BLAKE V. THE ALBION RANCE SOCIETY. 1878. Fraud Series of Acts Evidence. ostensible transaction. The only way to prove that acts are fraudulent is to show the intent, the motive, the design, that is LIFE ASSU- to be coupled with these acts. Therefore, were we to hold otherwise, and such evidence was not admissible, fraud could never be proved at all. To take the common instance of fraud committed by means of begging letters. If a single letter to one individual only were proved, the evidence would probably be insufficient for a conviction; but the particular transaction is shown to be a guilty one by proving that the person charged has done the same thing twenty times before, and that in each case he has told false stories, and given fictitious names. Then is there any rule of law to exclude this evidence? I am of opinion that there is not. Where the act itself does not per se show its nature, the law permits other acts to be given in evidence for the purpose of showing the nature of the particular act; as, for instance, in cases of uttering counterfeit coin; even in some cases of murder, and, generally, wherever it is necessary to show the intent with which an act was done. There is no difference between the rules of the civil and the criminal law in this respect; (a) if anything, the criminal law of evidence, which deals with cases where life and liberty are in dispute, is more strict than the civil. Therefore, supposing this action was brought against Howard, and it was doubtful whether his acts. were fraudulent, you might give evidence of other acts to show that he did intend fraud. Now, that being so, can this evidence be given as regards a third person? Now I will assume that, if such third person had been charged with frauds similar to the particular act by Howard, but unconnected with it, they would not have been admissible. But cannot you give such evidence, when you identify these frauds with the person by whom the particular fraud was committed? Suppose Howard to be a fictitious name, and that the defendants perfectly well knew that these transactions were fraudulent, and that they were committed by Howard, and the defendants got the benefit of them; then it appears to me that this evidence is admissible. If you show similar shams, carried out under the same false name, and that the defendants are the people who put the money in their pocket in each case, the difficulty arising from any possibility of mistake in the case is removed, and the jury may reasonably be called upon to infer that the defendants intended to pocket the money of the plaintiff in the particular case. The instances that I have cited from the criminal law show that this evidence is admissible; and I know of no case the other way. Supposing Howard to be a fictitious person, then the evidence would be admissible in order to satisfy the jury that the defendants had used a fictitious name for the purpose of fraudulently getting money. To show that Howard was only one of ten fictitious names, was to show that (a) R. v. Burdett, 4 B. & A. 95, 122, per Best, J.; Attorney-General v. Le Merchant, 2 T. R. 201, N.; R. v. Murphy, 8 C. & P. 297, 306; Leach v. Simpson, 5 M. & W. 309, 312, per Parke, B.; 25 How. St. Tr. 1314; 29 Id. 764.—[Note by Reporter.] BLAKE v. THE ALBION RANCE SOCIETY. 1878. FraudSeries of Acta -Agency Evidence, the use of that pseudonym was a fraudulent fiction, and not a mistake. How could that be shown except by the fact that they did transact business under various fictitious names? The very LIFE ASSUsame man whom they called Howard, they called Gard and other names. I am at a loss to see how that evidence can be thought to be inadmissible. Every fraud must consist of a number of acts all calculated to further the fraudulent design. Is the plaintiff not entitled to show that the company entered in their books a series of fictitious names? Suppose that there was no person at all acting as agent of the company, and Howard, Gard, Wood, and the rest were names and nothing more; then the plaintiff would be entitled to show that the real persons he was dealing with were these directors, who put forward fictitious names in order to get letters into their own hands surreptitiously; he would be entitled to connect those fictitious names with the defendants, and to show that the insurance company, with whom the plaintiff insured, was connected with the name of the person who had advertised for persons wishing for loans. It would be a natural supposition of the plaintiff that Howard desired an insurance in a good solvent company, and that there was nothing novel in his making it a condition of the loan that the plaintiff should insure in a company to be named by him. I think that the plaintiff was entitled to show that the insurance company were really the principals, and had no agents. It is very doubtful whether an action for deceit will lie against a company. All that we have to decide, however, is that the plaintiff can bring this action, which is for the return of money paid without consideration, and that the benefit which the company derived from the frauds of their agent, if they had one, must be given up. It follows that the only evidence by which it could be shown that the money was obtained by fraud, and that the company benefited by it, was admissible. LINDLEY, J.-I am of the same opinion, and after the exhaustive judgment of my brother Grove, I have very few words to add. The plaintiff's case is: I was induced by the fraud of Howard to pay certain money to you, the defendants, and, at the time I paid it, you knew it was obtained by the fraud of Howard. How is that case to be proved? We are asked to exclude all the evidence that was given as to the mode in which the defendant company carried on its business; in other words, all the evidence that throws light on this particular transaction. It is said by the plaintiff that this transaction of which he complains is only one of a class, and that a fraudulent class. Let it be shown that a fraud on A. is one of a class of similar frauds upon B., C., and D., and the frauds upon B., C., and D. at once become evidence in an action by A. It comes to thisis the plaintiff to be at liberty to show that this money was obtained from him by false pretences? He can only show that the pretence made to him was fraudulently false, by showing a series of similar pretences similarly falsified. If that evidence is to be BLAKE v. THE ALBION RANCE excluded, it must be by some very strict rule that I do not know of. The true answer to such a suggestion is that the rule that LIFE ASSO excludes evidence of transactions other than the one that is being inquired into does not apply where the transaction that is the subject of the inquiry is one of a class. It does not appear to me to be necessary to decide the point as to the liability of companies for frauds of agents. SOCIETY. 1878. Fraud Series of Acts Evidence. Lord COLERIDGE, C.J.-I am of the same opinion. Many questions have been raised in this case which I do not think it necessary to decide now. The simple question raised by this rule is whether certain evidence was properly received at the trial. Now it is obvious that in order to discover whether evidence is admissible at Nisi Prius the statement of claim has to be looked at. Objections might possibly have been taken to the statement of claim; but that question does not arise now. The general outline of the fraud alleged in the claim is this: A person called Howard offers by advertisement a loan of money, and the plaintiff answers the advertisement. Howard makes it one of the terms of the loan that the plaintiff shall insure his life in the defendant company's office. The negotiation is effected, and the premium is paid; outwardly there is no connection between the company and Howard. Afterwards exorbitant conditions are added to the terms on which the money was to be advanced, which conditions the plaintiff refuses, and no money is advanced. Obviously, so stated, there is nothing in the transaction which may not be bona fide. Suppose the office selected by Howard had been one of undoubted character, no jury, upon those facts alone, would find complicity between the office and Howard, and a verdict for the plaintiff. But, on inquiry, it was found from other cases that there was the most intimate connection between Howard and the defendants, and that the transaction between the plaintiff and Howard was quite well known to the defendants; offers of loans having been made for years under various names upon condition of insuring in the defendants' office, and upon the premium having been paid, the loan being in each case refused. It is not difficult to see that the obtaining of these premiums on policies of which there were no renewals, and upon which nothing was ever paid, was greatly to the benefit of the directors of this company. Such a state of facts, if proved, would show a gross and abominable fraud; but the proposition is that, though those facts would disclose a gross and abominable fraud, and though they could only be proved by giving in evidence the other cases that had been discovered, yet the rules of evidence prevent that being done. If that proposition were correct, many claims perfectly just and fair must fail by reason of it. There was a time when that would have been no argument against the correctness of the proposition; but that time has passed; and now the general rule is that almost everything that can throw light upon the matter is admitted. In any but an English court, BLAKE RANCE SOCIETY. 1878. FraudSeries of Acts Agency Evidence. and to anyone but an English lawyer, the controversy whether this evidence is admissible or not would seem, I imagine, THE ALBION supremely ridiculous; because it is admitted that it is most LIFE ASSUcogent and material to the plaintiff's claim. Some legal ground having, however, to be shown for receiving it, I think it is receivable on two distinct legal grounds. Two things are necessary to be established here, agency and fraud. It was necessary to show that those who effected the contract were agents of the defendants, and that what was done was done with fraud. Now, except as to Howard, the agency was clear. The secretary, manager, and others, were manifestly agents to effect insurances for the company. It is therefore clear that the company would be responsible for acts done by them in the course of their duty. As regards Howard, this was not so manifest; and, therefore, this evidence was receivable to prove the agency of Howard. It would not be the less receivable on this ground because it would prejudice the defendants in another way. There is no such rule of evidence. This evidence does clearly go to prove Howard's agency. Evidence-in many cases conclusive evidence-was given that Howard and all these other names that were used were aliases of Wood; that Wood was in intimate connection with the company through its managing director and secretary; and that Wood received half of the premium paid to the company on an insurance being effected. Now it is clearly evidence of Howard's agency to show that this man who called himself Howard was Wood, that he was in intimate connection with these directors, and that they were repeatedly benefiting by his frauds; because the moment that you establish that all these names were aliases of one person, and that under those names this business was conducted for the benefit of the company, it seems to me that you establish also that that person was an agent of the company. This evidence is therefore receivable on that ground. But, secondly, you must also show that these acts were fraudulent. Supposing that this case had stood alone, there was certainly no conclusive evidence of fraud on the part of the company, but when it appears that the various names are aliases of one and the same agent, and that these repeated acts of getting money from persons who receive no corresponding benefit were known to the defendants, I think it is proved that the acts were fraudulent in their nature. Then the facts that the plaintiff had to establish, viz., that Howard was the agent of the defendants, that he had committed frauds, and that by those frauds the defendants had benefited, are made out. I think that this evidence does not fall within the rule, Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet, because the facts given here in evidence are necessary links in the chain of proof in the particular case. As to the previous decision of this court in the same case (35 L. T. Rep. N. S. 269), by which certain paragraphs were struck out from the claim, I think that does not conflict with our present decision, because they contained statements of res inter BLAKE v. THE ALBION LIFE ASSU RANCE SOCIETY. 1878. FraudSeries of Acts -AgencyEvidence. alios acta without any attempt to connect them with the res inter Solicitor for the plaintiff, J. Robinson. Solicitors for the defendants, Phelps, Bennett, and Woodforde. [Note by Reporter.-Where, in an action against A., to recover the value of work done by the plaintiff to certain houses on the order of B., the question was, whether A. or B. was liable as principal; evidence was held to be admissible to prove that A. had given orders to persons, other than the plaintiff, to do work at the same houses: (Woodward v. Buchanan, L. Rep. 5 Q. B. 285; 22 L. T. Rep. N. S. 123. See also Reg. v. Francis, L. Rep. 2 C. C. 128, 131; 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 503.)] Freland. HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE. QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. Wednesday, January 29, 1879. (Before MAY, C.J., O'BRIEN and FITZGERALD, JJ.) Re JOHN REA. (a) (b) Committal by magistrate for contempt of court-Inadmissibility of evidence that statement in warrant of committal is untrue-Re Pollard (L. Rep. 2 P. C. C. 106) and Re John Rea (14 Cox C. C. 139) commented on and distinguished-14 & 15 Vict. c. 93, 8. 9. A solicitor who had been guilty of conduct amounting to a contempt of court was committed by magistrates, sitting at petty sessions, to gaol for a week. The warrant of committal stated that he had (a) Reported by CECIL R. ROCHE, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. (b) NOTE.-In this case the offence committed was a distinct one from that adjudicated on in the case of Re John Rea (14 Cox C. C. 139). |