When General McClellan, then in the city of Washington, heard that the enemy had evacuated Manassas, he proceeded across the river and ordered a general movement of the whole army in the direction of the position lately occupied by the enemy. The enemy moved on the morning of the 10th of March, the greater part of it proceeding no further than Fairfax Court-House. A small force of the army proceeded to Manassas and beyond to the line of the Rappabannock, ascertaining that the enemy had retired beyond that river and destroyed the railroad bridge across it.

On the 11th of March General McClellan ordered, by telegraph, the transports from Annapolis to Washington, (Alexandria?) to embark the army from there, and informed the department that he proposed to occupy Manassas with a portion of General Banks's command, and throw all the force he could concentrate upon the line previously determined upon. Subsequent events in the valley of the Shenandoah, terminating, for a time, in the battle of Winchester, of March 23d, prevented the force under General Banks from leaving that valley. On the 13th of March General McClellan convened at Fairfax Court-House a council of war, consisting of four of the five commanders of army corps, (General Banks being absent,) and informed them that he proposed to abandon his plan of movement by way of the Rappahannock, and submitted to them instead a plan of movement by way of the York and James rivers. The result of the deliberations of that council was as follows:

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"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Fairfax Court-House; March 13, 1862. "A council of the generals commanding army corps at the headquarters of the army of the Potomac were of the opinion:

First. That the enemy having retreated from Manassas to Gordonsville, behind the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, it is the opinion of the generals commanding army corps that the operations to be carried on will be best undertaken from Old Point Comfort, between the York and James rivers, upon Richmond; provided, first, that the enemy's vessel, the Merrimac, can be neutralized; second, that the means of transportation sufficient for an immediate transfer of the force to its new base can be ready at Washington and Alexandria to move down the Potomac; third, that a naval auxiliary force can be had to silence or aid in silencing the enemy's batteries in York river; fourth, that the force to be left to cover Washington shall be such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace. Unanimous.

"Second. If the foregoing cannot be, the army should then be moved against the enemy behind the Rappahannock at the earliest possible moment, and the means for reconstructing bridges, repairing railroads, and stocking them with material sufficient for supplying the army, should at once be collected for both the Orange and Alexandria and the Acquia and Richmond railroads. Unanimous. "NOTE. That with the forts on the right bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned, and those on the left bank occupied, a covering force in front of the Virginia line of 25,000 men would suffice, (Keyes, Heintzelman and McDowell.) A total of 40,000 men for the defence of the city would suffice, (Sumner.)"

The same day General McClellan informed the War Department that "the council of commanders of army corps have unanimously agreed upon a plan of operations, and General McDowell will at once proceed with it to Washington and lay it before you."

To this the Secretary of War replied: "Whatever plan has been agreed upon proceed at once to execute, without losing an hour for my approval."

The plan of operations was submitted to the President on the same day, and he approved the same; but gave the following directions as to its execution: "First. Leave such force at Manassas Junction as shall make it entirely

certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of communication.

"Second. Leave Washington secure.

"Third. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or anywhere between here and there; or, at all events, move such remainder of the army at once, in pursuit of the enemy, by some

route."

The army was directed to return to Alexandria to be embarked for the peninsula; previous to their embarkation all the corps to be concentrated upon the division nearest Alexandria. The transportation not proving sufficient for immediate embarkation, the troops were, for several days, exposed to the rains which then set in, being deprived of their former camping accommodations, although, in many instances, not far distant from them, having only shelter tents to protect them from the inclemency of the weather.

To General McDowell was at first assigned the advance of the expedition. But when it was found that there was not transportation enough to embark at once his entire corps, he consented, in order to utilize what was there, to allow his troops to remain until such time as they could be moved together, with the understanding that the troops preceding him should not operate upon his proposed field of labor. The result, however, was, that the corps of General McDowell was put off till the last, which, in pursuance of subsequent orders, led to his corps being retained here for the defence of Washington.

By reference to the President's general war order, No. 3, of March 3, 1862, it will be seen that no change of the base of operations of the army of the Potomac was to be made without leaving in and about Washington such a force as in the opinion not only of General McClellan, but of "the commanders of all the army corps,' was sufficient to render the capital entirely secure. And by reference to the report of the council of war held at Fairfax Court-House, on the 13th of March, 1862, consisting of Generals McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes, it will be seen that three members of that council deemed necessary for the safety of Washington "that the forts on the right bank of the Potomac should be fully garrisoned; those on the left bank occupied, and a covering force of 25,000 men." The other general (Sumner) deemed 40,000 men in all sufficient.

Notwithstanding this order of the President, and the decision of the council, when General McClellan himself left Alexandria for the peninsula, he sent back orders, without conference with the commanders of corps, for all the corps of the army of the Potomac, but that of General Banks, to embark at once for the peninsula. Just previous to leaving, General McClellan addressed the following communication to the adjutant general of the army:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "Steamer Commodore, April 1, 1862. "GENERAL: I have to request that you will lay the following recommendation before the honorable Secretary of War:

"The approximate numbers and positions left near and in rear of the army of the Potomac are about as follows:

"General Dix has, after guarding the railroads under his charge, sufficient troops to give him 5,000 for the defence of Baltimore, and 1,988 available for the Eastern Shore, Annapolis, &c. Fort Delaware is very well garrisoned by about 400 men.

"The garrisons of the forts around Washington amount to 10,000 men; other disposable troops, with General Wadsworth, being about 11,400.

"The troops employed in guarding the railways in Maryland amount to some 3,359 men. Those it is designed to relieve, being old regiments, by dismounted cavalry, and to send them forward to Manassas.

"General Abercrombie occupies Warrenton with a force which, including Colonel Geary at White Plains, and the cavalry to be at his disposal, will amount to some 7,780 men, with 12 pieces of artillery.

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I have the honor to request that all the troops organized for service in Pennsylvania and in New York, and in many of the eastern States, may be ordered to Washington. I learn from Governor Curtin that there are some 3,500 men now ready in Pennsylvania. This force I should be glad to have sent at once to Manassas. Four thousand men from General Wadsworth I desire to be ordered to Manassas. These troops, with the railroad guards above alluded to, will make up a force, under General Abercrombie, to something like 18,639.

"It is my design to push General Blenker's division from Warrenton upon Strasburg. He should remain at Strasburg, too, to allow matters to assume a definite form in that region before proceeding to his ultimate destination.

"The troops in the valley of the Shenandoah will thus be, including Blenker's division, 10,028 strong, with 24 pieces of artillery. Banks's fifth corps, which embraces General Shields's, 19,687 strong, with 41 guns; some 3,652 disposable cavalry, and the railroad guards, about 2,100 men, amount to about 35,157 men. "It is designed to relieve General Hooker by some regiment-say 850 men, leaving, with 500 cavalry, 1,350 men on the lower Potomac.

"There will thus be left for the garrisons and the front of Washington, under General Wadsworth, 18,000 men, exclusive of the batteries under instruction. "The troops organizing, or ready for service in New York, I learn will probably number more than 4,000. These should be assembled at Washington, subject to disposition where most needed.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Brigadier General THOMAS,

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Adjutant General United States Army."

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This statement, to use the expression of one of the witnesses, was very indefinite." General Wadsworth, who had been ordered to take charge of the defences of Washington, upon learning the dispositions of troops proposed by General McClellan, and feeling the great importance of the trust committed to his charge, and the total inadequacy of the means provided him for that purpose, addressed to the Secretary of War the following communication:

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON,

"Washington, D. C., April 2, 1862.

"SIR: I have the honor to submit the following condensed statements of the forces left under my command for the defences of Washington:

"I have no mounted light artillery under my command. "Several companies of the reserve artillery of the army of the Potomac are still here, but not under my command or fit for service.

"From this force I am ordered by General McClellan to detail two regiments (good ones) to join Richardson's division (Sumner's corps) as it passes through Alexandria; one regiment to replace the 37th New York volunteers in Heintzelman's old division; one regiment to relieve a regiment of Hooker's division at Budd's ferry-total, 4 regiments.

"I am further ordered this morning by telegraph to send 4,000 men to relieve General Sumner at Manassas and Warrenton, that he may embark forthwith. "In regard to the character and efficiency of the troops under my command, I have to state that nearly all the force is new and imperfectly disciplined; that several of the regiments are in a very disorganized condition from various causes, which it is not necessary to state here; several regiments having been relieved from brigades, which have gone into the field, in consequence of their unfitness for service-the best regiments remaining having been selected to take their place.

"Two heavy artillery regiments, and one infantry regiment, which had been drilled for some months in artillery service, have been withdrawn from the forts on the south side of the Potomac, and I have only been able to fill their places with very new infantry regiments, entirely unacquainted with the duties of that arm, and of little or no value in their present position.

"I am not informed as to the position which Major General Banks is directed to take; but at this time he is, as I understand, on the other side of the Bull Run mountains, leaving my command to cover the front, from the Manassas gap (about 20 miles beyond Manassas) to Acquia creek.

"I deem it my duty to state that, looking at the numerical strength and character of the force under my command, it is in my judgment entirely inadequate to, and unfit for, the important duty to which it is assigned. I regard it very improbable that the enemy will assail us at this point, but this belief is based upon the hope that they may be promptly engaged elsewhere, and may not learn the number and the character of the force left here. "I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

"Hon. SECRETARY OF WAR."

"JAS. S. WADSWORTH, "Brigadier General and Military Governor.

Those communications were brought to the consideration of the President by the Secretary of War. The subject was at once referred to the adjutant general of the army and Major General E. A. Hitchcock, with instructions to report at once whether the orders of the President had been complied with. Their report is as follows:

"WASHINGTON, D. C., April 2, 1862-7.40 o'clock. "In compliance with your instructions I have examined the papers submitted to me, and have the honor to make the following report:

"First. The President's war order, No. 3, dated March 8, requires that on

taking up any new base of operations the city of Washington shall be left entirely secure. The other points of the order it is unnecessary to consider, as the enemy, since its date, have abandoned their positions and batteries on the Potomac, and retired behind the Rappahannock.

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Second. The council of general officers held at Fairfax Court-House, March 13, took place after the enemy had retired from Manassas and destroyed the railroad in their rear. The council decided unanimously to take up a new base of operations from Fort Monroe, and three of the generals a majority-decided that the force necessary to be left should be sufficient to fully garrison the forts on the right bank of the Potomac, and "to occupy" those on the left bank, with a covering force of 25,000. It is, we think, the judgment of officers, that some 30,000 men would be necessary thus to man these forts, which, with the number of the covering force, would make a total of 55,000.

"Third. The President's directions of March 13th to General McClellan direct, first, to leave such a force at Manassas Junction as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy may not repossess it; second, that Washington shall be left entirely secure; third, that the remainder of the army move down the Potomac, or move in pursuit of the enemy. In regard to occupying Manassas Junction, as the enemy have destroyed the railroads leading to it, it may be fair to assume that they have no intention of returning for the reoccupation of their late position, and therefore no very large force would be necessary to hold that position. "Fourth. Major General McClellan's report to the adjutant general of April 1, after giving the several positions of the troops proposed to be left for the defence of Washington, gives a representation as follows: At Warrenton there is to be 7,780; at Manassas, say, 10,859; in the valley of the Shenandoah, 35,467; on the lower Potomac, 1,350. Total in all, 55,456. And there would be left for the garrisons and the front of Washington, under General Wadsworth, some 18,000. In the above enumeration General Banks's army corps is included; but whether this corps, operating in the Shenandoah valley, should be regarded as a part of the force available for the protection of the immediate front of Washington, the undersigned express no opinion.

Fifth. General Wadsworth's report of April 2d gives his force as follows: infantry, 15,335; artillery, 4,494; cavalry, 858-six companies only being mounted. Total, 20,477.

"Deduct sick, in arrest and confinement, 1,455. Total for duty, 19,022.

"From this force General Wadsworth is directed to detach two good regiments to Richardson's division, Sumner's corps, which should be deducted from his command, one regiment to replace the 37th New York, in Heintzelman's old division, and one to relieve a regiment of Hooker's division at Budd's ferry— total, four regiments.

"It is also ordered to send 4,000 men to relieve Sumner at Manassas and Warrenton. General Wadsworth represents that he has no mounted light artillery under his command; states that there were several companies of reserve artillery still here, but not under his command, or fit for service.

"General Wadsworth further reports that nearly all the force is new and imperfectly disciplined; that several of the regiments are in a very disorganized condition, some of them having been relieved from brigades which have gone into the field, in consequence of their unfitness for service, the best regiments remaining having been selected to take their place; two heavy artillery regiments and one infantry regiment, which had been drilled for months in artillery service, having been withdrawn from the forts on the south side of the Potomac, and their places supplied with new infantry regiments, entirely unacquainted with the duties of that arm, and of little or no value in their present position. If there was need of a military force for the safety of the city of Washington within its own limits, that referred to in the report of General Wadsworth would seem to be entirely inadequate.