other than the United States, the UNHCR provides funds to the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) for the transportation of refugees from asylum countries.

The UNHCR will also administer the refugee processing centers (RPCs) planned for construction in the Philippines and Indonesia. These centers will hold refugees who may have to wait up to 3 years to resettle in the country which has accepted them. Moreover, the UNHCR coordinates a program which provides for the departure of persons directly from Vietnam--"the orderly departure program"--to resettle in

other countries.

The UNHCR believes that increases in third-country resettlements are essential before resettlement in firstasylum countries can occur. Third-country resettlements pledged at a refugee conference in Geneva, Switzerland, in July 1979, resulted in some 260,000 resettlement opportunities in almost 30 countries. The conference did not generate commitments from countries that had not previously agreed to accept refugees, but countries which had made prior commitments increased their quotas.

COST OF REFUGEE ASSISTANCE

Refugee assistance is provided by the UNHCR, ICEM, various voluntary agencies, and the governments of asylum and resettlement countries, in the form of land for camp sites, protection, care (food, water, shelter, medical care, supplies, and education), resettlement, transportation, etc. The United States and other nations contribute to the UNHCR, ICEM, and voluntary agencies to provide relief and resettlement assist

ance.

During 1979, the UNHCR estimated that general program expenditures for assistance to Indochinese refugees were about $109 million. (This amount includes the former special program for Indochinese refugees which was incorporated into the general program after February 1979.) of the $109.0 million, the United States has contributed about $23.5 million--about 22 percent. In addition, the UNHCR estimated that it would spend an additional $10.5 million on special programs related to the Indochinese refugees. This includes $10.0 million for the planned construction and operation of the RPCs and $.5 million for implementation of the departure program.

For 1980, the UNHCR general program expenditures for the Indochinese refugees are estimated to be about $133 million. Its special programs are estimated to be $62 million, of which $60 million is for the planned construction and operation of the RPCS; $2 million is for the departure program.

During 1979, ICEM spent about $83 million to arrange transportation, medical examinations, and to provide other - services for Indochinese refugees. Of that amount, ICEM - received about $68 million from the United States for refugees being resettled there. The United States also contributed an additional $3.5 million for the ICEM administrative and operations budget. ICEM also received about $7.8 million from the UNHCR. The United States paid about $2.3 million of that amount which was based on its share of contributions to the UNHCR. For 1980, the ICEM estimated budget for the Indochinese refugee program is about $113 million.

CHAPTER 2

CHANGES ARE NEEDED IN

PROCEDURES FOR REFUGEE PROCESSING

The United States did not see an immediate need to change its procedures for processing Indochinese refugees when its resettlement commitment was dramatically increased in 1979. The existing procedures were adopted when refugee movements were about half of this new commitment. Emphasis was placed on meeting the increased quotas but the procedures did not always permit efficient and speedy refugee processing. For instance, undue emphasis has been placed on a priority category system resulting in much time being spent in proving or otherwise verifying refugee assertions. Also, circumstances surrounding medical examinations, diagnosis, and treatment contributed to delays in refugee processing. Difficulties were experienced in applying the INA provisions to the increased number of refugees that had to be resettled in the United States.

The frequent shifting of monthly quotas between refugee offices in first-asylum countries took place in an attempt to meet the increased quotas and to maximize refugee movements out of high-priority countries of asylum but added to the frustrations of managing larger numbers of refugees.

INCREASED REFUGEE RESETTLEMENTS

CAUSED PROCESSING PROBLEMS

In July 1979, the United States doubled its commitment for resettling Indochinese refugees--from 7,000 to 14,000 a month--during the 15-month period from July 1, 1979, through September 30, 1980. Past experiences disclosed that between the spring of 1976, and June 30, 1979, only about 74,000 refugees--an average of 1,900 per month--had been moved to the United States. During the 3 months prior to the increase, a monthly average of only about 4,500 had been achieved.

Even in light of this earlier refugee movement experience, the State Department Office of Asian Refugees (OAR), attempted to meet the quotas by utilizing existing procedures and by rapidly building a refugee case load pipeline to sponsoring voluntary agencies. This ambitious attempt to achieve a goal of processing and moving 14,000 refugees a month--without simplifying its procedures--created a crisis situation.

REFUGEES AWAITING PROCESSING AT UBON REFUGEE CAMP, THAILAND.
NOVEMBER, 1979.

Monthly refugee movement quotas were tentatively allocated to the various first-asylum countries by OAR. When these allocations were first made, however, some refugee offices were unable to meet their quotas at the increased levels. As a result, OAR shifted quotas between the country offices in an attempt to achieve the overall monthly goal.

The OAR requirement to rapidly increase direct departures to the United States precluded any meaningful managerial analysis and treatment of existing problems associated with the movement of the large number of refugees. Considerable time was spent trying to document and assign categories when, in reality, the categories did not always apply to the order in which refugees were selected and processed. Further, the capability to conduct medical examinations and arrange transportation to final destinations was, in the short term, affected. Agencies often duplicated each other's efforts and records. On occasion, refugees were shuffled back and forth between camps and transit centers. During the start-up, inadequate notice was given to ICEM to prepare for and schedule medical examinations.

In its quest to meet its quota, for example, the refugee office in Thailand allowed over 4,000 refugees to be brought to a 750-person capacity transit center for medical examinations and transportation arrangements. The facility was, therefore, greatly overcrowded and processing became virtually chaotic. An additional 1,000 refugees having Canadian destinations, further increased the already crowded conditions there. Although the refugees were only intended to spend a few days in the transit center, many were there for months.

Some refugees who did not pass their medical examinations were transferred to a camp about 150 miles away. That camp was not able to handle the sudden influx. Food, shelter, and medical care were inadequate. Refugees with identified medical problems were not always treated, and records of those treated were not maintained.