Saint Vincent's Female Orphan Asylum of the city of Washington, under the direction of the Sisters of charity,' and of the Washington City Orphan Asylum, and for other purposes.

CHAP. 250. An Act to release from duty, iron prepared for, and actually laid on, railways or inclined planes.

CHAP. 251. An Act supplemental to the act granting certain relinquished and unappropriated lands to the State of Alabama, for the purpose of improving the navigation of the Tennessee, Coosa, Cahaba, and Black Warrior rivers,' approved the twentythird day of May, one thousand eight hundred and twenty eight.

CHAP. 252. An Act for the relief of Bernard Leonard and Jacob Black.

CHAP. 265. An Act for the relief of

William Nelson, administrator of the estate of Andrew Nelson, deceased, and for other purposes.

CHAP. 266. An Act for the relief of Pierre Leglize.

CHAP. 267. An Act for the relief of Rebecca Blodget, widow of Samuel Blodget deceased.

CHAP. 268. An Act for the relief of Guy W. Smith.

CHAP. 269. An Act for the relief of the heirs of Thomas Davenport.

CHAP. 270. An Act for the relief of Thomas Holdup Stevens, and oth

ers.

CHAP. 271. An Act for the relief of Samuel May.

John Brunson.

CHAP. 255. An Act for the relief of

Silvia Posner.

CHAP. 256. An Act for the relief of

Abiah Warren, and others.

CHAP. 257. An Act for the relief of Don Carlos Dehault Delassus.

CHAP. 258. An Act for the relief of Heman Allen.

CHAP. 274. An Act for the relief of John F. Girod, of Louisiana.

CHAP. 275. An Act for the relief of William Wayne Wells, of the State of Indiana.

CHAP. 276. An Act for the relief of the heirs and legal representatives of Edward Barry, deceased.

John Buhler.

CHAP. 278. An Act for the relief of the heirs of Jeremiah Buckley, deceased.

Gates Hoit.

CHAP. 262. An Act for the relief of David E. Twiggs, Joseph M. Street and Stephen W. Kearney.

CHAP. 263. An Act for the relief of certain invalid and other pensioners, therein named.

CHAP. 264. An Act for the relief of John J. Jacob.

Gertrude Gates.

CHAP. 280. An Act for the relief of William A. Tennille.

CHAP. 281. An Act granting to Middleton McKay, a section of land in lieu of the reservation given him by the treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek.

CHAP. 282. An Act for the relief of

the sureties of George Brown, deceased, late Collector of internal duties and direct tax for the first district in the State of Maryland.

CHAP. 283. An Act for the relief of Robert C. Jennings, and of the executors of James Roddy, deceased. CHAP. 284. An Act for the relief of John and Benjamin Welles.

CHAP. 285. An Act for the relief of Randall Allis, Timothy Twichell, and John Lee Williams.

CHAP, 286. An Act for the relief of Benjamin Bullitt.

CHAP. 287. An Act to amend an act entitled, An act for the relief of George Johnston,' passed second March, one thousand eight hundred and thirtyone.

CHAP. 288. An Act for the relief of

Bartholomew Shaumburgh.

CHAP. 289. An Act for the relief of Hartwell Vick of the State of Mississippi.

CHAP. 290. An Act for the relief of certain Invalid Pensioners.

No. 1. Resolution, empowering the Secretary of the Navy to settle certain contracts, and to relinquish certain forfeitures.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of the Navy be empowered to relinquish and pay all forfeitures on contracts made by the Board of Navy Commissioners, when said forfeitures have arisen by the extension of the contracts, or where the contracts have been completed by the approbation of the Board of Navy commissioners, without any injury to the

CHAP. 292. John Peck.

where the completion of said contracts has been prevented by unavoidable accident, and the public service has sustained no injury.

Approved, February 10, 1832.

No. 2. Resolution concerning the recording of Patents for useful inventions.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of State, out of the proceeds arising from the fees, on patents for useful inventions, discoveries and improvements, procure the necessary

dations for recording the patents issued and unrecorded, as well as those hereafter to be issued, and that he employ, and pay at a rate not exceeding twelve and a half cents for every hundred words, so many clerks as may be requisite, with convenient despatch, to record the same.

Approved, March 7, 1832.

the Marines.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the pay, subsistence, emoluments, and allowances of officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians and privates of the United States Marine Corps, shall be the same as they were previously to the first of April, one thousand eight hundred and twentynine, and shall so continue, until they shall be altered by law.

Approved, May 25, 1832.

No. 4. Resolution transferring certain duties, relating to Pensions, from the Treasury to the War Depart

ment.

approved the twentyninth day of April, one thousand eight hundred and sixteen, authorizing the President of the United States to employ a skilful assistant in the corps of engineers.

No. 9. Resolution in relation to the execution of an act supplementary to the act for the relief of certain surviving officers and soldiers of the revolution.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, in the execution of the act supplementary to the act for the relief of certain surviving officers and soldiers of the revolution, approved June seventh, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-two, the time of imprisonment as a prisoner of war, shall be taken and computed as a part of the period of service. Approved, July 14, 1832.

No. 10. Resolution directing the transmission of the Fifth Census by mail.

No. 11. Resolution respecting the Biennial Register.

ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of West Ten

nessee.

Mr Grundy for the Plaintiff in error; Mr Isaacks for the defendant.

The facts of the case are fully stated in the opinion of the court delivered by Mr Justice Mc'Lean.

The writ of error is prosecuted to reverse a judgment of the Circuit Court for West Tennessee. An action of ejectment was prosecuted by Neal in that Court, to recover the possession of six hundred and forty acres of land. The issue was joined and at the trial, the defendant relied upon the statute of limitations and and prayed certain instructions of the court to the jury. Instructions were given, as stated in the following bill of exceptions. In the trial the plaintiff introduced in evidence a grant from the State of North Carolina dated

to Willoghby Williams, for the land in controvert, and deduced a regular chain of conveyances to plaintiffs' lessor, and proved defendant in possession of the land in question at the time suit was brought; defendant introduced a deed from Andrew Jackson to Edward Dillon, and proved that the defendant held by a lease from Dillon, and also in support of Dillons, introduced evidence tending to prove that persons claiming under and for Dillon, had been more than seven years in possession of the premises in dispute, adverse to the plaintiffs; upon which the court charged the jury, that according to the

present state of decision in the Supreme Court of the United States they could not charge that defendant's title was made good by the statute of limitations."

The decision of the point raised by the bill of exceptions in this case, is one of great importance, both as it respects the amount of property which may be effected by it and the principle which it involves. In the case of Patton's Lessee, vs. Easton, which was brought to this court by writ of Error in 1816, the same question which was raised by the bill of exceptions was then decided. But it is contended, that under the peculiar circumstances of the case now before the court, they ought not to feel themselves bound by their former decision. This court in the case of Powell's Lessee v. Green, 2 Peters, 240, gave another decision, under the authority of the one just named, but the question was not argued before the court.

The question involves in the first place, the construction of the statutes of limitations passed in 1715 and in 1797. The former was adopted by the State of Tennessee, from North Carolina: the third section of which provides, that no person or persons, or their heirs which hereafter shall have any right or title to any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, shall thereunto enter or make claim, but within seven years after his, her, or their right or title shall descend or accrue, and in default, thereof, such person or persons, so not entering or making default shall be utterly excluded and disabled from any entry or claim

The fourth

thereafter to be made.' section provides, after ennmerating certain disabilities, and the time within which suit must be brought, after they shall cease, that all possessions held without suing such claim as aforesaid, shall be a perpetual bar against all and all manner of persons whatever, that the expectation of heirs may not, in a short time, leave much land unpossessed, and titles so perplexed that no man will know from whom to take or buy land.'

In the year 1797, the legislature, in order to settle the true construction of the existing laws respecting seven years' possession, enact that in all cases whereever any person or persons shall have had seven years' peaceable possession of any land, by virtue of a grant or deed of conveyance founded upon a grant, and no legal claim by suit in law, by such, set up to said land, within the above term, that then and in that case, the person or persons so holding possession as aforesaid, shall be entitled to hold possession in preference to all other claimants such quantity of land as shall be specified in his, her or their said grant or deed of conveyance founded on a grant as aforesaid. This act further provides, that those who neglect, for the term of seven years, to assert their claims, shall be barred.

This Court, in the conclusion of their opinion in the case of Patton's Lessee v. Easton, say this question too has at length, been decided in the Supreme Court of the State. Subsequent to the division of opinion on this question in the Circuit Court, two cases have been decided in the Supreme Court for the State of Tennessee, which have settled the construction of the act of 1797. It has been decided, that a possession of seven years is a bar only when held under a grant, or a deed founded on a grant.' The deed must be connected with the grant. This court concurs in that opinion. A deed cannot be found ed on a grant which gives a title not derived in law or equity from that grant, and the words, founded on a grant, are too important to be discarded."

The two decided cases to which reference is made above, are Lillard vs. Elliot, and Douglass v. Bledsoe's Heirs. These cases were decided in the year 1815; and this court considered, that they settled the construction of the Statute of 1797. But it is now made to appear that these decisions were made under such circumstances, that they were never considered, in the State of Tennessee, as fully settling the construction of the act.

In the case of Lillard vs. Elliot, it seems but two judges concerned on the point, the court being composed of four; and in the case of Weathehead vs. Douglas, that was great contrariety of opinion among the judges, on the point of either legal or equitable connexion. The question was frequently raised before the Supreme Court of Tennessee : but the construction of the two statutes of limitations was never considered as finally settled until 1825, when the case of Gray and Reeder vs. Darby's Lessee was decided.

In this cause, an elaborate review of the cases which had arisen under the statute, is taken, and the construction of both statutes was given, that it is not necessary, to entitle an individual to the benefits of the statutes, that he should show a connected title, either legal or equitable. That if he prove an adverse possession of seven years and a deed, before suit is brought, and show that the land has been granted, he brings himself within the statutes.

Since this decision the law has been considered as settled in Tennessee, and there has been so general an acquiescence in all the courts of the state, that the point is not now raised or discussed. This construction has become a rule of property in the State, and numerous suits involving title have been settled by it. Had this been the settled construction of these statutes when the decision was made by this court, in the case of Pattons' Lessee vs. Easton, there can be no doubt, that that opinion would have conformed to it. But the question is now raised, whether the court will adhere to its own decision, made under the circumstances stated, or yield to the judicial tribunals of Tennessee. This point has never before been directly decided by this court, on a question of general importance. The cases are numerous where the court have adopted the constructions given to the statute of a state by its supreme judicial tribunal : but it has never been decided, that this Court will overrule their own adjudication, establishing an important rule of property, where it has been founded on the construction of a statute made in conformity to the decisions of the state at the time, so as to conform to a different construction adopted afterwards by the state.

This is a question of grave import and should be approached with great deliberation. It is deeply interesting in every point of view in which it may be considered. As a rule of property it is important and equally so as it regards