as the plaintiff upon proof of default and notice might recover at least five per cent. damages, the notice was not bad on demurrer. Riggs et al. v. The Bunk of the State. Ibid 183. The notice which the law requires to be given in summary proceedings, is sufficient, if it describes the debt upon which the motion is to be made with reasonable certainty. Colgin v. The State Bank. Ibid 222. When land is conveyed by a deed which is not registered, but the purchaser enters and holds under the deed for several years, after which a stranger enters on the possession, and holds without any connection with the title, these facts are sufficient notice to prevent a lien from attaching to the land by a judgment obtained against the vender of the land six years after his sale and conveyance, and a purchaser under the judgment obtains no title, being charged with notice by the outstanding possession, existing at the time of his purchase. Powell v. Allred. Ibid 318. Usury. A contract by which the use of slaves is allowed as a compensation for the interest of money, is not on its face usurous, but will be so, if intended as a shift, or device, to obtain unlawful interest. Wright v. McAlexander, Ibid 236. Such a contract cannot afterwards be converted into a mortgage by the borrower, so as to require the lender to account for the hire of the slaves, if that exceeds the legal rate of interest. Ibid 236. Bank Directors. In a proceeding by notice and motion, at the suit of a bank against its debtor, if no issue is made up, and a verdict returned for the plaintiff, it is not necessary that the judgment should affirm, with particularity, the proof of every fact which was necessary to have authorized their verdict; it is enough if it distinctly sets forth the facts, which are essential to the exercise of the summary jurisdiction. Riggs et al. v. The Bank of the State, 183. Directors of a bank are not responsible for any injury to the bank, caused by their act, originating in an error of judgment, unless the act be so grossly wrong as to warrant the imputation of fraud, or the want of the necessary knowledge for the performance of the duty assumed by them, on accepting the agency. Godbold v. The Branch Bank of Mobile, 191. The giving compensation to a member of the board of directors for extra services as an agent of the bank, though unlawful, is not such an act as will expose the directory to liability, if done in good faith, and with the honest intent of benefiting the bank. Ibid 191. An endorsement on the note, of the sum for which it was discounted, is an admission on the part of the bank, of the sum lent upon the note, of which the defendant may avail himself, as otherwise the inference would be, that the bank was entitled to recover the entire amount. gin v. The State Bank, 222. Col The right conferred on the bank, of suing out an attachment in the county of its location is a privilege conferred on it, and does not abridge the power it previously possessed, of suing out attachments in the county of the residence of the defendant. Pearson et al. v. Gayle, 278. ་ Since the act of December, 1811, a note payable to the cashier of a bank may be sued on in the name of the corporation. Caldwell v. Branch Bank at Mobile, 549. Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes. A bill of exchange payable twelve months after date, when the nominal day of payment falls on Sunday, is notwithstanding allowed three days of grace, and is properly protestable on the Wednesday following. Wooley v. Clements, Ibid 220. Where a note is given on consideration moving entirely from a third person to one assuming to act for him, any defence of the maker against the party in interest is admissible, where no interest in the note is disclosed by the person to whom it is made. M'Clure v. Litchfield, 337. When a note is given to one assuming to act for another, for a debt already owing, and the agreement is that it shall remain with a third person until the concurrence of the creditor is obtained, an attachment afterwards levied, upon such concurrence, will authorize the maker to resist the payment, on showing satisfaction of the judgment on the garnishee process. Ibid 337. An innocent holder, for value, of an acceptance, improperly made by a member of a firm, by his endorsement of the bill, transfers all his rights to his endorsee, who will not therefore be required to show when he acquired the bill, or that he gave value for it. Pearson v. Howe, 370. A gratuitous agreement by the holder of a bill with the acceptor, made on the last day of grace, to look to him alone for the payment, and not to present the bill, or notify the drawer, does not relieve the drawer if the protest is made and notice given. De Wilt v. Bigelow & Co., 480. A bill drawn, within, and payable within this State, nine months after sight, is payable nine months after it is presented for sight, and is entitled to days of grace. Brown v. Turner, 752. Notice of the dishonor of a bill, payable on the 12th November, in Mobile, given on the 27th of the month to the drawer, in Washington County, is insufficient to charge him, unless some satisfactory excuse is made for such long delay. Ibid, 752. Where suspicion is cast upon a mercantile security, the holder must prove that he gave a valuable consideration for it, and acquired it before it was dishonored. Boyd & Macon v. McIvor, 822. H. being indebted to D. & Co., procured S., who was indebted to him, to draw a bill in his favor, on D. & Co., which he endorsed to them, and which they received in payment of the debt of H.-Held, that S. was not entitled to notice of the dishonor of the bill, (no funds being provided for its payment.) Stewart v. Desha, Sheppard & Co. Ibid 844. DECISIONS IN SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA. Bills of Exchange. The act of 1823 giving five per cent. damages upon certain protested bills of exchange, applies to endorsed notes. See title, "Damages."— Howard v. Central Bank, 378. Kelly's Reports, Vol. III. Endorser. When indorser cannot object to the regularity of the contract upon which his indorsement is made, nor be protected by its want of conformity to the statute, &c. See title, "Contract."-McDougald v. The Central Bank. Ibid 191. The 26th section of the Central Bank charter, dispensing with proof of demand and notice in order to charge indorsers, applies to suits upon notes payable elsewhere, as well as to those payable at that bank.—İbid 191. If the indorser of any note or bill which is negotiated to the bank, is discharged for want of demand or notice, it is his duty to plead it by way of defence.—Ibid 192. Where indorsers of a promissory note resided in the county of Richmond, the one seven and a half and the other twelve miles from the city of Augusta, and were in the habit of receiving their letters and papers at the Augusta post office, at least once a week, held, that notices of the dishonor of a note, deposited in the Augusta post office, addressed to them, was sufficient to make them liable, although there was a post of fice at the Richmond Factory, nearer to them than the office at Augusta. Walker and others v. the Bank of Augusta. Ibid 495. When holder of note compelled to sue dormant partner of makers, by notice from indorser to sue. Ibid 527. Holder has the whole three months within which to sue. Ibid 529. Notaries Public. Their certificates prima facie evidence of the non-payment of a note, and of the notice also, when so stated therein. Walker and others v. The Bank of Augusta. Ibid 492. What statement in Notary's certificate sufficient to make out plaintiff's Ibid 494. case. DECISIONS IN NEW YORK COURT OF CHANCERY. Banking Associations. The act to authorize the business of banking, passed in 1838, enabled any number of persons to associate and establish banks of discount, deposite and circulation, on the terms therein prescribed. The capital was not to be less than $100,000. The associates were to seal and file a certificate, specifying among other things, the amount of the capital stock, and the number of shares into which it was divided, and the names, residence, and number of shares held by the associates respectively. The shareholders, unless by express stipulation in their articles, were not to be individually liable for the debts of the association.-Sanford's Chancery Reports, Vol. I., 669. A banking company was organized under this law, by articles of association, which declared that the capital stock should be a million of dollars, divided into ten thousand shares of $100 each, but business might be commenced as soon as $100,000 were subscribed for and paid. If any shareholder should omit to pay any instalment on his shares, pursuant to any call of the directors, the articles provided that his shares should be forfeited to the use of the association, together with all previous payments made thereon. And the shareholders were not to be personally liable for the debts of the association. The original association, of whom D. was one, signed four thousand, eight hundred and thirty-five shares, on which over $100,000 was paid in, and the bank commenced business. All the associates signed a paper attached to the certificate or articles of association, by which they subscribed for and agreed to take the number of shares set opposite their respective names, as shareholders in the bank, and mutually bound themselves to fulfil all the engagements contained in the articles. D. snbscribed for twenty-five shares. Held 1. That he was liable to pay the whole amount of stock which he subscribed. 2. That the authority to forfeit the stock for the non-payment of called instalments, was a cumulative remedy, and did not affect the direct liability by force of the subscription.-Sagory v. Dubois. Ibid 466. The statute and his subscription imposed upon him the duty of paying for his stock, which is recognized by the language of the articles of association, and from which the law implies an undertaking to make such payment. Ibid. The general banking law intended to provide for the payment (or securing to be paid) of an actual, substantial capital, to the extent defined in the articles of association, as the foundation of the operations of the banks thereby authorized. Ibid. This was the declared policy of the act, and it was imperatively demanded for the public security, in respect of the important privileges and franchises conferred on those associations. lbid. Promissory Notes. 1. A bank holding a promissory note made by L. and endorsed by P. for his accommodation, when the note fell due, to enable L. to pay it, discounted for him his own note; to secure which L. delivered to the bank another promissory note, made by himself and endorsed by P., dated about a year prior to that time, and payable two years after date. When this delivery took place P. was dead, and the officers of the bank were aware of the fact. The original note was not protested, and was cancelled under this arrangement. Held, that neither P. nor his executors were ever liable upon the note thus negotiated after his death; and that it was not a charge upon real estate, which P, after its date, devised subject to the payment of all notes which he had endorsed for L.-Smith's Executors v. Wyckoff, 77. Sanford's Chancery Reports, Vol. 1. 2. A note endorsed for the accommodation of the maker has no vitality or existence as a contract, while it remains in his possession.-Ibid. 3. An endorsement on a blank sheet, intended for a note, authorises the person to whom it is delivered, to write upon the sheet such note as he thinks proper.-Ibid. 4. All accommodation indorsements delivered to the principal debtors, clothe the latter with an authority to bind the indorsers in favor of persons who receive the securities in good faith on the credit of the indorsements.-Ibid. 5. Such authority is a mere naked power revocable by the constituent. Ibid. 6. All such powers are annulled by the death of the constituent. The death of an accommodation endorser of a promissory note, before it is negotiated by the maker, annuls the latter's authority to issue the note as one binding upon the indorser.-Ibid. 7. Where a party to an usurious bill or note, gives a new security for it to a holder for value, without notice of the usury, the new security is valid, although the holder could not have recovered on the bill or note. Smedberg v. Whittlesey. Ibid 300. 8. The possession of a bill or note by an indorsee, is presumptive evidence that it was transferred to him on a good consideration before its maturity-Ibid. 9. The giving of a new note without objection, by the debtor on an usurious note held by an indorsee, is of itself an admission that the indorsee is a bona fide holder of the old note, without notice of the usury. Ibid. 10. In a suit upon a new note so given, the holder may rely upon such admission in connection with his possession of the old note, to overcome the defence of usury in the matter, and the burden of proof will be cast upon the defendant, to prove that the holder had notice of the usury, or received the usurious note without a sufficient consideration.-Ibid. Usury. 1. When a person in want of money applies to a capitalist for his note payable at a future day, offering as security his own obligation, with an indorser or a mortgage; and the respective obligations are executed accordingly, the transaction is a loan.-The N. York Dry Dock Co. v. The American Life Insurance and Trust Co. Ibid 215. 2. When two persons, who are both desirous to raise money, exchange their own notes to be used for that purpose with third persons, it constitutes an exchange of securities merely. The effect is the same as if each had used his own note, with the other's endorsement.-Ibid. 3. A banking company in New York, which had stopped payment, being desirous of borrowing a large sum of money, applied to a Trust Company, usually lending money in New York, for a loan of their certificates of deposite payable at short dates, and offered to secure the payment of the amount, by their own obligations and a mortgage on real estate of sufficient value. The Trust Company agreed to issue their certificates bearing five per cent. interest, payable in London within two years, for £48,000 sterling, on receiving the bank's promissory notes for £50,000 sterling, payable in London at the rate of $5 for each £1 sterling, with six per cent. interest, within seven years, secured by a conveyance of the real estate to trustees, containing a provision that the bank should pay to the Trust Company in New York the respective instal |