CHAPTER XIV. MILITARY PREPARATIONS IN BOSTON-A SECRET EXPEDITION-ITS OBJECT— LEE'S PLAN FOR THE SECURITY OF NEW YORK-OPINION OF ADAMS ON THE SUBJECT-INSTRUCTIONS TO LEE-TRANSACTIONS OF LEE IN CONNECTICUT-LEE'S POLICY IN REGARD TO THE TORIES-UNEASINESS IN NEW YORK-LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE OF SAFETY TO LEE-IIS REPLY-HIS OPINION OF THE PEOPLE OF CONNECTICUT—OF THE HYSTERICAL LETTER FROM THE NEW YORK CONGRESS. EARLY in the month of January, there was a great stir of preparation in Boston harbor. A fleet of transports were taking in supplies, and making arrangements for the embarkation of troops. Bomb-ketches and flat-bottomed boats were getting ready for sea, as were two sloops-of-war, which were to convey the armament. Its destination was kept secret; but was confidently surmised by Washington. In the preceding month of October, a letter had been laid. before Congress, written by some person in London of high credibility, and revealing a secret plan of operations said to have been sent out by ministers to the commanders in Boston. The following is the purport: Possession was to be gained of New York and Albany, through the assistance of Governor Tryon, on whose influence with the tory part of the poplulation, much reliance was placed. These cities were to be very strongly garrisoned. All who did not join the king's forces were to be declared rebels. The Hudson River, and the East River or Sound, were to be commanded by a number of small men-of-war and cutters, stationed in different parts, so as wholly to cut off all communication by water between New York and the provinces to the northward of it; and between New York and Albany, except for the king's service; and to prevent, also, all communication between the city of New York and the provinces of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and those to the southward of them. "By these means," said the letter, "the administration and their friends fancy they shall soon either starve out or retake the garrisons of Crown Point and Ticonderoga, and open and maintain a safe intercourse and correspondence between Quebec, Albany and New York; and thereby offer the fairest opportunity to their soldiery and the Canadians, in conjunction with the Indians to be procured by Guy Johnson, to make continual irruptions into New Hampshire, Massachusetts and Connecticut, and so distract and divide the Provincial forces, as to render it easy for the British army at Boston to defeat them, break the spirits of the Massachusetts people, depopulate their country, and compel an absolute subjection to Great Britain." * It was added that a lord, high in the American department, had been very particular in his inquiries about the Hudson River; what sized vessels could get to Albany; and whether, if bat teries were erected in the Highlands, they would not control the navigation of the river, and prevent vessels from going up an down. This information had already excited solicitude respecting t * Am. Archives, 4th Series, iii. 1281. 1776.] LEE'S MILITARY PLANS. 135 It was now Hudson, and led to measures for its protection. surmised that the expedition preparing to sail from Boston, and which was to be conducted by Sir Henry Clinton, might be destined to seize upon New York. How was the apprehended blow to be parried? General Lee, who was just returned from hist energetic visit to Rhode Island, offered his advice and services in the matter. In a letter to Washington, he urged him to act at once, and on his own responsibility, without awaiting the tardy and doubtful sanction of Congress, for which, in military matters, Lee had but small regard. "but it will never, "New York must be secured," writes he, I am afraid, be secured by due order of the Congress, for obvious reasons. They find themselves awkwardly situated on this head. You must step in to their relief. I am sensible no man can be spared from the lines under present circumstances; but I would propose that you should detach me into Connecticut, and lend your name for collecting a body of volunteers. I am assured that I shall find no difficulty in assembling a sufficient number for the purposes wanted. This body, in conjunction (if there should appear occasion to summon them) with the Jersey regiment under the command of Lord Stirling, now at Elizabethtown, will effect the security of New York, and the expulsion or suppression of that dangerous banditti of tories, who have appeared on Long Island, with the professed intention of acting against the authority of Congress. Not to crush these serpents before their rattles are grown would be ruinous. "This manœuvre, I not only think prudent and right, but absolutely necessary to our salvation; and if it meets, as I ardently hope it will, with your approbation, the sooner it is entered upon fatal." the better; the delay of a single day may be Washington, while he approved of Lee's military suggestions, was cautious in exercising the extraordinary powers so recently vested in him, and fearful of transcending them. John Adams was at that time in the vicinity of the camp, and he asked his opinion as to the practicability and expediency of the plan, and whether it "might not be regarded as beyond his line." Adams, resolute of spirit, thought the enterprise might easily be accomplished by the friends of liberty in New York, in connection with the Connecticut people, "who are very ready,” said he, "upon such occasions." As to the expediency, he urged the vast importance, in the progress of this war, of the city and province of New York, and the Hudson River, being the nexus of the northern and southern colonies, a kind of key to the whole continent, as it is a passage to Canada, to the Great Lakes, and to all the Indian nations. No effort to secure it ought to be omitted. That it was within the limits of Washington's command, he considered perfectly clear, he being "vested with full power and authority, to act as he should think for the good and welfare of the service." If there was a body of people on Long Island, armed to oppose the American system of defence, and furnishing supplies to the British army and navy, they were invading American liberty as much as those besieged in Boston. If, in the city of New York, a body of tories were waiting only for a force to protect them, to declare themselves on the side of the enemy, it was high time that city was secured.* * Adams to Washington, Corr. of Rev., i. 113. 1776.] LEE IN CONNECTICUT. 137 Thus fortified, as it were, by congressional sanction, through one of its most important members, who pronounced New York as much within his command as Massachusetts; he gave Lee authority to carry out his plans. He was to raise volunteers in Connecticut; march at their head to New York; call in military aid from New Jersey; put the city and the posts on the Hudson, in a posture of security against surprise; disarm all persons on Long Island and elsewhere, inimical to the views of Congress, or secure them in some other manner if necessary; and seize upon all medicines, shirts and blankets, and send them on for the use of the American army. Lee departed on his mission on the 8th of January. On the 16th, he was at New Haven, railing at the indecision of Congress. They had ordered the enlistment of troops for the security of New York. A Connecticut regiment under Colonel Waterbury had been raised, equipped, and on the point of embarking for Oyster Bay, on Long Island, to attack the tories, who were to be attacked on the other side by Lord Stirling, "when suddenly," says Lee," Colonel Waterbury received an order to disband his regiment; and the tories are to remain unmolested till they are joined by the king's assassins." Trumbull, the governor of Connecticut, however, "like a man of sense and spirit," had ordered the regiment to be reassembled, and Lee trusted it would soon be ready to march with him. "I shall send immediately," said he, "an express to the Congress, informing them of my situation, and at the same time, conjuring them not to suffer the accursed Provincial Congress of New York to defeat measures so absolutely necessary to salvation." Lee's letter to the President of Congress, showed that the in |