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Another dimension of plaintiffs' equal protection attack was that

the system not only draws lines on the basis of wealth but that it "touches upon," indeed has a direct and significant impact upon, a "fundamental interest," namely education. It was urged that these two grounds, particularly in combination, establish a demonstrable denial of equal protection of the laws.

After examining the indispensable role of education in the modern industrial state and comparing it in importance with the rights of defendants in criminal cases and the right to vote--two "fundamental interests" which the Supreme Court of the United States has already protected against discrimination based on wealth, the Court concluded, "We are convinced that the distinctive and priceless function of education in our society warrants, indeed compels, our treating it as a fundamental interest." In the final step of applying the "strict scrutiny" equal protection standard the Court faced the determination of whether the California school financing system, as presently structured, is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.

In concluding that it was not, the Court's holding is essentially

contained in the following excerpt from the decision:

We therefore arrive at these conclusions. The California public school financing system, as presented to us by plaintiffs' complaint supplemented by matters judicially noticed, since it deals intimately with education, obviously touches upon a fundamental interest. For the reasons we have explained in detail, this system conditions the full entitlement to such interest upon wealth, classifies its recipients on the basis of their collective affluence and makes the quality of a child's education depend upon the pocketbook of his parents. We find that such financing system as presently constituted is not necessary to the attainment of any compelling state interest. Since it does not withstand the requisite "strict scrutiny," it denies to the plaintiffs and others similarly situated the equal protection of the laws. If the allegations in the complaint are sustained, the financial system must fall and the statutes comprising it must be found unconstitutional.

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In a clarifying "modification of opinion" issued October 21, 1971,

the California Supreme Court said:

We emphasize that our decision is not a final judgment on the merits... if after further proceedings the Court (Los Angeles Superior) should enter final judgment determining that the existing system of public school financing is unconstitutional and invalidating said system in whole or in part, it may properly provide for the enforcement of the judgment in such a way as to permit an orderly transition from an unconstitutional to a constitutional system of school financing.... A determination that an existing plan of governmental operation denies equal protection does not necessarily require invalidation of past acts undertaken pursuant to that plan or an immediate implementation of a constitutionally valid substitute. Obviously any judgment invalidating the existing system of school financing should make clear that the existing system is to remain operable until an appropriate new system, which is not violative of equal protection of the laws, can be put into effect.

WHAT SERRANO DID NOT HOLD

In analyzing Serrano and subsequent cases it is important to understand some things they did not hold. First, they have not held that property taxes may not be used for school support, only that existing systems of assessment, distribution and use of property taxes, together with other types of funds, are illegal. Secondly, they have not held that an equal amount of money must be spent for every child. In this connection the New Jersey court expressly disclaimed, "This is not to suggest that the same amount of money must be spent on each pupil in the state. The differing needs of pupils would suggest the contrary. In fact, the evidence indicates that pupil of low socio-economic status need compensatory education to offset the natural disadvantages of their environment." Thirdly, they have not directed that any particular system replace that in being but have left the way open to the Legislatures to proceed to adopt a revision. Illustrative of this again is the language of the New Jersey decision, "Nothing herein shall be construed as requiring the Legislature to adopt a specific system of financing or taxation. The Legislature may approach the goal required by the Education Clause by any methods reasonably calculated to accomplish that purpose consistent with the equal protection requirements of law.

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On April 17, 1972, the Attorney General of Texas appealed the

Rodriguez case to the United States Supreme Court. Thirty states joined the appeal as amicus curiae. In addition, cases similar to Serrano, Rodriguez, etc., are reported pending in thirty-four states. The outcome of these cases is uncertain but it is clear that Governors

and legislatures must be prepared to move swiftly toward significant reforms in state school finance systems.

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Part V Issues Created by the Cases

The implications of the court cases have thrown legislators,

educators, taxpayers, attorneys, and government officials into confusion Although decreeing that existing school finance patterns

and turmoil.

do not meet equal protection guarantees, the courts have refrained from either suggesting or establishing guidelines for legislatures to follow. In some states possible solutions may be barred by state constitutions, such as provisions which would prohibit a statewide property tax. In a few other states, leaders are "standing by" in the expectation that solutions will be forthcoming in the form of new money from the federal government. Regardless of the approach

being considered, one must be aware that many issues are being

raised regarding the future of educational finance in the states and traditional systems of school governance and structure.

the most controversial and complex issues are:

1. Educational Equality

Some of

Throughout most of the discussions of modern educational finance

we see the term "equity" or "educational equality." There are differences

. in the definitions of these terms. There is a general assumption that universal education and equal education are synonymous. This is not necessarily true. What is an equal education?

:

While a precise definition has not been offered by the courts, in common terms, educational equality generally means that the quality in education offered to all children by the state is essentially comparable. Thus, the state would provide each youngster with the level of education needed to reach his full potential. We probably will never achieve

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true "equality", even though we are committed to "approach"it. The courts have said that equity does not necessarily mean equal expenditures per child. In some instances, particularly when we talk about high cost programs for handicapped youngsters, compensatory education, vocational education, and other programs requiring special services, it may cost more to provide the special programs than for typical school curricula if they are to be "equal". For example, the New Jersey court in Robinson vs. Cahill declared that they were not suggesting "that the same amount of money must be spent on each pupil in the state. The differing needs of pupils would suggest to the contrary."

If we are to move toward equity in education we must look at the differences in children, at the differences in their needs and the differences in the educational experiences to which they are exposed. Anomalous as it may seem, equality in education is not achieved by treating different individuals as if they were identical.

2. Dollar Equality.

Although the courts have not required that the state spend the same number of dollars per pupil, the decisions have indicated that the dollar expenditure per pupil does have a bearing upon the quality of education offered. It seems a short step to move from the position that the number of dollars made available for the education of a child cannot be conditioned upon the wealth of any particular community

to the next proposition that all children deserve at least equal dollar expenditures (weighted by cost differentials) for the education provided by the state.