed that the property held by the trustees for the bankrupt should, subject to the Mathews incumbrance, be conveyed to the assignee in bankruptcy. The decree of the court is affirmed. KREKEL, J., concurs. AFFIRMED. State National Bank v. Freedmen's Savings Company. Graves v. Dolphin, Piercy v. NOTE. In full support of the foregoing views, see: 1 Simons, 66; Green v. Spicer, 1 Russ. & Mylne, 395; son, 18 Ves. 429; Rochford v. Hackman, 10 Eng. L. & Eq. 64; Roberts, 1 Mylne & K. 4; Hallett v. Thompson, 5 Paige, 583; Bryan v. Knickerbocker, 1 Barb. Ch. 409; Havens v. Healy, 15 Barb. 296; Collier's Will, 40 Mo. 287, 325; Doe v. Lea, 3 Term Rep. 39; Nicoll v. Walworth, 4 Denio, 385; 4 Kent Com. 310; Say v. Jones, 3 Brown Par. Cas. 113; Willard Eq. 514, 515; Story Eq. sec. 1216. STATE NATIONAL BANK v. FREEDMEN'S SAVINGS AND TRUST COMPANY. A certificate of deposit payable to the order of depositor on the return of the certificate was issued by Bank A. to T. D., who could not write. The bank took his mark on its signature book, and wrote a description of him opposite. Shortly afterwards the certificate was stolen from T. D. and presented to Bank B. by a stranger who gave his name as T. D., and said he could not write. Thereupon the cashier of Bank B. endorsed the certificate to his own order with the name of T. D. to which the stranger made his mark, and an employe of Bank B. added his signature as "witness to mark." The cashier then endorsed the certificate and sent it through a correspondent to Bank A., which thereupon paid it, and the money was handed over to the stranger. Thereafter the real T. D. appeared at Bank A., and on discovery of the forgery Bank A. paid him the amount and brought suit against Bank B. to recover the payment on the forged endorsement. Held, that Bank A. had a right to rely on the identification of T. D. by Bank B. and could recover. (Before TREAT and KREKEL, JJ.) Certificate of Deposit.-Forged Indorsement. On the 7th day of November, 1870, Tim Dunivan deposited in the State National Bank at Keokuk, Iowa, nine hundred dollars, and received therefor a certificate of deposit, of which the following is a copy: "$900. State National Bank v. Freedmen's Savings Company. STATE NATIONAL BANK, Keokuk, Nov. 7, 1870. “Tim Dunivan has deposited in this Bank Nine Hundred Dollars, current funds, payable to the order of himself hereon in like funds on the return of this certificate. "In currency, $900. [No. 4991.] "G. W. HORTON, "for Teller." Tim Dunivan was unable to write, and therefore placed upon the signature book of the bank his mark, the officers of the bank at the same time writing his description opposite the mark on the book. Dunivan went off on the river, and on or about the 20th of November the certificate was stolen from him. To About the 1st of December a man presented the certificate at the counter of the Freedmen's Savings and Trust Company, and asked the cashier to cash it. The cashier refused, on the ground that the person presenting it was a stranger to him, but offered to take it for collection. this the stranger acceded. The cashier asked him if his name was Tim Dunivan; he replied "yes." He then asked him if he could write his name, and receiving an answer in the negative, the cashier himself wrote the following endorsement: "Pay to the order of W. N. Brant, cashier. Tim Dunivan," the party himself making the cross-mark. The mark was then witnessed by W. P. Brooks, a man who did odd jobs about the bank, as follows: "Witness to mark, W. P. Brooks, St. Louis, Mo." Neither Mr. Brant nor Mr. Brooks was acquainted with the man offering the certificate. his X mark The certificate was then endorsed by Mr. Brant, as follows: "Pay Bower, Barclay & Co., for collection, acct. of W. N. Brant, Cashier," and forwarded to Bower, Barclay & Co. for collection, by whom the certificate was collected and the proceeds remitted to Mr. Brant, and by him paid to the party who had left the certificate for collection. On the 22d of December, Tim Dunivan appeared at the bank in Keo State National Bank v. Freedmen's Savings Company. kuk, and claimed that the endorsement was a forgery, and that he had never received the money. Thereupon the Keokuk bank paid him the amount and brought this suit against the Freedmen's Savings and Trust Company to recover the amount paid through its correspondent. The evidence adduced at the trial disclosed the above facts. It further appeared that the cashier of the Keokuk bank, when the certificate was presented from Bower, Barclay & Co., simply looked at the back of it, and remarked that "he guessed it was all right—the endorsers were good." Νο information was given by plaintiff's officers to Bower, Barclay & Co., or to defendant, as to the description of Tim Dunivan which had been placed upon its books; and there was no evidence as to when the plaintiff gave notice of the forgery, except that the cashier of defendant testified that notice was not given him until some time after the discovery. Noble and Hunter, for the plaintiff. E. W. Pattison, for the defendant. TREAT, District Judge, charged the jury as follows: :The case you are trying turns mainly on the question of negligence. The fact that defendant is a corporation is in proof. You have then the plaintiff a corporation and the defendant a corporation. The rule of law usually is, that where a certificate of deposit is issued by a bank, and it comes back to the bank issuing it with the endorsement of the depositor through the hands of bona fide innocent parties, the endorsement being forged, the bank paying the deposit certificate must lose it; for they are presumed to know the signatures of their customers, and the bank issuing the certificate has the means of verifying the signature. This is a different case. Here was a person who could |