a double share of criminality to one who, being in his natural temperament and in theory inclined to mercy, adopted far more severe measures than Gardiner; and who, having been himself delated before the Inquisition for heresy, sought to vindicate his own character from suspicion by making diligent search for heretics.

"When we remember," Dr. Hook says, "that his temper was merciful, and when we compare the leniency of his government at Viterbo with the severity he exhibited in England, we attribute the change in his conduct to a selfishness awfully criminal. It is impossible not to perceive, that he let the law take its course, without an attempt on his part to mitigate its ferocity, in order that his zeal against heresy in England might be a sufficient answer to those who denounced him as a heretic at Rome." (p. 390.)

There is one more enquiry raised by Dr. Hook, to which we can only advert with much greater brevity than its importance deserves. It is easy to understand, as Dr. Hook suggests, the motives which constrained bishops and other learned divines to resist even unto blood the imposition of a dogma which not only vitiates the whole character of one of the sacraments, but which leads, when developed, "to superstitions which tend to overthrow the very foundations of Christian truth." (p. 394.) It is not equally easy to understand the motives which constrained uneducated men, and in some cases "men who had not shown much earnestness in the cause of religion," to refuse such an answer to a theological question which they could not fully understand, as would have sufficed to save their lives. Dr. Hook ascribes this unshrinking resolution to the generally prevailing opposition to all attempts to bring England into subjection to a foreign power; in short, to the very same feelings of patriotism which send the soldier to the field of battle, and which prompt even conspirators in the support of an unrighteous cause to die rather than betray their accomplices. There may be some truth in these suggestions; and there can, we think, be no doubt that, in proportion as the cause in which they suffered was higher, the inducements to constancy, even in the case of men of unstable minds, were proportionably stronger. We think, however, that in the case of those men and women who, though "unlearned and ignorant" as regards this world's wisdom, were enlightened by God's own Spirit to discern the true nature and issues of the conflict which was then being waged between the light of Christ's Gospel and the darkness of Romish superstition, it is not hard to account for the strength of that resolution which prompted them to withstand alike the threats and the blandishments of their persecutors, and to "resist even unto blood," in the deadly conflict in which they found themselves engaged.

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Dr. Hook's Lives of the Archbishops of Canterbury. [Apr. It is true, indeed, that many of the Marian martyrs were unable to gauge the depths of those theological subtleties by which the Romanists, then as now, sought to disguise the monstrous absurdity and the gross idolatry involved in the dogma of transubstantiation. It is equally true, however, that that book, which they had learned to read and to love, had been productive of those results which the Psalmist ascribes to it when he declared, "The entrance of Thy Word giveth light, it giveth understanding unto the simple." It is to this source mainly, that we ascribe the constancy of the later as contrasted with the vacillation of the earlier martyrs and confessors. We would not, indeed, disparage, in the very least degree, the influence exercised by the example of those who had already suffered in this glorious cause. At the same time, we believe that it is "for the Word of God and for the testimony of Jesus Christ," that persecution has ever been endured with the greatest constancy; and hence it is that, when once it came to be clearly understood that the question lay between God's revealed truth and man's vain inventions, a motive was at once supplied to those who were taught by God's spirit, sufficiently strong to enable them to endure gladly the loss of all things, and not to count their lives dear unto themselves, so that they might testify, in death as in life, the power of Christ's Gospel to save.

Though Archbishop of Canterbury from 1556 to 1558, Pole did not live to carry into execution his purposes as a diocesan, of repairing to Canterbury and seeking to win the good-will of the people specially committed to his care. Prematurely worn down by anxiety and disappointment, he lived long enough to hear of the death of his cousin Mary, for whom-if for any one -he appears to have entertained feelings of sincere affection. On the morning of the 18th of November, 1558, the eventful career of this "pitiable object" was closed by death. "He lived long enough," Dr. Hook writes, "to hear the cheers with which the accession of Queen Elizabeth was acclaimed; and the policy of his late mistress and her minister was in these joyful acclamations condemned."

PROFESSOR MAURICE ON SOCIAL MORALITY.

Social Morality. Twenty-one Lectures delivered in the University of Cambridge. By F. D. Maurice, Professor of Casuistry and Moral Philosophy. London and Cambridge: Macmillan and

Co. 1869.

In the course of our perusal of these Lectures, we were reminded of a saying which we have heard quoted, and of which the original is, we believe, to be ascribed to Fénélon :"I love my family more than myself; my friends more than my family; my country more than my friends; and the whole world more than my country." If we except the mention of friends, the objects here contrasted are precisely those in reference to which Professor Maurice treats of the subject of the Lectures before us. The whole tenor of his teaching shows, however, that the Professor would not, any more than we ourselves should, endorse the sentiments of the distinguished French ecclesiastic to which we have alluded. Those sentiments are certainly, at first sight, somewhat fascinating, from their paradoxical character; but upon further consideration, the sequence pointed out appears to us one which ought to be instituted with reference rather to the true logical order of the affections than to the degrees of their intensity. That love towards a man's own self should be cherished and exhibited on account of his love towards his family, and only so far as the contrary would be inconsistent with the latter, and that love of the family should be owing to love for the country, and love of the country to love for all mankind,-is, we conceive, although difficult of conscious realisation, no less correct in principle than, to go a step higher, the proposition that a man's love for the whole body of his fellow-men should have for its motive his love to God. But the reverse is, no doubt, the historical and, we may add, the natural sequence; and the very fact that a man is inevitably called upon to put his affection towards those with whom he is more nearly connected into more frequent active exercise, if it does not indicate a propriety in his affection towards them being more intense than that which he bears to others with whom he is less in contact, at least tends to render it so by the mere force of practice.

Professor Maurice has adopted the historical order in his discussion of Social Morality. He divides his subject into three parts, and distinguishes between Domestic, National, and Universal Morality. If we were asked to give a brief description. of the system of his teaching, we should say that it was a

liberal eclecticism, based upon the patriarchal or domestic theory of society, and owning the human side of Christianity as the crowning stone of its edifice, as that which at once suggests and realises its highest conceptions and aspirations. We will proceed to examine some of the leading features which it presents.

In considering society as an aggregate not of individuals but of families, Professor Maurice takes the same view as that which, in its legal aspect, was some years since very ably put forward by Mr. Maine in his Essay on "Ancient Law"; a work from which Professor Maurice quotes at some length in reference to this branch of his subject, and in his admiration of which we heartily concur. We perfectly agree with him. upon the importance of the view in question, and the effect which the adoption or disregard of it exercises upon all further investigations into the constitution of society.

"Many writers," says the Professor, "begin with considering mankind as a multitude of units. They ask, how did any number of these units form themselves into a Society? I cannot adopt that method. At my birth I am already in a Society. I am related, at all events, to a father and mother. This relation is the primary fact of my existence. I can contemplate no other facts apart from it.

Perhaps you will say, 'For each of us separately that no doubt is true. But we want to consider the world at large.' Well! and to what portion of the world at large is this truth not applicable? In what region do you find a man who is not born a son, who is not related to a father and mother? It is a fact for me surely, but it is a fact for you and for every man. And if you determine not to take notice of this fact, not to give it precedence of every other, the effect is, that instead of contemplating the world at large, you will only contemplate yourself. You will be the unit about which all events and persons will revolve. Each man will regard himself as the centre of the universe. . . . . If, on the other hand, you start from the indisputable commonplace 'We are sons,' such a way of considering the Universe is from the first impossible. I cannot be the centre of the circle in which I find myself, be it as small as it may. I refer myself to another. There is a root below me. There is an Author of my existence."

Starting, then, with the idea of the family as the basis of society, Professor Maurice proceeds to discuss the relations which the structure of the family involves: the paterno-filial, conjugal, and fraternal relations, and also those which exist, or ought to exist, between masters and servants; for these are to be admitted into the same category. Professor Maurice has made some remarks upon these last, which have, we think, at the present day, a peculiar practical value. He considers that the formation of right or wrong conceptions with regard to them, as indeed, generally, with regard to all the relations of life, depends upon

the recognition of relationship in itself, or of property, as the foundation of society.

"The statement that the hireling servant, whether in the household, the farm, or the factory, may be as little regarded as any one who is bought and sold, is one which we cannot afford to disregard. It is strictly true. It points to a tendency which is in all of us—a tendency very little affected by theories concerning Governmentnot touched by any of the contrivances or comforts of modern civilization-strengthened rather than weakened by the mercantile dogmas which have supplanted the old feudal dogmas. The habit of regarding separate possession as the basis of Society, as the end which all Society exists to secure, leads directly to the expressions which we hear so often: 'I have paid the fellow for his services; what more can he ask of me?' That is, in other words, 'Between me and him there is no relation; the only bond between us is that which money has created.' That is the feeling on the master's side. And the servant's of necessity corresponds to it: 'I owe him nothing: he has had my work out of me. What more have I to do with him?'

"There are men, generous and noble men, who listen indignantly and impatiently to this kind of discourse; who think it is increasing, whom it fills with apprehension of that which must be coming upon a Society where it prevails. To them the obvious, the only remedy for it seems a proclamation that the terms Master and Servant are grounded upon a false and unrighteous assumption; that they ought to be banished from the vocabulary of true citizens and well constituted societies. I respect their feeling; I share their terrors; I utterly dissent from their conclusion. It seems to me that what we want is not a repudiation of service as inhuman, but a much profounder reverence for it; not an assertion that all have a right to rule, but far rather a conviction that every one is bound to serve, and may claim service as his highest privilege."

But, it may be asked, can a complete system of morality be constructed upon the assumption of the family, instead of the individual, as the unit of society? Does not personal morality, which upon such an assumption would be wholly ignored, possess, to say the least, an equal importance with that branch of ethics which treats of man's external relations with his fellows? Unquestionably it does: for the practice of social morality is incompatible with the neglect of individual morality; or, to revert to the idea suggested by the saying of Fénélon, a man cannot truly love his fellow-men unless he have within him a principle-not of selfishness-but of true self-love; a principle which, founded upon his love to God, prompts him to love himself for the same reason that he loves his neighbour, as being one of God's creatures and beloved of God; which accordingly impels him to aim at the highest attainable degree of personal perfection, knowing that, in so doing, he is endeavouring to carry out the will of God respecting himself.