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out and is not now found in the act. Indeed, if anything was wanting to show that Congress never designed to confer on the courts of the United States jurisdiction in this class of cases, beyond the single case covered by the twenty-third section, it would be found in the legislative history of this measure. See Cong. Globe, 2d session, 41 Congress, p. 3561, where the principle of giving jurisdiction to United States courts in this class of cases is first broached in section 5 of the bill there set out. It was much discussed by senators, and finally, with the consent of the chairman of the committee having charge of the bill, it was stricken out. (Ib. pp. 3570, 3654.) Subsequently it was renewed by Senator Carpenter, in an amendment proposed by him (ib. p. 3680), and his proposition, after a modification, making it in legal effect what the twenty-third section now is, was adopted by the senate (ib. p. 3680), and passed that body (ib. p. 3690).

The house not concurring in the amendments made by the senate, the bill went to a committee of conference, where the principle of conferring on the courts of the United States jurisdiction in contested elections, in any case, was specially considered, and the twenty-third section, as it now stands, was the result of that consideration, as is shown by the report of the committee to each house. The chairman of the committee of conference on the part of the senate, in reporting the action of the committee to the senate, referred particularly to the twenty-third section, and said: "The committee of conference have redrawn the section [23] very carefully, narrowing it down to the particular issue where the right to vote is denied for that specific reason (race, color, or previous condition of servitude), not drawing anything else before the United States courts, and for the purpose of giving effect to this fifteenth amendment." (Ib. p. 3753.)

The chairman of the committee of conference on the

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part of the house, in reporting the action of the committee to the house, after quoting the twenty-third section as it now stands in the statute, said: "I should have preferred, because I do not deem it essential to the success of this measure, that the senate had not raised this question with the house of contesting any election in the [United States] courts; but having raised it, I am content to enact the provision with the limitation now put on it (into a law), and leave it thus forevermore, assured as I am that it can work no possible harm, because in any event and in every event it leaves in the courts of the United States no power save to determine the single question where the person offering his vote shall have it rejected simply on the ground that his right, guaranteed under the fifteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, is denied. * * I do not believe, under any possible condition of things, it would be necessary, as the constitution now stands, to vest in any of the courts of the United States any jurisdiction over the question of contested elections, beyond the express jurisdiction with the express limitation contained in the twenty-third section of the report." (Ib. p. 3872.)

It will be seen from these reports that the twenty-third section in its present form was the work of a conference committee, that embraced among its members lawyers and jurists of eminence and national reputation, who were not likely to err in interpreting the work of their own hands.

Both houses of Congress approved and assented to the views of the committee by adopting their report. The text of the act will admit of no other or different interpretation than that given it by this committee. It is not pretended that the opinions of individual legislators can be received to alter the text or control the interpretation of an act of Congress; but where, as in this case, an act has been carefully considered and revised by a conference committee, their opinions carefully and deliberately expressed, when

Harrison v. Hadley, Governor.

they accord with the plain text of the act, show very conclusively that Congress was not mistaken as to the legal effect of the language of the act, and did not intend that it should receive an interpretation different from the one plainly expressed.

It is suggested that although the court may not have jurisdiction of the principal subject matter, it may yet have jurisdiction to grant the auxiliary and ancillary relief prayed for in the bill. In answer to this suggestion it is enough to say that there is no act of Congress conferring jurisdiction to grant such auxiliary and ancillary relief, and the reasoning that excludes the jurisdiction of the court over the principal subject matter of the suit applies with equal force to the ancillary and auxiliary relief sought.

The complainant is clearly mistaken in supposing the supersviors of election appointed in this state, under the act of Congress approved June 10, 1872 (17 U. S. Stats. pp. 348–9), have any authority to supervise or report upon the election of state officers. No return or report they might make in reference to the election of any state officer could have any official sanction, or be received as evidence in this or any other court.

The court having no jurisdicton of the case made by the bill to determine in any form of action the right of complainant to the office in dispute, it is needless to inquire whether a bill in chancery will lie in such case, or whether the remedy must be by quo warranto. And for the same reason it is unnecessary to inquire whether the court, supposing it to have jurisdiction, could grant the several injunctions and restraining orders prayed for in the bill.

The complainant must, therefore, be remitted to the justice of his own state tribunals, where, from the foundation of the government down to the present time, the exclusive jurisdiction over cases of contested election for state offices has been vested and still remains, except where the case

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turns solely on the single fact specified in the twenty-third section.

The demurrer to the bill is well taken, and the injunctions and other extraordinary writs and relief prayed for are refused, with leave to complainant to have a re-argument the demurrer, before a full bench at the next term. DEMURRER SUSTAINED.

upon

NOTE. No desire was expressed at the term to have the questions decided in the foregoing opinion heard before the full bench.

Enjoining the governor of a state in the federal courts: Murdock v. Woodson, ante. Indictment of governor: United States v. Clayton, ante. Enforcement Act: Mode of Administration.—As part of the judicial history of the circuit, it may be of interest to the profession to be apprised of the manner in which the anomalous and delicate duties required of the judges of the federal courts by the act of Congress, entitled "An act to amend an act approved May 31, 1870, entitled 'An act to enforce the rights of citizens of the United States to vote in the several states of this Union, and for other purposes,'" approved February 28, 1871, and the first section of the act approved June 10, 1872, amendatory thereof, have been performed. This will appear by the following statement:

In July, 1872, various applications from the state of Arkansas having been made to the circuit judge, in conformity with the act of Congress providing for the appointment and defining the duties of "supervisors of elections," in which applications the petitioners stated their desire to have the registration and succeeding election guarded and scrutinized (the said election being one at which representatives in Congress were to be voted for), the circuit judge, under the amendatory act, approved June 10, 1872, made and transmitted to the clerk of the circuit court for the eastern district of Arkansas, the following designation and appointment:

Being unable, by reason of distance, and from other causes, to perform and discharge the duties within the sate of Arkansas imposed by "An act to enforce the rights of the citizens of the United States to vote in the several states of this Union, and for other purposes," and acts to amend the same, I do hereby select and appoint in my place and stead to act for and within the said state of Arkansas, the Hon. Henry C. Caldwell and the Hon. William Story, who are respectively the judges

Harrison v. Hadley, Governor.

of the district courts of the United States for the eastern and western districts of Arkansas; and if one of the said judges shall be absent from the state, or unable to act, then the appointment shall be to the other solely and severally, and I do hereby direct and assign to them, or to either of them, as aforesaid, within and for the state of Arkansas, the performance of all duties and acts, and the exercise of all powers, functions, and jurisdiction, by the aforesaid acts of Congress imposed and conferred upon me. Given under my hand, at chambers, in the city of Davenport, this, the 6th day of August, A. D. 1872.

JOHN F. DILLON, Circuit Judge, Eighth Judicial Circuit.

On the tenth day of August, 1872, court was opened at Little Rock, and the foregoing appointment entered of record, and the said judges notified thereof. An order was made of record that the court remain open from day to day for the performance of the duties imposed and the exercise of the powers conferred by the said acts of Congress.

On the thirteenth day of August, 1872, the following letter was addressed to the chairmen of the republican and democratic state central committees, respectively, both of whom,- among many others,― had asked the benefit of the said acts of Congress :

LITTLE ROCK, Ark., August 13, 1872. SIR: I am directed by the judges to advise you that in pursuance of the act of Congress and the order and appointment of the circuit judge, the circuit court of the United States is now open in this city, and will remain open for the purpose of appointing supervisors of election for the various election precincts of this state, under the act of Congress providing for the same. When this jurisdiction is invoked by proper petitions, the act provides for the appointment of two supervisors of election for each precinct, who can read and write the English language, and who are of different politics, and qualified voters of the precinct. I am also directed by the judges to say, that owing to their limited personal knowledge of men and their politics, in the various parts of the state, they will be unable to select, upon their own knowledge, proper persons, having the required qualifications to act as such supervisors. In view of this fact, and inasmuch as the act of Congress provides that the supervisors of each precinct shall be opposed in politics, the judges have determined to devolve on the democratic and republican state central committees, respectively, the responsibility of recommending one of the supervisors for each precinct. The persons so recommended by your committee will be appointed by the court, unless it be shown that they do not possess the qualifications required by the act, or are otherwise