occupants of the European boxes in

the theatre.

"That is Mrs. X.," she said, pointing out a lady with a pretty delicate face, and a rivière of diamonds on her white neck and shoulders, who was sitting in the front of one of the most conspicuous boxes, with two men behind her; "the one we met driving with the Prince G., don't you remember? That is the Prince bending over to speak to her now. Look, she is laughing-Allah, Allah, Allah ! -the customs of these Europeans! Look at the diamonds she is wearing, -isn't it a shame? He will have none to give his poor wife when he marries."

She

Valda seemed to know all about the European ladies who were present, the wives of the Consuls of different nationalities, and various other ladies of rank and standing, and she pointed them out to Margaret with amusing and rather cynical observations upon their characters and histories. was interested in the men too, and as the entr'acte came to an end, and the stalls began to fill again, she bent her opera-glass upon them to make out those whom she knew by sight. “I cannot see the Pâsha anywhere,” she said, sweeping the lines of the men's faces with her opera-glasses; and then, suddenly, she gave a violent start, and Margaret saw her hand tremble as she tried to steady the glass.

"Have you seen him?" Margaret asked; but Valda did not answer, and when she lowered the glasses it was clear from her expression that it

Margaret caught up the glasses that had fallen from her hand, and looked to see whom she had seen. Alas, there was no room for mistake. It was Fitzroy. He was sitting immediately opposite, and his clear-cut profile and finely-shaped head seemed to make all the men near him look common. He was distinguished from them no less by the pride of his bearing than by the faultlessness of his attire, and he looked a very perfect gentleman; but was he? Margaret asked herself this question as she looked at him. She looked long and intently, noticing every detail of his appearance, from the impassive expression of his deepset eyes to the little lock of fair hair which, in spite of close cutting, would wave over his forehead; and then, suddenly, as the glass shifted in her hand, she caught sight of the Pâsha. She saw him for a moment,-the kindly rugged face with melancholy blue eyes and long gray moustache under the crimson tarbúsh-but as she looked the lights were turned out, and a sudden mist came before her eyes. The violins began to sing, and the wild suggestive Wagnerian music filled her ears and her senses. She listened to it as if in a dream, and it seemed to her like the revelation of depths in human nature that she had never before sounded.

TWICE within the last few months Lord Salisbury has admiringly referred to the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States' Senate. In his speech to the Constitutional Club the Premier expatiated on the great advantage it must be for a Minister to meet persons not of his own political faith and explain to them the reasons for his actions; and again at the opening of Parliament he professed to envy a nation possessing a Committee of Foreign Relations, a Committee which could secretly receive explanations that Ministers were only too glad to give.

Lord Salisbury's admiration is doubtless genuine, but it is founded on ignorance as to the real relations existing between the Secretary of State and the Committee. Theoretically the Committee is the recipient of confidential communications from the Secretary; probably that was the intention of the Fathers of the Republic, but like a great many other American institutions it has in this latter day assumed a character foreign to that which its creators intended. As a matter of fact the Secretary of State does not meet persons not of his own political faith, and does not explain to them the reasons for his action, until all the world knows those reasons. In the Senate the majority is given a majority representation on the Committees. If the Republicans control the Senate they also control the Committees, and any question of a political character coming before a Committee is treated as a political subject and dealt with according to party politics. In the No. 475.-VOL. LXXX.

Committee the rule of the majority governs; the votes of six men outweigh those of five. If the five Democrats are opposed to the reporting of a bill or a treaty, or endeavour to amend it, and find the six Republicans united in support of the measure or resisting an amendment, they are powerless. They may interpose further obstruction in the Senate, but they can accomplish nothing in the Committees.

Lord Salisbury, however, apparently sought to convey the impression that before the bill or treaty reaches the Committee the Secretary of State has discussed its provisions or terms with the members of the Foreign Relations Committee, members of his own political party as well as those to whom he is politically opposed; and as a result of this confidential discussion the Opposition is fully informed as to his plans. He seemed even to intimate, although he did not say so in exact terms, that the effect of this free interchange of views between the Secretary of State and the members of the Opposition may lead to a modification of details to meet the objections of the minority.

There could not be a more erroneous impression. Actually, and in practice, the Secretary of State rarely takes the members of the Foreign Relations Committee, even of his own party, into his confidence on matters of high importance, and so rarely indeed does he consult with members of the Opposition that when he does it is exceptional enough to attract attention. Of course I refer now to matters of the first magnitude. If

C

the

the State Department wants salary of a consul or a minister increased, (a proposal always likely to arouse the animosity of the Congressional economists) or if it thinks Congress is indifferent to the President's recommendation for suitable provision for the representation of the United States at an international scientific, or other Congress, the Secretary of State not only may, but frequently does ask the members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, his party associates as well as his political opponents, to lend their influence to secure the desired legislation. In America, as in Europe, men are after all very human; whether in a Republic or a Monarchy, most men are only too glad to be asked a favour by a Secretary of State and to be able to grant it. But in great affairs of State, in the conduct of secret negotiations, the members of the Committee seldom know anything of what is going on, and generally their first information is gleaned either through the Press or after they are placed in possession of the facts, when the President is forced under the Constitution to take them into his confidence.

A slight knowledge of the American parliamentary system explains this apparent lack of confidence. In America there is no responsible Ministry. The President under the Constitution is charged with the conduct of foreign affairs; with him and not in Congress lies the initiative. Congress may formally instruct the President to abrogate a treaty or recognise a new government, and the President need not regard these instructions as mandatory. That was the issue raised by Mr. Olney, when Secretary of State, which so aroused the anger of the Senate. The Senate recognised the belligerency of the Cubans, and President Cleveland,

acting under the advice of Mr. Olney, coolly ignored that recognition. Mr. Olney contended that the Senate had arrogated to itself functions which were vested in the President alone, and that the action of the Senate had no more legal weight than that of any other well-meaning body of gentlemen. But while the President can initiate, the conclusion rests with the Senate. The Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, negotiates a treaty, but that treaty, to become effective, must receive the assent of the Senate. In the case of a treaty it would be manifestly impossible for the Secretary of State, while negotiations were still pending, to take the members of the Foreign Relations Committee into his confidence. In the first place he would not care to entrust these details to eleven men, for the simple reason that these eleven Senators would discuss the question with their party associates, either to ascertain if the provisions met with their approval, or else to prevent an agreement by arousing public sentiment. Again, it must be apparent that if this system prevailed secrecy would cease to exist. The eleven men are not yet born who can preserve the silence of the grave; and if it is impossible to hope for concealment among eleven how much more impossible is it to expect that ninety men (the membership of the Senate) would respect the injunction? I venture the assertion that had the provisions of the Anglo-American arbitration treaty been known in advance of their presentation to the Senate, the treaty would never have reached that body. It is absolutely certain that the Peace Commissioners would never have been able to agree upon a treaty had the Senate known the details so soon as the Commissioners reached a conclusion.

It has been asserted that the

British parliamentary system places too much power in the hands of a few members, and that the American system is better and more democratic because it divides the responsibility. In America there is government by Committee instead of government by a Ministry readily responsive to the public will. Practically all legislation in Congress is the creation of the Committee. The entrance to both Houses of Congress is through the doors of their Committees. In the Committees the majority always rules. In matters political, or in matters requiring special or expert knowledge, in nine times out of ten the Houses accept the verdict of their Committees. Take the case involving the right of a a member to his seat. Members excuse themselves for simply voting as their party directs and without knowledge of the facts because, they say: "We cannot be expected to read six or seven hundred pages of printed testimony, or decide upon the delicate legal questions raised. The Committee, the members of which are lawyers, have done that and it is sufficient for us to know what their conclusion is." It is so in the case of a tariff-bill, an appropriation-bill, or almost any general or special legislation. The Committee is the conscience-keeper of the House, and, like Abraham's bosom, it is broad enough to offer shelter to all the faithful.

In truth the American parliamentary system has little to commend it to Englishmen. Far too much power is lodged in the hands of a few persons who exercise the most autocratic powers, who may be able to wreck their party and bring ruin to the country, and yet are able to escape all responsibility. Startling as these assertions may sound, they are capable of exact demonstration.

No bill can reach either House until it has been reported upon by a Committee. In the House of Representatives (the Commons of England) the Speaker, who is elected by the majority, has the appointment of all Committees. His power is absolute. Being a party man he gives a majority representation on all Committees to men of his own party, but there is no limit on his selections. He may, and does, reward a friend by assigning him a place upon an important Committee; he punishes an enemy by banishing him to a Committee which exists in name only and is never required to report; he packs a Committee by appointing men who are favourable to his own legislative policy. This is not regarded as disgraceful; it is looked upon as the Speaker's rightful prerogative. For instance, the present Speaker, Mr. Reed, being a believer in the gold standard takes very good care that a majority of his Banking and Currency Committee shall share his views on the question of currency, precisely as the last Democratic Speaker, Mr. Crisp, a silver-man, placed none but silver-men on guard.

It may be contended that this is simply the logical recognition of the rule by majority; that in a country which is supposed to exist by the minority yielding to the majority it is fitting for the party in power, necessarily the party of the majority, to be absolutely in control of government and solely responsible. One would not quarrel with the system if the facts justified the theories on which they are predicated, but practice and theories are antagonistic. The country seldom holds Congress responsible for anything; it is the President who must answer for all sins of omis

sion and commission. The President, however, while exercising a very powerful indirect control over Con

gress, has no direct influence. He recommends, but Congress does as it sees fit. If the President and Congress are of the same political party they generally, but not always, manage to maintain fairly harmonious relations; if, as sometimes happens, one or both branches of Congress are of the opposite political party, it is a constant struggle between the White House and the Capitol to obtain party advantage. While at the quadrennial elections Congress, as well as the President, is elected, actually everything is subordinated to the struggle over the Presidency; politicians are willing to lose the House of Representatives if they can secure the Presidency. Consequently attention is centred on the Presidential candidate ; candidates for Congress are in many cases almost lost sight of, and it is the candidate for the Presidency who stands as the embodiment of the party, who is held responsible for the mistakes of Congress, and who is the representative of the policy to follow from his election. An unpopular Congress may be the means of defeating a candidate whose advice it may have persistently disregarded but of whom the country makes a vicarious sacrifice. The President may not be responsible for the extravagance of Congress, or for any one of a dozen things which arouses the resentment of the electors; but the President being the party in its concrete form, the easiest way the outraged elector has of venting his anger is by defeating the candidate for the chief magistracy.

It has been said that a member of Congress may bring ruin to his party or the country, and yet not suffer. An illustration will suffice. When war was declared against Spain both army and navy were in no condition to meet a first-class Power; the supply of ammunition was insufficient, and

the coast-defences would have afforded little opposition to a nation possessed of a small fleet of first-rate battleships properly manned and officered. The man more responsible for this state of affairs than any other is Representative Cannon, of Illinois, chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, who has persistently fought the appropriations repeatedly asked for by the naval and military authorities. Like many other men representing inland constituencies, Mr. Cannon has never properly appreciated the value of a navy; his habits of thought and training make him grudge every dollar of the public money appropriated, and his rural constituents, to whom £100 is wealth and the £1,000 a year paid to a member of Congress a fortune beyond their desires, applaud Mr. Cannon for what they call his economy. Mr. Cannon, therefore, so long as he cares to remain in Congress, has simply to cater to his constituents and ignore the rest of the country. So long as the voters of his district are satisfied, it makes no difference to him what the people of New York, or Boston, or San Francisco may think. The fact that a member of Congress is frequently abused by other parts of the country endears him all the more to his con stituents, and strengthens his hold upon the district.

The object of the creators of t American Constitution was to provide an executive having co-ordinate powers with the legislative branch of the government, but the functions of both were to be independent. So fearful were the Fathers of the Republic of anything approaching control of the legislature by the executive that they hedged in the latter by a series of restrictive provisions with the object of making Congress a check upon the President. Theoretically perfect, an ideal instrument as the American