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largest establishments which had given employ- sian banking though in its first years it seemed ment to one-half of all the workers thrown out to stimulate even a more rapid growth in cerof work was lack of fuel. Lack of materials tain directions. According to the last statewas next in importance. Lack of cotton was ment of the Russian State Bank, published on responsible for the closing of eight establish- 6 Nov. 1917 — and no more recent reliable data ments which had given employment to 28,800 are available at this writing - Russia then had workers. On the other hand, lack of orders in circulation no less than 19,000,000,000 rubles, and financial losses were reported only from with one and a third billions of gold reserve. 12 per cent of all establishments employing less The total paper currency had grown from 3,than 10 per cent of the total number of 260,000,000 rubles in 1915 to about 25,000,000,workers.

000 rubles (est.) in 1918, with a greatly deThe industrial situation in the month of pleted gold reserve. Despite the prevailing October 1917 is characterized by the shipments panic caused by revolutionary conditions, the of coal from the Donetz Basin which, as has People's Bank of Moscow was so swamped with been seen, is the chief coal-producing centre deposits that it was opening new branches all of Russia. During the month of October the over the country to handle their amazing shipments of coal amounted only to 1,440,000 amounts — amounts which during four months short tons, of which nearly two-thirds were of 1917 increased from 353,000,000 to 781,consumed by the railroads. This left only 504,- 000,000 rubles. But just at the close of that 000 short tons for the supply of all industrial year the Bolshevik government seized all the establishments, which was about one-third of banks, which shared the sad fate of most other their regular demand for fuel.

institutions under that régime. The cessation of the war was followed by In imperial times the Bank of Russia acted the closing of munition factories and other war in the double capacity of State bank and comindustries. The secession of Ukrainia and the merical bank. The State Bank, the governCaucasus deprived Russia for a time of her ment bank of issue and directly under the conprincipal sources of fuel. The blockade was trol of the Minister of Finance, was the central directly responsible for the lack of cotton unifying banking institution that gave the which forced the closing of cotton factories. Russian banking system its soundness and

The breakdown of the transportation sys- stability. Before the World War it was the tem was, perhaps, the most potent cause of the largest bank in the world so far as actual decrisis of Russian industry. It is a well-known posits were concerned. Protected and confact that the war totally destroyed the efficiency

trolled by the State Bank were numerous State of the Russian railways. On 1 Oct. 1917, the savings banks, established to promote thrift number of disabled locomotives reached 5,551, among the people. The government guaranteed while work in the repair shops was practically all their deposits and fixed their rates of indiscontinued for lack of metal and fuel. On terest. None of their capital could be used for 31 Dec. 1917, 22,000 loaded cars accumulated at state expenditures, and only profits in excess the Moscow railway depot for lack of locomo- of 10 per cent went to the government. Losses tives to haul them. The Soviet government at- were met by a reserve fund built up from tempted to relieve the industrial breakdown by profits under the 10 per cent maximum pera broad scheme of nationalization of industry. mitted by the State Bank. The growth of these Isaac A. HOURWICH, PH.D.

popular savings banks, which were represented GEORGE J. KWASHA, M. E.

by at least 10,000 branches all over the country,

has been phenomenal. According to the official 13. BANKING AND FINANCE. Russia's report made by the Russian Minister of Finance extremely, agricultural character makes her in 1916, the deposits in these savings banks inbanks and banking, far less important than her creased by over 3,500,000,000 rubles in the first enormous size and population would warrant two years of the Great War. The growth of us to expect. Neither in number nor in magni- deposits in the State Bank amounted to 854,tude can Russian banks compare favorably with 000,000 rubles during the first 18 months of those of west European countries, let alone that war. Besides these general banks, Russia the United States. Indeed, banks are a compara- before the Revolution had special banks, such as tively recent institution in Russia. There were mortgage banks, land banks, etc. The functions no commercial banks at all in that country be- 'of these different kinds of loan banks are infore 1865, when the first of them (with a capi- dicated by their names. It should be noted, tal of 4,000,000 rubles) was established. Nor however, that the land banks were specially was their subsequent growth very rapid. The designated as the Nobles' Land Bank and the close of the last century still found only 39 Peasants' Land Bank, each doing an enormous such institutions in the whole empire, though business before the Great War - over 3,200,their total capitalization approximated 350,000,- 000,000 and 5,000,000,000 rubles, respectively, 000 rubles. By 1910 their number had decreased in 1913. There were 36 municipal credit sothrough consolidation to 31, though the number cieties in Russia on 1 Jan. 1915, having a of branch-banks had more than doubled during total capital exceeding 150,000,000 rubles; while the decade in question (increasing from 242 to the 53 joint-stock banks for commercial credit 492) and the capitalization reached the half- had a total capital of about 837,000,000 rubles billion-ruble mark. Within the next five years,

on 1 July 1915, with deposits approximating years of unusual industrial and commercial de- 2,900,000,000 rubles the previous year. The prinvelopment in Russia, the number and import- cipal banks of the latter kind before the World ance of Russia's business banks grew amazingly. War were the Petrograd International Bank In 1915 there were 53 main and 743 branch of Commerce (capital 90,000,000 rubles), the banks, with a total capital exceeding 1,200,000,- Russian Bank for Foreign Trade (capital 80,000 rubles. The World War, naturally, inter- 000,000 rubles), the Azov-Don Bank of Comrupted this rapid general develonment of Rus- merce (capital 75,000,000 rubles), the Russian


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Asiatic Bank (capital 65,000,000 rubles), the The "extraordinary expenditures United Bank of Commerce (capital 46,000,000 fewer in number and smaller in total amount. rubles), the Russian Commercial and Industrial There were just four general government outBank (capital 45,000,000 rubles), the Volga- lays under this head during 1915. These were Kama Bank of Commerce (capital 31,000,000 78,400,000 rubles spent by the Ministry of War; rubles), and the Siberian Trade Bank (capi- 66,000,000 rubles expended on railway extental 31,000,000 rubles). All these banks had sions; 9,400,000 rubles devoted to the construcbranches — some many

tion and improvement of ports; and 1,072,000 hundred — in various parts of Russia, with rubles paid out in railroad subsidies. This headquarters invariably at Petrograd.

makes a grand total of 3,268,632,000 rubles The government revenues and expenditures for all estimated expenditures, ordinary and of Imperial Russia were classed under the two extraordinary, for the year in question general heads of ordinary and extraordinary, which, on the bases used above, amounted to with numerous and confusing sub-classifica- about 18% rubles per capita. tions. The principal sources and gross amounts Of course these figures do not include Rusof Russia's "ordinary revenues, as enumerated sia's enormous war expenditures, which the and officially estimated in rubles for 1915, were Russian Minister of Finance placed at 10,000,as follows: (1) State domains — government 000,000 rubles for 1915 alone. That the cost railroads, banks, mills, factories, timber sales, of the World War to Russia, as to the other etc.- 1,700,000,000; (2) Indirect taxes --- cus- belligerent nations, increased as the struggle toms receipts and revenue from sales of tobacco, continued, goes without saying. Specific esalcohol, sugar, matches, petroleum, etc.— 699,

timates by years vary greatly, but Russian au000,000; (3) Duties revenue stamp receipts, thorities place the whole cost of the World passport charges, taxes on freight and passen- War to Russia at 56,599,275,699 rubles. ger railroad transportation, etc.- - 514,000,000; The rapid growth of Russia's national debt (4) Direct taxes — taxes on land, real estate,

during the war is another means of gauging capital, trade licenses, etc.— 375,000,000; (5) its cost. This increased from 8,811,380,000 ruState monopolies - mining industries, coinage, bles on 1 Jan. 1914, to 32,300,000,000 rubles on liquor traffic, post office, telephone, telegraph,

1 Sept. 1917, when Russia no longer figured in etc.— 326,000,000; (6) Reimbursement of treas

the war.

To cover this and subsequent defury expenditures, 124,000,000; (7) Land re

icits, Russia made several internal war loans, demption - payments on land purchased by ex

some of which were taken up abroad, and at serfs and other peasants - 1,900,000; (8) Sale

least two foreign loans, amounting to $100,000,of state domains forests, lands and other nat

000, placed in the United States, which alone ural resources - 1,850,000; and (9) Miscel

is believed to have extended financial aid to laneous revenues - military tribute, municipal

Russia approximating $325,000,000. Just what contributions, payments on railroad and Crown

the financial situation in that country is at debts, etc.— 15,200,000. If we add to these Vordinary) revenues the 155,000,000 rubles esti

the present moment, with the Bolshevik gov

ernment still in power, cannot even be conmated as extraordinary” revenues for the same year, the bulk of which was to come from state

jectured. With all her pre-Bolskevik governloans, we find Russia's estimated revenues for

ment loans repudiated by this reckless régime the first year of the World War mounting up

in 1918, and with her unprecedented issues of to nearly 3,912,000,000 rubles. Counting the

unsecured paper money, Russia's financial population of the empire as 180,000,000 in 1915

credit at home and abroad has already reached (a conservative estimate), these vast revenues

the lowest ebb in her whole precarious history. came to about 21% rubles per capita.

DAVID A. MODELL, At least 20 items made up the ordinary)

Authority on Russian Subjects. and "extraordinary expenditures of the Rus

14. RAILWAYS, HIGHWAYS AND sian government in its imperial days. The WATERWAYS. Russia's

size former included all the fixed or regular ex

makes her means of transportation and compenses connected with the various ministries;

munication even more essential than these vital the latter, naturally, most of the irregular or factors generally are in smaller countries. Yet, variable disbursements of the government. The neither her railroads nor her waterways have cost of running Russia's 11 ministries, which

been developed or utilized to anything like their constituted the bulk of her ordinary expend- maximum efficiency, both lagging behind Rusitures, was estimated for 1915 as follows (in sia's industrial and commercial progress. rubles and round numbers): Ministry of Ways of Communication, 752,000,000; Ministry of

This is especially true of the Russian railWar, 590,000,000; Ministry of Finance, 357,000,

road system, which, while it is the second largest

in the world in point of trackage, falls far beC00; Ministry of the Interior, 203,000,000; Min

hind those of England, Germany and the United istry of Marine, 199,000,000; Ministry of Edu- States in actual efficiency. The growth and cation, 159,000,000; Ministry of Agriculture, development of Russia's railroads has becn 143,000,000; Ministry of Justice, 101,000,000; very rapid, however. Beginning in the sixties Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 57,430,- of the last century, when but 264 miles of 000; Ministry of the Imperial Court, 16,300,- tracks were constructed annually, and passing 000; and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7,700,- through a period of tremendous development 000. The other ordinary expenditures for between 1895-99, when the annual increase of that year included 440,000,000 rubles in pay- lines averaged 1,915 miles, the development of ment of state debts, 52,500,000 rubles to the Russian railroads reached its highest point just Holy Synod, 8,830,000 rubles for the higher when the Great War broke out -- and, natugovernment institutions (Imperial Council, the rally, interrupted it

. Conflicting figures are Duma, etc.), and 27,000,000 rubles in miscel- given for the total mileage of Russian raillancous expenses.

roads immediately before the World War. VOL. 24 - 4




No very

In 1917, according to the American Railway railway commission, which has already increased Commission in Russia, the total mileage of the efficiency of Russian railroads to a very all railroads in European and Asiatic Russia considerable extent. (exclusive of Finland) approximated 43,300. Russia's internal waterways, covering so Only about 25 per cent of these railroads were large a part of two continents, are naturally the then double-tracked. Before the Russian Revo- longest in the world. The country is interlution (q.v.) about two-thirds of Russia's vast sected by numerous rivers, lakes and canals railroads belonged to the government, the rest which afford direct water communication bebeing owned by private companies. Despite tween the Caspian Sea and the Arctic Ocean, their poor equipment and inefficient operation, between the former and the Baltic and between Russian railroads carry enormous numbers of the Baltic and the Black Sea. Exclusive of passengers and mountains of freight.

Finland, European and Asiatic Russia has about recent statistics are available here, but in 1914 250,000 miles of waterways. But, owing to the a total of about 250,000,000 passengers and lowlands through which they pass, Russian 235,000,000 tons of freight were transported by rivers are generally not very deep. Hence only Russian railways. What the figures were dur- about half their mileage — not more than 132,ing the war, with its unprecedented movements 000 miles, at any rate – represents really naviof men and supplies, can only be conjectured gable waters, the rest being navigable by rafts at present.

and small sailing vessels. Moreover, most of The principal Russian railroad lines connect Russia's internal waterways are practically icethe outlying provinces of central, southern bound in winter and some are greatly affected and western Russia one with another and with by drought in summer, especially in their the chief Baltic, White Sea and Black Sea southern reaches. Yet, despite these handicaps, ports. Moscow, the centre of Russia's greatest about one-third of Russia's immense freight is industrial region, is naturally the most import- transported by water, which still affords by far ant Russian railroad

centre. Next comes the cheapest means of communication. And the Petrograd, the actual commercial centre of proportion of waterway to railway transportaRussia, which is linked with the older Rus- tion in Russia is bound to increase rather than sian capital by the Nicholas Railroad. Nijni- diminish as time goes on, judging from the Novgorod, the leading commercial city on the vast and numerous waterway improvements Volga, ranks third as a railroad centre. Con- projected by the Executive Committee on nected with Moscow by the Nizhni-Novgorod Water Transportation during the Great War. Railroad, it is a great distributing point for There are six large river systems in the much of the grain that comes from such agri- former Russian Empire - two in Europe and cultural trading centres as Kazan, Riazan, four in Asia and these, with their numerous Samara and Saratov. Another railroad, the connecting canals, make up a network of waterMoscow-Kursk, connects Moscow with the ways unsurpassed anywhere else in the world. densely populated governments of central and Of the two European systems, that of the southern Russia; and still another, the Moscow- Volga River is by far the larger. It lies in Briansk, connects it with the city of Kiev, the the East and includes the waters of the Neva fourth largest city of Russia. The Riga-Orlov Basin as well as those of the northern Dvina, Railroad runs directly to the port of Riga, on which empties into the White Sea. The other the Baltic, and connects that important city European Russian river system is that of the with those of four or five adjacent governments, Dnieper, which flows south into the Black Sea. finally making a junction near Dvinsk with the

This is the Western system and includes, Warsaw Railroad. The Yelets and the Griaze- besides the Dnieper Basin itself, the basins of Tsaritsin lines help to connect the fertile black- the Western Dvina, the Nieman and the Vistula, soil region of southern Russia with the western which link together the Black Sea with the part of the country. The Petrograd-Warsaw Baltic. The two systems, together, afford a and the Moscow-Brest lines connect Petrograd continuous water route between points so disand Moscow with Poland and the Austrio- tant as the city of Astrakhan, on the Caspian Prussian frontier. Then there is, of course, the Sea, and Petrograd, on the Gulf of Finland, great Trans-Siberian Railroad (q.v.), the long- 2,540 miles apart. est continuous railway in the world, which The principal river systems in Asiatic Rusconnects such remote cities as Petrograd and sia are those of the Ob River, the Yenesey, the Vladivostok, 5,435 miles apart by rail, which is Lena and the Amur. The first is the largest one and three-fourths times the distance from and most important, comprising all the rivers New York to San Francisco by the shortest of the West Siberian plain north of the Rusroute. This enormous railroad, costing over sian Atai and northern Mongolia, with at least $172,525,000 in initial outlay and taking nearly 7,000 miles of navigable waters. The Yenesey 12 years to build --it is being extended by system, second in size, drains about 870,000 branch lines and made more efficient by double- square miles of Siberian territory and has a tracking all the time - is double-tracked from total of 4,500 miles of navigable waters. The Omsk to Vladivostok, a distance of 3,566 miles, Lena River system comprises over 5,000 miles which exceeds, the distance across the whole of navigable waters and drains the northern American continent. The Trans-Siberian Rail- Irkutsk region as well as the greater part of road has given a great impetus to commerce northeastern Siberia, an area exceeding 1,000,and agriculture in both European and Asiatic 000 square miles. Finally, the Amur system, Russia and has greatly promoted Siberian immi- which drains the Russian Far East, affords gration. In the Great War, when it was natu- another 5,000 miles of navigable water routes. rally taxed to the utmost, its services were in- Together, all these vast waterways, connecting estimable. The much-needed lesson taught here and there with the Trans-Siberian RailRussia by the exigencies of that unprecedented road, have been one of the greatest promoters war is being improved by the above-mentioned of Siberian colonization and expansion. The RUSSIA – ARMY AND NAVY (15)


maintenance and control of Siberia's river systems, as well as of the large and deep Lake Baikal (a fresh water lake of unlimited possibilities), is vested in the Russian Department of Ways of Communication, which recommends and makes necessary improvements,

The future of Siberia undoubtedly depends quite as much upon her vast waterways as upon any other single factor, the great Trans-Siberian Railroad not excepted.

A country so predominantly agricultural as Russia must of necessity depend a great deal on wagon roads and highways for means of transportation and communication. While Russia's ordinary wagon roads are apt to be impassable in spring and fall, they afford very cheap transportation facilities the rest of the year, especially in winter, when sledging is almost universal. It is then that Russia's agricultural and other products can be transported most conveniently from the villages to the towns and railroad stations by millions of peasants whose time is all their own. There are about 75,000 miles of ordinary (unpaved) roads and over 15,000 miles of post (macadamized) highways in European Russia alone. The latter connect all the principal cities, thus linking together such important centres as Moscow, Petrograd, Warsaw, Kiey and Kharkov. The post highways, over which millions of passengers travel in winter and summer, were built by the tsars, but are kept in repairs by local authorities and the rural communities through which they pass.

There are at least six kinds of roads and highways in Asiatic Russia: (1) Main highways, (2) caravan roads, (3) local roads, (4) colonization roads, (5) by-roads and (6) commercial highways. Space does not permit a description of the character and function of each, except to add that the principal road in the first class (the famous Sibirsky-Tract) alone exceeds 4,000 miles in length, that the local roads (some 61 in number) have a total mileage of 16,000, and that there were about 6,600 miles of colonization roads in 1913. Most of these Siberian roads are of a rather primitive character, though examples of more modern highways are not unknown even in this undeveloped part of Russia.

David A. MODELL, Special Authority on Russian Subjects. 15. ARMY AND NAVY. At least three vital factors have combined in the past to make a large standing army essential to Russia's political integrity and imperial well-being: (1) Her vast territorial extent, which made three practically separate armies necessary; (2) her diverse and very numerous ethnic elements, which made racial revolts an ever-present danger; and (3) her peculiar geographical position, which necessitated a very considerable army to guard her extensive frontiers. Fortunately, Russia's enormous population, a population which has always enabled her to put more men under arms than any other nation in Europe or America, makes it comparatively easy to supply any number of soldiers needed in peace or war. Thus, while her standing army before the Great War probably did not exceed 1,700,000 trained men, Russia could always mobilize twice that number. In the World War she had no less than 12,000,000

men under arms, with perhaps as many millions more under training.

Like most other European countries, imperial Russia had universal and compulsory military service, which she first established by law in 1874. Theoretically, every able-bodied male between the ages of 21 and 44 was liable to conscription; but exceptions and exemptions were quite numerous. Finally, many of the non-Slavic races found in the Russian Empire

- such as the aborigines of Siberia, the inhabitants of Turkestan, the Caucasians, and the subjects of the grand duchy of Finland - being deemed undependable, were permanently exempted from military service. Such exemption, however, involved considerable exemption taxes in the case of the Finns and Turkestanians, at least. These and other ways, honest and dishonest, of evading military service in Russia made conscription there much less onerous than it is elsewhere in Europe.

The number of conscripts to be called annually was usually determined by the Imperial Senate in accordance with recommendations made by the Minister of War. Thus the quota of new recruits would vary from year to year. Immediately before the Great War about half a million men were drafted out of the 1,300,000 liable for military service; and on this basis had not the war intervened the number of recruits would have increased by about 150,000 annually for the ensuing year or two. The general demoralization following the Russian Revolution naturally wrought havoc with the Russian army, greatly depleting its ranks through wholesale desertions and undermining its morale through premature relaxation of discipline. With the conditions existing under the Bolshevik régime, several rival armies have long been operating in various parts of Russia. The largest and strongest of these would seem to be that of the Bolshevik government called the Red Guards, and composed largely of mercenary troops and German officers.

The Russian army in pre-revolutionary times had the usual four branches — infantry, cavalry, artillery and engineers — to which the Great War has added an indispensable fifth, the aviation branch. The infantry consisted of regulars, Cossacks, militia and what corresponded to the German Landsturm. Only the first of these divisions maintained its full strength in time of peace, while the Cossacks' ranks were normally kept at one-third their war strength. The conditions and length of service varied slightly before the World War, but were generally as follows: For the infantry and the artillery, , three years in the active army and 15 years with the first reserves; for the cavalry and other branches, four years in the active army and 14 years with the first reserves; and for all of them five years with the second reserves. This makes a total liability to military service of 23 years for these particular branches, while the Cossacks' liability is practically lifelong. The latter, after two years' training at home, entered the active district regiment of the first order at 21. After four years of active service there came four years' leave of absence, which meant service in regiments of the second order, with a month's military training every year. Then followed another four years of active service in regiments of the third order and five



years with the reserves, after which the Cossack, splendidly trained and well disciplined, belonged to the Landsturm division.

The term of military service would be reduced by five years for university graduates, who served but two years in the line and 16 with the reserves, and graduates of secondary schools, who served three years in the line and 15 with the reserves.

For military purposes imperial Russia was divided into 14 districts, each in charge of a district commander. In 1914 the Russian army had 37 army corps, each of which generally consisted of two infantry divisions, an engineer battalion and sometimes a division of cavalry. On a war footing an army corps had between 36,000 and 40,000 men. Two of the three separate armies maintained by Russia before the Great War were stationed in Europe. There were some 40,000 or 50,000 frontier guards permanently on the Austrian, German, Rumanian and other frontiers. Behind these guards, in the various military districts, were the regular army corps. The principal military hcadquarters in European Russia in time of peace were located at Saint Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, Kovno, Grodno, Vilna, Minsk, Odessa, Riga, Revel, Warsaw, Lodz, Kharkov, Smolensk, Vitebsk, Simferopol, Dorpat and Brest-Litovsk. The Caucasian army, consisting of at least four cavalry divisions, had its headquarters at Tiflis and Alexandropoi. There were, besides, considerable forces (some 150,000 troops) stationed in central Asia, while those normally in the Far East were by no means negligible. Military schools and academies were quite numerous in Russia before the Revolution and, naturally, were located near military headquarters.

Russia's navy has not attained such high rank among the navies of the world as her unlimited resources would seem to have made possible. But the Russians, it should be remembered, are not naturally a seafaring people, and shipbuilding is with them a comparatively recent art. It was Peter the Great (q.v.) who first organized the Russian navy as one of his pet ideas, but it never amounted to much until comparatively recent times. Its growth was so slow at first that only in the early part of the last century, did it attain third rank among the world's navies. Even this rank was lost after the Crimean War, and such relatively small ravies as the Turkish, Italian and German were in the middle of the 19th century easily surpassed Russia's naval strength. But late in that century (in 1884) a new naval program was begun in Russia which by 1895 again raised her navy to third rank. Such naval progress was not long sustained, however. In the RussianJapanese War Japan's more modern feet easily and decisively defeated Russia's squadron near Tsushima. Since that disastrous defeat Russian naval reform and expansion have gone on apace, though effective reorganization began only in 1911. The full naval program as then projected involved the construction of 24 new battleships, 12 battle cruisers, 24 lighter cruisers, 108 destroyers and torpedo boats and some 36 submarines. The entire program was

to be carried out by 1930, when the Russian navy would indeed have become very formidable. The Great War interrupted this huge naval program which, from present indications, will never be completed.

Before the war with Japan Russia maintained four separate naval squadrons - one each in the Pacific Ocean, the Baltic, the Caspian and the Black seas. Before the World War the entire Russian navy consisted of some 200 vessels of various types, with a total displacement of approximately 408,000 tons. These warships included seven battleships (five of the dreadnought type), seven battle cruisers, five armored cruisers, seven fast and other cruisers, 118 destroyers, 40 submarines and 15. torpedo boats. But these figures give no adequate idea of the nature and size of the Russian navy in the Great War, in the first years of which many important additions must have been made as vessel after vessel then building was completed. The actual increase from this source has never been tabulated. It could hardly have offset Russia's considerable naval losses during the war, which were greatly augmented by revolutionary conditions, especially under the Bolshevik régime. What the Germans did not sink or capture of Russia's navy --- and the Black Sea fleet nearly all fell into their hands — Bolshevik maladministration ruined or rendered impotent.

Before the revolution Russia had three principal navy yards at Petrograd — the Baltic works, the New Admiralty Yard and the Galerny Island Yard — one each at Kronstadt, Sevastopol, Vladivostok, Reval, Libau, and Helsingfors.

DAVID A. MODELL, Special Authority on Russian Subjects. 16. RUSSIA AND THE WORLD WAR. The immediate cause which brought Russia into the conflict was a declaration of war by Germany on 1 Aug. 1914, following an ultimatum requiring that Russia should demobilize within 12 hours. On being asked by the Russian Foreign Minister (M. Sazonov) whether the inevitable refusal of Russia to this curt summons meant war, the German Ambassador replied that Germany would be forced to mobilize if Russia refused. Up to this stage there were but two belligerents — Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and they had opened hostilities only two and a half days before. In reply to a message from President Wilson to the effect that the United States stood ready at any time to mediate between the warring powers, the German emperor on 10 Aug. 1914 handed Ambassador Gerard a personal letter to the President. This document was first made public on 5 Aug: 1917. In it the emperor stated that a general order of mobilization issued by the tsar on 31 July 1914 had rendered war inevitable. This theory was upheld on the German side for a considerable period of the war, for in his maiden speech to the Reichstag on 19 July 1917 the German Imperial Chancellor, Dr. Michaelis, stated that Germany was forced into the war <by Russia's secret mobilization, which was a great danger to Germany.” On 5 September of the same year he repeated the charge, saying it was now irrefutably established that it was not Germany who had chosen the time for the war, but a military party surrounding the tsar, which was under the influence of France and England.” Against this view may be set the statement by Prince Lichnowsky in his famous memorandum: "On 30. July, when Count Berchtold (Austrian foreign minister] wanted to give way, we (Germany), without Austria


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