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having been attacked, replied to Russia's mobilization by sending an ultimatum to Saint Petersburg, and on 31 July we declared war on the Russians, although the tsar had pledged his word that so long as negotiations continued not a man should march so that we deliberately destroyed the possibility of a peaceful settleit is not surprising that the whole civilized world outside Germany attributes to us the sole guilt for the World War." The oft-repeated question of "mobilization responsibility" - as to which state was the first to mobilize has been much canvassed. At noon on 31 July 1914 there was proclaimed throughout Germany a "state of danger of war" (Kriegsgefahrzustand), the preliminary step to mobilization. At 4 P.M., four hours later, the kaiser telegraphed to King George, ".

I

have just heard from the Chancellor that intelligence has just reached him that Nicholas, this evening, has ordered the mobilization of his entire army and fleet." It will be observed that there is a discrepancy of one day between the account of the kaiser and that of his Ambassador. An acute analysis of this subject may be found in 'Current History) (Vol. XIII, p. 496) from the pen of Dr. David Jayne Hill, former United States Ambassador to Germany. (See also ib., Vol. XII, pp. 473-475). Russian foreign relations with certain powers are treated under separate heads. See ALLIANCES; AUSTRIA-HUNGARY and the WAR; BALKAN League; BALKAN WARS; BERLIN CONGRESS; EASTERN QUESTION; PERSIA; RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS; TRIPLE ALLIANCE; TRIPLE ENTENTE; WAR, EUROPEAN: HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION and DIPLOMATIC HISTORY.

Throughout the period preceding the Crimean War the relations between Russia and Great Britain had been of a friendly nature; such controversies as arose from time to time were always amicably settled. That friendship dated back to the middle of the 16th century, when Ivan the Terrible concluded a commercial treaty with Queen Elizabeth and even aspired to win her hand. In 1806 Alexander I instructed his ambassador setting out for London that "Russia and England are the only powers in Europe which for many years to come cannot be jealous of one another or have conflicting interests." Two disturbing elements arose, however, that were destined entirely to change the course of European history- Russian expansion in central Asia and the Turkish Empire. In time Russian opinion veered round to the view that Great Britain was the natural and implacable enemy of the Russian nation and its vital interests, while in Great Britain there grew up a conviction that an attitude of jealousy, distrust and hostility was alone possible toward Russia. A dread of a Russian invasion of India seized the British imagination. This began about 1830, but already in Pitt's time England became alarmed at Russia's victories over the Turks and it was seriously proposed to send a fleet to assist the latter. It is immaterial at this date to revive the question of whether the so-called "Testament" of Peter the Great or of Catherine II provided for the acquisition by Russia of the Bosporus and Constantinople, but it may be asserted that the trend of Russian policy toward Turkey pointed in that direction. "The Turkish government

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is the enemy of the human race," wrote Prof. Spenser Wilkinson over 20 years ago; "it is a rule of bestial force, of corruption, of lies and of unrighteousness. The duty of Europe is to make an end of it, and to set up a civilized government in its place. But Europe has never been able to do this because the Powers are divided." Within these few words lies half the history of Europe during the 19th century. Discussing Turkey with the British Ambassador on 9 Feb. 1853, the tsar Nicholas I said, "we have on our hands a sick man, a very sick man. I tell you frankly it would be a very great misfortune if he should give us the slip some of these days, especially if it happened before all the necessary arrangements were made." Five days later he told the Ambassador that he would not allow England to gain a foothold in Constantinople, but would engage not to establish himself there, "that is, as a proprietor, I do not say as a guardian." He also hinted that he might be obliged by circumstances to Occupy Constantinople. The Crimean War quickly followed, in which Great Britain, France and Sardinia fought on the side of the Turks against Russia. Nearly 50 years later Lord Salisbury confessed that in this war Great Britain had "backed the wrong horse." At the close of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, England and Russia nearly came to blows again over Constantinople, but once more was the Turkish Empire saved from destruction. From 1863 dates the steady advance of Russia in central Asia; Afghanistan and Persia became zones of friction with England; in the Balkans, Russian aims clashed with those of Austria, while in the Far East, Japan looked askance at the Russian approach through Manchuria to the Sea of Japan. From 1872 to 1895 there were periodical wranglings between Russia and England over the boundaries of Afghanistan; the arrival of a Russian army at Merv in 1884 produced in England what the 8th Duke of Argyle facetiously described as "a violent attack of Mervousness." More than perhaps any other great European power, Russia followed a consistent foreign policy; with plodding perseverance she aimed at securing an icefree outlet to the sea, in the Far East and on the Persian Gulf. Her conquests in central Asia brought peace, order and security to that region; she abolished slave-raiding, constructed railways and introduced modern industrialism. While material progress was fostered, however, education was not attempted.

In 1888 France lent Russia 500,000,000 francs ($100,000,000), thus paving the way to the Dual Alliance. Democratic France allied herself with autocratic Russia chiefly because she feared a German attack. Year by year the indebtedness of Russia increased, until at length economists began to ask whether Russia was not paying the interest on her old loans with the principal of her new borrowings. Russia began to enjoy the security of the reckless debtor: she could always ask for more, because if more were refused France might lose all that she had embarked. After the accession of Tsar Nicholas II in 1894, the German emperor so successfully played upon the young tsar and the French Foreign Minister, M. Hanotaux, that Germany became a quasi-silent partner in the Dual Alliance. French diplomacy

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multiplied difficulties with England in Africa and Asia. The Franco-German-Russian combination directed its energies to isolate England. At the close of the China-Japanese War in 1895 the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki were dictated by the European triumvirate to the detriment of Japan, who was compelled to evacuate Port Arthur, taken from the Chinese. This proceeding drove Japan into the arms of England and to prepare for her revenge. The year 1898 stands out in bold relief as a momentous epoch in world history. The SpanishAmerican War was in progress; a European coalition against the United States loomed on the horizon; France was in the throes of a semi-civil war over the Dreyfus case; with England she stood on the verge of war over Fashoda; the Franco-Russian alliance was neutralized, even paralyzed; Italy and France were at daggers drawn; the United States annexed Hawaii; Russia took Port Arthur and Talienwan; England took Weihaiwei, and France obtained a 99 years' lease of the Bay of KuangChau-Wan. But perhaps the climax of that eventful year was the issue, in August, of the tsar's famous "Peace Rescript" to the world, calling for a general disarmament. France was infuriated; her dream of revanche was shattered. In the same year, too, Austria and Russia arrived at a Balkan agreement, while the kaiser landed in Palestine, dressed in the garb of a Crusader, and assigned to himself the protection of the Holy Places, which the Pope had refused him. At Damascus he declared himself to be "at all times" the friend of the 300,000,000 Mohammedans in the world.

For the time being Russia stood as dictator of the world's affairs, backed by France and Germany. The territorial scramble in China seemed to presage the break-up of the Celestial Empire. England stood isolated, helpless to intervene on behalf of the Armenians or to prevent the Greco-Turkish War. With the outbreak of the South African War in October 1899 the tripartite coalition—or at least Germany-made strenuous efforts to bring about active intervention, but both Russia and France drew back. At the time of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 Russia occupied Manchuria, promising to hand the territory back to China on 8 Oct. 1903. In 1902 came the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Russia failed to evacuate Manchuria on the stipulated time, and on 9 Feb. 1904 Japan commenced hostilities without a declaration of war. On the battlefields of Mukden, Japan wiped out her score of Shimonoseki with Russia; by the Treaty of Portsmouth, Russia relinquished Manchuria to China and made her leasehold rights on the Liao-tung Peninsula (which included Port Arthur), over to Japan. The Russian disaster changed the political situation and profoundly disturbed the balance of power, for one partner of the Dual Alliance was temporarily eliminated. Relations between Russia and England had been severely strained during the war over the North Sea incident, when the Baltic fleet had fired on British trawlers, believing them to be Japanese torpedo boats.

From 1898 onward a new under-current had been working under the troubled diplomatic waters. In that year M. Hanotaux had been replaced at the Quai d'Orsay by M. Théophile

Delcassé, to whom fell the task of settling the Fashoda incident with Great Britain. It was he who realized the peril of a conflict between those two countries and resolutely set himself to remove it. While Russia was being battered by the Japanese, M. Delcassé concluded (8 April 1904) the Anglo-French Agreement and established the Entente Cordiale. That move stunned Germany, for the incredible had happened. After the Japanese War, Russia seemed to have reached the limit of her borrowing facilities. The French banks with the governIment behind them refused to assume the sole responsibility for floating another Russian loan. When Lord Lansdowne left the Foreign Office in December 1905 he had already begun the negotiations which were to end in the AngloRussian Agreement of 1907. Sir Edward Grey pursued them and by the spring of 1906 the alliance was virtually concluded, though the convention was not signed till 31 Aug. 1907. In March 1906 a great Russian loan was floated in London and Paris- the first one in London since 1854. From this period, Russia drew liberally on British capital up to the European War. Thus were three quondam enemies brought into the same political orbit by an "understanding" against the Triple Alliance, though there was not, as in the case of the latter, any specific stipulations for mutual defense. Between Russia and England, Persia still remained the apple of discord. With Austria, Russia had once been on good terms. In the Revolution of 1848 it was Russian troops that had saved the throne and empire of Francis Joseph. Austria repaid this obligation by mobilizing on the Russian frontier during the Crimean War, thus contributing to Russia's defeat. For over a century the Dual Monarchy had opposed Russian ambitions on the Bosphorus and had directed covetous eyes toward Salonika. Russia, to her credit be it remembered, had been the chief instrument in liberating the Balkan States from Turkish rule. She had also constituted herself the protector of the Slavic Balkan nationalities. But Austria had greater interests in the peninsula. The populations were her next-door neighbors and she had millions of Slavs under her rule. Pan-Slavism constituted a real danger to the state. Russia was further away; only Rumania, neither a Slav nor strictly a Balkan state, touched her borders. Slav and Teuton seem born enemies; the evolution of the former is one of natural growth as opposed to that of forced development; he has never bartered his individuality for any preconceived higher cult, and it was just this Slav element within her gates that contributed most effectively to the collapse of Austria in 1918. Her traditional policy of suppressing rising nationalities necessitated the procedure of keeping the Balkan Slavs weak and divided among themselves and against themselves by promoting strife between them. This policy of mischief-making was prompted by self-preservation and directed against RusThe latter power was by no means guiltless of intrigue. She worked for the elimination of the Turk from Europe and the strengthening of Serbia. Austria and Germany were interested in holding together the Turkish Empire, upon the assistance of which they reckoned in a war with Russia. Austria had repeatedly

sia.

threatened Serbia and Montenegro with war, in the full knowledge that Russia would immediately intervene by force. As the Russian Foreign Minister informed the British Ambassador on 25 July 1914, Austria's bellicose attitude toward Serbia "was in reality directed against Russia. She aims at overthrowing the present status quo in the Balkans and establishing her hegemony there.»

Russian relations with Germany had been more intimate than with any other country, physically, if not spiritually. Since the days of the early Muscovite tsårs Russia had been overrun with German officials, originally invited to introduce Western methods. They supplanted the natives in administrative positions and were hated by the people over whom they ruled. The large number of German names borne by Russians to-day bear witness to this. Frequent intermarriage between the nobility of the two countries brought it about that Russian society, from the court downward to the bureaucracy, was permeated with German ideas and influence. But while the Germans regarded Russia with contempt as an inferior race, they feared her on account of her strength in man-power. Frederick the Great had suggested the partition of Poland between Russia, Prussia and Austria; when that was accomplished, all three were equally interested in preserving their Polish territory, thus forming a tacit union between them. From that period every revolt in western Europe was represented to Russia as a menace to all sovereigns, ever since the first French Revolution. The same policy was energetically pursued by Bismarck. Russia had been largely instrumental in delivering Prussia from Napoleon I, and had again come to the aid of Prussia in 1870 by threatening Austria with immediate war if she came to the aid of France. But for this, the Franco-German War might have been avoided. At the Berlin Congress in 1878 Bismarck stood against Russia, and when he had formed the alliance with Austria against Russia and France, he concluded another pact- the "re-insurance treaty with Russia against Austria. Bismarck is credited with having pushed Russia into war with Turkey in 1877, and William II induced her to waste her strength against Japan in 1904.

The agreement with England in 1907 completed the Triple Entente, the bond that held solidly together despite outside efforts to shake it. Russia remained firmly with her allies through a succession of shocks the BosniaHerzegovina crisis of 1908, Agadir, the Balkan wars and, finally, into the Great War. With her inexhaustible man-power and her vast natural resources, Russia was indeed an invaluable ally, but the weak points in her armor were soon to be disclosed. She had entered the war heavily handicapped. Her factories and transport services were deficient, and could neither furnish nor distribute the supplies required by the army and the civil population; it was only by a reckless sacrifice of life that she won her early victories. Soon, owing to the shortage of shells, rifles and munitions, the army was left almost defenseless before the enemy, and many of the troops had to fight with sticks and stones. As disaster succeeded disaster in the field the undoubted

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enthusiasm with which the nation had responded to the call to arms gradually cooled; enemy agents sowing dissension completed the breakdown of Russia.

So-called "Willy-Nicky" telegrams which had passed between the German emperor and the tsar in 1904-07 (published in the New York Herald Aug.-Sept. 1917), showed that the kaiser had persuaded the tsar in 1905 to participate in a coalition against England. These negotiations, however, antedate the AngloRussian Agreement. The secret treaty between the two monarchs was shortly after torn up by Count Witte. The Allied diplomats who were personally acquainted with the tsar have never doubted his loyalty. Russia's tremendous military efforts during the first two years of the war literally saved the Allied cause.

HENRI KLEIN, Editorial Staff of The Americana. DIPLOMATIC 17. RUSSIA, RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH. The United States and Russia, with their many striking examples of similarities and contrasts, have had between them some curious and interesting sympathies but no important political relations. Their relations, although not intimate, have usually been friendly and were especially so from 1861 to 1867.

In the period of the Revolution, the ruling empress, Catherine II, with all her professions of neutrality, showed no acts of sympathy for the revolting English colonists, although several Russian Poles allied themselves with the American cause.

The traditional friendship between them originated in various acts of Alexander I who succeeded to the Russian throne in March 1801. President Jefferson, who since 1786 had been interested in Pacific trade, in 1803 (in connection with the Lewis and Clark expedition) suggested plans for commercial communication between the United States and Asia via the Northwest Coast. In November 1803, although no treaty had been arranged with Russia, he sent a consul to Saint Petersburg. The Russian Foreign Minister in May 1808 requested the negotiation of a treaty regulating trade with Alaska which American vessels had visited for trading purposes since the beginning of American nationality. He complained of American clandestine trade in arms and ammunition with the Indians, and soon thereafter he suggested a southern boundary limit which the United States rejected because it was far south of 55 degrees which the emperor had designated as the southern boundary in 1799. In June 1808, Russia appointed Daschkoff as consul-general at Philadelphia and also chargé-d'affaires at Washington where he presented his credentials on 11 July 1809. At the same time Jefferson secretly sent William Short on a special mission to request Russia to protect American commerce against aggression of the European belligerents, but after reaching Paris he waited for additional instructions and finally returned without going to Russia, his appointment having been rejected by the Senate just at the close of Jefferson's administration.

John Quincy Adams who was commissioned Minister Plenipotentiary to Russia on 27 June 1809 remained in Saint Petersburg until April

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RUSSIA

1814, when he took his leave. Although there had been difficulty in getting admission to Russian ports and in determining the limits of the Russian settlements, he found a willingness to adjust all causes of friction. The emperor took a lively interest in American affairs- showing an "obstinate attachment" of which there were frequent evidences in the decade that followed. In the War of 1812, doubtless inspired chiefly by desire to strengthen Great Britain in contest against Napoleon rather than by friendship for the United States, he offered mediation to secure termination of hostilities in a war which was for the United States inglorious. Later he was selected to arbitrate one of the difficulties resulting from the war and the Treaty of Ghent, and in 1822 decided that Americans were entitled to an indemnity, the amount of which was fixed at $1,204,960 by a mixed commission.

By 1817 the importance of establishing a defined southern limit to Russian settlement in America was considered. In 1816 Russian traders from Alaska established a fort at Bodega Bay in what is now California, north of San Francisco, and another at Atooi in the Sandwich Islands. In 1821 the tsar by ukase gave to a Russian company exclusive right to territory as far south as 51 degrees and threatened to make the northern Pacific a mare clausum by excluding foreigners from the seas within 100 miles from the coast.

Against this Russian policy the United States co-operated with Great British in remonstrance, and President Monroe incorporated a manifesto in his famous declaratory announcement of 2 Dec. 1823. Finally, Russia, refusing the bribe of California which Mexico had offered for a recognition of Mexican independence, yielded to the combined protest of the United States and Great Britain, and on 17 April 1824 concluded her treaty with the United States fixing the parallel of 54° 40′ as the southern boundary of Russia and also providing for freedom of trade for 10 years and granting the right to fish along the coasts of Russian America, except in the rivers and harbors; but, after 10 years, believing that the privilege had been abused, she refused to renew the agreement for allowing either fishing or trading.

In the meantime Russia continued to maintain a spirit of apparent goodwill toward the United States, co-operating with her in regard to Spanish American affairs, taking an interest in a proposed arbitration between the United States and England, and assisting the United States in arranging contemplated negotiations with Turkey.

In 1832 the United States negotiated with Russia a treaty providing for reciprocal liberty of commerce and navigation and also reciprocal liberty of sojourn and residence in order to attend to their affairs and with the same security and protection as the natives.

After 1835, although the Van Buren administration in 1839 complained of the Russian pretension to exclusive dominion on the northwest coast and a year later exhibited some anxiety in regard to a lease of the Russian American dominions by the Hudson's Bay Company, the continuation of good feeling was shown by the continued expression by the Russian government of a friendly interest in American relations with Great Britain just be

fore the negotiation of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty.

Although connection between the United States and Russia was slight they continued to remain on good terms and on several occasions before 1861 acted in harmony in the Far East where both secured advantages from English and French victories which opened China to intercourse with the commercial powers. American relations with Russia at once became more important following the extension of the American boundaries to the Pacific in which consequent increase of American interests invited changes and enlargements of policy. Realizing this, Secretary Clayton in 1850 invited Russia to accede to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and Secretary Webster in 1851 declared to Russia the policy which the United States was disposed to pursue in regard to the Sandwich Islands. In 1854, and throughout the Crimean War, certain influential American newspapers openly expressed sympathy for Russja. On 22 July 1854, Secretary Marcy negotiated with Russia a convention on rights of neutrals. At the same time, Russia was extending to the United States facilities in negotiating a commercial treaty with Persia.

The diplomatic correspondence indicates a good American understanding with Russia from the close of the Crimean War to the opening of the Civil War. The Russian government agreed to Marcy's doctrine as to the Declaration of Paris and was ready to take the initiative in the effort to extend the principles over Europe. There was a desire for increase of intercourse between the two countries. Early in 1858 Stoeckl, the Russian chargé-d'affaires at Washington, was raised to the rank of minister plenipotentiary, and in 1858-60 there was conference and friendly co-operation as to joint interests in China and the opening of the Amoor to free trade. It was seen that the friendly relations between the two countries would favor the United States much in the development of the Pacific and Eastern trade, which would increase with the growth of the Frazer River settlement and extension of a railway to the Pacific. In December 1859, Russia was sounded on negotiations for the cession of Alaska for $5,000,000 which the Russian government regarded as inadequate but as meriting deliberation.

The continuous growth of Russo-Amerian cordiality after the opening of the War of Secession was significant. In 1861 the two governments agreed to co-operate in establishing cable connections between Saint Petersburg and San Francisco by way of Bering Sea and Siberia. Throughout the war which threatened the integrity and strength of the American Union, Russia remained friendly to the government at Washington. In 1862 she refused to join in Louis Napoleon's proposal of mediation or intervention in the American War; and, in 1863, when a revolt in Poland caused apprehension of an Anglo-French diplomatic intervention there as well as in America, she demonstrated her goodwill toward the American government by sending a fleet on a friendly visit to American waters causing various rumors and suggestions of a possible Russo-American alliance. In 1866 the American Congress recognized the friendship of this international amenity by sending Gustavis V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the

Navy, with a formidable vessel of the navy on a special mission to Saint Petersburg to congratulate Emperor Alexander II on his escape from an attempted assassination. In return for this mission which was received with imposing ceremonies, Russia (a year later) planned to send the Grand Duke Alexis on a visit to America.

A fitting climax to this strange paradoxical friendship appeared in the negotiations resulting in a treaty of 1867 for the transfer of Alaska which, although it had been suggested as early as 1845 and contemplated again in 1854 and in 1859, surprised the diplomats of the Old World.

Although the absence of conflicting interests after the transfer of Alaska seemed a guarantee against serious dispute new sources of controversy arose, first, in connection with AngloAmerican negotiations for adjustment of serious questions, and later, from reactionary Russian policy after the death of the liberal Emperor Alexander II in 1881.

Near the close of 1870 when a series of events contributed to hasten the American negotiations with Great Britain for the adjustment of the Alabama claims, Constantin Catacazy, the Russian Minister who since his arrival in 1869 had interfered in questions not appropriately connected with his legation, suggested to Fish that the condition of European affairs indicated that it was an opportune time to press for an immediate settlement which he expected to result in the American annexation of Canada, but Secretary Fish proposed to the British Minister Thornton a basis of settlement which omitted any mention of Canada and resulted in the famous Treaty of 1871 for the peaceful settlement of Anglo-American difficulties doubtless much to the surprise of Russia. Catacazy continued to use methods at variance with diplomatic practice to defer or to prevent a peaceful adjustment with England. He did not hesitate to use the newspapers to influence the public on questions pending before the government. His continued methods of interference to prevent the successful execution of the provisions of the treaty whose negotiation he had unsuccessfully attempted to prejudice and defeat made him intolerable and finally induced the American government (in July 1871) to suggest his recall and later impatiently to urge it, notwithstanding the "intimate ties of amity between the two governments. Secretary Fish acceded to a postponement of the recall only because Russia found his removal inconvenient and impracticable until after a prearranged visit of the Grand Duke Alexis.

Although after the close of the period of the "entente cordiale" there appeared evidence of continued friendship - such as resolutions unanimously adopted by the United States Senate in March 1881 denouncing the assassination of Emperor Alexander II and extending condolence, and the promotion of popular sympathy by American shipments of food to relieve the famine sufferers of Russia in 1892- the chief subjects of correspondence in the last quarter of the 19th century were sources of friction and irritation.

An extradition treaty signed on 28 March 1887 met strong opposition in the United States from those who urged various objections against treating Russia with the same considera

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tion as countries such as Great Britain or Switzerland, but after six years of delay its ratification was advised by the Senate (February 1893) and it was proclaimed by the President in June 1893. In 1894 an agreement for a modus vivendi in relation to seal fisheries was concluded. In September 1900, by exchange of notes, a claims protocol submitted to arbitration certain differences relating to American claims.

After 1890 earlier friendly relations gradually changed and after 1898 became increasingly unsatisfactory by the aggressiveness of Russian diplomacy and by repressive measures of Russian internal administration. Americans condemned the harshness of the Siberian exile system, published to the world by articles of George Kennan in 1888-89, and the increasingly reactionary spirit of government authorities shown in severe treatment of Poles and Jews --many of whom emigrated to the United States in increasing numbers, destitute and with their tales of woe to spread a hatred of the land from which they had fled. In 1903, following the horrible massacre of Kishiney which was believed to have been instigated by government authorities, the Washington government brought the subject into publicity by an unusual and unsuccessful inquiry whether the Russian government would receive a petition from American Jews. In 1904 President Roosevelt expressed the American nation's condemnation of the outrage at Kishinev.

Russian aggressiveness in diplomacy became a larger source of danger. Germany and Russia, who in 1895 were foremost in intervening to deny to Japan the legitimate fruits of her victory over China against the latter's exclusive policy, in 1897 seized strategic positions in China which, together with demands for vast concessions, threatened the complete exclusion of the United States. In the SpanishAmerican War, Russia favored Spain and participated in a movement to make a European question of Cuba.

Thus in connection with the revolution in international relations after 1898 a wider divergence of Russo-American interests resulted from events in the Far East. The threatened disintegration of China induced the American government to propose (6 Sept. 1899) a policy of "open door," largely directed against the exclusive trade policies of Russia in Manchuria where the recently constructed trans-Siberian Railway gave her special advantages. Later (1900) the American government presented a courteous reminder of Russia's promise to evacuate Manchuria whose occupation appeared to menace American trade and manufacturing interests. A continuation of the controversy was a sequel of the peace-making in China following the Boxer troubles.

In the Russo-Japanese War, American public opinion favored Japan to a high point of enthusiasm, causing considerable astonishment and anger to many conservative Russians, but at the close of the war bitter feelings were softened by President Roosevelt's successful initiation in facilitating peaceful negotiations resulting in the Treaty of Portsmouth and by later American sympathy for reforms in Russia.

Although Russia showed gratitude for the peace, her subsequent acts in violating the open door principle in Manchuria resulted in a di