The first and essential property which a bank must possess, is a perfect.confidence on the part of the public. The small amount of benefit which a banker can afford to give his customer for placing his money in his hands, can never be sufficient to induce any man to run a hazard; and, more particularly, the mere difference of terms which one banker can afford compared with another cannot be sufficient to induce any man to give preference to more tempting terms, when weighed against a greater security and confidence.

UNITED STATES PUBLIC LOANS.

THEIR LIABILITY TO TAXATION.

MR. JUSTICE STORY, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, vol. 2, page 492, says:

"In another case the question was raised, whether a State had a Constitutional authority to tax Stock issued for loans to the United States, and it was held by the Supreme Court that a State had not. The reasoning of the Court was as follows:"Is the Stock issued for loans to the Government of the United States, liable to be taxed by States and Corporations?”

Congress has power to borrow money on the credit of the United States. The stock it issues is the evidence of a debt created by the exercise of this power. The tax in question is a tax upon the contract subsisting between the government and the individual. It bears directly upon that contract while subsisting, and in full force. The power operates upon the contract the instant it is framed, and must imply a right to affect that contract. If the States and Corporations throughout the Union possess the power to tax a contract for the loan of money, what shall arrest this principle in its application to every other contract. What measure can government adopt, which will not be exposed to its influence?

But it is unnecessary to pursue this principle through its diversified application to all the contracts, and to the various operations of government. No one can be selected which is of more vital interest to the community, than this of borrowing money on the credit of the United States. No power has been conferred by the American people on their government, the free and unburdened exercise of which more deeply affects every member of our republic. In war, when the honor, the safety, the independence of the nation are to be defended, when all its resources are to be strained to the utmost, credit must be brought in aid of taxation, and the abundant revenue of peace and prosperity must be anticipated to supply the exigencies, the urgent demands of the moment. The people, for objects the most important which can occur in the progress of nations, have empowered their government to make these anticipations 'to borrow money on the credit of the United States.' Can any thing be more dangerous, or more injurious, than the admission of a principle which authorises every State, and every Corporation in the Union, which possesses the right of taxation, to burthen the exercise of this power at their discretion.

If the right to impose the tax exists, it is a right which, in its nature, acknowledges no limits. It may be carried to any extent within the jurisdiction of the State or Corporation which imposes it, which the will of each State and Corporation may prescribe. A power which is given by the whole American people for their common good; which is to be exercised at the most critical periods for the most important purposes, on the free exercise of which the interests certainly, perhaps the liberty, of the whole may depend; may be burthened, impeded, if not arrested, by any of the organized parts of the confederacy.

In a society formed like ours, with one supreme government for national purposes, and numerous State governments for other purposes: in many respects independent, and in the uncontrolled exercise of many important powers, occasional interferences ought not to surprise us. The power of taxation is one of the most essential to a State, and of the most extensive in its operation. The attempt to maintain a rule which shall limit its exercise, is undoubtedly among the most delicate and difficult duties, which can devolve on those whose province it is to expound the supreme law of the land in its application to the cases of individuals. This duty has more than once devolved on this court. In the performance of it, we have considered it as a necessary consequence, from the supremacy of the government of the whole, that its action in the exercise of its legitimate powers should be free and unembarrassed by any conflicting powers in the possession of its parts, that the powers of a State cannot rightfully be so exercised as to impede and obstruct the free course of those measures which the Government of the United States may rightfully adopt.

This subject, brought before the court in the case of M'Culloch vs. The State of Maryland, when it was thoroughly argued and deliberately considered. The question decided in that case, bears a near resemblance to that which is involved in this. It was discussed at the bar in all its relations, and examined by the court with its utmost attention. We will not repeat the reasoning which conducted us to the conclusion thus formed; but that conclusion was, that all subjects over which the Sovereign power of a State extends, are objects of taxation; but those over which it does not extend, are upon the soundest principles exempt from taxation. The Sovereignty of a State extends to every thing which exists by its own authority, or is introduced by its permission; but not to those means which are employed by Congress to carry into execution powers conferred on that body by the people of the United States. The attempt to use the power of taxation, on the means employed by the Government of the Union, in pursuance of the Constitution, is itself an abuse; because it is the usurpation of a power which the people of a single State cannot give. The States have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burthen, or in any manner control the operation of the Constitutional laws, enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general government. We retain the opinions which were then expressed. A contract made by the Government in the exercise of its power to borrow money on the credit of the United States, is undoubtedly independent of the will of any State, in which the individual who lends may reside; and is undoubtedly an operation essential to the important objects for which the Government was created. It ought, therefore, on the principles settled in the case of M'Culloch vs. The State of Maryland, to be exempt from the State taxation, and consequently from being taxed by Corporations, deriving their power from States.

It is admitted that the power of the Government to borrow money cannot be directly opposed; and that any law, directly obstructing its operations, would be void. But a distinction is taken between direct opposition and those measures which may consequently affect it; that

is, a law prohibiting loans to the United States would be void; but a tax on them to any amount is allowable. It is, we think, impossible not to perceive the intimate connection which exists between these two modes of acting on the subject. It is not the want of original power in an independent sovereign State, to prohibit loans to a foreign government, which restrains the legislature from direct opposition to those made by the United States. The restraint is imposed by our Constitution. The American people have conferred the power of borrowing money on their Government; and by making that Government supreme, have shielded its action, in the exercise of this power, from the action of the local governments. The grant of the power is incompatible with a restraining or controlling power; and the declaration of supremacy is a declaration that no such restraining or controlling power shall be exercised. The right to tax the contract to any extent, when made, must operate upon the power to borrow before it is exercised, and have a sensible influence on the contract. The extent of this influence depends on the will of a distinct government. To any extent, however inconsiderable, it is a burthen on the operations of Government. It may be carried to an extent which will arrest them entirely.

It is admitted by the counsel for the defendants, that the power to tax stock must affect the terms on which loans will be made. But this objection, it is said, has no more weight when urged against the application of an acknowledged power to Government stock, than if urged against its application to lands sold by the United States. The distinction is we think apparent. When lands are sold, no connection remains between the purchaser and the Government. The lands purchased become a part of the mass of property in the country, with no implied exemption from common burthens. All lands are derived from the general or particular Government, and all lands are subject to taxation. Lands sold are in the condition of money borrowed and repaid. Its liability to taxation, in any form it may then assume, is not questioned. The connection between the borrower and the lender is dissolved. It is no burthen on loans; it is no impediment to the power of borrowing, that the money when repaid, loses its exemption from taxation. But a tax upon debts due from the Government stands, we think, on every different principle from a tax on lands which the Government has sold. The Federalist has been quoted in the argument, and an eloquent and well merited eulogy has been bestowed on the great statesman, who is supposed to be the author of the number from which the quotation was made. This high authority was also relied upon in the case of M'Culloch vs. The State of Maryland, and was considered by the court. Without repeating what was then said, we refer to it, as exhibiting our view of the sentiments expressed on this subject by the authors of that work.

It has been supposed, that a tax on stock comes within the exemptions stated in the case of M'Culloch vs. The State of Maryland. We do not think so. The Bank of the United States is an instrument essential to the fiscal operations of the Government; and the power which might be exercised to its destruction, was denied. But property acquired by the corporation in a State was supposed to be placed in the

same condition with the property acquired by an individual. The tax on Government stock is thought by this court to be a tax on the contract, a tax on the power to borrow money on the credit of the United States, and consequently to be repugnant to the Constitution.

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES.

Extracts from the "Report on the Standards of Weight and Measure for the State of Maryland; by John H. Alexander."-1845.

The commercial dependence of the American provinces upon Great Britain, notwithstanding the actual differences in colonial origin of some of them, would naturally tend to a sort of identity with the English standards of Weight and Measure. We have already seen what was the case in Maryland; and in point of fact, at the establishment of the American confederacy, all of the thirteen States had legalized the measures of England. Five of them had named the Winchester measures in their laws; of the rest all but one had, under the epithets Exchequer or London, accepted either the Winchester bushel or one, derived from a gallon of Henry VII, of 2177.78 inches. The single exception was Connecticut, who had taken a gallon of 224 inches for wine and one of 282 inches for ale; this last was intended to be the eighth part in volume of the bushel.

When the States became independent, a zeal for repudiating all old connections possibly augmented the stimulus which at the time, as I have already said, was pervading many parts of the civilized world, towards the research after uniformity and an absolute indelible measure. At all events as early as August 1785, the board of treasury was directed to "report an ordinance fixing the standards of Weight and Measure throughout the United States." But the still revolutionary character of the period and a coming crisis plainly marked, were unpropitious to any immediate result; and, at the adoption of the present Constitution, the matter stood as it had done for years before.

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The second session of the First Congress under the Union was held in New York on 4 Jan. 1790; and five days afterwards, President WASHINGTON in his speech, called the attention of the Legislature particularly to the subject. A suitable reply, promising early attention,' was made in the Senate; and in the House of Representatives, an order was passed calling upon the Secretary of State (then Mr. Jefferson) to prepare and report a proper plan or plans for establishing uniformity in the currency, weights, and measures of the United States. months later, the report was received by the House where the call had originated; and it was communicated to the Senate on 23 Dec. of the same year, after a fresh special invocation by the President's address upon the subject of which it treated.

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