And yet this same correspondent, who has surrendered his bonds, taken his new certificates of stock, and holds an interest in the Wabash and Erie Canal by actual conveyance from the State, pretends that the State is legally and morally bound to pay, and that she should make immediate arrangements to pay, the entire amount of the surrendered bonds!Any man of ordinary sagacity can see, if this were done, in what condition the State would be placed;-as any man can also see that it is both absurd and impudent to ask it. I have said already that the Wabash and Erie Canal was taken in consideration of half the debt, or of $5,500,000. The annual interest upon this sum is $275,000, at five per cent. If the Canal yield annually $500,000 from tolls and water rents, as estimated by the bond-holders and their agent, this entire interest will be paid, and a surplus of $225,000 annually pass into the pockets of the bond-holders-part of which your correspondent will get, in proportion to the amount of his surrendered bonds. This $225,000 will go towards the payment of the principal of the cancelled debt. If this amount shall not be increased by the general improvement of the country-and it may be reasonably anticipated that it will be-the annual product of $225,000 will yield an aggregate sum, in twenty-four years, sufficient to discharge every dollar of these surrendered bonds. At this time, or at any other time, when the debt is paid, the canal will revert to the State, and again become her property. The State has not only thus made provision for the payment of these surrendered bonds, but has issued new certificates of stock for the arrearages of interest on them, which was due on the 1st January, 1847, amounting to $3,326,940. This amount has to be paid as the other new certificates, and will be paid in good faith, as part of the uncancelled debt. So that, it will be seen that no other part of the debt than the $5,500,000 of surrendered bonds depends upon the Canal. When that amount is paid, as I have shown it may be, and the new certificates of stock are discharged, the whole debt will be paid. This statement of the matter shows the fact to be as it is known to be by those understanding the arrangement, that the Canal is to be looked to for nothing beyond the principal of the surrendered bonds; and that this principal will be, at some time or other, fully discharged. If the twenty-four years, as estimated by me, are not sufficient for this purpose, the Canal may be held still longer-even for an indefinite period. It does not revert to the State until the debt is paid. Can any body object that it shall do so, when this event occurs? Such objection might be expected from your correspondent, but, I apprehend, it will not be made by any body else. Your correspondent says he has surrendered his bonds under protest, and calls upon all those who are similarly situated, to unite with him in demanding of the State the payment of the surrendered bonds. He threatens to continue his "petition" until his object is fully accomplished. To this I have nothing to say. So far as I am individually concerned, I leave it to him and the Legislature. He is right in supposing that he has the Constitutional privilege of petitioning that body. I have no idea that the Legislature will deny him this privilege. But if he will permit me to do so, I will advise him, that he employ in his contemplat ed memorial, more courteous and truthful language than is found in the article in your paper. The author of a charge, so false and unmerited as is that of repudiation against the State of Indiana, cannot expect to be very patiently heard by those whose credit he desires to impair, and whose reputation he is seeking to destroy by his malignant calumny and defamation. I do not propose to argue with him the constitutional question he has raised. I cannot, however, refrain from remarking, that he will be likely to find a good deal of difficulty in persuading any body to believe that his acceptance of his new stock, with a perfect knowledge of the conditions of the law, together with the interest in the Canal which he now holds, does not amount to a full and entire waiver of any right he may have had under the old bonds. As I have learned the law, a contract is not impaired by a change of its terms, when both parties consent to the change-it must be changed or otherwise affected against the consent of the injured party. If he shall succeed in establishing a principle different from this, he will show himself to be possessed of more skill as a lawyer, than he has so far shown of candor as a man; and will entitle himself to rank amongst those who, while they complain of the bad faith of others, are content to enjoy the wages of their own. er. I could not, in justice to the people of Indiana, make this article shortI hope you will not consider it too long for publication. Very respectfully, &c., INDIANA PUBLIC DEBT. R. W. THOMPSON. From the New York Journal of Commerce, Aug 9, 1848. To the Editors of the Journal of Commerce: Gentlemen:-I observe in your paper of the 1st inst., a piece headed "PUBLIC DEBT OF INDIANA," signed "R. W. Thompson," who is, I be-lieve, an Hon. member of Congress. I will not follow the bad example of the Hon. member of Congress, in calling hard names, which he ap-plies very freely to the "Subscribers under protest to the $800,000 loan." Ugly names never yet convinced a man that he was wrong. It seems to me the honorable member is fortunate in quoting from. memory; otherwise he could not have asserted that Indiana had repudiated no part of her debt. It may go by some other name in the West. If the calculations herewith submitted, do not show that she does not pay one-half of her debt, I do not know the meaning of words and figures: If we take for granted that the Canal will ever pay the moiety of the debt saddled upon it by the State, (of which there is great doubt,) there will be still a clever loss of $818 and upwards, on every five bonds of £225 sterling each, up to 1853. And after 1853 a clever loss of 2 per cent. per annum on $990, from 1853 to the period the debt is paid. The loss, taking it altogether, is full twenty per cent. on the original bonds. Nor is this the worst feature in the transaction. The Legislature in passing the "Act to provide for the funded debt of the State of Indiana, and for the completion, &c., of the Canal," uses, as it were in mockery, the following terms:-"And whereas there is reason to believe that the plan embraced in the following provisions is entirely within the means of the State successfully to accomplish,-that it will be acceptable to our creditors,-honorable to the people represented by the general assembly," &c. It is also declared by the Legislature of said State, that in no wise shall those holding the bonds of the State, and who refuse to surrender them and come in under the provisions of the Act of the Assembly, ever receive either principal or interest on any of the internal improvement bonds. I understand it has also been recommended by the agent of the State in New York, that money be furnished to him by the State to enable him to buy up the bonds at the market price. I do not vouch for this rumor. With this statement, I leave it with the public to draw their own conclusions. Far better for the State of Indiana to return to the orignial debt, and comply literally with her pledged faith and honor. August 5, 1848. A BOND-HOLder. Statement of five Indiana Bonds, of the kind made payable in London : Five Bonds, of £225 sterling each, is Interest from 1st Jan., 1841, to 1st Jan., 1853, at 5 per For which the State of Indiana gives in exchange her own bonds, bearing 4 per cent. interest from 1st Jan., 1847, to 1st Jan., 1855, Interest on this sum from 1st. Jan., 1847, to 1st. Jan. 1853, at 4 per cent., Also her bonds paying no interest until after the 1st Jan., 1853, and then only 2 per cent., Also bonds payable only from the Canal, if the revenues of it ever pay, Interest thereon, if ever paid by said revenues, from 1st £1,125,00 0 719,15 0 1,843,15 @ 139,10 0 £1,983,05 0 $2,500 00 600 00 900 00 2,500 00 750 00 750 00 $8,000 00 Actual loss up to 1853, $818,44 on each five bonds; to which must be added the loss of 2 per cent. per annum on $900, from 1853 to the period of redemption, and also the loss of the exchange on the interest of sterling bonds from 1853 to the period of redemption in 1870 LEGAL MISCELLANY. DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA. Banks. CASE lies by the assignee of bank stock, for a refusal by the bank to permit the shares to be transferred to him on the books of the bank. Presbyterian Congregation v. Carlisle Bank, 5 Barr's Supreme Court. Reports, 345. W. being the owner of forty shares of bank stock, bequeathed them to his four sons. During the minority of one of the legatees, the bank with notice of the will, permitted the transfer of thirty shares of the stock, by the consent of all the legatees, to a stranger. Under the act of 1824, the bank cannot refuse to permit a transfer of the ten remaining shares, on the ground that a debt is due by two of the sons, who were f full age when a tranfer of the thirty shares was permitted.—Ibid. Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes. Drawer, after payment and delivery up, competent to show failure of consideration in action by his principal to recover back money paid thereon. Gilpin v. Howell, 5 Barr, p. 41. An endorsement of a promissory note procured by a principal, and given to his surety in a former transaction, on demand made for a change of his liability, entitles such surety to sue the endorser. Mercer v. Lancaster, Ibid 160. Evidence of the demand for such change in the liability of the surety which led to the execution and delivery of the new note, is proper as part of the res gestæ, to show the consideration of the note. Ibid. Notice of dishonor addressed to an endorser at the post office at which he habitually receives communications by mail, is sufficient, though such office be not the nearest to his place of abode. Ibid. The question of due diligence in seeking to give due notice of the dishonor of a note is for the court, the facts being undisputed. Haly v. Brown, Ibid, 178. A notice deposited in the Philadelphia post office addressed to an endorser generally, is insufficient when he resides in Roxborough, and the nearest post office, at which he is accustomed to receive letters, is at Manayunk. Ibid. To excuse a want of notice by reason of ignorance of an endorser's residence, such ignorance, and due diligence to discover it, must be shown on the part of the owner of the note deposited for collection, as well as of the notary and bank. Ibid. Sending a notice for an endorser to his subsequent endorsee, is equivalent to an inquiry of the endorsee by the notary for the residence of the endorser, and it is the duty of the endorsee to use due vigilance in forwarding the notice to his endorser. Ibid. DECISIONS IN ALABAMA. Endorsement. It is not necessary to fill up a blank endorsement by inserting the plaintiff's name, although the declaration describes him as an endorsee. Lawyer's Adm'r. v. Patterson. Smede's Alabama Supreme Court Reports, Vol. XI. p. 523. Where a note loses its assignable quality by a judgment having been recovered thereon against one of the makers, in the name of the assignee, the insertion of the name of another person in the endorsement of the payee which was previously blank, is a nugatory act, and the name thus inserted may be stricken out at the trial of a suit brought by the assignee against another maker. Ibid 523. The act of 1837, which inhibits the assignment of a promissory note by delivery merely, so as to permit the assignee to maintain an action thereon as the bearer, cannot be extended by construction to blank endorsements, or as to an endorsement which directs the contents to be paid to the bearer, without indicating him by name. Ibid 524. In order to pass the legal interest in a promissory note to a third person, and to invest him with a right of action in his own name, the transfer must be made by indorsement; and the indorsement of a receipt given by an attorney at law for a note placed in his hands for collection, will not pass to the assignee the legal title to the note, although the attorney, by an indorsement on the receipt, promised to pay to him the proceeds when collected and such an assignment does not impose upon the assignee the necessity of pursuing the same steps as are necessary to charge an indorser. Gookin v. Richardson, Ibid 889. Interest. When a promissory note is dated at "Macon," and "payable at either of the banks in Macon," it cannot in the absence of an allegation or proof, be intended that "Macon" is in another State, so as to devolve upon the plaintiff the necessity of proving the rate of interest abroad; especially as there is a county, and perhaps several villages, called "Macon" in Alabama, though there is no incorporated bank in either. Smith v. Robinson, Ibid 270. An administrator is chargeable with interest, from the time money of the estate comes to his hands, unless he makes oath that he has not used the funds, and if he does, it may be controverted, and an issue made to try the fact. Parker and Wife v. McGaha, Adm'r. Ibid 521. Notice. In a summary proceeding by the bank against its debtor, the notice alleged that the drawer and indorser were indebted to the plaintiff by a bill of exchange, purchased under the first section of the act of 1843, and informed them that a motion would be made against them for the amount of money due and unpaid on the bill, together with the interest and damages at the rate of thirty per cent. which shall have lawfully accrued thereon. The damages prescribed by the statute on one description of bill to which it referred was thirty, and another five per cent. Held, that |