In re Hezekiah.

ed this by striking out "1864," and inserting "1871" in lieu thereof. (Act of June 8, 1872, 17 Stats. at Large, 334.) Some controversy having arisen as to whether this provision applied to debts contracted prior to the time of the passage of the amendment, Congress, on the 3d day of March, 1873, passed a declaratory act, as follows: "That it was the true intent and meaning of an act approved June 8, 1872, entitled "An act, &c. that the exemptions allowed the bankrupt by the said amendatory act should, and it is hereby enacted that they shall be, the amount allowed by the constitution and laws of each state, respectively, as existing in the year 1871, and that such exemptions be valid against debts contracted before the adoption and passage of such state constitution and laws, as well as those contracted after the same, and against him, by judgment or decree of any state court, any decision of any such court rendered since the adoption and passage of such constitution and laws notwithstanding." (17 Stats. at Large, 577.)

Rose & Green, for the bankrupt.

Benjamin & Barnes, for the assignee.

DILLON, Circuit Judge.-1. I am of opinion that the exemption provided by the constitution (Art. 12, sec. 1) executes itself, and that such exemption is exclusive, and not cumulative. The enlarged, and, as compared with the then existing statute provision, generous exemption given by the constitution in favor of any resident, without regard to his trade or condition or relations in life, with the privilege to him to select the property he desired to retain, seems to me to evince an intention to supersede the more narrow provisions which the statute had strictly limited, if not reluct antly given.

2. As all the property is personal, my opinion is, that the bankrupt is not entitled to claim, under the constitution

Pike v. Wassell.

of the state (Art. 12, sec. 1), $2,000 in addition to his household and kitchen furniture, &c. Household and kitchen furniture, &c. may be claimed as exempt under the bankrupt act (sec. 14), and this act then provides "that there shall be exempt such other property not included in the foregoing exceptions, as is exempt by the laws of the state in which the bankrupt is domiciled. There cannot be a double exemption of the same property; and, as the $2,000 embraces all the property which is exempt by the state constitution, including household and kitchen furniture, wearing apparel, &c. the value of the latter, if selected by the bankrupt, ought, under the spirit if not the letter of section 14, be deducted from the $2,000, and he be allowed to select other property, so as, in the aggregate, to amount to that sum. I reach this conclusion upon the language of section 14 and the amendment of June 8, 1872 (17 Stats. at Large, 334), without resting upon the act of March 3, 1873 (Ib. 577), as having any controlling effect in this respect.

AFFIRMED.

LUTHER H. PIKE, et al. v. JOHN WASSELL, et al.

1. Under the confiscation act of Congress of July 17th, 1862 (12 Stats. at Large, 589), no interest in land could be forfeited which would extend beyond the life of the offender.

2. Where, under said act, a decree was entered condemning as forfeited real estate for and during the life of the owner thereof, his children cannot, during his life-time, file a bill to question the validity of subsequent sales on execution against the father of his reversionary estate in the property.

3. A decree condemning as forfeited an estate for the life of the owner does not immediately cast the entire beneficial estate in the property upon his children so as to make them, while he is still living, his heirs.

(Before DILLON, Circuit Judge.)

Pike v. Wassell.

Confiscation Act.-Effect of Forfeiture of Life Estate in Lands of the Offender.

THE plaintiffs describe themselves in the bill of complaint as "the children and heirs-at-law of Albert Pike, who was formerly a citizen of the state of Arkansas, but is now a citizen of the state of Tennessee, residing in the city of Washington," in the District of Columbia.

The bill sets forth that on the 17th day of July, 1862, their father was seized, in fee of certain real estate in the city of Little Rock, and that at the date of the passage by Congress of the confiscation act of July 17th, 1862 (12 Stats. at Large, 589), and subsequently the said Albert Pike was a general in the Confederate army, and that after his resignation as such officer he afterwards, to-wit, on the 16th day of February, 1865, acted as judge of the supreme court of the state of Arkansas, after the passage by that state of the ordinance of secession, and at a time when the said state was acting under the constitution of the Confederate States; that on the said 16th day of February, 1865, the marshal of the United States seized the real estate of the said Albert Pike, described in the bill, under the said confiscation act, and on due proceedings had the district court of the United States for the eastern district of Arkansas, on the 5th day of April, 1865, entered a decree condemning and forfeiting to the United States the interest and estate of the said Albert Pike in and to said real estate for and during the natural life of the said Albert Pike, and directing the same to be sold for the benefit of the United States. It is shown that the said life interest was subsequently, May 1st, 1865, sold and conveyed by the marshal. About the time said real estate. was so seized, several actions at law were commenced by attachment in the state court against Albert Pike, and at the September term, 1865, judgments were rendered therein against him, on an appearance entered by his son, Luther

Pike v. Wassell.

H. one of the present complainants. The bill avers that this appearance was never authorized by the said Albert, and that the defendant, Wassell, fraudulently induced the said Luther H. to enter it, and waive service by publication. At the April term, 1867, the real estate of the said Albert Pike, which had been seized as aforesaid by the marshal and condemned as forfeited by the United States district court, being the same which had been attached in said actions in the state court, was sold on executions issued on said judgments rendered in the state court, to the defendant. It is averred in the bill that this sale was for an inadequate price, but this is denied in the answer.

The bill contains also averments tending to show an equity or right in favor of Albert Pike or his heirs, if the plaintiffs are such, arising out of an alleged agreement between the defendant, Wassell, and the said Luther H. Pike, acting as attorney of Albert Pike, in respect to the said. judgments and execution sales thereunder, but in the view. taken by the court it is not necessary to state this portion of the case at any greater length. The defendant subsequently became the owner of the life estate or interest which was sold by the marshal under the confiscation decree, and claims thus to be seized in fee of the whole estate in the lots in controversy. The bill admits the validity of the confiscation proceedings, and that the life estate of the said Albert Pike was sold, and this is also admitted by the defendant. But the bill denies the validity of the judg ments against Albert Pike, rendered by the state court, and the validity of the execution sales and sheriff's deeds thereunder. On the other hand, the answer, which is made also a cross bill, insists upon the validity of said judgments and execution sales.

The bill proceeds on the theory that the plaintiff's, as the heirs-at-law of Albert Pike, are the owners of the reversion after the determination of the life estate, condemned and

Pike v. Wassell.

sold by the United States, and the object of the bill is to compel the defendant, as the tenant for life, out of the rents, to keep down the taxes, and properly to care for and preserve the property.

The pleadings and exhibits are voluminous, but this outline of the case is sufficient for an understanding of the question decided by the court.

A. H. Garland, and Dodge & Johnson, for the plaintiffs.

T. D. W. Yonley, and Wassell & Moore, for the defendant.

DILLON, Circuit Judge. -Both parties agree that Albert Pike was seized in fee of the lots in controversy, and that the United States condemned and sold only an estate therein for and during his natural life. Both parties admit that the proceeding was valid, and that to this extent the title of Albert Pike was divested and is now in the defendant. It is stated in the bill that Albert Pike is still living. The substantial point in dispute is as to the ownership of the reversion, or of the estate other than life estate which was forfeited to and sold by the United States under the act of July 17th, 1862. The defendant claims this reversionary estate under the execution sales by the sheriff. The plaintiffs claim the same estate as "the children and heirs-atlaw" of their father. As the plaintiffs claim only as heirs, it follows that if they are not now the heirs of Albert Pike, the foundation of the relief sought by the bill fails. Their case rests, and rests alone, upon this proposition. This their counsel concede in argument. They insist that the decree of condemnation and sale, though it was but of the life estate of Albert Pike, deprived him of all beneficial interest in the property and cast the descent or effected a settlement of it upon his lawful heirs, the same as though he were dead, and that it does this so effectually as to disable