be done in such a manner as not to injure the service, or weaken the army too much at once."

The troops were assured that clothes, on reasonable terms, were provided for those brave soldiers, who intended to continue in the army another year." With great difficulty the arrangement of officers was completed, and recruiting orders were immediately issued. [Nov. 12.] Recruiting officers were directed to "be careful not to inlist any person suspected of being unfriendly to the liberties of America, or any abandoned vagabond, to whom all causes and countries are equal, and alike indifferent. The rights of mankind, and the freedom of America would have numbers sufficient to support them, without resorting to such wretched assistance. Let those, who wish to put shackles upon freemen, fill their ranks with, and place their confidence in, such miscreants." To aid the cause, popular songs were composed and circulated through the camp, calculated to inspire the soldiery with the love of country, and to induce them to engage anew in the public service. But unfortunately, the army at this time was badly supplied with clothing, provisions, and fuel, and the consequent sufferings of the soldiers, operating upon their strong desire to visit their homes, prevented their inlistment in the expected numbers. On the last day of December, when the first term of service expired, only nine thousand six hundred and fifty men had inlisted for the new army, and many of these were of necessity permitted to be absent on furlough. It was found impossible to retain

the old troops a single day after their times expired. General Washington called upon the governments of the neighbouring provinces for detachments of militia to man his lines, and he was highly gratified by the prompt compliance with his demand. In a letter to Congress he writes, "The militia that are come in, both from this province and New Hampshire, are very fine looking men, and go through their duty with great alacrity. The dispatch made, both by the people in marching, and by the legislative powers in complying with my requisition, has given me infinite satisfaction."

In the space of time, between that of disbanding the old army, and of an effective force from the new recruits, the lines were often in a defenceless state; the enemy must have known the fact; and no adequate reason can be assigned, why an attack was not made.

JAN. 4, 1776.] "It is not," says General Washington, in his communications to Congress, "in the pages of history to furnish a case like ours. To maintain a post, within musket shot of the enemy, for six months together, without ammunition, and at the same time, to disband one army and recruit another, within that distance of twenty odd British regiments, is more, probably, than ever was attempted. But if we succeed as well in the last, as we have heretofore in the first, I shall think it the most fortunate event of my whole life."

To defend the American lines with an incom

petent number of troops, with defective arms, and without an adequate supply of ammunition; to disband one army and recruit another in the face of eight thousand British soldiers, will be viewed as a hazardous measure, and will be supposed, with the organization and discipline of the men, to have employed every active power of the General; yet this did not satisfy his mind. He knew that Congress with solicitude contemplated more decisive measures, and that the country looked for events of greater magnitude The public was ignorant of his actual situation, and conceived his means for offensive operations, to be much greater than in reality they were; and from him expected the capture or expulsion of the British army in Boston. He felt the importance of securing the confidence of his countrymen by some brilliant action, and was fully sensible that his own reputation was liable to suffer, if he confined himself solely to measures of defence. To publish to his anxious country, in his vindication, the state of his army, would be to acquaint the enemy with his weakness, and to involve his destruction.

The firmness and patriotism of General Washington were displayed, in making the good of his country an object of higher consideration than the applause of those, who were incapable of forming a correct opinion of the propriety of his measures. On this, and on many other occasions during the war, he withstood the voice of the populace, rejected the entreaties of the san

guine, and refused to adopt the plans of the rash, that he might ultimately secure the great object of contention.

While he resolutely rejected every measure, that in his calm and deliberate judgment he did not approve, he daily pondered upon the practicability of a successful attack upon Boston. As a preparatory step, he took possession of Plowed Hill, Cobble Hill, and Lechmere's Point, and upon them erected fortifications. These posts brought him within half a mile of the enemy's works on Bunker's Hill; and, by his artillery, he drove the British floating batteries from their stations in Charles's River. He erected floating batteries, to watch the movements of his enemy, and to aid in any offensive operations, that circumstances might warrant. He took the opinion of his general officers a second time respecting the meditated attack; they again unanimously gave their opinion in opposition to the measure, and this opinion was immediately communicated to Congress. Congress appeared still to favour the attempt, and, that an apprehension of danger to the town of Boston might not have an undue influence upon the operations of the army, had resolved, in Dec. 1775, "That if General Washington and his council of war should be of opinion, that a successful attack might be made on the troops in Boston, he should make it in any manner he might think expedient, notwithstanding the town, and property therein, might thereby be destroyed."

General Howe had, in October, succeeded Ge

neral Gage in the command of the British army, and through the winter confined himself to measures of defence.

The inability of the American General to accomplish the great object of the campaign, repeatedly pointed out by Congress, was a source of extreme mortification; but he indulged the hope of success in some military operations during the winter, that would correspond with the high expectations of his country, and procure him honour in his exalted station of Commander in Chief of the American armies. In his reply [JAN. 6, 1776.] to the president of Congress, on the reception of the resolution, authorizing an attack on the fortified posts in Boston, he observed, "The resolution relative to the troops in Boston, I beg the favour of you, Sir, to assure Congress, shall be attempted to be put in execution the first moment I see a probability of success, and in such a way as a council of officers shall think most likely to produce it; but if this should not happen as soon as you may expect, or my wishes prompt to, I request that Congress will be pleased to revert to my situation, and do me the justice to believe that circumstances, and not want of inclination, are the cause of delay."

Early in January, he accordingly summoned a council of war, at which Mr. John Adams, then a member of Congress, and Mr. James Warren, president of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, were present; in which it was resolved, "That a vigorous attempt ought to be made on the ministerial troops in Boston, before